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**SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
DURHAM UNIVERSITY**

**TESTING THE CAPACITIES OF MIDDLE POWER  
RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:  
THE CASES OF TURKEY AND IRAN**

**by**

**Suleyman Elik**

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**Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor  
of Philosophy in International Relations at Durham University**

**23 JUN 2009**

**December, 2008**



## **ABSTRACT:**

### **TESTING THE CAPACITIES OF MIDDLE-POWER RELATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THE CASES OF TURKEY AND IRAN**

Suleyman Elik, December 2008

The aim of this study is to provide a fresh analysis of middle-power states' capabilities within the international political arena, utilising an integrated experimental model to conduct a unit-level of analysis of Turko-Iranian relations with a focus on economic, diplomatic, political and military issues.

The principal argument of this study is that the middle-power state is the key actor in the region; socially constructed within a distinctive political context; resisting super power hegemonic intervention, and having bargaining power with regard to more powerful entities. The socially constructed identities of Turkey and Iran are highlighted as key influences in foreign relations, leading to a complex dynamic between these 'reluctant neighbours.' The limits of their power are clarified as consisting of employing agent groups to manipulate internal threats and apply counter-terrorist/revolutionary politics, but falling short of sufficient to control transnational nationalism. Using this ethnic political card to negate each other's influence invites foreign power penetration into regional politics. Kurdish nationalism acts as an independent regional player and challenges the Turkish and Iranian political identities, both secularist and religious. Turkey and Iran endeavour to apply the 'niche diplomacy' in energy and pipeline routes competition in the Southern Caucasus. The study, thus, examines the competing factors of the both countries' geographic adjacency as a stimulus for economic integration as a partial entrenchment against diplomatic mistrust, and preventing systematic regional integration within the last three decades within the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) framework. The role of Iran's nuclear ambitions and Turkey's western alliances are examined as influences on the countries' identities. Contrary to the systemic and regional circumstances of secularist Turkey, the messianic identity of Iranian religious nationalism has resulted in a nuclear weaponisation programme that not only militarises the domestic politics of Iran, but also undermines the countries' mutual trust, with a profound adverse effect on the countries' economic relationship.

In order to increase the efficiency and explanatory power of middle-power state, this study amended the middle-power state theory, and successfully tested its applicability to Turkish-Iranian relationship through various variables related to international relations, international policy aspects of domestic political events, ethnic tension and economic relations.



## **Declaration**

The author of this thesis declares that this study is his own original work, conducted under the supervision of Prof. Anoush Ehteshami. All sentences or passages quoted in this dissertation from other peoples' work have been specifically acknowledged by clear cross-referencing to author, work and page(s). None of the materials in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree qualification in this or any other university.

## **Copyright**

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**Dedication**

To the memory of my father and love for my mother.

**Notes on Translation**

Unless otherwise noted, all translations in the manuscript are mine.

## **Transliteration**

All diacritical marks in Turkish letters, such as ç, g, i, ö, s, ü and Persian scripts have been omitted throughout the dissertation for the sake of simplicity.

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*AEOI*: The Atomic Energy of Iran  
*AIOC*: Azerbaijan International Operating Company  
*ASAM*: Centre for Eurasians Strategic Studies  
*BLACKSEAFOR*: Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group  
*BOTAS*: State Pipeline Corporation  
*BSEC*: Black Sea Economic Corporation Organisation  
*BSNC*: Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee  
*BTC*: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
*BTK*: Baku-Tehran-Khark  
*CAC*: Central Asia-Centre  
*CENTO*: The Central Treaty Organization  
*CIS*: Commonwealth Independent States  
*CNPC*: Chinese National Petroleum Company  
*CPC*: Caspian Pipeline Consortium  
*CUP*: Committee of Union and Progress Party  
*D-8*: Developing Eight (Islamic countries)  
*DECA*: Defence Cooperation Agreement  
*DEIK*: Country Reports of Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board  
*DIE*: Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü (State Institute of Statistics)  
*DTP*: Democratic Society Party  
*ECO*: Economic Cooperation Organisation  
*EU*: European Union  
*GCC*: Gulf Cooperation Council  
*GUAM*: Georgia-Ukraine (Uzbekistan)-Azerbaijan-Moldova  
*HADEP*: Halkın Emekçi Partisi [Public Labour Party]  
*HEP*: Kurdish Workers' Party of the People  
*HRK*: Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan  
*HT*: Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islamii (Party of Islamic Liberation)  
*IAEA*: International Atomic Energy Agency  
*IBDA-C*: The Islamic Great East Raiders' Front  
*ILSA*: Iran and Libya Sanctions Act  
*IMU*: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

*IRNA*: Islamic Republic News Agency

*IRT*: International Relations Theory

*ISAF*: International Security Assistance Forces

*JDP (AKP)*: the Justice and Development Party

*KDP*: Kurdistan Democratic Party

*KDPI*: Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran

*KKK*: Korpezhe-Kurt Kui,

*KOMALA*: Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Kurdistan)

*KRG*: Kurdish Regional Government

*KTI*: Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran

*MAP*: Membership Action:

*Mcf*: million cubic feet

*MGK*: Turkish National Security Council

*MIT*: Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (National Intelligence Agency of Turkey)

*MNP*: Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party))

*MoU*: Memorandum of Understanding

*MSP*: Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party

*NATO*: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

*NIOC*: National Iranian Oil Company

*NKR*: Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

*NPP*: Nuclear power plants

*NPT*: Non-Proliferation Treaty

*OEOC*: Oil Exploration Operations Company

*OHAL (Olaganustu hal valiligi)*: Turkish governor of state of emergency

*OIC*: Organisation for Islamic Conference

*OPC*: Operation Provide Comfort

*OSCE*: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

*PJAK*: Partiya Jiyana Azadî ya Kurdistanê (Party for Free Life in Kurdistan)

*PKK*: Kurdistan Workers' Party

*PLO*: Palestine Liberation Organisation

*PSA*: Production sharing agreement

*PUK*: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

*PWR*: Pressurised water reactors

*R2P*: Responsibility to protect

*RCD*: Regional cooperation development  
*RP*: Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)  
*RSCT*: Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)  
*SAIRI*: The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq  
*SETA*: Political, Economic and Social Foundation  
*SIPRI*: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute  
*SOCAR*: State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic  
*SP*: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party),  
*TAEK*: Turkey Atomic Energy Institutions  
*TAP*: Trans- Afghan pipeline  
*TAV*: Tepe-Akfen-Vie  
*TBMM*: Turkish Grand National Assembly  
*TCGP*: Trans-Caspian gas pipeline  
*TCP*: Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipeline  
*TERRACE*: Transport corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia  
*TESEV*: Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation  
*THB*: Turkish Hezbollah  
*TIKA*: Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency  
*TIKA*: International Cooperation Development Agency  
*TIKKO*: Turkish Worker's Peasants Liberation Army  
*TIS*: Turkish Islamic Synthesis  
*TIT*: Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey  
*TPAO*: Turkish Petroleum Corporation  
*TUSLOG*: USA Logistics Group, Turkey  
*UAM*: United Azerbaijan Movement  
*UNOMIG*: The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia  
*UNSC*: United Nations Security Council  
*USA* or *US*: United States of America  
*WMEI*: Wider Middle East Initiative  
*WMENAE*: Wider Middle East and North Africa Initiative  
*WTO*: World Trade Organization

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## INTRODUCTION

*"Now is not the time for business as usual with Iran. We urge all of our friends and allies, including Turkey, to not reward Iran by investing in its oil and gas sector, while Iran continues to defy the United Nations Security Council by continuing its nuclear research for a weapons capability."*

*Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,  
the Future of the U.S.-Turkey Relationship, Remarks  
at the Atlantic Council of the United States  
Washington, DC, (Fars News Agency, 13 September  
2007)*

Turkey and Iran, two neighbouring states with one of the longest borders (529-km) have preserved their positions of being the two crucial countries in the Middle East with common geopolitical locations, historical heritages, populations and rich cultures while at the same time maintaining a distance in fundamental political, security priorities and economic and trade cooperation. Similar circumstances can hardly be found in two other countries in the world. The torn picture between Turkey and this 'far away' country on its doorstep remains as an option for diversifying the foreign policy direction of both states in the twenty - first century. Turkey and Iran have the option of either drawing closer together or moving further apart in this century. However, despite the 'up and down relationship' that occurs from time to time, they successfully manage this fragile relationship with great state diplomacy by recognising each other's regime legitimacy and common state interests since the signing of the *Qasr-i Shirin Peace Treaty* in 1639. The polarity relationship between the leadership of Asia Minor (now modern Turkey) and Persia (Iran) goes back to ancient and middle age experiences; there was continuous rivalry between Constantinople, based in Anatolia and the Sassanian Empire of Persia with its capital. Both Empires struggled and fought for control of Mesopotamia, now known as Iraq. In the seventh century Muslim Arabs from the Hejaz destroyed the Persian Empire and Persian people converted to Islam. However, the coalition of Iranian and Seljuk Turks protected them from Arabic assimilation; the Turko - Persian alliance also provided Turks with a wide-ranging occupation of the Middle East, Asia and Europe





after the toppling of the Arab dynasties. Ultimately, the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis ended up with the brutal military campaign of the Mongols, and the Christian crusaders' invasion in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. As a result, the historical rivalry torch was taken up by Ottoman Empire, which Turkified and Islamized Asia Minor and beyond, into the Balkans. The Sunni Ottomans and the Shia Safavids of Persia fought for the control of the Iraq, but the Ottomans finally overcame them to control Mesopotamia. Since the 20<sup>th</sup> century much of the Muslim world was under Anglo-Saxon, or Russian military occupation or political domination. The strength of Turkey and Iran was the ability to sustain their sovereignty and unoccupied powers against the hegemonic demands, political threat and economic intimidation of the United States. Turkish military and political experience and Iranian sophisticated cultural reservation compose two of the legs of Islamic cultural identity in the Islamic civilisation. The legacy of this experience presents a great political sphere of influence in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus for both Turkey and Iran.

In modern times, the secular leadership of Turkey and Iran follow the same goals of western type modernisation. The friendship agreement signed by the two countries in Iran on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1926 referred to cordiality, neutrality and non-aggression. Under the same agreement, the parties also pledged to take joint action against Kurdish insurgency that threatened their new common political discourse as well as regional security. The failure of the *Sadabat Pact* during World War II questioned the sovereignty of Turkey and Iran against great power occupation. However, during the Cold War, Turkey's and Iran's strategic weight in the international community mostly relied on their geopolitical position as a buffer state against Soviet expansion. Hence, Turkey and Iran joined the US-led short-lived *Baghdad Pact* military alliance with Pakistan (which included Britain, with the US as an observer), the Central Treaty Organisation and an economic agreement, the Regional Cooperation for Development. Iran withdrew from both the military and economic agreements after the revolutionary leadership's seizure of power (Ogutcu, 2007).

The Islamic Revolution in Iran increased the fear of pro-western, secular leadership in Turkey; around 4 million Iranian refugees spread across the world and a large number went through Turkey. It is estimated that between 600,000 and 800,000 Iranians in Turkey posed major threats to Turkish domestic stability and its relations with Iran

(Gurdogan, 2003; Ogutcu, 2007). The Iranian state views dimly Turkey's western security orientation with Washington and political orientation towards Brussels, in order to protect its own interests and by its provision of refuge to opponents of the Iranian regime (*Mujahidin-e Khalq*) in Turkey and its pro-Israeli stance. The new religious leadership has also been concerned about Turkey's nationalist aspirations and influence over its large Azeri-origin population (20-25 % of the population). The spiritual leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, is an Azeri Turk and, by tradition, chiefs of Iran's armed forces tend to be Azeri Turks. On the other hand, Iran has managed to blockade Turkey's Turanist ambitions' moves to link with the Turkic State in Central Asia by closely cooperating with Russia and Armenia. Iran has great geographical advantages by as an energy corridor that stretches from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to eastern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. However, with the western alliance, Turkey has been revealed as a regional "energy hub" for the Central Asian, Caspian, and Russian and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon transportation. Nevertheless, rather than choosing competition, Ankara and Tehran increased cooperation on energy and trade matters with the completion of the 2,577 kilometre natural gas pipeline which stretches from Tabriz to Ankara in 2001. Iran is now the second largest natural gas supplier (20 % of gas that constitutes almost 75 % of Turkish - Iranian external trade) for Turkey after Gazprom. The preliminary agreement and a series of MoU between Iran and Turkey in July 2007, including Tehran's approval for Ankara to develop phases 22, 23 and 24 of Iran's *South Pars* gas field and pumping of Iranian and Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey in a plan is called *Nabucco* pipeline project, has been backed by Europe to move away from dependence on Russia by gaining access to Central Asia natural gas resources, which run across Turkey to Hungary and Austria through the eastern Balkans. It will eventually be able to carry 31 billion cubic metre of gas a year to big consumers in Europe (Ogutcu, 2007). Turkey's increasing energy cooperation with Iran and the mediation role for a dependency relation between Iran and Europe has been viewed by a Washington spokesman as "troubling." However, it is compulsory for Turkey and Iran to cooperate in relations with regard to common problems and interests brought along by their joint and geopolitical obligations. This neither is sacrifices Iran's anti-Westernism and anti-US attitudes nor Turkey's concerns that stem from the past, namely the threat posed by attempts to import the Iranian revolution.

After the paradigm shift of 9/11, the rising power of Iran as a “*pariah state*” and the call to “*wipe Israel from the map*,” its expanding sphere of influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia and Caucasus, its attempts to incite the Shiites in the Gulf region, and Afghanistan, the home to two-thirds of the oil reserves in the world, the threats against the free passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, its revelation of a bridgehead for China and Russia to project power in the Middle East, proxy war through Hezbollah and Hamas, Washington’s policy of curbing Iran by isolating its leadership in the international system and contingency plans for *air strike*, result in a situation in which resorting to military options is no longer viewed as a “*non-option*.” In terms of crude oil production, Iran produces 4 million barrels per day and 2.5 million barrel per day of this amount is exported to the Asian markets via the Straits of Hormuz, and provides 84 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually production. Hence, Washington’s possible ‘*air strikes*’ to paralyze Iran’s nuclear energy and communications infrastructure have already been considered. The situation is critical as Ankara cannot afford to stand idly on the sidelines and await a “*fait accompli*” from Washington or Tel Aviv. If the new Obama government decides to strike Iran it is highly probable that Washington will request Turkey’s cooperation for use of the jointly operated bases and immediate closure of the borders to trade and human traffic. In this regard, Ankara would have to play a key role because much of Iran’s trade with Europe goes through Turkey. The Turkish position on Iran today looks much like it did for Iraq’s invasion in 2003; it would be defined as the Turkish “*déjà vu*” in the case of Iran (Cagaptay, International Herald Tribune, and 18 July2008).

## **1. The aim and objectives of the study**

This thesis identifies the construction of a strategic socio-political culture of two influential states in the Middle East and explores different types of leadership and the subversion of the variable agents in society, to determine the capacity of Turkey and Iran in the international politics. The focus of this thesis is on institutional development, structural changes, and the evolution of policies of the Cold War and post-Cold War period for the macro level of analyses. This study also undertakes a micro-level analysis of transnational factors to examine especially religious terror and counter terrorism in domestic politics and regional competition in the “*niche space*” pertaining to Kurdish military campaigns in Northern Iraq. Furthermore, it also

explores competitive or cooperative relations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Conflict resolution on transnational issues, conflict management and energy variables provide a primitive explanation for the middle - power state capacity in Turko-Iranian relations. Above mentioned issues provide the context of the theoretical framework applied in this study, namely middle - power state theory. This study, however, aims at modifying the middle - power theory in analysing relations between Turkey and Iran, which is essential in theorizing and analysing the mentioned relationship. In addition, these studies takes analyze further by testing the modified version of the middle-power state theory within framework explain above.

## **2. Significance of the study**

The literature on Turko–Iranian relations is very limited because most of the works, so far, have been focused on the Kurdish question and ideological competition. However, this study is the first comprehensive attempt at exploring Turkish-Iranian relations since 1979. Therefore, it aims at locating the capacity of middle - power states in international politics in the case of Turkey and Iran by utilizing a domestic, regional and systemic level of analysis, which provides an experimental integrated model in international politics. The significance of this study derives from its aim to overcome the shortcomings pertaining to the study of Turkish and Iranian foreign policies in the region. This research also attempts to clarify contemporary political historiography concerning two of the most important states in all of the Middle East and Central Asia as well as the Caucasus, which have a combined population of some 140 million people. Consequently, the contribution of this study stems from the application of an experimental integrated model to the aim of the study by developing a particular framework. Thus, this research goes beyond the boundaries of political history and event analysis.

## **4. Literature survey**

There are few studies, which have been directly related to Turko-Iranian relations. Even Turkish scholars did not pay any attention to these significant countries' modern historiography. It is remarkable that the two most important countries in the region should be neglected not just by non-Middle Eastern scholars including Turkish scholars, who are fulfilling their Turkish nationalist responsibilities as part of the

western political identity of ‘*Ottoman Westward*’ but also disregarded by Iranian scholars. A few introductory studies have been done mostly by Western scholars: the American anthropologist Robert L. Canfield’s “*Turko-Persia in Historical Perspective*” is very valuable in order to define the Turkish and Persian national identity in the medieval period. On the other hand, Adel Allouchche’s doctoral research, “*The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (1500-1555)*” explains the basis of geo-political competition and clarifies the alienation from the Turko-Persian cultural synthesis. The significant contributions have been made by Turkish-academics. Bekir Kutukoglu’s case study, “*Osmanli-Iran Munasebetleri*” (Ottoman –Iran relations, 1578-1590) is an example. However, Ernest S. Tucker’s research highlights the possibility and failure of conflict resolution between two nations in his book titled “*Nadir Shah’s Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran*” which is a significant contribution to the pre-modern history of Turko-Iranian relations. The pro-nationalist approaches to Turko-Iranian relations were undertaken by Mehmet Saray who briefly covers modern history in his book titled “*Tarihte Turkiye Iran relations*” (Turkey Iran Relations in History). On the other hand, Ustad Robert Olson’s contribution to pre-modern history of Turko-Iranian relation is more constructive, especially with regard to the geopolitical competition in Iraq. His book is entitled “*The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, 1718-1743: A Study of Rebellion in the Capital and War in the Provinces of the Ottoman Empire.*” However, his other valuable research entitled “*The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*” applies the event analysis method for modern historiography. He exemplified his theory, especially the impact of Kurdish nationalism on Turko-Iranian relations in his two important books: “*The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998*” and “*Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups, and Geopolitics.*” His other book, named “*Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 1991-2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions*” highlighted the geopolitics of Turkish-Iranian relations in the wider context, include the Central Asia and Middle East. On the other hand, he deeply analyses the ambitions of Kurds to establish independent state in Kurdistan- Iraq in his last book titled “*The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan - Iraq since the Iraqi War.*” The systematic approaches to Turko-Iranian relations are mostly focused on Kurdish nationalism. Olson applied the *omnibalancing theory* in his precious researches.

Additionally, there is only one relevant doctoral study, done by Rengin Gun in his dissertation "*Uluslararası çatışma ve çatışma çözümü temelinde Türk-Iran ilişkileri*" (Turkish-Iranian relations on the basis of international conflict and conflict resolution) (Gun, 2003). However, his analysis does not give any concrete solutions but describes the conflict between two countries. On the other hand, Turel Yilmaz's research titled "*Türkiye'nin Orta Dogu'daki sınır komşuları ile ilişkileri, 1970-1997*" (Turkey's relations with its border neighbours in the Middle East (Yilmaz, 1997) gives more depth to Turko-Iranian relations than Rengin Gun's research. Turkish sociologist Alev Erkilet Baser's work is a great contribution to comparative studies of three important countries, Egypt, Turkey and Iran. Her doctoral researches "*Ortadogu'da modernleşme ve İslami hareketler: Türkiye, Mısır, İran*" (Modernization and Islamic movements in the Middle East: Turkey, Egypt, Iran) explains the process and influence of ideology in the Middle East (Erkilet, 2005).

There are still no scholarly monographs dealing with Turkey and Iran relations since 1950. The only article which compares the regimes of both countries is "*Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian Reading*" written by Jean-Francois Bayart. There is a smattering of articles and edited books, but no full length monographs. I note a few: Tschangiz Pahlavan, "*Turkish-Iranian Relations: An Iranian View*, 71-92 in Henry J. Barkey edition. "*Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East* (1996) is one of the few studies addressing the two countries; Gokhan Cetinsaya "*Rafsanjani'den Hatemiye: İran Dis politikasına Bakışlar in Türkiyenin Komşuları*," edition. Mustafa Turkes and İlhan Uzged (2002). This is one of the few articles that devote some attention to Turkey-Iran relations. His other article "*Essential Friends and Natural enemies: The Historic roots of Turkish Iranian relations*" was published in MERIA in 2003. It is unfortunate that his last work with Talha Kose reused this article, namely the "*Iran File*" published in SETA, which is a conservative think-tank institution in Turkey. The other prominent article "*The Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological Influence*" was written by Unal Gurdogan in 2003. There are some important articles which are focused on the conflict and cooperation in Turko Iranian relations. John Calabrese called his article "*Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship*" and drew the main outline of bilateral relations in general. Similarly, a Turkish academic's, Nilufer Narli' in her article, "*Cooperation or Competition in the Islamic World: Turkish –*

*Iranian Relations from the Islamic Revolution to the Gulf War and After*” makes a clear contribution to the general modern historiography of Turkey - Iranian relations. Though there are many articles on the general politics of Central Asia and Caucasus, the impact of regional competition on Turko - Iranian relations seems limited in focus. Henri.J. Barkey’s article “*Iran and Turkey; Confrontation across an Ideological Divide*” edited by Rubenstein in his book, “*Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia*” provides the general analysis of the first stage in regional competition. Arif Keskin and Arzu Jelalifer, who are of Iranian Azerbaijani origin, follow Iranian domestic politics closely as members of the Turkish think-tank, ASAM and USAK Gundem. Professor Bulent Aras, who is the director Middle East studies at ISIK University, also focuses on the Middle East and Central Asian politics in general but gives some attention to Turkey - Iranian relations. Similarly, Patrick Clawson’s and Soner Caqaptay’s comparative works under the auspicious of the Washington Institute are valuable in the modern political historiography of Turkish and Iranian states.

## **5. Research methodology**

The research methodology of this case study is essentially twofold, namely data collection as well as an analysis of contents and events of middle - power international politics.

### **5.1. Sources of data**

The study can be defined as a macro-level analysis, theoretically, but gives great depth to the micro - level experimental model for Turko - Iranian cases. The collection of data and their analysis forces the author to apply multi-method, multi-paradigm and multi-disciplinary perspectives in this study, because the relevant period covers very recent and ongoing events of political historiography. Most of them involve official records that have not yet been de-classified by either both side and consequently are not available for first hand inspection. However, I have reviewed whatever I received from the public statements of governments, their foreign ministries, and other interested ministers; the agreements between Turkey and Iran; the joint communiqués announced at the end of official talks between the two states; the statements of officials of both side; the memoirs of statesmen; the parliamentary discussions in Turkey and congressional hearings in Iran; the bulletins of foreign

ministries - these are the primary sources used. I have reviewed twenty - nine years' worth of achievements of Turkish and Iranian newspapers, journals, magazines and parliamentary records and benefited from the Durham University library facilities, especially the micro copies of Turkish newspapers: Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and also the Tehran Times, Ittalaat and Kayhan International. The Durham university computer data system also provided a great source on Turko-Iranian cases, especially of the BBC monitoring service for the worldwide press review. The further sources were the external online data systems, especially the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) for Iran; the Anadolu Agency, think-tank institutions' foreign and domestic press reviews such as ASAM (Centre for Eurasian Studies), TUSAM (Turkish Centre for International Relations & Strategic Analysis), SETAV (Political, Economic and Social Research Foundation), TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) were of great help. The political analysis and the reviews of RAND cooperation, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Brookings Institution, and Chatham House, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), are also useful for outside views on Turko - Iranian relations. At conferences, workshops, seminars and lectures I was able to make other less formal contacts with many of the leading scholars who have studied Turkish and Iranian foreign policy and these further enhanced my knowledge both in general and alerted me to many important lines of inquiry.

## **5.2. The event analysis method in political science**

After collection of the necessary data from various sources, this study used the periodisation and chronological methods to classify the importance of the relevant time period of events on Turko - Iranian relations. This study can make a great contribution to modern political historiography of present and future trends, and stress the relative importance and effects of various interactions by using the pragmatic method based on analyses of language, religion and ethnography which have a socializing effect on new nation - state formation in Turkey and Iran (Moses and Knutsen, 200:197). One tactic for periodization of the distant past in with relation to ethnographic qualitative data such as the creation of nations is focusing on immigration, deportation and exile in new settlements (Bulmer and Solomos, 2004). Ethnographic political theory relies on events such as the invention of a tool or the



origins of language, culture, identity and transformation of a society in general (Besserman, 1996). The social engineering policy of the state is very valuable or the social theory and psychoanalysis of nation states in constructing their national identity (Clarke and Jurist, 2007). Thus '*imaginary society project*' of Turkish-Iranian leadership groups gives a very insightful description of social microcosms in Turkey-Iranian case (Hammersley, 1993). The revaluation of these data in relation to selected IR theories and generalisations of past experience help to redefine a new states identity, which allows us to find conflict resolutions to contemporary problems between Turkey and Iran. Political research employs qualitative methods, which emphasise the study of contexts and behaviour in a natural rather than an experimental model. The modes of this research are classified as descriptive, narrative, expositive and argumentative (D'Angelo, 1984). However, narrative and the exposition methods are essential to analyse a philosophical idea, the causes of events, the significance of decisions, the motives of participants, the working of an organisation and the ideology of states in this study (Boje, 2001). The potent force of event history analysis defines the individuals and the organisations of data units, through a finite series of statements and factors influencing the event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). Event history analysis is prominent in the field of international relations, where it has been used to analyse time - series of international conflicts and diplomatic events (Garson, 2008; Hannan and Carroll, 1981). The timing and spacing of observations, therefore, becomes a critical variable in periods of observation, which is taken at each stage of a sequence of events and their measurement are different according to the what time units selected and whether the time axis is continuous or not. The events may occur only at certain discrete times and the state - level study of diffusion of a particular governmental innovation (Allison, 1982). However, the dependent covariates vary over the course of the study, which creates additional variables, which may influence the failed-time process being studied (Garson, 2008). On the other hand, the interpretation of documents and material culture helps to build theories such as functionalism, behaviourism and symbolic interactionism (Silverman, 2001). Combining the qualitative and quantitative methods in my research is an essential tool for *grounded theory* analysis (Bryman, 1988). Hence, I applied the multi-disciplinary approach to find out the interplay between data and analysis integrated with a multi-paradigm theoretical perspective by using sequential transformative explanatory strategy (Creswell, 2003). This method is useful in my findings for theory building as

it analyses the units and variables to construct the validity and reliability propositions, and draws on both critical and analytic or interpretive procedures, (Charmaz, 2000). Although there is currently no middle - power international relations theory, the author aims to establish one middle-power state theory for IR. Therefore, four theoretical chapters and six empirical chapters consist of the necessary empirical material assist in building this theory of middle - power politics. I will use the interpretative method that meets the criteria of scientific method: significance; theory-observation compatibility (Hodder, 1998:155); general reproductive precession, rigor, and verification in Turko - Iranian cases (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The interpretative data analysis aims to explore differences and similarities and investigate whose provisions are the more flexible, comprehensive, and comprehensible by enshrining that all texts and references are accurate than the other. Hence, the author provides bibliographic data of the articles or clauses are directly quoted. At the end of the analysis of each unit, an illustrative summary is made on the main findings with specific emphasis on the policy choices that could be available for Turko-Iranian cases. Consequently, this study applies three integrated models of IRT (constructivism, regionalism, and omnibalancing) to clarify the theoretical and intellectual bases of interpretation and content analysis in this study.

### **5.5. The contribution of the study**

This study applies multi-disciplinary '*integrated*' foreign policy analysis methodology towards Turkish-Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East Central Asia and the Caucasus in the timeframe 1979-2008. It is the first study to conduct a micro - level analysis on middle - power state scholarship within this specific timeframe and scope in the wider regional context that has been outlined. In considering the influx of modernisation, this study also provides a new interpretation of patronage and political clientilism in the nation states of Turkey and Iran as middle - power states. The further key significance of this study is that is contributes to a new definition of a middle - power state and also identifies the boundaries of middle - power statecraft in international politics.

### **6. The outline of the dissertation**

The structure of the thesis is divided into three substantive sections and ultimately consists of eleven chapters that may be read “*a la carte*.” Each section sets up a theme with the relevant chapters that offer relatively freestanding discussions of particular macro theoretical settings and experimental micro - analysis.

Part One outlines through a theoretical approach in four different chapters. In Chapter One, I conduct a literature review of international relations theory to build integrated approaches to middle - power state international politics by focusing on constructivism, regionalism, and omnibalancing theories. In Chapter Two, firstly defines the theoretical framework of this study being middle-power state theory. However, this study attempts to modify the theoretical framework of middle-power state theory through its own assumptions on Turko-Iranian relations with the aim of contributing to international relations discipline through such an amendment. The dependent, independent and control variables are identified in testing the experimental model for this study within this chapter. This chapter should be considered as the backbone of this study as an important contribution. In connection with the previous chapter, I analyse the historiography of Turko-Persian relations to support the variables at the proposed integrated theoretical consideration in *Chapter Three*. I aim not only to identify the paradigm shift in Turkish Iranian relations but also explain the role of historical experience (social memory) in crafting Turkish and Iranian state bureaucratic traditions in foreign policy. The chapter also identifies Turkish and Iranian spheres of influence in the Central Asia and the Caucasus and also the Middle East orientation of Turkish and Iranian national identities. Similarly in Chapter Four, the study tests the variables of the established framework as will be elaborated in the context of the strategic culture of security of contemporary Turkey and Iran. Chapter Four will explain the structure of the ‘*patronage state*’ systems in the domestic politics of Turkey and Iran and clarify and compare the relative political clout of the two countries in the international arena. The chapter explains the role of external migrants and internal resettlement in formatting of nation states. It also explains how both states reconcile the exclusion of external religious and national identity connections in the framework of middle - power state capacity.

Part Two presents an argument for an experimental model for transnational variables which are mainly described in three chapters. In *Chapter Five*, the religious and ideological confrontations will be analysed. The role of state-agent and the structure

of state religious institutionalism is essential for counter revolutionary politics of Turkey and Iran. Five micro case studies, which caused two diplomatic crises in the last three decades, will be explained within the framework of ideology and religion. In Chapter Six, I will deal with the armed agent group - state relationship and counter - terrorism strategies of middle - power states to negate each others' influence in regional politics. The key micro research case of Turkish Hezbollah and unresolved political murders will focus on the consequences of patronage and political clientilism in the domestic politics of both countries. I will explain the modern historiography of Kurdish nationalism and its impact on Turko - Iranian relations in Chapter Seven. There will be a micro - level analysis of the new military insurgency campaign by the PKK which has become a major player in the Middle East over the last three decades. The chapter questions the legitimacy of the middle - power state in the concept of R2P and also analyses the failure of mediation efforts by Ankara and Tehran in the Kurdish civil war between the KDP and the PUK in the 1990s. The chapter employs the chronological method to explain Turkish Iran competition in Northern Iraq. The research analyses the emergence of the PJAK and the KRG, which has emphasized the significance of the *Higher Security Commission* between Turkey and Iran. The author tries to present an objective picture of guerrilla warfare and the middle - power states involved in the conflict.

Part Three emphasises middle - power competition and cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus and also considers economic relations between Turkey and Iran. The section consists of three chapters. Chapter Eight discusses the role of ethnic instability in the regional conflict and its impact on Turkey's, Iran's and Russia's politics in the region. The ethnic conflict has brought about severe consequences between the smaller powers and strong ethnic minorities in the Southern Caucasus. However, the instability in the Central Asia is focused on Islamic fundamentalism in the Fergana Valley and Tajikistan. The chapter evaluates the major difficulties of the democratisation process of region's countries post cold war. Chapter Nine explain middle - power states' capacity in regional competition in energy and pipeline politics. The policy options of Turkey, Iran, Russia and China in energy transport are examined in this chapter. In the second section of the chapter, the author checks the economic institutionalism of both Turkey and Iran in the wider contexts of the region. Chapter Ten the study explains Turkey - Iran economic relations in the last three

decades. The economic relationship between these two countries is considered in the regional context, especially concerning Turkey - Iran natural gas agreement and ongoing negotiations regarding the Pars Gas field. Lastly, Chapter Eleven clarifies the capacity of middle - power states by bringing the entire discussion together. It aims at providing the results of the testing of the modified version of the middle-power state theory. In doing so, this study demonstrates that the modified version of middle-power state theory has an effective explanatory power in locating and examining the nature and dimensions of Turkish – Iranian international relationship, which constitutes the main contribution of this study.

## PART I: THEORY

Kenneth N. Waltz provides a definition of the Theory of International Politics, which explains the general principles of behaviour that govern relations between states in an anarchic international system. It is not a theory of foreign policy and does not attempt to predict or explain specific state actions (Waltz, 1979:17). Similarly, this Part focuses on the particular set of themes within international relations theory and the construction as well as reconstruction of Turkish and Iranian national identities. It is spread over four Chapters.

*Chapter One* reviews the paradigm of international theories through systemic, domestic and integrated approaches, providing a multi-paradigm analysis of the middle-power state's international politics. In *Chapter Two*, the model portrays the theory of the middle-power state with its own assumptions and variables. The model further provides an integrated model of International Relations (henceforth, 'IR') theory by simplifying the main principles inherent in the constructivism, regionalism, and omnibalancing theories.

In *Chapter Three*, the focus is transferred to a historical analysis, so as to illustrate the main outline of paradigm shifts within Turko – Iranian cases. To that end, historical experiences between the 9<sup>th</sup> and the 11<sup>th</sup> centuries will be presented as an integration model for the two nations. On the other hand, the influence of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict-paradigm during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, particularly in the creation of the Turkish and Iranian foreign policies, will also be analysed. The peace treaty of *Qasr-i Shirin* is considered as the recognition of dual legitimacy between two different sectarian religious divisions and different political discourses. The effort of Nadir Shah towards political integration and interfaith dialogue in the Najaf Assembly is the main instrument of conflict resolution theory in Turko - Iranian cases, to this day. However, it was the Pan-Islamist policy of the Ottoman Empire and the constitutional revolutions in Iran and Turkey that ultimately determined the new nation - state systems of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Lastly, *Chapter Four* elucidates the newly-formed legitimacy and recognition of these two nation-states, their territoriality as well as the strategic political culture of security.

Turkey's orientation towards the West and Iran's nuclear ambitions are considered as components which form the national identities of modern Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, the preparation for an Islamic revolution and Turkey's militaristic, quasi-democratic experience respectively constitute these discourses. This part mainly tries to establish the basic assumption behind for the experimental model of Turko-Iranian international politics.

## CHAPTER ONE:

### A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TURKO - IRANIAN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

#### 1.1. Introduction

Contemporary studies in international affairs emphasise that the multi-paradigm perspective provides the most useful explanation both for the Cold War and the realities manifesting themselves in the post-Cold War environment (Gilpin, 1987). Alexander Wendt, for instance, integrates neoliberal and critical theories as contributions to cultural phenomena, societal identities, interests and social constructions of power politics (Wendt, 1994:391-425). Within such approaches, systemic and domestic factors are transformed into transnational ones, which fill the gap between those two realms. This integrated model of International Relations Theory (hereafter, 'IRT') is applicable to Turko - Iranian relations, as analysed by the present study.

After the collapse of their monarchical regimes, the republican state systems of both countries have followed the path of Kant's Pelagian project, which is based on the abolition of war through a governmental regime adopting a new social and political form (Kant, 2003). The anti-revisionist policy of both countries relied on national security concerns and tried to incorporate the international system. However, the modernisation programmes within these states did not result in the Western - style liberalism which they claim to have achieved. The authoritarian reformation of middle - power state can only create the '*opportunity space*' for sub-groups identities, which enforces to subvert the society. It does not provide any expansion of public sphere in either Turkey or Iran.

In contrast to Hans Morgenthau's pessimistic perception of human nature, the Pelagian interpretation can be adopted to comprehend the nature of both nations within this study. Leaving aside the intellectual imperialism of U.S. and English schools, the present study defines the middle - power state's relations through rationalist, reflectivist and constructivist levels of analysis: It also gives greater depth to the powers of idealism in both states' republican formations, based on their



historical similarities (Smith,2000)). Therefore, this work will define the relationship as ‘middle-power states relations in the international politics’ by giving a simple definition of their identities and spheres of influence within the “*Northern Tiers*” geographic area. Due to absence of academic any awareness of IRT within the Turkish and Iranian intellectual circles, there are insufficient published sources to provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for Turko-Iranian International Relations. Whilst it is true that previous studies have dealt with the foreign policy behaviour of the Middle Eastern states by utilising realist approaches (Ehteshami, and Hinnebusch, 2001; Owen, 2004; Halliday, 2004), this study takes a single step forward, in terms of theory, by constructing a multi-paradigm perspective, which fleshes out the continuity of foreign policy from a historical perspective and its dynamic transformation in regional and international politics. Whilst the Turkish and Iranian national identities are presented in this study as independent variables, the regime theory, leadership, ideology and similar factors are treated as dependent variables. The application of the integrated model to these variables provides an explanation on consistency of Turko - Iranian relations, while systemic theories, in their consideration of system realities, simply cannot account for such continuity and change. Meanwhile, the domestic politics model is useful in examining the internal dynamics and issues faced by the state.

It is noteworthy that the transnational models of foreign policy attempt to synthesise and integrate both systemic and domestic approaches. Therefore, an integrated approach can provide a more coherent explanation than a systemic one and a domestic model can individually guarantee, and also allow a holistic analysis to both Turkey and Iran international politics.

By taking into account these approaches, ethnic nationalism, religious factors and ideological variables are analysed as external and internal threats, being the two main variables that constitute the integrated model in this unstable region (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). However, these competitive and cooperative forms of bilateral interactions underpin the peculiar ‘*up and down*’ relationship between Turkey and Iran. A theoretical consideration of the means by which identity is constructed provides a dualistic set of characteristics - namely the ability or inability to construct either a congenial or antagonistic relationship between states. However, the

relationship of absolute interdependence as well as the status quo inherent in a *buffer state* provides bargaining power to middle-powers in relation to super powers' hegemony in this region.

This study mainly focuses on the following research direction; '*What is the capacities of middle - power state in international politics?*'

To provide reasonable answers to the research question, this study proposes an integrated model to explain the continuity peaceful co-existence with regard to the essential variables of the Turkish and Iranian nation-states (Barkey, 1992; Ramazani, 1975; Hale, 2000). However, within the last two decades, academics within this field have paid more attention to the domestic, regional and transnational factors concerning Turkey's and Iran's relationship (Olson, 2005). This study reviews the systemic and domestic foreign policy literature in general but also focuses in particular on the integrated model of constructivism, interdependence, regionalism and the "*omnibalancing theory*", as part of an attempt to build a model for middle-power state politics.

## **1.2. Review of literature regarding international relations theory**

The epistemological historiography of IRT rests on the human consciousness, and subliminal and philosophical assumptions. A theory is a social construction of worlds within the social consciousnesses of particular phenomena (Allott, 1990:31). Hence, the archaeology of theories presents a way of understanding in practice of social theory for the unit level of analysis. The theoretical analysis in this study is not merely the consideration of possible developments, but also an expression of human experience. Whilst everyone is morally responsible for his/her own actions, the State which is one reason why we continue to kill, maintain persecute and starve our fellow citizens. Hobbes' 'Mortal God' is the totalising Gestalt of a society unified by the enslavement of its members under the power of the legislature. Rousseau's 'General Will' is the superhuman, enigmatic and infeasible will of the '*Mortal God.*' Hegel believes in the 'mechanism of society' rather than the '*Will of God*' or another authority (Hegel, 1952:156). In what we idealize, he formulates the collective will of democracy as capitalist-scitechocracy that we have found a way to divide all human activities systematically to collect their effort socially. On the one hand, the mythology

of capitalism is given a social absolutism by the collectivist ideas of Adam Smith and presents its foremost country representative, the United States of America, as the land of the future,(Hegel,1956). Moreover, John Locke (1988) defined America as the beginning of the world's democracy (capitalist-scitechcracy), and liberty and equity. Hence, in the Turkish and Iranian intellectual environments, America is still considered as the *backyard of Europe*, similar to Napoleon's statement that "*one hundred and seventy years later, America is still Europe recycled, and Europe is boring in new forms of its old ways*" (as cited in Hegel, 1956:86). However, the misery of intellectual life within Iran and Turkey is not a contributor to the new alternative economic and political super structure within the world order and so they could not achieve liberal capitalism, as driven mainly by the Smithian perspective. However, the achievement of Keynesian capitalism paved the way for a new capital elite class, which has a strong connection with the governments in both states. Therefore, social nationalism or violent capitalism are absent from the construction of a model within the secularist and religious state establishments. Their revolutionary reflective behaviour and capabilities could be manageable by a super power (Walt, 1996). Even though Turkey is an essential partner in the Western system of security, it is outside the Western scitechcracy. Therefore, Turkey's anti-nuclear stance with regard to Iran in the last decade is attributable to the building of alternative scitechcracy against the Western system by the Turkish elite. Therefore, I will not offer any an alternative paradigms based on Asiatic theory but rather consider IRT as covered within the general political/scholarly literature of the West. On the other hand, the English-school is helpful in understanding the world as a society or a community of states, although this theory could not provide a testable result in the operational measurement of the variables relevant to this study, despite Hedley Bull's rationalist approaches to liberal realism. Therefore, I rely on the traditional IRT of American scholars in general.

Critiques of IRT still elicit inevitable disputes within the political and social sciences. For instance, Stanley Hoffman (1977) criticizes IRT as "*an American social science*" (p.41). The pessimistic approach of Martin Wight (1996) also questions why there are no international theories for perpetual peace. On the other hand, an analysis of the world when we study the world affairs can provide a peaceful solution for humanitarian intervention. However, such this political intelligence is used by

powerful states to intervene militarily in weak states and enforce the results in warlike in international community (Nicholson, 2000). Therefore, the state of the art in examining national governance within the liberal rhetoric has yet to provide any practical results (Kratohwill and Ruggie, 1986). Following the failure of the pax-Ottoman system, which was based on a multi-national society (Naff, 1984), the basic principles of pax-Americana became similar to that of pax-Britannica, namely to internationalise the nation-state system by establishing the main machinery of international institutions for the purpose of ensuring perpetual peace (Cox, 1986). However, the experience of the two World Wars, nuclear proliferation and the global war on terrorism has undermined the validity of Western liberalism during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The situation has not changed after the Cold War. In this regard, George Sorensen claims that uneven globalisation did not result in a new world order in the normative sense at the end of the Cold War, but rather caused changes in regional variations and transnational processes, (Holm and Sorensen, 1995:3) making Turkey and Iran a conflict zone, which in later years have been affected by the global war on terrorism thus making the creation of a peaceful zone within the long-term largely unthinkable. In fact, the security –based attitude of the Cold War is still effective for an understanding of systemic IRT policy. However, Turkey and Iran have to follow the multi - dimensional politics in order to protect their national security. Hence Steven David's *omnibalancing theory* explains the behaviour of both countries policy behaviour against transnational movements. Medium-sized states need to apply constructivist theory, which is an IR theory alternative to the liberalist and realist approaches, replicated within critical theory (Walt, 1998). There are three mainstream and alternative approaches to IRT, namely the systemic, domestic and integrated models, which serve the purpose of constructing theories aimed at explaining the behaviour of the middle-power state.

### **1.3. Systemic approach to foreign policy**

Systemic approaches to foreign policy are based on rational actions by decision makers, with a state's main foreign policy purpose being to maximise/imperialise its power by seeking security whilst balancing external threats.

### 1.3.1 Structural realism

The Neorealist School provides a simple but powerful explanation for international relations phenomena such as war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to co-operation and other international occurrences during the Cold War years (Waltz, 1988 and 1997). It focuses on the systemic factors to explain the foreign policies of states. With regard to theoretical assumptions, the anarchical systemic constraints are the primary determinants of state foreign policies. The theory is based upon the separation of international, regional and domestic politics and claims that the whole structure determines and controls the various parts of the state. The internal dynamics of the state, such as the domestic political system, are not relevant to the formulation of foreign policy. Foreign policy, as perceived by this approach, should be based upon a rational set of objectives if the state is to survive in the anarchic arena.

Structural realism uses the same assumptions, namely the applicability of realism, but rather than attributing to human nature the behaviours of countries within the realist framework, it places emphasis on the structure of the international political system (Waltz, 1986). This approach states that the nature of human beings is too complex to be explained directly and cannot be uniquely and solely causally linked to the occurrence of wars. It further argues that human nature cannot change social and political institutions (Waltz, 2001).

The lack of a '*world government*' or an absolute controller over the entire system causes the international system to remain anarchic. Therefore, survival is the main reason for the state, whereas behaviour is governed by self-help within a state system (Brown, 1996; Waltz, 2001) argued that this condition would lead weaker states to rally together so as to balance against, rather than to join the bandwagon of their more powerful rivals.

The main principles of neo-realism are that : (a) the state, is the principal actor that organises activities, accumulates and uses physical power; (b) as a unitary actor it serves the common interest of other actors, unifies them when necessary for survival within the anarchical environment; (c) as a rational actor its decision-making is determined by the national interest and the maximisation of its power; (d) it is preoccupied with national security, which in turn is concerned with national interest,

as national security takes precedence over all aspects of domestic policy( Kauppi, 1999;Waltz,1986).

To fully understand and to provide a context for IRT within this study, the following sections discuss the relevant theories of neo-realism, the balance of power and the balance of threats.

#### **1.3.1.1 Balance of power**

Waltz defines the balance of power as the “*distribution of power in the international anarchical political system*” (Waltz, 1986:98). It is, thus, identified as an effective instrument balancing the distribution of power, deterring war, and checking the hegemonic ambitions of emerging states. Great powers play the leading roles in influencing the balance of power in the international system as well as in sub-systems.

In exploring the balance of power, Morgenthau identified two modes: a pattern of direct opposition in internal politics and a pattern of competition in external politics (Morgenthau, 1978; Miller and Kagan (1997). Bull (1991) contributed to this premise by summarising the functions of the balance of power as follows: (a) the existence of a balance of power serves to prevent the system from being transformed, by conquest, into a universal empire; (b) the existence of local balances of power serve to protect the independence of the state from absorption or domination by a locally preponderant power; (c) it is a theory about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states; (d) coexistence is achieved through maintaining a balance of power and limited co-operation, becoming possible in interactions where the realist state stands to gain more than the other states.

Sorensen and Holm (1993) pointed out the changing nature of realism and how this was a rational choice of IRT after the post-Cold War to develop the main stream of realist school. The concept of international systems changed, which resulted in the consideration of concepts such as power, sovereignty, and statehood. The capabilities relating to power were revealed as multi-faceted, diffused elements while the sovereignty of the state is undermined by international organisations or hegemonic powers. Keohane and Nye (1997) attempted to discover the means of bringing about peaceful change (p.23-37), and Gilpin (1984) addressed the problem of change in an

environment of declining hegemony. Robert Cox (1996) argued that history is a process of human nature's transformation along with changes in the structure of human interactions. Similarly, the paradigm of realism is infiltrated by the pluralist and globalist propositions, while realism restricts itself to Cold War realities, such as the international system, wars and the logic of anarchy. On the other hand, pluralist and globalist perspectives provide international, societal or hierarchical (world government) explanations (Burchill, 2001). The pluralist understanding of anarchy is slightly different from Waltz's logic of anarchy, which is described as a process resulting in continuity but not change. However, the pluralists' anarchy represents the process of continuity and change, which enables the consideration of the behaviour of systematic change that was seen as revolutionary by the realist school (Keohene and Nye, 1997).

#### **1.3.1.2 Balance of threat theory**

The continuity of realism in practice (Linkater, 1995) and its progressive power in international paradigms is critically integrated with Third World politics by Kenneth Walt (1997). His Balance of Threat theory considers power separated from the threat. His emphasis is on states' orientation towards alliances, determined by the threat as they perceive it. Although very weak states are more likely to join any the bandwagon against of a rising threat in order to protect their own security, states generally compensate for the rise of a perceived threat by uniting. In the case of weak states, the definition implies that joining the bandwagon against a rising threat is preferable to balancing power by allying. Therefore, threat assessments are critical for those attempting to understand the balancing and bandwagon behaviour of a state (Waltz, 1999).

The Balance of Power theory, which has previously dominated realist analyses and which claims that states band together to balance out the influence of a greater power, assumes offensive intentions by a rising power. Walt (1997) argues that this is not born out by empirical evidence, and that the Balance of Threat theory - according to which states will not create a balance against those who are rising in power if they do not display offensive intentions - is a better account of the evidence. Walt identifies four criteria for the behaviour of states. Such states evaluate the threat posed by another nation by assessing: (a) its aggregate strength (size, population, and economic

capabilities); (b) its geographical proximity; (c) its offensive capabilities; and (d) its offensive intentions. Walt (1991) argues that the more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and so balance against it (p.35).

Balancing behaviour is more common than bandwagon behaviour (Jebb, 2004). The occurrence of balancing behaviour depends on a combination of four variables: (a) the tendency of stronger states to conduct balancing alongside weaker states. However, stronger states may 'bandwagon' if they are threatened by a great power; (b) the greater probability of allied support, the greater the tendency to balance when such support is certain. However, the tendency for free - riding or buck - passing increases; (c) the more unalterably aggressive a state is perceived to be, the greater the is tendency for others to balance against it. In war time the closer one side is to victory, the greater the tendency for others to bandwagon with it (Walt, 1987); (d) balancing occurs more often than bandwagon tendencies if a country does not want others to balance against it, leading to benevolent and test-raining types of foreign policy. In addition, if any country sees bandwagon behaviour as the predominant form of alignment, the country will have an aggressive, competitive foreign policy (Walt, 1999).

This theory inspired Steven David to propose the *omnibalancing theory* for the understanding of Third World states' foreign policy formation. His critics mainly focus on the weakness of this balance of threat theory, that it is not able to assess the strength of external threats, as it usually depends on internal conditions. He claims that Walt does not understand *Third World alignment* and ignores other considerations that these states incorporate when assessing the threat, as well as the fact that these nations must consider internal threats and these threats then become part of the equation in calculating alignments (David, 1991). Eric Labs (1992) criticises Walt on the same point and argues that weak states will choose sovereignty over security as they make their alignment choices, with weaker states choosing to fight for their territorial or sovereignty rights before they surrender some of them in exchange for physical wellbeing. Hence, his claims on security issues are not the only concern for nation-states, because there are other reasons for alignment behaviour. In fact, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses, whilst bandwagoning is driven by the



opportunity for gain (Schweller, 1994). Neo - realist approaches accept that all states have the same goals and have the same strategies to achieve these goals (Labs, 1992).

### **1.3.1.3 The critics of neo - realism**

Though the issues of institutionalism and states' absolute gains are a shared priority amongst neo-realists and neo-liberals, the ontology of both paradigms is based on essentially the same view of the world and an identical perception of knowledge (epistemology)(Powell, 1994). In general, the key trend of realism aims to explain the nature of the world, which has to correspond to reality, but does not have the goal of predicting trends in world politics. The integrated approaches of neo-realist and neo-liberalist scholars such as David Baldwin (1993) illustrates the six main areas of contention between neo - realists and neo – liberals suggesting that two approaches contribute to a better understanding of the relevant factors, promoting international cooperation. Robert Keohane (1989) claims that despite having different assumption about human nature, the amalgamation of the two paradigms is basically similar over the nature of war and the character of international society. On the other hand, the reflectivist critiques by Cynthia Enloe (1990) attributed great weight to the role of masculinity and femininity by looking at the place of women in international politics. She argues that the private sphere influences the public sphere which, in her opinion, challenges the core approaches in rationalism. However, due to a failure to present testable theories, the reflectivist approach is considered intellectually weak and illegitimate in the realm of IRT. The neo - liberal approach of Inis L Claude that of collective security versus balance of power, emphasise the effective management of power amongst the independent and interdependent states of the world (as cited in Russell, 2005). On the one hand, the democratic peace theory of Russet (2005) claims that liberal democracies avoid going to war with another and accuses the neo-conservative administration of undermining democratic peace theory in his theoretical framework. In Robert Gilpin's (2002) hegemonic stability theory, maintenance of a liberal world economy requires strong political leadership by the dominant economic power, this is expected to have obligations including the creation and maintenance of a liberal trade regime, the establishment of an international monetary system, and playing the role of '*lender of last resort*' to prevent financial crises. In a realist or state-centric intellectual framework, the political analysis thus fashioned is a realist

version of the hegemonic stability theory. On the other hand, Keohane's explanation (1989) of cooperation and regimes together with Joseph Nye's complex interdependence theory brought new directions to neo-liberal development theory.

Political realism is seen as a philosophical disposition and a set of assumptions, but not a scientific theory as such, even though it does give a testable hypothesis and systematic theories relating to the world (Gilpin, 1986). According to Richard Ashley (1984), the major difference between classical realism and neo-realism is methodological, using closed-loop tautology as if the classical realists were members of the realist group and were intuitive, whilst the neo - realists were more scientific in character. In response to his critics, Gilpin (2000) claimed that if the realists and neo - realists observed the practice of states, they could be credited as being the first true political scientists. His argument supports Waltz's theory that laws must be established by observing things that happen repeatedly.

In contrast, Ashley (1984) and Wendt (1999) highlight the weakness of neo - realism in noting that its proponents fail to explain the meaning and importance of sovereignty, which is socially constructed and changes over time. In fact, neo - realism emphasises continuity, but does not deny the occurrence of change. The change in the international system has occurred because of the configuration of military power, not due to change in its organising principle. Hence, anarchy may give way to hierarchy. The units within an anarchical environment must rely on self-help; national politics (hierarchical, vertical, centralised, heterogeneous, directed and contrived; the realm of authority, administration and the law; and international politics (the realm of power, of struggle and of accommodation as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralised, homogenous, undirected and mutually adaptive). Systemic approaches analyse these three realms in light of the mechanisms of international structures and the interactive units of national and international politics. The most successful units of the system are the leaders and others will emulate them.

Instead of focusing on how units interact, a structure must focus on how units are arranged or positioned. Hence, the unit level of analysis and the reductionist methods of neo - realism give some insight into explaining the general attitude of middle-power states' behaviour, including their efforts to increase internal capacity and

external efforts for alliances as part of the international community. However, the absence of socially constructed theoretical approaches restrains the systemic theoretical explanation in Turko- Iranian cases.

### **1.3.2.0 The Theory of globalism**

The concept of globalism was encountered after the inception of modernism, it shares some features with realism and pluralism, but perceives the world capitalist system a differently (Clark, 1997). Whilst pluralism, as a perspective, perceives the global economy in terms of dependence, globalist perspectives contend that structure of the world capitalism perpetuates an equitable relationship between North and the South (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999:341). Cultural transnational factors and political economy are the main components of the globalist approach (Leiber, 2002), but centre and periphery relations are replaced with a central periphery model in this theory. The globalist security perspective is divided between into the centre and periphery (Little,1995) and analyses international relations based on four main assumptions: (a) the international system defines the level of analysis; (b) the behaviour of individual actors is explained by a system that provides constraints and opportunities; (c) some individuals, states and societies benefit from this system, but it is used up by others; and (d) historical analysis is important in understanding the international system(Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).

Contrary to realists' and pluralists' view of the state as an independent variable, globalists consider states as dependent variables. A global-centric analysis focuses on how some states, classes, or elites use mechanisms of domination to benefit from the capitalist system. On the other hand, globalists share certain commonalities with realists and liberalists school (Russet and Starr, 2003). Like realists, globalists consider the state to be a very significant actor in international affairs, but they emphasise the conflicting interests of social classes. Hence, the state is not a unitary actor, but capitalist class may cooperate with multinational corporations to maintain the political and economic environments. Contrary to the behavioural approaches of liberalism, realism and globalism, capitalists emphasise the system level of analysis, while globalists separate certain features of system-level components from realist approach. Whilst the globalists focus on the capitalist mode of production, realists

concentrate on the distribution of aggregate power. They also emphasise intimate connections between the international system and domestic politics. Although the globalists are also concerned with the welfare of less developed countries, they are not as optimistic about the possibility of peaceful change. Change, peaceful or revolutionary, is problematic in the globalists' view (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999).

#### **1.3.2.1 Dependency theory**

The dependency school originated in the Latin - American countries and within the UN bodies throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Dependency theorists such as Dos Santos, Cardoso and Furtado argued that development is not autonomous and depends on the cycles of the world's advanced economies.

The definition of dependency is provided by Theotonio dos Santos:

“By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development” (Des Santos, 1970:231). The theory focuses on the influence of international structures, which divide all countries into two categories-the core and periphery (Gourevitch, 1978 and 1993).

According to this theory, world economic structures and levels of development are the main determinants of foreign policy options. Structure places constraints on the foreign policy alternatives of regional countries, but also provides opportunities for the core countries. Decision - makers of regional powers, therefore, have little choice in foreign policy - making. The foreign policy of the less developed periphery nations is dictated by the developed core system, according to this theory. Frank (2004) stressed how the periphery or third world was actively underdeveloped by activities, which promoted the growth in wealth of the core Western countries and of elites on the periphery. The periphery produced materials which were exported to the core

states. They were then processed or converted into manufactured goods, and re-exported to periphery with the added value simplified the transformation of underdevelopment in Latin America by presenting a radical solution by cutting off contact with western capitalism and the Cuban revolutionary movement (Cardoso, 2001). However, Warren (1980) challenged the dependency and world system theories by looking at the key element of Marx's thinking, namely the contention that around capitalism could produce rapid and progressive social change. Therefore, the next section will explain the world-system theory in the context of dependency theory and globalism.

### **1.3.2.2 The world- system theory**

The origin of the world-system theory goes back to Marxist views, which contributed to the development of world politics (Nye, 1991). According to this the process of historical change is a reflection of society's economic development. Marx and Engels in their joint text, *The Communist Manifesto*, defined the history of all hitherto existing societies as the history of class struggle (Hobden and Jones, 2001:204). Therefore, in capitalist society, the conflict that is posited is one between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The economic modes of production determine the broader social and political relations in Lenin's imperialism, namely "*the highest stage of capitalism*" (Lenin, 1976). Lenin's analysis concerns the structural division between the core and the periphery, which was further developed by the Latin - American dependency school by focusing on the periphery, as discussed above (Prebisch, 1964).

In addition, Immanuel Wallenstein (2006) outlined the key features of world-system theory by stating that organization of the global economy is divided into the core, the periphery and the semi - periphery. In this model, the periphery serves the interests of the core and the external behaviours of periphery states themselves are also dictated by the core states. The inequitable level of exchange ensures that the core remains the dominant partner in the relationship. Wallenstein (2006) also identified a transitional belt between the two poles, known as the semi-periphery, which accommodates the newly industrialised countries. The semi - periphery states are dependent on the core, as they are created by the core. Nevertheless, semi-periphery states may develop their

economies at the expense of the periphery, but they can do so only with permission of the core. However, this process is strictly limited, and ensures that the states of the periphery remain dependent upon the states of the core. The process of global capitalism in this realist perspective highlights the influence of imperialism, as it perpetuates dependency and oppression (Huntington, 1996; Rashid, 1997). Economic factors are critical in explaining the evolution and functioning of this capitalist system and the reorganisation of sub - system within the overall international system (Kauppi, and Viotti 1999).

Marxian Antonio Gramsci's key concept, namely 'hegemony', is defined by Robert Cox (1983). He claims that free trade is a hindrance to the peripheral states' interests and welfare benefits while it is very much in the interest of the hegemonic power. On the other hand, critical theory has touched on questions concerning international society and security, developed by the Marxist Frankfurt School led by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas. Habermas (1991) argued that the emancipatory potential lies in the realm of communication and radical democracy, within which his theory was later revised by Andrew Linklater in favour of moral boundaries' expansion within the political community. Therefore, he concluded that the European Union is an example of the post-Westphalian institution of government.

### **1.3.2.3 Multiculturalism of globalisation**

After the Cold War, the liberal ideas (liberal democracy and market capitalism), which embrace a certain degree of multiculturalism became the new universal project. Intellectuals such as neo-liberalist Fukuyama, in his Hegelian prediction, presented liberalism as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1992). He also claimed that Islam had been defeated by liberal democracy, because Islamic cultural and political conquest is over. In response to end of history theory, Davutoglu (1994) claimed that this 'endism' paradigm is a fallacy that fails to explain the historical process of civilisation. His assumption regarding Islamic civilisation warrants great credibility as an alternative ontological and epistemological dynamic for continuity and change in history. Davutoglu (1994) claimed that the Islamic paradigm is not only *"the one true, final and universal religion but also the foundation of states' morality in*

*the international system.* "The world is seen as consisting of two poles within Islamic systemic theory. The *abode of Islam (dar al - Islam)* and the *house of war (dar a l-harb)* between two worlds, in which there could be no lasting peace and a state of permanent war, would prevail (Ramazani, 1975). This anti-Western rhetoric used terms like 'arrogant' and 'satanic' referring to the balance of power (Ehteshami, 1996:184). Further negative approaches to Islamic political culture are provided by Huntington who claims that the clash of civilisation is a historic development.

The advance of global culture and capitalism is met with fundamentalist resistance, in the form of a domestic insurgency. Huntington highlighted the tension between Western and Islamic culture as a clash of civilisations, serving as the main cause of international conflict. His concept of "*clash of the civilisation*" remains the subject of many discussions that have become more relevant in the aftermath of the *traumatic events* on September 11<sup>th</sup>. He defines civilization through its cultural identity (Huntington, 2002:23) and nation states, which remain the most powerful actors in world affairs. He rejects the two core principles of modernisation and development tradition -- that all good things go together, and that distributing power is more important than accumulating power. Those assumptions resulted in the '*clash of civilisations*' paradigm as a means of explaining international conflicts. However, the general critique comes from Edward Said, who interpreted this theory as the "*clash of ignorance*" (Said, 2002). Moreover, Buzan and Weaver (2003) claim that there is no cultural clash between the great civilisations, but rather a clash is experienced between regional states. Though the political Islamic movement has suspicions about global culture and capitalism, the secularist and political Islamic model have been enforcing globalisation in different ways, because Muslim societies do change in the 21st century.

#### **1.3.2.4 The critics of globalism**

Neo-liberal and neo-realist responses to globalism assume that the forces of globalism challenge the sovereignty of the state. However, the state still has a monopoly over the legal use of coercive power regardless of globalism. The inception of modern and post-modern relations also increases the concern about the security of nation states, because state alignment in terms of polarity is now more complicated with regard to

continuity and changes in the foreign policy than in the past. Even though globalisation impacts a domestic politics through transnational social movements, which may be a challenge for national leaders, Waltz rejects the notion that the state can not be pushed aside by global actors (Waltz, 1979). In fact, the current rules and institutions promote a global economy under the control of the United States. The controversy between globalist and neo-liberalist schools mainly focuses on free markets. Free market neo-liberals believe that globalisation is a positive force and the state should not fight globalisation or attempt to control it with unwanted political interventions (Smith and Baylis, 2001:196). Globalisation theory is connected with dependency, world order, modernisation and development theory. In the next section, this research discusses dependency and world- system theory and the general critiques of multiculturalism, so as to explain the behaviour of states based on the global economic structures. As such human interactions are dependant on one another, the concept of international society increases the dependency relations of the nation state (Dunne, 2001).

#### **1.4.0 Domestic approach to foreign policy**

In the aftermath of globalist challenges to the sovereignty of nation states, most neo - liberalist scholars have focused on domestic policy models, largely focusing on the decision-making process, bureaucratic politics, internal power struggles and ideological legitimisation (Walt, 1998:42). Governing elites pertain to state structures (Snyder, 1991) the ideology of the regime (David, 1991), opposition movements, regime change, and internal stability (Walt, 1987). The following Sections discuss the domestic structure model developed by Katzenstein, unified theory by Snyder, democratic peace theory proposed by neo - liberals, the bureaucratic politics model and organisational processes' model of Allison, and domestic opposition, regime change and foreign policy change in Hagan's model, all of which provide the main theoretical premises within this section.

##### **1.4.1 Katzenstein's domestic structural model**

Katzenstein wrote three articles on domestic structure models, to explain the foreign policies of industrialised countries (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan), which basically rely on a coalition between political and economic



institutions (Katzenstein, 1977). He claims that the interaction between their state and private sectors is more co - operative than that between undeveloped countries (Katzenstein, 2007). However, the process of industrialisation dominates state bureaucracy and, later these state elites occupy the apparatus of governmental. This cooperative transmission provides them with a direct involvement in the foreign economic policy implementation of the state. Stephen Walt's and Mearsheimer's recent work emphasises the influence of the '*Israeli Lobby*' in the foreign policy of the United States in this context (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006)

However, Katzenstein's domestic structure model undermines the role of international systemic factors for the big industrialised states and the role of domestic factors for small-industrialised states. His theory basically can be classified as a sub-lens theory of the systemic approach. Thus, his argument is not applicable to middle - power state's foreign policy of continuity and change. However, the connection between the private and state sector is not cooperative in the middle-power state. Rather the state creates its own capital classes, which then dominate the foreign economic policies of these countries. Meanwhile, the latest studies by Katzenstein have contributed to constructivism by mainly clarifying the concept of strategic culture in security and the concept of identity construction in society. A later section will consider a compromise of his argument with that of Wendt's constructivist theory.

#### **1.4.2: The Unified model of Jack Snyder**

Government generate the '*myth of empire*' and overextend themselves abroad. Hitler's unitary act is classified as an elite persuasive expansionist policy. However, Stalin's moderate overexpansion policy is a product of the political and propagandistic activities of an oligarchic group who hijacked the state and converted national policy to its own interest. He points out the propagandist activities of the imperialist group, such as big corporations, the ruling class, and the military and indicates how they benefit from imperialism and expansionist policies in general. Snyder (1991) identified three basic regimes types: the democratic, where interests are integrated and methods of criticism institutionalised; the cartelised, where parochial interest may hijack government policy; and the unitary -- involving either a dictator or an oligarchy. Expansion is in unitary and moderate within democratic states, but overexpansion

occurs in cartelised states, which have many concentrated groups. He focuses on societal groups rather than state leadership groups, which are more important in the non-Western world (Snyder, 1991). His book, the "*Myths of Empire*" examines the likelihood that democracies will engage in imperial overexpansion and be restricted with authorial politics. This research has benefited from his theory when comparing revolutionary and leadership-driven societies.

#### **1.4.3 Democratic peace theory**

Owen and Snyder have focused on democratic countries to produce a liberal domestic political model, which evaluates liberal countries as being more peaceful than non-democratic countries, since the foreign policy of democratic countries is not so much subject to revisionists or threats from other states (Owen, 1994). Democratic countries prefer to solve conflicts with mutual negotiations due to the pressure of public opinion (Owen, 1994). Jack Snyder's recent studies emphasise civil society and strong state institutions that can enforce the rule of law, which are important theoretical components (Snyder, 2000). The democratic peace thesis holds that war has become unthinkable between liberal states. However, the theory does not explain non-democratic and authoritarian countries' foreign policy behaviour and cannot explain the long-term friendly relations between liberal democratic and authoritarian states.

#### **1.4.4 Bureaucratic politics and organisational models by Allison**

Graham Allison points out the bureaucratic politics and organisational process models explain decision-making processes and the foreign policy of states. This model has signified the individual actors as the main players in decision-making policy. The Organisational model provides the leaders with opportunities or places constraints on them. The theory does not explain how foreign policy continues and changes, because bureaucracy and established state institutions generally resist major restructuring. In comparison to developed countries, underdeveloped countries' policy-making bureaucracy is vulnerable to the leadership's subordination to foreign policy institutions. Turkish (Ozkececi-Taner, 2005) and Iranian foreign policy bureaucracy can be classified as well-organised state institutions, equal to those in Western countries. However, this study can use the foreign policy continuity process proposed

by the author, including his bureaucratic and organisation process models (Allison, 2002).

### **1.5.0 Integrated Approaches to Foreign Policy**

The integrated model provides a significant tool of analysis both for domestic and for transnational phenomena of international theory. Such integrated sub-systemic lens theories are discussed in this section in an effort to explain foreign policy continuity and change in the Turko-Iranian case.

Rosenau's integrated model focuses on external sources of states' foreign policies. Individuals' roles, the government, non-governmental organisations and systemic variables are seen as the main determinants of foreign policy buildings. Systemic factors bring threats from abroad as an ideological challenge. The other four factors are considered as internal elements of foreign policy. Therefore, undeveloped countries formulate their policies with in their internal structure. Rosenau's theory is more suitable to adapting political elements to a states foreign policy. In his theory, foreign policy change is a constant phenomenon, experienced by nation-states in their daily activities. He concentrates on governments' adapting to internal and external demands. However, his theory does not have sufficient robustness to serve as a suitable model for foreign policy continuity and change (Rosenau, 1981).

Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model develops an integrated model for foreign policy change. He concentrates on patterns of external relations, to reach foreign policy restructuring, which is usually a response to military, cultural and economic threats, whether domestic or external. He utilises four sets of independent variables: external and domestic factors; vulnerability and domestic factions; historical-cultural factors; and the policy-making process (Holsti, 1982). This type of foreign policy reorientation and restructuring is based upon the level of external involvement. Foreign policies of a nation-state become subject to reorientation when external penetration occurs (Holsti, 1982:4). However, restructuring happens when a state changes from one type of foreign policy pattern to another, such as from dependence to diversification and he underestimates governing elite groups and transnational factors as foreign policy determinants.

Hermann, on the other hand, proposes four different independent variables to explain foreign policy changes, but his variables are related to sources of policy - making: leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shocks. He claims that foreign policy changes are concentrated on minor changes in state policies, but he overestimates the role of the decision-making process (Hermann, 1990:3-21). Stephen Krasner (as cited in Risse-Kappen, 1995) interprets the neo - realist approach as being supportive of transnational factors which influence the power calculations between states. He argues that transnational institutions have the greater impact on state preferences and policies, and the more they command power (material), such as resources, the more they are institutionalised (pp.3-33).

Ideological and nationalist movements, in fact, influence the foreign policy behaviour of the state, which is used to build an integrated model of foreign policy in this study. With the end of the Cold War, transnational ideologies have emerged in the form of Islamic fundamentalism, which is considered a significant opposition movement to the Western-dominated new world order of liberal democratic regimes after 9/11 (Huntington,1996). For the Turko-Iranian examination, three level correlations were applied to understand the rise of the trans-national ethnicity--discussed in the following Sections.

### **1.5.1 Omnibalancing theory by Steven David**

Omnibalancing, as a theory, presents a multi-dimensional theoretical model which gives more suitable explanations for the behaviour of regional middle-power states. It establishes a bridge between the international perspective and the domestic level of analysis for middle-power states' behaviour (David, 1991) as it operates from a realist perspective in the international realm, and integrates pluralist and globalist maxims in the domestic field. In accordance with the macro lens theory of the realist school, power is considered to be the most important factor in the international system. It is therefore argued that the balance of power theory is the most effective mechanism with which to organise state relations. However, balance of power theory provides an inadequate explanation for the behaviour of Third World states, (Quilliam, 1999)

because it is confined to relations and dismisses the relevance of the international dynamics of states.

The main principles of omnibalancing in general terms can be summarised as follow:

(a) Middle - power states are not unitary; unlike the realist school, in which the state is divided and subject to intense competition among a variety of social, ethnic, confessional and sectoral groups;

(b) The environment of the domestic arena is perceived as anarchic rather than hierarchical as it is viewed from a realist angle. These states cannot organise regional alternative security blocs or economic alliances against the great powers or an established balance of power;

(c) The middle-power regime is not unitary, thus the scheme cannot produce a universal regime to be followed by the other regional states. Middle-power regimes are perceived as international and regional threats to the international system. This is down to the fact that the middle-power states are able to defend themselves from the great powers and they become a barrier to expansion of the great powers. Therefore, the state is open to threats from external and internal powers. To impede this, states have to create a multi-dimensional balance between interest groups so as to provide domestic stability and to produce suitable foreign policy. For the purposes of Steven David's theory of omnibalancing, the balance of power can be used to examine domestic politics and is an analytical tool for explaining state or regime behaviour;

(d) The leadership of the middle-sized power state is a component of the unit level of analysis, as there is a lack of social stability and institutional framework to support civil society and non-governmental organisations. Therefore, the regime is a phenomenon subject to dispute between the society and state. For David decision - making processes revolve around the interests of the leader and his closest elite and family. Decisions taken by the regime are supported by the security services and the regime barons so as to ensure the regimes' survival. The leader of the middle-power state provides the balance among the domestic interest groups and forms the peripheral alliances between regional powers. For David, state interests in a middle - power are subordinated to the requisites of regime survival;

(e) Regime survival is the foremost objective of Third World leaders and can be achieved through balancing the interests of domestic groups and forming alliances accordingly. Their (leaders') assets are of state interest, which is necessary to the requisites of regime survival;

(f) Foreign policy is rational in the middle-power state. According to the (neo) realist school, systemic factors partially determine the making of the foreign policies of the state, but for David domestic politics play a significant role in making foreign policy. Despite the importance David attaches to the role played by domestic politics and the structural forces of the international system in forming foreign policy, omnibalancing recognise that foreign policy is based upon rational decision – making processes. David does, however, give greater importance to the role of internal threats than to that of external threats as motivators of foreign policy;

(g) Internal threats (as defined by national identity, such as Kurdish nationalism in Turkey and Iran) are more important than external threats. For the middle-power state, internal threats are considered to be mortal threats to the regime and state hierarchy, as such threats damage national security and weaken the status of the state in the international system. The state usually uses military solutions against internal threats, which in turn brings about criticism from international institutions. Middle-power states use this kind of internal threat to weaken rival partners in order to play a greater role in the region.

In applying this theoretical framework to the subject-matter of this study, Turkey and Iran can be considered to be middle-power states in the international system (Ehteshami, and Hinnebusch 1997). According to these principles, Turkey's and Iran's geopolitical competition and co-operation can be explained by using this theory, but the theory does not have sufficient ability to explain their foreign policy continuity and change. To build an integrated three - level model, the question of whether regional security systems can be definable through various perspectives must be resolved.

### 1.5.2 Regionalism or regional integration

Josep Nye defined an international region as a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence; and (international) regionalism as the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions (Nye, 1968). Others, such as Haas (1970) have stressed the need to distinguish notions of regional cooperation, regional systems and organisation and regional integration. For this framework, the breakdown of the Soviet subsystem created space for regional powers in Central Asia and the Caucasus such as Turkey and Iran, so that new regionalism could develop. However, the Kremlin has reconstructed a sphere of influence in the '*Near Abroad*' composed of the Commonwealth of Independent States, driven by regional political factors. Generally, there are three main components of regionalism : (a) interdependence; (b) cooperation between states; and (c) regional integration.

An analysis of the Turko - Iranian interaction in the Caucasus and Central Asia requires a form of regionalism which differs from European integration, because they have only achieved economic co-operation in the form of trade investments and other economic connections. However, they lack the degree of economic institutionalisation and political participation required in multilateral trade negotiation (Baylis and Smith, 2001). According to Karl Deutsch (1978:240), there are four conditions for this kind of integration; (a) mutual relationship between the units; (b) compatibility of values and presence joint rewards; (c) mutual responsiveness; and (d) some degree of generalised common identity or loyalty. These conditions, therefore, could not have been accommodated by idealist of Turanism of Turks and the political Islamism of Iran, because they could not create the security communities (zones of peace) among the Central Asian and the Caucasus states. However, Russia has partially created the political and economic unit with regard to their political behaviour, because it is still the only hegemonic power ensuring regional stability. Security and economic and cultural connections are restricted to the establishment of an interdependence relationship between Russian and Turkic states (Kubicek, 1997).

An intermediate regional power, such as Turkey, is closely linked to the core states. However, Iran established its interdependence relationship with mostly peripheral regions, in contrast to its politically turbulent and economically stagnant society.

Therefore, it now has insufficient economic and political capacity to integrate with the new region. So far only one of the three core regions, namely Europe, aspires to build such organisations. The other two, namely North America and East Asia, are both economically strong, but so far they lack a regional political order. After Russia, European countries are, therefore, the main trading partners of Central Asian and Caucasian states. Moreover, Chinese political and economic influence is increasing with trade, investment and political integration under the auspicious of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, because the core regions are those regions which are politically capable, no matter whether such capability is expressed in the form of a political organisation. It can be posited that social and politico - cultural changes need long - term democratisation processes and economic openness, so as to access macroeconomic regions. However, the security concern of the medium-sized state forces its leadership group into a natural alliance with the super powers in order to protect itself. Hence, the regional security complex theory emphasises the sub-national micro-security analysis in order to understand the emergence of a new regional system as well as competition in the sub-national regional environment. This will be elaborated in the next section.

#### **1.5.2.1 Regional security complex theory by Buzan and Weaver**

The concept of regional security complex theory (RSCT) was developed by Buzan and Weaver, (2003:378) and applied in the case of South Asia, the Middle East and the post-Cold War integration of Europe. Buzan and Weaver have attempted to fill the gap between regional and system levels of analysis. RSCT can be defined as a cluster of nation states within which *“security interdependence is relatively more intense inside than across its boundaries”* (Buzan and Weaver, 2003:29). This theory focuses on the state as the main unit in the political, military, economic, societal and environmental sectors. It uses neo - realist approaches to explain the interplay between the formation of regional security complexes and the anarchic character of the international system within the geographical proximity. However, regionalism mostly uses a more constructivist model to explain society and state security than other models based on the kind of roles – enemy, rival and friend which dominate the system, for the security of the state is more important than societal security, if state security is under threat. RSCT is capable of incorporating neo - realist understandings



of the global level into its own multi - level scheme by giving priority to the lower level of analysis (Buzan and Weaver, 2003). The theory endeavours to show that the international system, and its sub - system, the unit and its sub - unit, as well as individuals can explain the pattern of national security for the level of analysis. Both contributors on the theory have specified four different levels of analysis (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: Prawindarti, 2005):

- (a) the domestic level, observation of which can reveal vulnerabilities. The specific vulnerability of a state defines the kind of security fears it has;
- (b) state-to-state relations as the pattern of amity and enmity;
- (c) the regional interaction within the neighbouring region;
- (d) the role of global powers in the region as they interplay between the global and regional security structures.

The main types of security complexes for the understanding of the regional security structure are standard and centred on security complexes:

- (a) The standard Security Complex is defined as the polarity of regional power and varies from polar to multi-polar. There is no global level power or uni - polar regional power in the region. Therefore, the region is open external interference and global power penetration. However, conflict formation between sub - systems and sub - units is defined by the patterns of rivalries, balances, alliances or concerts, and friendship.
- (b) The centred Regional Security Complex which includes super - powers and great powers, regional powers and institutional integration. A uni - polar climate centred on a super - power, and a great power climate centred on a great power. However, there is no regional uni - polar power in the regional complex, the regional system is multi - polar but they open to override by super power intervention (Buzan and Weaver, 2003:40-89). Between standard security complex and centred security complex theory are geographically determined zones of weak interaction occupied by insulators, who are not capable of bringing the different complexes together into one coherent strategic arena.

It should be stated that RSCT can organise empirical variables and predict new directions in the following forms:

(a) RSCT is defined by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global and geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence;

(b) The particular character of a local RSCT will often be affected by historical factors such as long - standing enmities between the Greeks and the Turks, the Arabs and the Persians or the common cultural embrace of areas of civilisation as in the instance of Arabs, Europeans, South Asians, North - East Asians and Latin Americans;

(c) The formation of an RSC derives from the interplay between the anarchic structure and its balance of power' results, and on the other, the consequences of local geographical proximities;

(d) Simple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction amongst neighbours than among states located further apart. Thus adjacency provides a potential proximity for security interaction in the military, political, societal and environmental sectors. Anarchy, the distance effect and geographical diversity yield a pattern of regionally based clusters. Smaller states will be usually locked into a regional security bloc with their neighbours. This can explain state situations such as internal threats to a weak state with regard to US very statehood and political ideology; inadvertent and unit-based threats to vulnerable nation states; unintentional threats against states on ideological grounds; structural systemic threats to weak states on political ideological grounds; and threats to international society, order and law. If both sides of a local conflict are dependent on the same power, it usually results in balance and preserves the conflicting parties by ushering them into a peace process. The patterns of amity and enmity can be understood by beginning analysis at a regional level and extending it through inclusion of the global actors. The regional level is a crucial one for security analysis.

On the other hand, RSCT cannot form an overlay and unstructured regional security due to the following cause:

(a) Overlay can occur when interaction capacity in the region is low, but higher in the wider system. The overlay's external power moves directly into a regional complex by suppressing indigenous security dynamics, and great power interests dominate or penetrate the region, virtually resulting in the long - term stationing of great power armed forces in the region and in the alignment of the local states according to the patterns of great power rivalry. An overlaid security region could transform into any of the other forms (Prawindarti, 2005);

- (b) An integrated actor can disintegrate;
- (c) Unstructured security regions exist where local low level capabilities amplify the effect of geographical insulators and high capability reduces them. The model of unstructured security regions is one in which the units are too weak as powers to generate security interdependence on a regional level. No regional RSC exists because the units do not become each other's main security concern.

It can thus be concluded that RSCT reveals security as a relational phenomenon, a pattern of amity and enmity as well as of state-to-state relations intertwined with the character of the relationships. The dynamic of security elements generates the structure of a regional security complex by observing the states within it. The concept of a security community cannot be specified in the role of the global power in which the US is penetrating the region as the main overlay of the regions security system into Middle East. The RSCT also stresses the notion of security and peace interchangeably, and leaves an open space for the redefinition of the concept of security in a region. However, it overlaps with the concept of the security community. The theory perceives a strong linkage between the concept of security and the concept of a region. The noticeable correlation between security complex theory and the constructivist approach is very valuable in understanding continuity and changes in foreign policy. The concept of security community thus tends to see peace (and security) as an output of community social construction, while RSCT tends to see security itself as a social construction (Buzan and Weaver, 2003).

#### **1.5.2.2 The critics of RSCT**

Structural realists do not accept RSCT as a valuable theory for the foreign policy - making of a state, as its approach to anarchy and conflict is more simplistic than that dictated by systemic approaches. The theory's approach to Huntington's cultural clash theory and conflict between rivals is founded on a regionalist basis rather than a systemic one. The theory classifies the international system in a regional context as a '*one - plus - four*' system since the end of the Cold War and devotes attention to issue of immigration (which are often evaluated as external and internal threats since the end of the Cold War) and to other issues stemming from it. This is because ethnical and ideological identities are internal threats which can become external threats and

cause the region to become vulnerable to external penetration. In fact, the theory is very vulnerable to the use of force against global societal fragmentation in terms of security concerns in Europe and the US after the inception of global terror, namely foreign immigrants entering western countries. They are considered components of diversity in the liberal societies now representing an internal security threat to the Western societies. RSCT cannot explain foreign policy continuity and change but can provide a geographical security portrayal of states' relationships.

The issue thus becomes the selection of elements that can be employed in understanding the foreign policy continuity and change, mentioned above, within the parameters of this study. The progressive historical approach component relates to state and national identities, alliance formation against external threats, ethnic conflicts playing the role of an internal threat as well as a regional challenge and co-operation which potentially provide useful perspectives in determining the continuity and change in foreign policy.

### **1.5.3 The social theory of international politics (constructivism)**

Alexander Wendt (1999) builds on the shared character of the liberalist wing of the rationalist tradition and contemporary constructivist wing of reflectivist, as a third alternative approach. However, Adler (1997:322) does not accept constructivism as an alternative theory but views it as the true middle ground between nationalism and relativism (Checke,1998:327) accepts that constructivism builds a bridge between rational choice theorists and post-modern scholars. However, Ruggie (1998:35-36) distinguishes three variants of social constructivism as 'neoclassical, based on intersubjective meanings; post-modernist, based on epistemological breaks with modernism; and naturalistic, based on the philosophical doctrine of scientific realism.

This study focuses on Wendt because his theory present as an alternative ontology, a re-description of the world politics (Unif, 1998:58). In opposition to the realist understanding of anarchy, which is the permissive regarding causes of war, the anarchy myth of Wendt (1999) is neither necessarily confrontational nor cooperative. He claims that there is no pattern to international anarchy but "*the anarchy is what states make of it.*" If a state behaves aggressively towards another, the nature of

international anarchy is confrontational. If a state behaves cooperatively towards another, the nature of international anarchy becomes cooperative. Though states determine the nature of international anarchy, they depend on their identities and interests, which are prone to change. Constructivism argues that neither identities, interests nor institutions in international politics are stable. They have no pre-determined nature, but rather are formed through interactions with other identities and with collective social institutions. Therefore, anarchy and self-help only become meaningful once social interactions have taken place.

Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (a) a state is the principal unit of analysis for international political theory; (b) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material. Wendt argues that intersubjective categorisation rather than the material aspects of structures influence behaviour, because intersubjective structures are constituted by collective meanings; and (c) state identities and interests are to a significant degree constructed by these social structures, rather than imbued exogenously into the system by human nature and domestic politics. According to Wendt (1994), there are two fundamental principles of social theory. Peoples' actions depend on meanings and meanings arise out of interaction (Zehfuss, 2002:36). Social constructivists assume that the fundamental structures of international politics are socially constructed.

Wendt focuses on identity to explain the change and continuity in foreign policy. Identity is considered as a property of international actors that generates motivational and theoretical dispositions (Wendt, 2007:24). Wendt defined identities as relatively stable, role - specific expectations about the self, created through collective meanings (Wendt, 2007:24). Identities provide the basis for interests, and they, in turn, yield a relatively stable set or structure of identities and interests (Wendt, 2007:161). Wendt discusses the egoistic nature of identity and how to develop interactions between actors in a security concern (Wendt, 2007:36). The process of interaction is not only the changing behaviour of people but also the changing of identities. The common identity feelings make up the national identity that aggregates the relationships between the self and others. Identifications can come close in the opinion of some to patriotism. Wendt claims that identities may be hard to change but

they are not carved in stone. This demanding process transforms the 'self' that changes behaviour (Wendt, 2007:21). Constructivists argue that actors in world politics are dynamic and that the identities and interests of states (and other actors) change across contexts and over time because the state identity is pre-determined (Alice, 2003). However, social constructivists can be pessimistic about changing international relations and achieving international security because the behaviour of actors in anarchy is unpredictable prior to social interaction. States are influenced by other ideas such as the rule of law and the importance of institutional co-operation and restraint (Wendt, 1994).

Wendt's and Katzenstein's co-work on the culture of national security identifies norms and identities. They claim that norms have constitutive effects that specify identity and its particular behaviour (Katzenstein, 1996). Additionally, states' domestic and international environments are arenas in which actors contest norms and, through political and social processes, construct and reconstruct identities. The norms and mutual practice of recognition of sovereignty and self-determination regulate state behaviours and reconstruct their identities (Kratochwil, 1989).

This study utilises the essential principles of constructivism versus realist understanding to expand the argument, because it deals with identities not only as a process that includes the identities of both policy - makers and societal units, but also the internalisation of identity processes by which they are influenced by a cultural mentality and patterns of social life. It is the externalisation of these specific choices through constructivism that has a direct impact on the formulation of national interests and foreign policy, as constructivism points out distinctive categories of political groups and the strengthening of group identities. This multifaceted construction process highlights perceptions and helps to explain the chronic sense of insecurity versus realist understandings. The culture of national security is valuable for the definition of the Turkish and Iranian culture of political security which is reconstructed in both as part of the governmental establishment. Social theory presumes that the identities, norms and interests are components of dynamic change in society. People create society, which produces the norms that then make up the agent. The continuity of this circle reconstructs the political identity for society's general interest (Unof, 1998).

### **1.5.3.1 Critics of constructivism**

Constructivism fails to deliver on its promise of evolving beyond reification because in order to escape the concrete logic of anarchy, it ratifies the state. Constructivism fails to restore a focus on the process and practice in international politics (Weber, 2001). Additionally, the poststructuralist critics of constructivism (Keohane, 1998) emphasise Giddens's notion of the "*duality structure*" that both constrains action and acts as the medium through which actors act and, in doing so, potentially transform the structure (as cited in Isiksal, 2004). However, from a methodological perspective, constructivism is incompatible with realism's focus on the association between realism and both materialism and rationalism, whilst the realist paradigm is incompatible with constructivism's focus on aspects other than methodology (Barkin, 2003).

### **1.6. Conclusion: overall discussion for the multi-paradigm perspective in theory building**

The multi-paradigm perspective examines the means of bridging across blurred paradigm boundaries and their correspondence with each other to unify the main variables in analysing world politics (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). To build an integrated model, the overall discussion should identify the main variables of systemic, domestic and regional politics as they affect foreign policy continuity and change.

As mentioned above, systemic assumptions explain foreign policy-making as being rational, by using a reductionalist method. But they do not explain middle - power country behaviour in regional and domestic politics, since they ignore the diversity within the state, regional structure and domestic realities, as well as concepts such as its leadership and ideology. In this case, the difference between regime survival and state survival is a critical one. Neither the balance of power theory nor the balance of threat theory can explain the co-operative and competitive behaviours of Turkey and Iran. This study uses the assumptions of neo - realist and neo - liberal theories and their sublime theories for the behaviour of the middle - power state.

The present study has also benefited from the interdependency theories of neo-liberalist challenges to structural realism. Keohane states that *"since international institutions, rules and pattern of cooperation can effect calculations of interest, and can also be affected incrementally by contemporary political action, therefore they provide a natural focus for scholarly attention as well as security concerns"* (Keohane and Nye, 1987). Their assumption reflects continuity and change and also delineates the limitations of cooperation within Turko-Iranian economic relations.

The economic criticism of globalism is that individual cases are examined in terms of dependency and capitalist world-systems, whilst giving little attention to the cooperation of international systems in the process of capital accumulation and its related dynamics. Critics of globalism look favourably on the concept of semi-periphery because it is poorly defined and not subject to checks and balances. On the other hand, as medium-sized states, Turkey and Iran are not able to challenge western democracy (capitalism - sciocracy) and have no option in that they cut off economic and political relations. Consequently, these theories cannot explain the variations found amongst core (developed) states and peripheral states (less developed countries). They also cannot account for foreign policy continuity and change in most countries, such as Turkey and Iran.

On the other hand, major studies on the characteristics of states, governmental organisations and individual leaders have not provided a general theory to explain the behaviour of middle - power states, but they do identify other factors of internal dynamics in contrast to realist and liberalist assumptions (Walt, 1998:34). In addition, domestic politics models give insufficient weight to the systemic variables in explaining foreign policy continuity and change. Therefore, it is the author's belief that the integrated model is more helpful than domestic and systemic approaches in clarifying the behaviour of middle-power states. Therefore, following chapter aims at discussing middle-power state theory with the objection of contextualizing as a theoretical framework for this study.



## **CHAPTER TWO:**

### **AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO MIDDLE POWER STATES INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

An integrated approach into Turkish-Iranian relations will present a new model for Middle Eastern middle power states relations. This holistic approach employs systemic, regional and domestic international theories influencing continuity and change and explaining the long tradition of Turkish-Iranian bureaucratic politics which have been conducted so far. The logic of this foreign policy brings together domestic inputs, cultural, ethnic, and state identity within regional and systemic based approaches. The study attaches these dimensions to integrated theories by adding the transnational factors such as ethnic identity and state identity (regime) to explain the evolution of processes of continuity and change. Three main areas are utilised in order to signify the applicability of the theory, namely identity policy, regional, systemic alignment and economic policies. In this model a more comprehensive and more explanatory framework than that seen in previous studies will be used, to be discussed further in subsequent sections. This chapter utilizes different key concepts from various disciplines for the contextualization of the proposed model of the theory. The chapter also uses multivariate assumptions which allow for conclusions to be made about how two or more variables are related; positive and direct relationship between two variables produces one variable and causes the other to rise. The relationship between two variables also implies that the cases are not distributed randomly, but rather indicates the presence of an identifiable pattern.

This chapter will first overview Turko-Iran diplomacy to demonstrate their placement in world politics, modify the definition of middle power state, explain the nature of Turko-Iran relations and identify variables to offer an alternative integrated approach to middle power state's relations in international politics.

## **2.2. The foundation of Turko-Iran diplomacy**

As middle power states, Turkey and Iran have a long tradition of independent conduct at the top level of bureaucratic politics and have presented a more measured response to balance of power conduct of global politics. The political forces of both states aim to reach the “*ultimo ratio*” in foreign policy implementation (Waltz, 1979). In comparison with great power, middle power employs a multi-dimensional art of diplomacy in communication with regional and balance of powers to avoid war or maintain survival in the international society. However, the hierarchy of states contains ambiguous issues as to how states can be presented as a great/super power, middle power and small power in international relations. Clausewitz’s criteria are chosen to classify the state’s power capacity in this study; these are statistical measurement, their perceived power and their statecraft (Clausewitz, 2004). This comparative country-based research will deal with the capacity of contemporary middle power states. They perform niche diplomacy, which involves concentrating resources in specific areas and may act as catalysts in launching diplomatic missions, facilitators in setting agendas and building coalitions of support, and institutions in international relations. Therefore, looking at the diplomatic history of world politics is essential to explain the hierarchy of state and measurement of middle power, great power and small capacity in international politics.

### **2.2.1. Turkey and Persian’s placement in the multi-polar system and notion of nation state**

The diplomatic history of world politics began with empires which have been typical modes of government for the longest period of history. The empires aspire to be international systems themselves (Kissinger, 1994). Therefore, they have no need for a balance of power. However, the rivalry or competition between imperial powers presented the same power struggle to dominate others by use of *zero sum game*. For instance, the Ottoman state took the rivalry torch of Byzantine and acted as Kaiser against the Persian Empire in the Eastern Hemisphere. Two great powers policy behaviour could be explained in realist perspective. However, in spite of the western engagement, the Ottoman state remained geographically marginal, culturally alien and historically hostile to Europe. Therefore, the political power of Ottoman states started

to decline in the 16th century. However, the Thirty Year's War in Europe (1618-1648) allowed the Ottoman state to restore its power in the Eastern hemisphere; Ottoman Sultan Murat IV recaptured Baghdad (1638) from Iran and signed the Turko-Persian *détente* (Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin) in 1639. This agreement was seen as *Turko-Iran détente* after the long lasting war by the '*recognition of dual legitimacy*' of each others' religious and political discourse. On the one hand, the civil war in Europe did not only decentralize the Holy Roman Empire's power, but also created the nation state system in Europe. Cardinal Richelieu who is the first architect of the modern state system introduced the French nation state project. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the French and Spanish Empire was the major balance of power in Europe while the Ottoman state maintained its great power *status quo*. However, the discovery of new trade routes and the rising of Sea Powers in Europe had overridden the Ottoman control over trade routes in the Mediterranean belt and Eurasia. Hence, the defeat of the Ottomans by Russia in the north and by the Austria-Hungarian Empire in Vienna (1683) was further hastening the decline of empire. Changing of the balance of power increased the pan-European sentiment in Richelieu's system which contemplated a United Germany might dominate Europe and overwhelms France's interest. However, Great Britain was revealed as a balance of power and dominated European diplomacy in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand after the victory of the Napoleonic War, Great Britain, Russia and Metternich's system reconstructed the European Concert at the Vienna settlement in 1815. The system offered a power based multi-polarity system. The pessimistic approaches to power first became a subject of diplomatic discussion in international politics, because the Russian advancement westwards further challenged the status quo of both Poland and Ottoman Turkey which was no longer a mortal threat for Europe. Ottoman states rather became known to the cabinets of Europe as the "*Eastern Question*." However, as a buffer state, Turkey and Poland blockaded the Russian advancement into Europe. On the other hand, the question of intervention into middle power states such as Turkey and Iran dominated the European diplomatic environment. The Great powers, Britain, Russia and France agreed that if there were any intervention in those countries, it should be a collective one but not a sole intervention being a competitive intervention. Therefore, the collective interference of Britain, France and Russia in Turkey's internal affairs resulted in Greek independency in 1827. On the other hand, the Russia-Iran and Turko-Iran treaties resulted in territorial loss for Iran mostly in Armenia and

Transcaucasia. The most important of these were the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) with Russia, the Erzurum treaties of 1823 and 1847 with the Ottoman Empire and the Paris treaty with Britain. However Britain was alarmed by Russian expansion into the region and therefore the “*great game*” between Russia and Britain in Afghanistan (1838, 1881, and 1919) became an intensive rivalry in Persia and Tibet to control Indian, Eurasian and Middle East natural sources. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, modernity also challenged the Turkic and Muslim peoples when Caucasus and Eurasian steppes fell completely under the Russian and Chinese occupation. However, two revolutionary leaders Napoleon III and Bismarck were not happy to see the Metternich system underline its order in the wake of the Crimean War in 1851 (Kissinger, 1994). After The Crimean War (1854), Holy alliance (French-Britain-Ottoman) forced Russia to return Bessarabia, Kars and the eastern shore of Black Sea. Russia also lost its claims to the guardianship of Slavic nations and the Orthodox East, regarded the Ottoman Empire in Europe as a Christian “*terra irredenta*,” but France replaced as the sovereign authority in the Holy land of the Middle East. The Crimean War and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had accentuated the interest of Britain and France in the Near East and were followed by Britain’s rule of Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt which was officially part of the Ottoman Empire in 1882. This was done to protect commerce, especially in the Persian Gulf and Levant connection with the Indian trade route for Britain’s imperial policy, because Britain and Tsarist Russia extracted many economic, commercial contracts that transformed Iran into a semi-colonized country. On the other hand, as a consequence of the Crimean War, Turkey was admitted for the first time to the community of nations, however, this was a passive and not an active membership (Weight, 200:290), because the practice excluded the Sultan or his representatives from international conferences, even from those that were arranged specially to deal with the “*Eastern Question*,”. This continued until after 1856 and shows that the Ottoman Empire was not really accepted as a great power. Therefore, the place of the Ottoman Empire in the European system was a little below that of the great powers but well above that of the small states, this position does not seem to have led anyone to describe the Empire as a middle power. On the other hand, the balance of power changed after France was defeated in the Prussia-French War of 1870-1871. It is essential that the term of middle power states was first formally recognized among the states of Germany, because the German confederation of middle power states

survived the defeat of Napoleon and its three most important were Bavaria, Württemberg and Hanover which employed a particular type of foreign policy in defeating Napoleon (Holbraad, 28). Although the Post-Napoleonic international order (Treaty of Paris in 1871) created German and Italian unity, the Ottoman state became known as the "*Sick Man of Europe*." After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, Ottoman states further lost Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro which achieved independence. However, Britain's historic policy in the "*Eastern Question*" was to preserve Turkey's independence as a bulwark against Russia. Turkey has still played an effective role in the Eurasian buffer zone. Afghanistan, an outpost of the Indian Empire, became a British protectorate as a result of the Second Afghan War (1878-80). Therefore, Britain preferred to keep relations with the Ottoman Caliphate to secure its hegemony in Pacific and Indian continent. However, the congress of Berlin further provided an opportunity for Tsarist Russia to interfere with the internal affairs of Turkey in 1878. The treaty of Berlin listed the sovereign states of Europe as six great powers, German Empire, Great Britain, Italy, Austro-Hungary and Russia (Weight, 2002:37), but the military weakness of the Ottoman and Persian Empires and their inefficient administration and long record of economic decline had long since taken them out of the rank of great power, therefore they remained silent in world politics (Weight, 2002: 303). As a great power, Britain and France's further interference into Ottoman and Iranian hemisphere materialized in the Nile Valley and Persian Gulf while Russia had been trying to occupy the entrance of the Black Sea Straits. On the other hand, Ottoman-German cooperation began to develop an interest and influence in Turkey. Germany established a direct link between Berlin and Constantinople in 1883. However, the great power's penetration into Ottoman periphery forced a removal of Ottoman presence from all of Thessaly in 1898. On the verge of Great War, the Young Turk government policy caused total destruction of Ottoman balance of power after the losing of Africa and Balkans while Persia was positioned into sphere of influence by Britain and Russia at the same time. Before the First World War, both countries position in international society was ambiguous, because the six great powers were agreed among themselves, they treated it not as a great power but as a state upon which their will was to be enforced. But when Turkey was able to negotiate an agreement with the six great powers and participate in its execution, it might be ranked as seventh great power because, Ottoman and Persian states were not evaluated as an intermediate power but rather accepted as oscillating

between one extreme and the other. In European Concert, Italia was like the Ottoman and Qajar Empire, it could be regarded as an intermediate-class power (Holbraad, 1984:36). During the Great War, the Turko-German alliance successfully resisted against entente powers in Dardanelles and Gallipoli in 1915. However, British humiliation at Kut-al-Amara in Mesopotamian and the Palestine Front resulted in total British control over energy sources in 1919. After the Arab revolt and the replacement of British and French sphere of influence in Middle East, the region remains one of the cockpits of international politics as the strategic land-bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa, and oils resources for the industrialized countries.

The victory of entente powers changed the new international order and it was established by the principles of the Versailles Treaty in 1919. It dismantled the imperial system, and offered nation state system as major players in international society. The multi-polar nation state system included five great powers namely, France, UK, US Italy, Japan were allowed five delegate each in the *League of Nations*. However, this system lasts as long as no conflict of interests has arisen to make a decisive schism between the great powers. However, the role of intermediate powers are below the rank of Great Powers such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Iran Central Russia, Poland, Greater Serbia , etc. (Holbraad, 1984:48). On the other hand, the First World War transformed US into the holder of the balance in the international order. The idealism of Woodrow Wilson offered that the international system should be based on balance of power but recognize ethnic self-determination. Security should also rely on military alliance but it should be collective security. Wilson's idealism implemented by Entente powers who forced Turkey to accept the Armistice of Moudros (1918) and Treaty of Sevres (1920) but their imperialist policy was faced with national resistance known as the Turkish War of Independence that provided Mustafa Kemal to easily establish the Republic of Turkey with European discourse of nation state while Reza Shah failed to do so. The new state legitimacy was recognized by the international society by signing of Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, but the rejection of Wilsonian Armenia and Kurdistan proposal did not allow for the development Turkey-American relations until the "*peaceful transition of power*" from Britain to the United States (Carr,2001). On the other hand, the rise of Lenin's Russia as an alternative discourse of capitalism made Turkey and Poland buffer zones for European security at the same time Iran has played a frontline zone for security of

Persian Gulf and Asia Pacific. The situation in Eurasia was also critical when the Uzbek revolt began in 1916 but the failure of the Turkistan and Basmachi resistance movements in 1922, 1924 and 1926 wiped out Turkic people from the history of world politics. Consequently, Soviet Russia occupied the Turkic lands by following divide and rule politics.

### **2.2.2. The peaceful transition of balance of power and atomic revolution**

The new leadership in Turkey and Iran had hijacked the states and entrenched the new oligarchy in the state bureaucracy and society by use of the authoritarian reformation without providing any facilities for modernisation. Therefore, the concept of nation state is different from traditional middle power nation states, because the Western context of nation states based on the social contract, which is rooted in Western political philosophical tradition (Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Alex Tocqueville, John Rawls) and Smithian and Keynesian approaches to capitalism, which encompass this system. However, both Turkey and Iran's new elite designed the new states with their new definition of strategic culture, which restricts the hegemonic ambition but they failed to create common political culture in society. Therefore, both countries spent their wealth and power to stabilize internal security. Both Turkey and Iran have no political contribution to the new designed international system. However, realist and moralist international theory asserted that the morality plays a significant role in behaviour of the states (Carr, 2005). Thus his theory supports the establishment of the *League of Nations*. However, the *Kellogg-Briand Pact* concluded outside of *League of Nations*, was embodied with American values and Wilson's idealism. However, both of them failed to bring peace to the international society after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and the German invasion of Poland in 1939. According to the *Kellogg-Briand World Order*, Turkey and Iran can be classified as neither middle powers nor small powers but have a wider scale geopolitical capability in the alignments of the great powers. Turkey and Iran could not achieve security on their own even though they signed the Sadabat Pact in 1937, because both states were militarily weak and politically authoritarian, but internationally maintained their geopolitical importance as intermediate state powers. Hence, during the Second World War, Turkey and Iran played essential roles as buffer states against German

and Russian aggression. The Great powers had vital interests in preventing the others from controlling the buffer zones as neutral or independent to establish their own control. The geopolitics and energy sources of Iran led to reconsideration of Iran's position when the global conflict revealed. Therefore, Britain and Russia occupied Iran. British Middle East Command stretched from Malta to Iran, Syria to Ethiopia and kept Germany outside of both the African continent and the Middle East. Therefore, during the Second World War, Turkey's active neutral position also put Germany away from the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea security belt. However, Turkey and Iran were happy with Germany's attempt to gain mastery of the small vassal-state in Caucasus against Russian hegemony over two decades, because Turkey and Iran hoped that the German military campaign on the Russian front would have given freedom to Turkic and Muslim peoples in Russia. Russia always showed its ambitions on South Azerbaijan and the entrance of the Strait in Turkey. However, after the failure of the German operation of Barbarossa on 22 June 1941, Stalin's brutal campaign destroyed the Turkic and Muslim elements in the Caucasus. On the other hand, as a result of nuclear revolution, the United States had given up its isolationist policy and then launched its "*Open Door*" policy. *The peaceful transition of power* from UK to US has protected the North Atlantic lifelines and gave assurance to Britain's survival against German and Soviet penetration into Western Europe. The meeting of the big three (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin) in Tehran in 1943 designed the strategy against Japan and Germany's threat and made clear America's balance of power status. The dropping of the first nuclear and plutonium bomb on Japan in 1945 changed the balance of power in international politics. The atomic monopoly overstretched American influence from Asiatic and greater buffer belt and from Mediterranean to the Pacific Ocean whereas those were controlled by Britain in 19th century. The agreement between King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and President Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 was another stage in transition of power from Britain to the United States in the Middle East. During the transition period, the Great Powers were unable to save the European buffer state, Poland, from becoming a satellite of Soviet Russia at the Yalta Conference in 1945. Stalin also established its sphere of influence and satellite in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1948. The rise of the Soviet threat in Europe, Asia and Middle East challenged America's offshore balance status quo in the late 1940s. However, Harry Truman's pressure on Stalin to withdraw Soviet troops from Iran strengthened American offshore balancing strategy. Soviet demands on Turkey to



control the Black Sea Straits have never been satisfied and caused another crisis in 1946, which led to the Truman doctrine, which in effect declared that the United States had a vital interest in Turkish independence which cannot be lost without a general war. The symbolic American navy vessel named *Missouri*, was sent to Istanbul to secure the Mediterranean security belt in April 1946. The decision had been made to ensure that the independence of Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy is essential to protect Euro Atlantic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean when Pentagon Talk was held in 1947. The British support Israeli state was established in Palestine that hastened Britain's withdrawal from region but created another proxy for Washington's containment policy in 1948.

The transition of balance of power from multi-polar to bipolar enshrined the principles of democracy and has promoted pan-Europeanism by every means since 1947 in resistance to Russia. Stalin's Russia killed millions of people in Eurasia and Eastern Europe. Arendt's 'The Origin of Totalitarianism' portrays the Soviet Union as a mutation of the same species as Nazi Germany. Stalin's imperialist expansion directly threatened buffer states Turkey and Iran. While the situation forced Turkey to establish a systemic relationship with the US and Europe, the US entrenched special relations with the Shah of Iran in the 1950s. American commitment to contain Soviet expansion led NATO to establish a unified military command for their forces in Western Europe and the North Atlantic. As an offshore balancer, American commitment to Japan was also essential as deterrence within the South Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). The pact brought together Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan as an anti-communist alliance to blockade China and the Soviet Union. Kennan's containment theory has dominated American diplomacy since the Cold War but it has never implied the complete elimination of Soviet power. Containment, instead, sought a modification of behaviour through a combination of determinants and rewards. Soviet Union was not considered a military threat. Rather, it was valued as a hegemonic balancer in bipolar international system. Therefore, Soviet ideological propaganda forced the US and Europe to impede communist influence in domestic politics. Kennan supported the CIA activities around the globe and contra- guerrilla warfare, which overlapped with Eisenhower's chorally on the Monroe doctrine in Latin America. The first act of the CIA successfully overthrew the pro-Soviet Musaddegh's government and restored the

Muhammad Reza Shah's power in Iran. On the other hand, the economic containment policy of Washington was aimed at blocking the economic warfare of the Soviet Union in Europe. The relations were bad and warlike. They were to some extent restrained and had not reached the point of hot war. The containment was another way of restoring a balance of power in the international society. On the other hand, the patron-client relationship between Ankara and Washington and the special relationship between Tehran and Washington made their sovereignty variable to the West. American support for Turkey's democratisation process and Shah's reformation program was not dependent on their commitment to liberal democracy but their geopolitical significance as a western ally gave reasonable respect to their independence. Both Turkey and Iran have effective role in Middle East and Northern Flank. However, both of them could not have supported the Secretary of State Dulles' project of Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) which was considered to be a Middle East version of NATO with the purpose of containing of the Soviet Union along its southern border. However, both of them became part of the collective security concept of Northern and Southern Tier of nations to be composed of Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan with Iran, known as the Baghdad Pact. Even though Britain together with France had tried to regard itself as the pre-eminent power with Baghdad Pact was established in 1955 by Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Britain and Iran as a junior partner of US against Soviet threat. However, the overthrowing of King Faruk of Egypt and King Faisal of Iraq put an end to Turkey's and Great Britain's influence in the region. Whereas, the transition of power changed the leadership group in Middle East such nationalisation program of Musaddagh and Michel Aflaq's pro-Arab nationalism theory inspired Nasser and the Baath party removed the British-France influence including the Turkish in the Middle East. During the Suez Canal crisis, Soviet and American coercion on Britain and France demonstrates that the two super powers acted as a balance of power and did not allow a great power illusion in Egypt, Iraq and Iran. On the other hand, Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria after the Suez War alarmed both Turkey and the United States. Turkey wanted to use its Euro-Atlantic vision to penetrate Middle East politics. Turkey supporting US intervention into Lebanon by allowing the use of Incirlik bases in 1958 strengthened Turkey's position in the Mediterranean and deliberately served as a military bulwark against Soviet expansion during the Cold War era. Furthermore, Turkey's pro-western policy as well as its ties with Israel, were criticised by Arab states after signing of secret

Periphery Pact which included Iran and Ethiopia in 1958. The restoration of the pro western-northern tier alliance of Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan with the US observer in CENTO further alienated Turkey and Iran from the Middle East in 1959. The pact was structurally weak and has no centralized military command, however it was only helpful in obtaining arms from the US. After the end of British rule in Cyprus, the long standing arc of crisis began between Turkey and Greece with the civil war in 1957. However, Turkey maintained its influence by signing the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960.

### **2.2.3. Responding to containment policy: patron-client relationship**

The Eisenhower government employed the nuclear theory of Henri Kissinger. Kissinger suggested that nuclear war could be kept limited and might, under certain circumstances produce less devastation than a conventional war (Kissinger, 1957). According to US nuclear umbrella policy, Turkey has harboured US tactical nuclear weapons in its territory, which persistent adherence to this imprudent deterrence policy in the Middle East and Mediterranean and Black Sea since the Cold War. Eisenhower government moved intermediate-range nuclear missiles to bases in England, Italy, Turkey as a quick -fix to plug with possible missile gap. Thus, the presence of nuclear forces in Europe provided the Pentagon the second strike capability against Soviet tactical weapons. Turkey's and Iran's significance in the Northern Flank was also to reduce Soviet *first strike* capability and to divert at least 450,000 troops in the Caucasus and resist its attack as buffer states in 1960s while U.S. positioned 24,000 troops in Turkey. The *second strike* capability to nuclear triad (bombers, missile and submarines) for surety were also in placed in the Mediterranean, Pacific and Persian Gulf to give the ability to cause massive destruction to anyone attacking the alliance nations. Hence, Turkey rightly opposed the proposal to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Balkans. The proposal was first put forward by the Soviet Union on 25 June 1959, when the deployment of U.S. medium range nuclear missiles, namely Jupiter missiles to Turkey was on the horizon in 1961. However, the American containment policy first was checked with Fidel Castro takeover of Cuba in 1959 and then when allowed the deployment of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missile in October 1962. The Cuban missile crisis first questioned the dangers of nuclear warhead for the purpose of military deterrence. Therefore, the

architect of the Vietnam War, Robert McNamara asserted that the 25,000 nuclear warhead in Europe served no military purpose whatsoever (Morris, 2004). He rightly developed the idea of *Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)*, which held that in a world in which both the US and Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons to wipe each other off the map, both sides' fears of nuclear retaliation would prevent either from ever using the weapons for aggressive purposes. Although critics decried McNamara's nuclear "*balance of terror*" policy as mad (MAD), he believed that it would help maintain a stable nuclear world. As non-nuclear countries, such as Turkey and Cuba, the hosting of strategic missile put them under *first strike* option which is a more terrible threat than others. During the crisis, the bargaining of small and medium sized states' national security, so called *Turkey-Cuba trade* affected middle power state's foreign policy behaviour and also questioned the offshore balancing role of super powers. The talk of *first détente* reconciled the *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (1963) and the *Non-proliferation Treaty* (1969) which proved that nuclear warheads do not anymore a military deterrence whatsoever. On the other hand, the change in security perception helped to diversify middle power states policy behaviour in international society. For instance, Turkey followed the partial engagement policy with U.S. after receiving Johnson's blunt letter that rejected Turkey's demand for military intervention into Cyprus. Turkey's role declined in the Western cabinet while Iran successfully employed the multi-dimensional policy towards Soviet Russia as well as Europe and the US. The Shah of Iran became the main customer of Soviet and American arms and also major a partner of Eurodif via Sofidif (Franco-Iran consortium which owned 25 % of Eurodif) in 1970s. Turkey's attempt to rehabilitate its relations with Soviet Russia, so called *Russo-Turkish détente* did not survive long as Iran's cooperation with the Kremlin in the 1970s. However, Turkey's new strategic design in Pan-European sentiment made structural change in Turkish foreign policy behaviour. In fact, after the Second World War, there was no balance of power in Europe, because Germany and Italy became middle power states of today and client of United States, these neutralized, disarmed and unified states might create a power vacuum tempting to Soviet and US intervention. For instance the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 checked the structure of the bipolar system. In addition, the Arab-Israeli conflict caused the super power confrontation in Middle East in 1973. Therefore, the recovery of France's sovereignty was essential to America's role as an offshore balancer in Europe and the Middle East. However, the joining of Britain and

France into a nuclear club provided an opportunity to restore their great power status in international society. After the solution of the German Question between Soviet Russia and United States, Franco-German reconciliation further supported Pan-European idealism.

Turkey rejected American demand to use Incirlik bases for in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and 1973. Therefore, the partial engagement of the Turko-American alliance relationship was further reduced when Turkey occupied the Cyprus in 1974. Turkish invasion of Cyprus impeded the Soviet interference into Mediterranean Sea at this critical time. The US had no commitment to liberalize such as nuclear host countries as Turkey, Italy and Japan and act as a proxy alliance to Iran's domestic politics but rather make sure that the leadership kept their alliance relationship with US. Therefore, American interference into the domestic politics of middle power states was experienced when military took over the civil government three times in Turkey, and Iran. As Niebuhr (1986) points out, sometimes it is necessary to do evil in order to accomplish the good. Therefore, the contra guerrilla department of NATO supported the *right-wing* parties in the nuclear hosting countries to make sure the strategic weapons security, especially in Turkey and Italy and Japan, which those countries has been considered as '*first strike*' capability by US and '*first-use*' by Soviet. The *ostpolitik* of the West German government was opening up the relationship between Soviet satellite and Europe. Therefore, the *détente* relations with communist blocs can be seen as yet another attempt to containment and was effectively a less cost approach as implemented by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. The Shah used revisionalist policy against Turkey and Gulf countries by using Kurdish and Shia religious card in the 1970s. However, the rise of Shah's Iran as a regional power questioned the proxy alliance relationship between Iran and Washington - Tel Aviv. Therefore, the rise of *right-wing* religious ideology and populism in Iran was dominant, and that served to prevent Soviet ideological expansion as a '*negative balancer*' in the Middle East. Therefore, the Pentagon did not put forward any attempt for fully fledged military intervention to Iran. America only had made alliance with such radical Islamist guerrilla against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Hence; the new structural change in the region helped the restoration of Turkey's client status quo in the Northern Flank which has made Turkey the only ally in Northern Tier.

Turkey's main concern was not only an inability of the new regime of Iran to conclude another Soviet intervention into Iran but also that it would increase the Kurdish separatist movement in the region. However, the new regime restored its central power and oppressed the *left-wing* parties and Kurdish separatist in Iran and also stalled the nuclear program. Therefore, Turkey removed its troops back from the Iranian border and normalized its relations with the new regime. The United States spent a billion dollars implementing the counter revolutionary politics against the Third World type revolution in Iran. Thus, Iran-Iraq war not only blockaded the revisionist policy of the new regime but also caused the suspension of the nuclear program of Iran. As Tarita Patsi claims, Tehran-Israel-Washington "*treacherous alliance*" has served Iran's '*negative balancer*' status in the region. In addition to this, it has increased the '*forward defence strategy*' of the Pentagon in the Middle East by stationing the strike forces of *CENTCOM* into the Persian Gulf in 1983 and the *Joint Task Forces* to be located roughly in the centre of the Indian Ocean against the extent of probable threat. A *forward strategic* line also consists of a group of military bases and facilities and strategic cooperation with Arab states. However, after the third military coup, Turkey successfully contained the religious and ideological threat of Iran by using religious agents until the late 1990s. The common security engagement was articulated after the signing of military agreement with Washington, while Reagan's Star War project known Strategic Defence Initiative, based on the ambition to construct a space based anti- missile system to defend the US from the Soviets in 1983, launched what was the starting point of the Second Cold War process. During the Cold War, Soviet power was exaggerated by the necessity of hegemonic balancer but it was revealed that is a great illusion (Allin, 1995), because, the Soviet Union is long way from centrality of its key Third World clients such as Syria, India, and Iraq. The Kremlin lacked influence in other important Third World states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Therefore, *Palma commission* offered security needs be based on mutual commitment to joint survival, and the acknowledgement of others legitimacy and security concerns, because in the nuclear age and unilateral security is no longer violate as a deterrence in international politics (Bakis, 2001). Since the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Ankara's security concern has increased in the Balkans and Eurasia. However, Saddam's fatal blunder to invade Kuwait invited '*collective intervention*' into Iraq in 1991. Whilst Iran followed the neutral policy against coalition forces, Turkey was directly involved in the War

against Saddam's oppressive regime. Turkey's policy in the Middle East can be described as power politics, including Post-Cold War strategic partnership with Israel and the United States. However, Iran aimed at ideological expansion in the Shia crescent in the Persian Gulf. Both countries insulator position between the Middle East, and post-Soviet Eurasia always made the region to vulnerable super power penetration, because there is no great power in this security complex. The Turkey-American relationship was one of the regional allies with the regard to regional insecurity but marked by conflict of interest in the issue level politics such Kurdish and Armenian problem not long term grand strategy. America's *core alliance* and *forward defence forces* served Turkey's interest in the Bosnian and Kosovian conflict and NATO's *Partnership for Peace program* in Eurasia. The gradual extension of NATO to all democratic states wanted to strengthen Turkey's ties with West while Iran was faced with *containment policy* since the post-cold war. The Nuclear program of Iran has been perceived by Washington to break the reliability of its security umbrella in the Middle East. As a middle power state, to seek strategic self-sufficiency (including nuclear weapons) would not allow super power containment any more. Both Russia and Iran see NATO as direct threat against them. Thus Russia would rather engage with China at Shanghai cooperation Organisation. Hence, the strategy of selective engagement is considered as another way of *forward strategy* in a post9/11 international system. Turkey has followed Gareth Evan's *cooperative security theory* based upon multilateral collaboration while it is excluded from new European security system. Both Turkey and Iran supported the United States in the "*War on Terror*." However, the metaphor of "*axis of evil*" put an end to Tehran-Washington rapprochement. Even though the evil regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq were overthrown, both Turkey and Iran were not happy to see American military intervention in the region. However, the Russian-Georgian war checked post-cold and post 9/11 politics and the American influence in the Eurasia. The region is still vulnerable to Russian military intervention due to unresolved ethnic and political issues in Caucasus with having of military bases in Georgia, Armenia, and Gabala Radar station in Azerbaijan. Therefore, Turkey and Iran's fear on Russian threat still played effective role in their foreign policy behaviour. As an offshore balancer US cannot prevent the rise of new great powers either within (EU, Germany, and Japan) or outside (China, a resurgent Russia) its sphere of influence. Therefore, Iran's

negative balancer position is essential for the offshore strategy of America such commitment of Turkey to client status quo in the Middle East and Eurasia.

As it has been mentioned in Chapter One, the systemic approaches to middle power politics can only explain middle power and super power's alliance and client relationship. The *containment theory* of Kennan and Kissinger's *theory of domino effect* supports the role of offshore balancing strategy of United States in Middle East and Eurasia. Turkey and Iran have survival as non-imperialized countries in the region by using self-reliance and alliance strategies. Both Iran and Turkey benefited from the simplicity of the bipolar system as it reduces the proliferation of uncertainty and miscalculation making war less likely. However, post-cold war and post- 9/11 politics, the *client* status of Turkey and the *negative balancer* status of Iran in regional politics still impede the Russian expansion. On the other hand, domestic theories to international politics are considered as sub-lens theories of systemic approaches which are mostly aimed at explaining super power domestic politics. Therefore, both systemic and domestic theoretical assumptions cannot explain such states as Turkey and Iran bilateral relations. However, the integrated model provides holistic approaches to middle power states politics in the Middle East and Eurasia.

### **2.3. Modifying the concept of middle power states**

The various interpretations of definitive middle powers characteristics have neither been formally nor explicitly evaluated within the concept of the international power structure. Therefore, the definition of middle power state requires a new model or modification, which is necessary in the conceptualisation of this case study.

Three types of middle power states are considered in classifying the states. Though each one of them characterizes their own systemic, regional and domestic sentiment, they have some commonalities which distinguish them from great power to small power state behaviour. Jonathan Ping (2005) applied *perceived power*, and *statecraft* measurement to classify the hierarchy of states in his work. For Turko-Iranian cases, the *perceived power* and *statecraft* is more constructive than statistical measurement, because there is always evolution in political discourse but continuity of the national identity of Turkishness and Iranianhood. According to this ranking category, there are



three basic classifications of middle powers; oriental middle powers in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, Anglo-Saxon middle powers (Canada, Australia) and Latin middle powers.

*Oriental middle powers* are more occasionally considered as buffer states, while *Anglo- Saxon middle powers* have played insulator roles in international relations, because they are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic but regionally influential. However, the focus in this research is on *Middle East middle powers* which have some commonalities with other middle powers, while they have some distinct in foreign policy behaviour and orders in Middle East and Eurasian security complexes. There is no equity among these middle powers in the Middle East. For instance, Turkey, Iran and Egypt compose a regional triangle ranked first while Syria, and Saudi Arabia are considered within the '*second order*.' On the other hand, Israel can be classified neither as second nor first order. It could be distinguished between '*upper secondary powers*' which were almost able to play the role of dominant powers having nuclear deterrence and alliance relationship with the West and lower second ones which had less in common with those powers. Due to the Palestinian issue as an internal threat, Israel spent its power for domestic politics that weaken Tel-Aviv to act as a middle power states in the regional politics. Rather than integrating the region, Israel has established its own security system in the Levant. As mentioned above the *periphery pact* in 1958 did not provide an institutional security engagement with those states. Similarly, Turkey-Israel security cooperation has only provided Turkey to return to region and improve the economic and security engagement between the proxy power of Israel and the client Turkey , so called '*co-opt alliance*' relationship, because the security alliance between the two countries has not been socially constructed. Rather, it had been enforced by Turkey's dependency on military to the core. For instance, Turkey has to buy the data system of strategic weapons from Israel. However, post-9/11 has proved that for Turkey and Israel political interest is conflict in the issue of Palestine and the Kurdish question. Both of them have accused the owner in interfering with each others internal affairs. Therefore, Iran has never perceived Turkish-Israel security cooperation as a national security threat against Iran. Similarly, the Iran-Syria alliance has not been considered as a threat by Turkey. Both alliances characterize that middle powers prefer to make alliance relationship with less powerful states. However, they can not manage to entrench institutionalized

security alliance relationship. It is essential for the balance of power to impede alliance relationship between equal middle power states in the Middle East and Eurasia.

In order to provide a better theoretical framework to analyse the Turko-Iranian relationship, this study proposes the use of middle power states framework, the parameters of which are discussed below. However, as mentioned, the conventional definition of middle power state as developed in the literature may not necessarily be efficient enough to explain the Turko-Iranian relationship; and therefore certain modifications have to be introduced to the available framework with the objective of producing a more efficient theoretical framework. All these characteristics including the proposed or new characteristics are described as follows:

*(a) Middle power is a key actor in the region:* Middle powers seek to maximize autonomy by balancing regional impact of great power. Geographical proximity to offshore balancer enables the middle power states to conduct more independent global foreign policy than that of more distant middle powers attracted to the United States. Middle power states economically and technologically depend on core and the best can minimize the constraints of dependency on their autonomy by diversifying their links. They also have sufficient force and authority to maintain themselves without help from others. During the Cold War, the strategic engagement between Turkey-Iran and US architect of CENTO in the Middle East. Both countries military technology dependency to core lessens their policy behaviour. However, Turkey and Iran launched multi-directional policy in economy and military technology. The preeminent priority of both countries is now to develop self-reliance assertive and pragmatic policy to demise their dependency. Whilst Turkey's strategic engagement in forward defence strategy plays a multi-dimensional role in international politics, Iran's military technological contract with Russia and Asian market improved her self-reliance. However, the nuclear proliferation of Iran will create a new resonance in the region. Therefore, United States maintained the constant instability in proximity region to negate middle power such as state Iran and Turkey. However, middle powers have a special interest in maintaining the balance of power in the region. Turkey is very pleased to see the North Atlantic vision in Kosovo and the Partnership for Peace program of NATO in the Caucasus. On the other hand, neither Turkey nor

Iran is happy to support to American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rather than using force as preponderance strategy, they have no concern on super power offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East and Eurasia.

*(b) Middle powers organise the regional polarity system in their sphere of influence/history:* Middle power polarity system has some characteristic rivalry such bipolar hostility between two super powers. The ideological and religious rivalry would form an alternative political discourse, which encourages the establishment a regional alliance. Their alliance relationship could not provide any security pact, but rather a political economic alliance such as Turkey-Israel and Iran-Syria security alliance mentioned above. They have taken some regional roles that may be open to middle powers under conditions of dualistic limited conflict might well be possible for several such powers also in situations of triangular restrained rivalry. The role of middle powers in this type of triangle has been considered only in regard to the relationship between the two super or great power rivals. As client middle powers, they were recommended as defenders of the balance of power and providers of peace and order. Therefore, they may engage in joint activities with alliance super powers despite non affirmative to offshore initiative in many fields of common interest. For instance, Turkey's strategic engagement worked in the Second Gulf War in 1991 and the Russia-Georgian War in August 2008. On the other hand, non-aligned middle powers, less affected by the polarising forces of the dualistic system, have a wider range of possible roles as a negative balancer in the regional system. For instance, Iran's partial cooperation in removal of the Taliban and Saddam regime demonstrates the clear shared interest between super power and middle powers.

*(c) Middle powers are able to play a role as regional balancer:* The alliance or special relationship between middle powers and balance of power encourages the regional polarity to maintain anarchy in the international system. The anarchy enforces the maximisation of power for sovereignty and survival in the international society. The negative balancing strategy of Iran and forward forces strategy of Turkey serve offshore balancer strategy in the Middle East. The causality here enforces the self reliance capacity strategy. However, the other can restore the alliance relationship by gaining relative importance in the region. According to these assumptions, Turkey

and Iran fulfilled their middle power commitment to international system after the revolution.

*d) Middle powers have the ability to resist super power intervention or make bargains with the balance of power:* The structure of duality system had impeded the super power military intervention. However, the unipolar system questioned the bargaining capability of the *second order middle power* state in the Middle East and Eurasia after the US led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq because there was no strategic balance of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union even though security system remain undisputable in the international system. Super power intervention into weak state threatens middle power security but provides a bargaining power to regional middle power states. For instance, Iran has bargaining capacity in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, Turkey used her bargaining power in regard to US sanctions against Iran and the Turkish parliament's rejection of the March memorandum in 2003 which demonstrated that as a middle power state, Turkey can say 'No' to super power, US when their interest comes across a conflict in the regional politics. I will explain these cases in the Chapter Seven. Similarly, Iran have kept using of Hezbollah as a forward defence strategy in the Lebanon and also kept its nuclear program to reach certain deterrence patterns in the regional system.

*(e) Middle power is not able to entrench a coalition:* As part of the modification of the concept of middle power initiated by this study, this '*proposed*' characteristic states that in the absence of institutional engagement between *oriental middle powers* distinguishes them from *Anglo-Saxon middle power* states and discourages the regional alliance relationship; they only make political alliance relationships with less threatening one. For instance, the Iran-Syria and the Turkey-Israel alliance are a good example for this assumption in this research. However, middle power states have no capacity to entrench an alternative economic, military and political system against the balance of power system. Thus, the offshore balancing strategy of super power does work in that region where there is no regional balancer. On the one hand, the structure of patrimonial and rentier Turkey and Iran neither allow the emergence of liberal society nor the coalition-building in the regional system. For instance, even though Turkey and Iran have established regional organisations such as the Baghdad Pact, CENTO, RCD, ECO and D-8, they are not able to entrench a super economic and

security or political structure against super power containment. Similarly, Latin American middle power states demonstrate the same characteristics in their regional alliance and their interdependence relationship with their other counterpart. Super power can contain middle powers' hegemonic regional ambitions. Hence, the military *coup d'état* and '*exit guarantee*' securitize the domestic politics of Oriental and Latin middle power states. Whilst these middle powers have no capacity in contributing of international peace, Anglo-Saxon middle powers serve as '*mediators*' or '*go-betweens*' and through international conflict management and resolution activities such initiatives of middle power in nuclear non-proliferation (Neack, 2000).

(f) *Balance of power is able to contain middle power revolution in the region:* Being the second '*new*' characteristic of the modified concept of middle power state, this containment oriented characteristic suggests that "*revolution leads to war, but the war in turn affects the revolution, which was recognized*" Walt (1996:6). Thus, the warfare of Iran-Iraq was to be met by the counter revolutionary tactics of the United States which has successfully impeded revolutionary tactics of new regime in the region. The failure of this policy of Iranian regime transforms the characteristics of revolution from universal to religious nationalism. Therefore, Iran is now identified as a hegemonic threat by GCC countries. In addition to this, nuclear ambition of Iran is considered to be a fatal threat by the balance of power, because if such middle powers have any WMD capability, balance of power cannot contain Iran any more, which change the balance of power in the region. Sagan (et al, 2007) strongly argues that nuclear proliferation of such countries is not acceptable, because the complexity of bureaucratic organisation, which often acts in incoherent ways, have their own imperfect bounded conception of rationality. Contrary to Sagan, Waltz (2003) argued that deterrence also work its-conflict subduing effects in other conflict, such as the Indo-Pakistan conflict. However, Iranian nuclear proliferation might challenge the regional balancer and create a new resonance in international society. However, Turkey does not perceive nuclear attempts of Iran as an eternal threat because Ankara consider that nuclear Iran would provide Turkey with an opportunity to comply with its own nuclear program. On the one hand, if both countries have nuclear capability, the balance of power can still enforce the nuclear regime in the stability of the regional system. However, this type of containment of super power would avoid the use of force against middle – power. In this regards, Waltz's theory of proliferation

will be applicable if rational politics will be begun by the Obama government in this case.

#### **2.4. The nature of Turko-Iran relations**

The features of Turko-Iran relations have been experienced as friendship, rivalry, détente which represent the *peaceful co-existence* by competition and co-operation. The paradigm of friendship, rivalry and détente reflect the main characteristics of Turko-Iran relations. However, the Turko-Iran détente has seen middle power containment policy between each other since the 17<sup>th</sup> century without going to any fully fledged war even though the oscillatory relations experienced in their sphere of history in Eurasia and Mesopotamia. The ethnic instability is the flashpoint to set strategic engagement between two countries when great power penetrates regional politics.

In order to explain the behaviour of Turkish and Iran foreign policy, this section will introduce certain intellectual norms and efficient definition of the middle-power to explore the nature of the Turko-Iran relationship as developed over the years and can be explained through the following parameters:

(a) *The cordial relationship*: The friendship paradigm inherited from the *Turko-Persian Islamic syntheses* created a new dynamic culture from the Danube to the Indian continent, which I will deal with in the Chapter Three. This hybrid culture still plays effective role in bilateral relations when the hegemonic power penetrates the geographical proximity of Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis. Due to the long lasting disintegration from *Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis*, they could not reconstruct a new coalition building program against Russia's or Britain's hegemony in the region. However, there was some attempt to restore Turko-Iran friendship relations such as Nadir Shah's Najaf Assembly, Pan-Islamism, the Tagrib movement and the D-8 project of the Turkish premier Erbakan which was aimed at accommodating new entrancement to check the regional balance. On the other hand, during the Cold War, this geographical proximity of *Northern Flank* provided Turkey and Iran a strategic security depth within Euro Atlantic community. However, since the post-Cold War era, the great game could have been expected by the great powers between two middle

powers, but no such conflict occurred except economic and quasi-political competition. I will endeavour to cover these issues in the Chapter Eight and Nine.

(b) *Rivalry relationship*: There were two developments enforced the Ottoman and Safavid military conflict. Firstly, the Mongol invasion put an end to the reign of Oghuz Turks in Eurasia, Iran and Turkey. Secondly, Shia externalism established a new imaginary society in Persia which caused political and religious alienation of both nations from each other. However, the sovereignty of Iran is always essential for Turkish policy strategy, because the occupying of Iran would bring the great burden in internal politics. Therefore, the presence of Iran as '*negative balance*' provides Ottoman Turk the opportunities to legitimize their hegemony in the Middle East. I will deal with these cases in the Chapter Three. Even though some of the today's politicians give reference this rivalry torch, the paradigm of enmity relations has not been conducted by the Turkish and Iranian diplomatic environment since the *détente* agreement in 1639. In fact, the rivalry is generally less intense in relations and may take less demanding form of tacit co-operation. Therefore, rather than following the *zero sum game*, Turkey Iran has followed the *zero plus game* for peaceful co-existence by respecting each other's regime and sovereignty. However, the rivalry between the middle powers is now tempered with a measure of cooperation. However, the nuclear ambition of Iran would cause a systematic alteration in the regional system. There may be rivalry or a starting point for the armed conflict through various levels of tension, ranging from restrained rivalry and cold war to crisis and war. I will explain the rivalry relationship in the related sections of Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

(c) *Détente relationship*: The Turko-Iran *détente* seemed to be moving towards a relationship of *peaceful co-existence* by employing the holistic approaches to conflict and cooperation. Since the Qasri Shirin Treaty, the Turko-Iran relationship can be classified within a *détente framework* which offers a middle power containment policy practice. Two politically divergence far away countries on each other doorstep can *negate* each others influence while they manage economic and reach security co-operation at the same time.

(c.a.) *Competitive détente relationship*: The hostility between two countries rooted from their sphere of history led their archaic hegemonic ambition in controlling of the Caucasus and Northern Iraq. There are three kind of competition between Turkey and Iran; *geopolitical*, *ideological*, and *client or negative balance strategy*, which those policy implementation provide the second order competitive détente relationship in regional system. During the 1980s, the ideological competition between secularism and the Islamic revolution occupied Turkish -Iranian diplomatic relations. The ideological competition is based on Shia national identity in the GCC countries and regime differences between secularist regime and political Islam movement. These ideological differences created two time's diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Iran in 1989 and 1997. However, both capitals learn how to manage those differences of so called *conflict management* in bilateral relations in the last three decades. The ideological differences bring other dimensions, which provide the legitimacy to the leadership groups to impose their regime discourse in domestic politics. Therefore, until the brink of war, both countries are happy to show alternative regime as an evil regime against each other. On the other hand, secularism is a revolution within Sunnite religion. Similarly, Islamic governance (*Valayat-e Faqih* theory) is considered as a revolution within Shia religion. However, there is no proxy alliance in Turkey for Shia religion to interfere with Turkey's internal affairs, because Alevite in Turkey is one of the agents of state-establishment even though their religious identity politically has not been recognized by state. I will explain these issues in Chapter Five. On the one hand, Turkey has no strategic policy to return back to the Persian Gulf after the First World War. However, the military intervention of Turkey and Iran into Northern Iraq created tension between two regional powers. During Iran-Iraq war, Tehran used Kurdish guerrilla groups against Saddam regime and Turkey's growing influence in the region. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet empire, both Turkey and Iran tried to export their ideology to Central Asia and the Caucasus but the competitive strategy of both countries has not only failed but resulted in the building of a regional polarity; while Iran became political allied with Russia-Armenia, Turkey tried to use the Euro-Atlantic vision in the region and strengthened ties with Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, Russian military bases and the Russia-Georgian War in August 2008 checked Iran's political alliance and Turkey's economic dependency with the Kremlin. Another dimension of Turkish Iran competition was seen in the '*second order*' to be a reliable alliance with super power



United States; whilst the Shah of Iran achieved the *proxy alliance* of the Carter government, Turkey was faced with international isolation in the 1970s. Therefore, Turkey is benefited from the regime change in Iran to restore its alliance relationship with the North Atlantic Organisation. However, the Tehran government suffer a lot from '*negative balancer*' status even if enmity regime was overthrown in Iraq and Afghanistan.

There are two basic concepts checking the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey and Iran; the threat perception and regional alliance. (a) "Internal threat is more essential than the external one" as Steven David said. Thus Turkey sees radical Islamism and Kurdish nationalism as a national security threat while Iran considers that MKO and the secularist movement is a fatal threat for the regime survival. Turkey and Iran use the forces to penetrate the buffer zone when the power vacuum revealed in the region. The nature of their coercion is limited by hot pursuit right which does not allow full-party occupation to the buffer zone, because if any middle power or small power invades the buffer zone in the security complexes, they may cause regional or general war. Therefore, the balance of power does allow such power intervention into lesser power territory. For instance, Turkey and Iran made military intervention into Northern Iraq. However, they have been forced to remove their troops from Kurdistan-Iraq. The use of force also cannot solve transnational problems, therefore, the weakness of middle powers invites *third party* solutions or interventions such situation which occurred in the Ottoman-Egypt conflict, Crimean War and ongoing intervention and Afghanistan and in Iraq. The other characteristic of middle power produces negating strategy to demise her counterpart sphere of influence. For instance, Turkey and Iran has applied this policy strategy in Northern Iraq and Central Asia and Caucasus. I will deal with this '*negating strategy*' in the Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. On the other hand, Turkey benefited from the *forward player strategy* to increase her sphere of history in the Central Asia and the Caucasus and the Balkans. For instance, the independence of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina was the product of a forward strategy of patron-client alliance.

However, both countries achieved to contain either secularist or Islamic revolutionary activities by using para-military or non-military groups as state agents. In contrary to traditional middle power states, Turkey and Iran have used the agents to maintain

anarchy in domestic politics, and created counter revolutionary or counter terrorism strategies, because the state is not agent of society. Rather, society becomes the agent of state in both societies. However, they avoided going into direct conflict with each other, because if they went to war; they may cause total war that may change the balance of power in international system. I will explain the middle *power containment strategy* in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

On the other hand, (b) the middle power regional alliance does not provide anything in forming of a bloc. Similarly, Turkey and Iran's alliance relationship only created a *counter balance strategy* against the other regional powers. However, they have no capability to establish a security bloc to deter super power penetration into region because super power longs for maintaining of its containment in those regions by resisting their regional challenges (Holbraad, 1984:64).

(c.b.) *Cooperative détente relationship*: Cooperation between two neighbours is modified by an interdependence relationship in economy, transport, energy, security sectors and their technological dependency considerable component of *détente relationship*. The regular meeting of such organisations; ECO, Iran –Turkey Higher Security Cooperation and Border Security Commission, Tripartite Security Cooperation provide some systematic settlement between Iran and Turkey so that they arrange and rehabilitate possible misunderstandings in bilateral relations. Turkey's positive attitude on Iran against the United States' economic and political isolation politics prove that the Turkey- Iran relationship has special meanings as well as a fragile character, because the sovereignty of buffer states can play significant role in resist in hegemonic penetration. Therefore, Turkey rejects the possible *air strike* to Iranian nuclear facility, because the situation will break down the regional stability and possibly destroy Turkey's *strategic détente management* as well as agreements with Iran. Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement, the Nabucco pipeline project, and the ongoing Pars Gas Field deal increased the dependency relationship between two capitals. Therefore, Turkey supports Iran in her affiliated international organisation and never applied the economic sanction of the UN and the United States. I will explain these cases in Chapter Nine and Chapter Ten.

## 2.5. Identifying Variables

There are three variables which are applicable to theory building for the purposes of this case study: independent, dependent and control variables. Monroe (2000) argues that “Independent variables are those presumed in the theory underlying the hypothesis to be the cause and dependent variables are the effects or consequences” (p.20), but “control variables are additional variables that might affect the relationship between the independent and dependent variables” (p.21). All variables in the assumptions below would be measured in a quantitative or qualitative form for the same unit of analysis.

### 2.5.1 Domestic and national level variables for modelling the Turko-Iranian relations

The most important domestic factor that influences the foreign policy behaviour of states is the leadership group and state identities defined by them. The state identity is given here as independent variables, in return, leadership groups are considered as dependent variables for the unit level of analysis in Turko-Iran cases. Consequently, the following hypotheses are constructed as part of theory modelling in this section:

**Variable I a:** *Society, leadership and regime change*

**Assumption I a:** *Unless the leadership groups satisfy societies’ security, political and economic needs, or causes of conflict within the societies’ realm, the logic of collective action could reconstruct a new political discourse*

The society, which has always been the main machinery of domestic politics is considered here as an independent variable. However, leadership plays dependent variables role in this assumption. The security, economic, and political sectors are presented as conditions for the regime change which create a new political discourse. The structure of Turkish Iranian society is differentiated from each other in respect of identity construction and the entrancement of a new strategic culture. Iran established the imaginary society project that mixed Shia religion and Iranian nationalism. Iran

has not received much external population; therefore, the leadership could not impose any traumatic alteration in the society. However, 80% of Turkey's population rely on the external immigration from Caucasus and Balkans who established a secular regime and aimed to create a secular society under the auspices of a Turkish national state. Therefore, the Turkish imaginary society project put religion as a hidden identity but disregarded the ethnic diversity under Kemalist leadership. As a security provider, Kemalist leadership realigned with Kurdish and Alevite seculars who became the reliable agents of a Turkish nation state since the republican period. Therefore, Turkey has not been faced with such an Islamic revolution as in Iran by keeping religion as a hidden identity and using agents in the society. On the other hand, as an independent social body, Shia religious institutions changed the regime of the Shah. In the absence of internal security, economic weakness can bring the communicative action to change the regime. Messianic identity of leadership established an Islamic State at aiming to create a general Islamic society. However, leadership groups seem to be hijackers of the states in Iran and Turkey. Therefore, the absence of liberal society and social movement remains their regime security guarantee.

The following hypotheses will try to theorize the interlink between threat and policy behaviour of states as part of theory modelling in this section:

**Variable I b:** *internal and external threat and the leadership group*

**Assumption I b:** *If the elite leadership group perceives an internal and external threat against state-establishment, they may realign with the regional and super powers to ensure national or collective security.*

The leadership groups see themselves as state. Therefore, the leadership group is able to reconstruct the strategic political culture as well as the nation state identity. The modernisation program from above would be challenged by ethnic, religious, and ideological movements. Therefore, the threat perception is considered here as an independent variable. However, the leadership groups act as a dependent variable. The outcome of this interaction would be regional and domestic alliance in this assumption. For instance, Turkey and Iran established an alignment relation with US against Soviet threat. On the other hand, Iran has made a regional alliance with Syria

against American containment policy in the region. Turkey Iran Higher Security Commission serve co-operation and intelligence sharing against the Kurdish insurgency movement, because both Ankara and Tehran perceive Kurdish nationalism as an internal threat as well as an external one. Consequently, the following proposition is necessary for construction of the theory.

**Variable I c: State identity and patterns**

**Assumption I c:** *If state identity and its interests manifested themselves as competitive or co-operative patterns in an enmity and amity relationship, then the patterns determine the character of relationship between insulator states and regional middle-power states.*

The main determinant factor between two neighbouring states relations characterizes an autarkic interaction. As an independent variable, *the patterns* identify features of relations. State identity and interest serve as condition variables in this assumption. However, the regime differences sometimes create a competitive relationship, as opposed to a rationalist policy approach. The Islamic regime of Iran and the secular regime of Turkey reflect ‘*two sides of the same coin*’ but still have potential competitive and cooperative features of a relationship. The amity or enmity relationship depends on the individual leadership in that discourse. For example the leadership of the Ozal government emphasised the economic ties rather than political ones. However, the leadership of the military governments by Ecevit and Yilmaz highlighted the political and regime interaction versus the leadership of Khomeini and Rafsanjani, which was confrontational and resulted in the mutual undermining of state identities. Hence, the fourth hypothesis, which explains the importance of regime security for the leadership group, is appropriate for the construction of this theory.

**Variable I d: regime threat and leadership**

**Assumption I d:** *Regime security is more important than the state security as the regime survival is equated to state survival, bringing about the regional authoritarian state. If the regime identity plays an effective role in foreign policy making of the states, the state-to-state relations are more confrontational than co-operative within the regional system.*

The threat is considered as independent variable; because the leadership groups actions rely on the challenge of threat in this assumption. The interaction between two variables would conclude duality relations in such cooperation or competition. The Islamic regime of Iran and the secularist regime of Turkey are considered to be alternative political models for the Muslim state in general. Therefore, the revolutionary export policies of the Iranian government have been perceived as a national security threat by Turkey, and Islamic tendencies in domestic politics are also manipulated through resident Islamic communities by the secular leadership of Turkey. For instance, the headscarf issue is the main reason behind cutting diplomatic relationship twice in the last three decades. Therefore, the security issue preserves its relative status quo as a source of conflict in Turko-Iranian relations. Consequently, the following hypothesis emphasises the importance of theory-setting.

### **2.5.2 Transnational level variables**

There are many significant transnational factors influencing the foreign policy behaviour of a state, among which ideological and ethnic movements cause a new direction of foreign policy continuity and change in the systemic context as discussed in the following sections.

#### **Variable II a: *Transnational ideology and the leadership group***

**Assumption II a:** *If transnational ideology challenges the governing groups or social stability of the regional system or international system, regional states and governing elite groups reorganise its foreign policy and make alliances with the less threatening ideologies or external environments, especially in religious, social, and political concepts, all of which may have a deterministic impact on foreign policy making, as ideological movements organise the new societal identities and influence directly or indirectly the foreign policy behaviour of the state.*

Transnational movement is taken as an independent variable which determines the behaviour of the leadership groups. The consequences of threat perception would be an alliance with internal agents to contain counter ideological movement. Whilst ideological movements rehabilitate the behaviour of the state and create a new dynamic unit for state bureaucracy and society, economy and political behaviour of

the state, they also produce the opposite frictions in middle-power countries, so as to challenge the regime or governing elite group's static position. The regimes and societies within such states are very vulnerable to transnational ideological movements, which lead these countries to forge alliances with the external environment, employing an Omnibalancing policy model in their internal and external affairs. The state attempts to create balance and thus co-operate with less threatening regimes against the primary threat. Political and ideological revolution (political Islam) in a state (Iran) causes the reorientation of the foreign policy of other states (Turkey) in that regard. Consequently, the hypotheses on revolution are constructed as part of theory modelling in this section:

**Variable II b:** *Third World revolution and super power*

**Assumption II b:** *If middle-power states' have a revolutionary movement such as the Islamic revolution in Iran and communist revolution in Third World, they may challenge the interest of the super power interest in the region. However, the global power is able to contain the revolutionary expansion of these states in the regional politics by use of counter-revolutionary policy strategy.*

The revolution is considered as an independent variable which receives a counter effect from offshore balancer super power. The political outcome will be containment policy or using of second order military coercion against the middle power revisionist policy. For Iran, experience indicates that the middle-power states' revolutions are able to expand their influence to the whole region. However, if an ideology is perceived as a threat to global power's interest in the region, the global powers create a barrier against its overexpansion into the region. For instance, the Turkish secularist revolution has not been considered a threat for Western civilisation, but the Islamic revolution of Iran is perceived as a threat for global powers and their allied interests in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Hence, the regional state and super powers were able to manipulate the overexpansion of the middle-power state revolution and also to counter the interference to the Middle East by the other super power. With regard to Turkish domestic politics, the super power (United States) countered the left-wing revolutionary challenge posed by the Turkish youth movement in 1980. Hence, the institutional integration of client and patron

relationship allows the super power to directly or indirectly interfere in domestic politics of a country without undermining the sovereignty of the leadership group and the state identity. Consequently, the following assumptions focus on sub-group regional actors as part of theory modelling in this section:

**Variable II c:** *Sub-group ethnic nationalism and internal leadership groups*

**Assumption II c:** *When sub-group ethnic nationalism causes intensive social movements against the common strategic political interests, the leadership of the state use military coercion against these militarised groups and seeks collaboration with the other regional countries encountering similar challenges.*

Kurdish military guerrillas have behaved as a regional player. Hence, they are considered as an independent variable in this assumption. However, leadership group's behaviour depends on their campaign for the counter action. As a result of it, the outcome would be either military intervention or regional co-operation in the region. A topic worthy of examination is the transnational ethnic nationalism of the Kurdish people in the Middle East, which illustrates middle-state power behaviour against internal and external threats. Steven David claims this is an internal threat as the Islamic movement and Kurdish nationalism inside Turkey are manageable. On the other hand, the transnational movement of Kurdish nationalism is a tool of interference with the regional affairs of the Turkish government. Hence, Turkey was able to exploit a power vacuum to conduct military incursions into Northern Iraq. Therefore, the anarchical character of sub-group nationalism creates amity and enmity patterns of relationships between regional and global power. Security cooperation between Turkey and Iran is a reliable hypothesis in seeking cooperative relationship against the common regional threat, especially with regards to Kurdish issues in the Middle East, despite having different regimes and a bipolar regional setting.

**Variable II d:** *Transnational sub-group nationalist threat and leadership groups*

**Assumption II d:** *If the transnational ethnic movement is a secondary threat for other regional states, these states will use such ethnic nationalism against their counterpart states. The host states will make alliances with other regional or global*



*states in order to balance against the threat coming from transnational ethnic nationalism and supervised states.*

The Kurdish nationalist threat is considered as an independent variable in this assumption while leadership's political activities are seen as a dependent variable. The consequences of this conflict would form the regional alliance. The militarisation of Kurdish nationalism became both an internal and external threat, which politicised the transnational phenomena especially in 1990s, for Turkey. Iran and its alliance with Syria have used Kurdish and Islamist groups as political cards against Turkey's active politics in the Middle East and Central Asia to decrease its influence since the 1980s. Whilst Turkey strengthened its relationship with Israel, Iran has focused on Russia and also domestic military technology, especially with by restarting the nuclear programme. This regional environment against transnational Kurdish movement is vulnerable to external interference in a variety of different ways. Thus, regional middle-power states struggling with the militarisation of ethnic movements force them to make alliances with regional and international powers.

As I mentioned in the first section, the foreign policy behaviour of states is influenced by many systemic factors such as international structure, alliance patterns, regional context, geopolitical and geo strategic positions of states as well as international regimes. This study argues that systemic factors are equally effective in determining foreign policy of the middle-power and insulator countries' relations. The relationship between global powers and middle-power states is seen as periphery and core in the context of relations in the global view, which mostly involved patron-client or overlaid relationship. Both regional middle-powers and global powers are unable to directly control peripheral regions and neither great powers nor middle powers are able to dominate the regions. However, if they are dominant, they will likely become a global power. Therefore, hostile great powers can be deterred from attacking the middle-powers. Alliance relations between regional middle powers are the main obstacle to global dominance, in that regional middle powers are able to escape from diplomatic isolation and defend their sovereignty (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). Consequently, the following hypotheses, relating to systemic levels, are also constructed as part of theory modelling within this Chapter.

### 2.5.3. Systemic level variables

According to systemic change in the international system, state leadership can create a new dynamic of society and a new bureaucratic class that brings a new direction to state foreign policy that could turn former friendly states into enemies in relation to the state identity. Most change in the middle power state internal politics is reshuffled or shaped by the super power containment and coercion. Therefore, systemic setting has relative influence in the domestic politics of middle power states.

#### **Variable IV a:** *patron-client relations, and containment*

**Assumption IV a:** *Middle-power and global power relationships characterise the deferrable and cooperative features in systemic realms; while middle power states are able to bargain with the global power as to its own interest and defend her from global power isolation, a global power has the capability to operate or override the region and establish an opposite-pole system by directing a regional middle power satellite state.*

The systemic behaviour of patron and client is considered as an independent variable; however, the containment and bargaining power capability of states bring about an alternative alliance in the region. For instance, despite counter revolutionary activities, dual containment, and the metaphor “axis of evil” politics of United States, Iran sustains its regional status quo and applies alternative politics by entering the Asian markets to avoid Western isolation. However, the politics of Washington became the primary national security threat after the occupation to Afghanistan and Iraq as far as the Iranian leadership group is concerned. However, Iran’s negative balancer role and Turkey’s client status could not resist the super power intervention into their backyard. Therefore, both negative balancer and client are not happy to see the preponderance policy of the neo-conservative US government. On the one hand, Patron-client relations enforced to co-opt the Turkey-Israel security agreement.

As a result, the following assumption explains the interest conflict between super power and middle power state relationship.

**Variable IV b: *interest conflict and alliance relationship***

**Assumption IV b:** *If the interest becomes confrontational between a patron and a client state, the systemic setting in the international system determines their alliance relationship's continuity and change, which may be confrontational or cooperative. Unlike alliance relationships, if the interests of the super power and the enemy state converge; the regional alliance would be more vulnerable for turning into a cooperative or alliance relationship as long as the ideological differences are not a threat for super power interests in the region.*

The interest conflict plays independent orientation between super power and client states. The situation can check the reliability of their alliance relationship. Therefore, the outcome of this confrontation will determine the patterns of relations. For instance, American and Turkish interests were contradictory, especially American support for the state establishment process in “*Kurdistan-Iraq*” after the failure of the March memorandum in Turkish parliament to open the northern ‘*front door*’ for the U.S army. However, Washington and Tehran have agreed to cooperation against the Taliban regime until Bush’s announcement of the “*axis of evil*” which included Iran. The cooperation in Iraq with regard to Shia groups is still ongoing between the two opposite alliances, but this partial cooperative relationship would not be able to change the negative balancer role of Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia. On one hand, the systemic alliance relationship between Turkey and United States is also more competitive than cooperative, including by countering the PKK in the region after the new Washington process in early 2008.

On the other hand, super powers never allow the emergence of middle power states as regional powers in the regional system. Foreign policy behaviour of great powers and middle-powers is rationally based on the anarchical system (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). However, the overriding of regions is very vulnerable to the transformation of new security complexes which have capability to deter regional hegemonic competition in areas of regional middle-powers. Competitive and co-operative relations are mostly seen in mini sub-complexes and in sub-units in the region because this complex is very vulnerable to foreign penetration. An insulator middle power state, which is not able to bring the different complexes together into one coherent strategic arena, plays a passive balancing role in the instable and overridden regions. It is more dependent on core global power policies, unless its

interest is confrontational. Therefore, the patron-client relationship between insulator and the global power provides foreign influence in the region with the contractual activities and also an alliance against the regional competitors (Buzan and Waever, 2003:40-89). The following hypothesis explains the regional competition and regional integration.

#### **2.5.4 Regional level variables**

**Variable V a:** *Power vacuum and competition,*

**Assumption V b:** *Historical rivalry torch between middle power states becomes apparent if the power vacuum manifests itself in the adjacent vulnerable region or the major power withdraws from the region. The competition will be able to create a medium sized bipolarity system in the region.*

The power vacuum is presented as a conditional variable which creates a competitive relationship. The competitive character of relationship is considered as an independent variable even if the competition depends on the balance of power in the region. The competition between middle power states can only negate each other's influence in the region. The logic of this regional rivalry torch and anarchical order in the region is seen as competitive due to the super-power interest competition in the region. The main determining variants in the regional systemic contexts are historical standings, overlay and transformation. The relationships between the periphery and semi-periphery or regional systems and subsystems or unit/subunits are the main systemic regional explanations used to understand regional anarchy. Buzan and Waever (2003) believe that the regional system is anarchic as the anarchy is by its nature a structural systemic anarchy. Thus, the regional states' foreign policy behaviour is explained by the realist understanding of such great power politics in the region. The tools of this anarchical system are non-governmental sub-state entities or internal threats and low interaction capacities of the regional states, which are key technological devices and social infrastructure. Competitive and co-operative relations are experienced in the realist game within historical standings, because internal threats are vulnerable to becoming external threats through the actions of regional and global powers. The regional states receive threats from neighbouring countries, if regional subsystem where a particular state is located is unstable and has many conflicting issues. The

regional context may, therefore, enforce states to pursue a defensive or offensive deterrence policy.

Turkey and Iran have got a middle-power state capacity to influence the region (Ehteshami and Hinnebush, 1997). Consequently, the following assumptions explain the economic dependency and political integration for purposes of constructing this theory.

**Variable V b:** *dependency and competition*

**Assumption V b:** *If economic variables (energy, communications and economic incorporation in this research) are more important than political integration, then the competition characterises the economic struggle for institutionalism. However, middle-power states do not have the capacity required to create institutional incorporation models for the regional economic and political integration, as is the case with, for example, the European Union.*

The dependency relationship between medium-ranked states is evaluated as independent variables. However, the competition depends on the patterns of economic variables. The relationship would be characterized as cooperative but institutional. Theoretically, middle-power states would be able to compete with their equivalent counterparts to penetrate regions by using their cultural and economic proximity. However, geo-economic and geopolitical regional autarky requires cooperative and competitive rational politics. Hence two regional middle-powers are able to manage co-operative or competitive relationships with weaker states. However, they are not capable of establishing an institutional integration or coalition-building to dominate the region. In fact, the regional middle-power states are depended on the core, economically and technologically. However, the physical regional dependency enforces the cooperative relationship between middle-powers. In reality, regional dependency is more important than the global dependency relationship, because geo-economics and geo- cultural linkage enforce compulsory relationships between them. There are three vital dynamic elements in developing the dependency relationship between Turkey and Iran. These variables encourage the middle-power state to forge an economic alliance but economic institutionalism could not provide any systematic management in the regional system. For instance, the Economic Cooperation

Organisation and the Organisation for Islamic Countries are not capable of institutionalising Turko-Iranian partnership within the Northern Tier geography. Consequently, the following section provides an experimental explanation for the testing of the integrated model.

## **2.6. Parameters of the integrated model for the unit level analysis in Turkish-Iranian cases**

The multi-paradigm perspective tries to restructure a model for Turko-Iran cases during the Cold War and in the period that followed. The model consists of domestic and national, transnational (ethnic nationalism, ideology), systemic and regional variables, used to explain regional middle-power states' relationships within the parameters of this case study since 1979. Theories relevant to national identity provide an explanation for the domestic, bureaucratic and the leadership's role played in foreign policy formation within Turkey and Iran. For transnational cases, political Islam and secularism, Islamic terrorism, and Kurdish nationalism will be examined. Additionally, the regional co-operative détente or competitive détente relationship in Central Asia and the Caucasus attract the focus of this study with regard to issues of energy security and also examine the economic integration of the regional state with new partners as well as between themselves.

### **2.6.1 The experimental model for the deconstruction of Turkish and Iranian grand strategy**

The concepts of Turkish and Iranian identity are more stable than state identity, which is changeable if the systemic situation creates any alternative models such as imperial or nation states. However, the new identity definition of peoples transforms society by preserving certain characteristics of the former manifestations. Hence, continuity is a factor within the definition of individual identity in Wendt's writings, but the change would be experienced in the regime, ideology, and nationalism as dependent variables, as even though Turks and Iranians reside in different locations and were controlled by different dynasties, Turkish and Iranian people maintained their status quo as separate national identities in the primitive basin of civilisation. Turkish cultural identity

integrated with three other cultural identities, which are the Russian, Persian, and Greek culture of identities. I describe the experience of both nations as *the Turko-Persian cultural synthesis* in the 9th and 10th centuries, within Chapter Three. The countries' leaderships use authoritarian social engineering processes to reconstruct nation state identity. While Turks reject their historical reservation and experience which they now define as a '*torn identity*', Iranian people preserves the cultural connection with their past. However, the revolutionary religious leadership try to engineer the society as a religious one, unlike the Turkish secularist implementation. In fact, both leadership groups would oppose transnational movements which are contrary to their nature. After the revolution, the different religious formations such as Shia and Sunni, presented an alternative sectarian religious identity. While Iran's religious identity play a more important role, Turkey's Sunni religious identity still has a passive role so called '*hidden identity*' of secular state-establishment. However, the nationalist and secularist identities of Turkey are still seen as an alternative regime for the regional countries. On the other hand, the involvement of the Islamic Iranian regime in the nuclear programme is considered to be a part of the strategic culture in the security sector which has resulted in militarisation of the internal politics of Iran. However, the religious state identity of Iran strengthened the position of Turkish secular leadership and secular identity of Turks as a Western security ally. Hence, the westernisation politics of the Turkish state are considered a part of national identity of Turkish people. I will apply this model to my case studies in Chapter Three and Chapter Four.

### **2.6.2 The experimental model for complete détente relationship in discourse of religious-ideological and Kurdish transnational movement**

The Islamic ideology of Iran emerged as threat for Western interests and secular regimes of the Middle East in 1979. As a consequence of the Islamic revolution, the United States and Israel lost one of the most important alliances in the region. However, Turkey benefited from the new positioning of Iran in the international community, as this caused the strengthening of its ties with the Western security and economic systems, particularly in the military *coup d'état* in Turkey in 1980s. The domestic restructuring of Iranian and Turkish foreign policies contributes to international confrontation with regard to veil disputes and Turkish Hezbollah, which

twice caused diplomatic crises, because the ideological differences are perceived an alternative threat for the regime of both countries. The Kurdish nationalist movement and military insurgency campaigns of PKK and PJAK are classified as transnational factors in the study of Turkish and Iranian relations. The tripartite security cooperation among Syria, Iran and Turkey challenges Kurdish nationalism after the super-power involvement in Iraq. American-led invasion of Iraq and the super power involvement creates a mortal threat for the regional states, making the area more vulnerable to foreign influence, especially in Iraq and the Kurdish areas. The conflict between the patron and client and between negative balancer and offshore super power is still a useful point of analysis in identifying the power of transnational movements. This competitive détente relationship will be dealt with in the Chapter Five, Chapter Six and Chapter Seven.

### **2.6.3 Testing model for cooperative and competitive détente relationship in Central Asia and the Caucasus**

Regional systems are considered to be a microcosm of the international system and the changes in the international community, as a bipolar system and unipolar order, were equally significant for the regional systems. The regional opposite alliance system is not as active as the rivalry of great powers, but it has importance from the regional perspective. Iran's alliance relationship and close ties with Russia and Asian complexes are perceived as a threat and a source of anxiety for Turkish foreign policy makers. On the other hand, Turkey's alliance with Israel and NATO are considered a national security threat to Iran. However, the American intervention inot Turko-Iran buffer zone has broken the negative balancer role of Iran and forward strategy of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey-Iran security will dramatically increased in Northern Iraq since the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Turkey's insulator role in the region provides the facilities for Iran to promote its nuclear ambitions to penetrate the region, while its systemic Western-oriented regional policies provide a threat for Iran's regional ambitions. Nevertheless, both countries are always aware and careful not to escalate into open conflict with one another. Even if this regional low-intensity opposite alliance system looks like a Cold War conflict between both countries, this anarchical regional order creates a



hierarchical balancing act in the region, as well. This can, in turn, be explained with realist-perspective assumptions. In considering geopolitics, Turkey and Iran are not a regional threat to one another, locally, as both states' boundaries are determined through geographic realities and cultural borders of the society shaped over the centuries (Balbay, 2006). However, this does not prevent an influence competition over Iraq and the Caucasus during the historical process (Davutoglu, 2004). The balancing relationship between Turkey and Iran has successfully operated the peaceful co-existence, discussed in the following sections.

Buzan and Weaver (2003) defines the Middle East region as a pattern of security interdependence that covers a region stretching from Morocco to Iran, including all of Arab states plus Israel and Iran but excluding Cyprus, Sudan and the African Horn. Afghanistan is an insulator between Middle East and South Asia and Turkey between it and Europe. Davutoglu points out that those external triangular strategies of Turkey, Iran and Egypt determine the politics of regional setting for the grand strategies of these middle power states as a historical continuity and change (Davutoglu, 2004). The political sketch between external triangles operates the internal dimension but the influence of great powers and middle-powers should accumulate the power politics in the region, but such sub-systems of Iraq, Saudi, Syrian and mini subsystem of Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Northern Iraq and Israel's its own subsystem generally have been characterised as competitive with each other in the Middle Eastern security system. On the other hand, Mutual regional threats and regional competition operate in both countries' regional relations. The competition between these regional players is experienced in the shadow of the great powers. However, Turkey and Iran have never gone ahead to the point of regional co-operation against their mutual threats due to the existence of the dominant factors of different state identities and interests in the region. They prefer to co-operate in some areas of consensus where threats are concerned, rather than creating a regional security complication for their respective national securities. As I mentioned above, Turkey's and Iran's regional threats have always been Russia and the domestic ethnic paramilitary groups. Therefore, the Soviet threat during the Cold War pushed both countries towards an alliance with the Western security system. However, after the Cold War, the situation changed within the international system, and so Turkey and Iran diversified their foreign policies. The realms of historical rivalry then appeared and their competitive or cooperative détente

relationship began in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Northern Iraqi region. The influence of Turkey and Iran in Central Asia operates through competition, but the rivalry over the Caucasus complexes is more intensive than those in Central Asia. Turkey's nationalist ambition over the Caucasus mini sub-complexes is a threat for national security of Iran and Russia--since Turkey pursues parallel policies with the superpower against Russia and Iran in the region. On the other hand Iran prefers to have a co-operative relationship with Russia over the Caucasus mini complexes. However, Iranian geographical advantages and Turkey's cultural benefit create a balance between the two regional players. The failure of the regional policies of Turkish and Iranian parties over Central Asia facilitate the regional establishment of an independent security complex, but the Caucasus complex is always vulnerable for foreign military intervention such Russia-Georgian War in August 2008. The competition in the region is rather a struggle of economic influence than is one of political influence.

#### **2.6.4 Experimental model for cooperative détente relationship in the discourses of complex- interdependency**

The regional middle-power states are dependent on the core economically and technologically, but they are more dependent on their neighbours in aspects of regional necessities, such as economic, especially energy and transportation, cultural and security issues. This peripheral dependency necessitates creating a balance or shaping the co-operative détente relationship between the two neighbours. The most important sector of the Turkey-Iran relationship will be checked on economic and security interdependency. However, the Iran-Iraq war, which brought economic opportunities to improve Turkey's Middle Eastern relations, the country has followed pragmatist and 'active *neutrality*' foreign policies against Iran and Iraq during wartime. Turkey is also the only Western alliance country that did not recognize the American economic sanctions (the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act) against Iran. For instance, in opposition to this economic embargo, Turkey made a natural gas deal with Iran in 1997. However, the institutional relationship (ECO, D-8 and OIC) between Turkey and Iran is not constructive in bringing about regional integration, or coalition building in economic and security sector. As we mentioned above, middle power states have no capacity for such a model against balance of power in the region.

Rather than dealing with the operational measurement of variables which had outlined in methodology section of introduction. The following section will try to establish its own integrated approach to the cases of Turkey Iran relations as part of articulation theory modelling in international relations.

## **2.7. Conclusion: Contribution of the Integrated Approach to the Discipline**

Rather than focusing on specific theories or single model, much of sub-lens systemic integrated approaches draw upon insights from the field of international relations to develop generalisation for explaining domestic, regional and global politics of middle power states. The theories of omnibalancing, RSCT and constructivism are reviewed integrated approaches to Turkish and Iranian cases.

The theory of omnibalancing asserted that realism must be broadened to examine the internal threat in addition to focusing on external threats and capabilities. Seeking *is* valuable in examining the middle-power states' multi-directional international politics. However, contrary to the main principle of the omnibalancing theory, this study posits that the middle-power state is a unitary actor for the principle unit of analysis. The concept of Turkish and Iranian states is socially constructed with the legacy of the independence war in Turkey and the Islamic revolution in Iran. Hence, the secular leadership of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and Messianic leadership in Iran are also unitary actors. Hence, this oligarchic leadership of the middle power state is different from the leadership of institutionally constructed western states. If the leaderships' interest and national interests come into conflict, they may choose their interests in the framework of security, because they became states. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran have an extensive interest in economic cooperation. However, due to security and economic engagements with different blocs; they do not have enough policy capacity to establish a regional economic system in the area. Having different religious and ideological backgrounds, the leadership of middle-powers use this ideological differentiation to legitimise their legacy. So, they are content with regional and domestic anarchy even if this transnational movement damages the national and public interests. On the other hand, the policy outcomes of states and regimes as unitary actors are vulnerable to internal and external penetration. The external type is

seen here as global functionalism, which indirectly influences the society of the middle-power state. The state regime and leadership can control these external and internal dependent threats, especially by using its agent communities. As stated by Steven David, an internal threat is manageable, such as Kurdish nationalism, political Islamic movement and internal terrorism. However, there is a gap between his theory and rational politics and the weakness of his explanation pertains to constitute a manageable internal threat. This study argues that the domestic movement (internal threat) can become a transnational one if it challenges the state regime and leadership by using military options. Secondly, if the state regime or leadership lost their hegemony with the alliance agents (Alevites in Turkey) and less threatening agents (Islamic groups), the society would establish another political discourse or new leadership such as the Islamic revolution in Iran. Therefore, middle-power states should provide a power vacuum between systemic and domestic demands to impede their mutual enforcement, so as to maintain the legacy in society, but always remain open to the use of force against the overexpansion of transnational movements, which invite the external intervention of regional and global powers. The agent communities who are not fully part of the state-establishment must find an '*opportunity space*' in the centre or share the wealth of the state. However, this agent expansion in the state is limited only by economic liberalism but not by political factors in the long run. Therefore, while having an alternative regime theory, political parties have never been institutionalised in Turkey and Iran. For instance, the deviation of Menderes, Ozal, Erbakan and Erdogan or Khatemi's leadership could not provide any '*policy outcomes*' as unitary actors in the secular state-establishment or messianic leadership, because they are considered as part of the leadership group's perestroika, negating and agent construction strategy for the continuity of the regime. The inside and outside interactions between the core and the periphery have the same measurements of independent and dependent variables. The outcome would be seen as an integration process on both sides but the hegemony of the state could not refrain from use of force to penetrate the state-establishment in Turko-Iranian relations.

However, society is not set in stone; the dynamics of change could subvert the *logic of collective action* in society. The subversion in the '*opportunity space*' presents similar issues of super power leadership and middle-power leadership interactions despite the discrepancies of using power against the threats differentiated by the regimes. While

super-power states use soft power and their institutional bodies, which provide a wide range of *public space* against the leadership, the middle-power behaviour against the internal threat demonstrate the *hard-power intervention* with regard to the periphery. Due to absence of the wide range “*public space*”, the practical intervention of the middle-power state could appear as a military “*coup d’état*”, as experienced in Turkey three times during half a century. However, the intervention of the institutionally constructed liberal state leadership could be vanishing in the public sphere as such Western countries prevail in society. Due to a lack of opportunity space to crystallise the public demand and state authority, internal threats can be considered as being more dangerous than external ones in the middle power states theory. For example, the Turkish state used coercion against Kurdish insurgency and employed religious agents (Islamic groups) against Turkish Hezbollah in the 1990s, because the Turkish state and its leadership do not have enough political power to satisfy the ethnic and religious demands coming from the periphery.

On the other hand, there is *subversion* in liberal society, especially against the foreign identities, namely immigrants from the Islamic world. As a consequence of liberalism and globalism, liberalist society does not want to share its wealth with foreign entities that increase nationalism and create a barrier against global integration in the nation state system. As a result of liberalist society subversion, the global war on terror and the focus on internal threats, attention is also given to external connections to rogue identities in the Western societies. Therefore, foreign immigrants are contemplated as a homeland security issue and are the biggest threat for Western democracies in this regard (Buzan and Weaver, 2003).

The omnibalancing theory provides an explanation for alignment and realignment of Third World states’ policies when they choose a side. David presumes that state can choose the less threatening partner, especially on the issue of transnational Kurdish nationalism. Iran used Kurdish nationalism against the rising influence of Turkey after the Cold War. However, after the emergence of PJAK as a national security threat for Iran, Tehran terminated close relationship with the militant Kurdish nationalist movement. In that discourse, the Regional Security theory of Buzan explains *the holy tripartite security meeting* of Turkey-Syria-Iran. On the other hand, if the transnational movement became the common enemy, the adjacency could generate the

security interaction between the regional states and result in military cooperation for national security in countering transnational movements.

The secular regimes of the Turkish and Islamic regimes of Iran cannot extensively expand into the region because they do not have enough systematic capacity to produce an alternative economic and political discourse for the international community. Their revolutionary movement is manageable by a super power by using of containment strategy. For instance, the Islamic revolution of Iran has been successfully manipulated by the United States' counter-revolutionary politics. On one hand, middle-power states benefit from this opposite regional setting. For instance, Turkey strengthened its ties with Western security and economic systems after the Islamic revolution.

In the framework of the middle-power definition, states can organise the regional polarity system in their sphere of influence but middle-power states would be incapable of creating a regional integration or coalition buildings. The institutional integration of middle-power states after the Cold War could not produce any systematic formations. For example, domestic change in Russia concluded with the dissolution of the Soviet Empire; most scholars state that Turkey and Iran would have occupied the vacuum in the region due to having some degree of generalised common identity or loyalty with Central Asian states and countries of the Caucasus. However, the security and economic interdependence of these states produced a new regional system. The middle-power interactions in the region have only experienced economic competition, especially in the field of energy. To integrate my middle power theory, the nature of Turkey- Iran relations had been determined as cordial, détente relationship mentioned above since the 1979.

Consequently, this chapter examines these areas to explain foreign policy continuity and change -- the systemic and regional changes after the domestic changes occurred in the Soviet Union; the systemic and the regional systems are seen as an independent variable for *Newly Independent States* and Turkey/Iran. Hence, the competitive and cooperative relations have been restricted by the balance of power's delimitation in Turko-Iranian relations. On the other hand, the geographic adjacency and its related economic autarky are the main motives of regional state cooperation. The domestic

policy change and regime change resulted in the growth of the transnational movement, especially with regard to the formation of religion, ideology, nuclear proliferation and internal terrorism in regional politics. Despite playing a part in the systemic, regional, and domestic changes in the society of states, Turkishness and Iranianhood remain the main dependent variables in identifying middle-power states' international politics. Hence, the following two Chapters attempt to contextualise the construction and reconstruction of Turkish and Iranian strategic cultures of security, state, religion and society.

## CHAPTER THREE:

### THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF TURKO-PERSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURAL IDENTITY

#### 3.1. Introduction

Despite social structural differences, the two nations achieved a common epistemological cultural synthesis in which the material conditions, interests, and ideas constitute part of a framework. The mutual social and political systems allowed them to avert Arabic cultural assimilation by maintaining their language and social identities in the Middle Ages. However, the gap between ancient Persians and Turks has, in modern times, crystallised the cultural identity of Turko - Persia, creating a profound Islamic civilisation and fashioning the “*Gaza*” spirit of Islam in the 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> centuries are modern times makes it easier to understand the common elements of the two countries. Even though the cordial give-and-take relationship had mutual influence, the *status quo* of the nations did not preclude national awareness, but rather created a mutual national culture. On the other hand, the segregation of Turko-Persian national identity in the 16<sup>th</sup> century reinforced the ethnic national consciousness of both nations. However, despite of their similarities of their cultural identities, there was also conflict (Tucker, 2006:114). Central Asia and the Caucasus played central roles in the development of a Turko - Persian strategic culture. However, Kurdish and Shia externalism penetrated this Turko - Persian cultural synthesis as foreign elements; externalism had become a sordid political card used to weaken each others’ strategic national interests in the region, and magnifying the peripheral ethnic nationalist issues during the previous two centuries. The states’ security concerns became a main instrument in the ir formation as the nation states.

The author argues that historical and sociological institutionalism as well as symbolic interactionism constitutes elements of structural idealism in Turko - Iranian relations that can be now designated as an undefined common political identity. The author also aims to draw the main lines of this interaction and to discover the paradigm shifts in the Turko - Iranian relationship, which are influencing the foreign policy makers’ mindset in modern times. The author outlines the historical those paradigm shifts from the present day back to the past by using the periodisation method of social history



theory. He also uses the key concept of Robert Confield's "*Turko - Persian synthesis*" which facilitates the contextualisation of the concept of 'Turko - Persian strategic cultural synthesis' (Katzenstein, 1996), and applies the Alexander Wendt social theory of international relations within this chapter.

### **3.2.0 The conceptual framework for a Turkish national identity**

Turkish people were faced with three fundamental national identity crises throughout their history: Chinese assimilation, conversion to Islam and Westernisation. This section presents an overview of the important Turkish national identity fragmentations, which include language, homeland, culture, religion, and history from the foundation of the ancient Turkish Empire to the present day (Smith, 1990:14-103). Conversion to Islam and the evolution of a Turkish Islamic paradigm are investigated in the third section which provides an explanation for the crisis in Westernisation policies.

All languages change. Otherwise the users will belong to a state characterized by inertia status qua. Hence, change rather than perpetual continuity characterises Turkish language formation. Turks rejected the adoption of the symbolic Chinese languages in the early stage of their history to instead preserve the phonetic '*Orkhon inscriptions*' until they converted to Islam. The '*sun language theory*' and '*the Turkish history thesis*' claim that the Etruscan alphabet originally imitated an ancient Turkish language, which provides a cultural explanation for the ancient Turkish homeland of Anatolia but also supports the idea of Turkish nation being the part of the Western community (Mirsan, 1966, 1970, 1985, and 1998). This idealistic nationalism philosophy also proliferates pan - Turkish ideas of the unity of Turkish nations stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Wall of China, after the collapse of the Soviet empire. This romantic nationalism in Turkey could not keep pace with the realm of Turkish language formation during the historical process. Due to divisions into Turkic language, Turkic states cannot communicate with each other. In 1990s, the Turkish International Cooperation Development Agency (TIKA) organised a grouping of countries to create new common alphabets to develop economic, cultural and political connections with each other (Oran, 2005). This project aims to fulfil the theory of Ismail Gasprinski (1841-1941) who published a newspaper in the Crimea called

Tercuman, which had as its motto “*dilde, fikirde, iste birlik*” (unity in language, thought and action).

**Table 3.1: Turko or Turko Tatar language divisions**

|          |             |                          |
|----------|-------------|--------------------------|
| JAGATAI  | TATAR       | WESTERN TURKISH          |
| Uighur   | Kyrgyz      | Derbent                  |
| Koman    | Bashkir     | Azerbaijani              |
| Jagatai  | Nogai       | Crimean                  |
| Uzbek    | Kuman       | Anatolian                |
| Turkoman | Karachai    | Rumelian(Constantinople) |
| Kazan    | Kara-Kalpak |                          |
|          | Meshcherak  |                          |
|          | Siberian    |                          |

Sources: Czaplicka, and Collins, 1999

According to this classification, modern Turkey has accommodated Rumelian language groups but excluded the imports (Ottoman language) from Arabic and Persian languages. Rather, they used the Anatolian people’s language to create an imaginary homogeneous society by transferring former paradigms to the Turkish nation (Lewis, 2001). With the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, as part of the Westernisation process, the connection between the Ottoman heritage and the new nation was completely cut off. Ataturk aimed at creating a homogeneous society based on Turkish ethnicity by changing it from a heterogeneous society based on the millet system of the Ottomans (Perry, 1985).As a new imagined language project, Today’s Turkish language is very close to Azerbaijani and Crimean languages, but the Jagatai Turkic language family has different cultural and political connotations in the Asian steppes. In this respect, Kazakh and Uzbek identities compete and shape the future of political and cultural formation in the Central Asia. The chart below shows the languages and population divisions during the first census after the establishment of the nation state. The only ethnic majority language was Kurdish, but Turkish speakers constituted more than 98 percent of the population. This language was thus chosen as a strategic national cultural frame of the modern Turkish state.

**Table 3.2: Turkey’s language and population distribution in the census of 1927**

| Race             | Turkey in Europe | Turkey in Asia | Total      |
|------------------|------------------|----------------|------------|
| Turks            | 774,800          | 10,961,200     | 11,736,000 |
| Kurds            | 1,700            | 1,182,300      | 1, 184,000 |
| Arabs            | -                | 134,000        | 134,000    |
| Circassians      | 1000             | 95,900         | 96,000     |
| Albanians        | 5,000            | 15,000         | 20,000     |
| Tartars          | 400              | 10,600         | 1 1,000    |
| Pomaks           | 1,000            | 9,000          | 10,000     |
| Greeks           | 77,000           | -              | 77,000     |
| Armenians        | 50,000           | 27,000         | 77,000     |
| Bulgars          | 2,000            | 1,000          | 3,000      |
| Jews             | 45,000           | 37,000         | 82,000     |
| Unclassified     | 18,000           | 114,000        | 132,000    |
| Foreign subjects | 65,000           | 21,000         | 86,000     |
| Total            | 1,040,000        | 12,608,000     | 13,648,000 |

Sources: Pallis, 1938

On the other hand, the Ottoman strategic language approach attempted to create a special imperial political language but not a scientific or cultural one. Since this language was produced from the mature grammar and vocabulary words from Jagatai, Farsi, Arabic and Anatolian languages, it became the symbol of the Turkish Islamic paradigms during the imperial period. But its duality in written and spoken forms caused it to be removed from publications so as to allow communications with the periphery in Anatolia. Nor was it also not embraced by other parts of the empire, and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s language reforms adopted a new version, as part of Turkey’s cultural and political transformation into a Western oriented state.

The territorial legacy of modern Turkish lands was determined by the last Ottoman parliament in 1920 as a “*National Pact*” (*Misak-i Milli*) (Shaw, 1976; Hurewitz, 1956). In the historical context, current Turkish territory was made the nation’s homeland following with the “*Battle of Manzikert*” in 1071 (Sumer, 1971) and then defended as a motherland during the Independence War in 1923. It finally gained international legitimacy with the “*Lausanne Conference*” in 1924 (Tahau, 1963). However, the cities of Batum, Mosul and Kirkuk are still outside this “*National Pact*.”

### 3.3.0 The conceptual framework for an Iranian national identity

The Iranian national identity was formed from the transcendent and immutable principles which have been experienced throughout Iranian history. To understand these principles, it is necessary to consider the phases of the self-determination crisis: Islamisation, and modernisation, other related frictions. Westernisation had established links with ancient Iran but revolutionary movements go back to the constitutional revolution in 1908. Thus, the elements for a national identity such as a shared homeland, and a common culture (religion, language, and tradition) are reconciled within this framework (Smith, 1990).

In the Naqsh-e Rostem script, Darius was fully conscious of his racial affiliation and declared his Aryan lineage. The Pahlavi dynasty was proud of this dual reference to Aryan (Poliakov, and Howard, 1996) and imperial heritage. His monarchical legitimacy notion reached its peak during the commemoration of the 25<sup>th</sup> century anniversary in 1971 of the foundation of the Persian Empire by the Cyrus the Great in Persepolis (Ramazani, 1972). During the transition from the imperial community to a nation state, Reza Shah and Ataturk launched a new society built on the foundations of previous empires. Persia became Iran, many town and street names were changed to pre-Islamic elements and symbols, such as the Academy of Gondishapur, which became the symbol of cultural awareness for Iranian people in the 20th century (Dols, 1987). Even though the concepts of Iran and Pahlavi are narrower than those of Persia and Farsi, they still play a very significant role in inspiring the romantic nationalisation amongst the Iranian people.

After the industrial revolution in Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Iranian and Turkish national identities were faced with the same cultural and political crises. In response to western imperialism, the tobacco revolt movement and successive constitutional revolutions improved the collective national awareness of the Iranian people. The reform programmes of the Shah continued the constitutional revolution by establishing a constitutional monarchy (Lambton, 1987; Vaziri, 1993). Western educated intellectuals such as Taqizadeh, Kazimzadeh Iranshahr, Ali Akbar Siyasi, Ali Dashti, Mustafa Adl, Amir A'lam, and Mohammed Said produced modernisation programmes for the Shah's monarchy (Bayat, 1991). The role of clerics and

intellectuals in the constitutional revolution is very important to the Islamic revolution's legacy. Contrary to Algar (1969)'s assertion, Mongol Bayat (1991:10) argues that despite the clerics' visible participation in the constitutional revolution, the clerics and state were not mutually exclusive but rather dependent upon each other as clerics were important agents of constitutional change in society. However, Ali Reza Afshari (1993) pointed out the conflict between secularists and traditionalists in his historiography of Iranian modernisation. Both Ahmed Kasravi (1940) and Nazim al-Islam Kirmani emphasised the nationalist and liberal motives of the constitutional struggle. However, Mahdi Malikzadah (1949) and Firiyyun Adamiyat (1976) consider the revolution as a solely liberal advance. The constitutional revolution is still a major factor in determining the reformation policies of clerics after the Islamic revolution.

The establishment of Dar ul - Funun in 1851 (Michael, 2003) and the reforms of the court system were aimed at promoting modern Iranian nationalism. Secularisation and nationalism were considered a part of the modernisation programmes which especially targeted the tribal system of such Iranian ethnic peoples as Bakhtiari, Khamseh, Lurs, and Qashqai, who become urbanised over decades through religious institutional power in society (Katouzian, 1997). This policy peaked when the Shah began to operate the White Revolution (land reform) programme in the 1960s (Abrahamian, 1982). However, this state centralisation programme created two important crises during the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty: the Kurdish Republic of Mahabat and the Azerbaijan People's Government as Soviet-backed client states in the 1940s which also resulted in the Islamic revolution in 1979.

The historical territorial legacy of Iran extended from the sacred crescent of the Oxus Rivers, the Amu-Darya and the Syri - Darya in the north in Transoxiana, and the sacred crescent of the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers in Mesopotamia (Frye, 2000). The emergence of the Shia crescent in the twenty - first century is part of the same continuity of territorial nationalism in Iran. The Sassanid dynasty had controlled today's Middle East security complexes as a Middle Age super - power state and even challenged the Byzantine Empire. Therefore, Iran's role in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea did not only affect the domestic situation but also became a part of its historical legacy claims (Ramazani, 1972). According to Arnold Toynbee, Shah Ismail nearly restored the ancient frontiers of the Sassanid Empire in the 15th century

(Barthold, Minorsky, et al. 1968:475-9), but at the end of 19th century, the loss of Azerbaijan, Armenia, much of Georgia, and Afghanistan, as a result of Russian and British military action, helped shape Iranian nationalism (Clawson and Rubin, et al. 2005:143)

Additionally, the 'Nevrooz' is the symbol of the continuity of Iran's national identity which ensures the collective solidarity of the Iranian nation. The resurrection of an Archimedean identity and the myth of Shahinshah in Nevrooz (Vaziri, 1993:87) become integrated with Shia political theory and still affect the self-determination of revolutionary Iran (Ramazani, 1972). The annexation of Babylonia in 529 B.C. by Cyrus coincided with the celebration of Jewish salvation in 1441 (Sykes, 2004). This friendship formed part of the political agenda aimed at improving the Iran-Israel relationship during the Pahlavi period. It is also the symbolic root of the Turko-Persian cultural synthesis, spreading from the Caucasus to Asia.

Changes in the Persian language are evolutionary rather than revolutionary-- the language of Avesta was written in ancient Persian which was very close to Sanskrit. In the Middle Ages, Pahlavi languages were used as the official language of the Sassanid Empire. After the conversion to Islam, the Pahlavi alphabet was replaced with the new Farsi - Arabic inscription (Pope, 1999). Persian national culture was not only playing a very important role in the state bureaucracy of Arab and Turkish empires but also in systematising Islamic science and restoring Jewish theological literature during the Middle Age (Neusner, 1975). The process of Iranian adaptation of Islam took about two centuries and was completely different from Egyptians and Barbers interpretations of Islam but it was closer to the Turkish. The national heroes and social characters of Freidan, Rostam, Kowrosh, Darios, Barbod, and Anousherevan are related to the Islamic Iranian characters such as Selman Farisi and Caliph Ali and Hussein. The poets, such as Feduki, Ferdowsi, Sadi, Hafiz, and Mawlawi Rumi are the main figures of the Persian national identity, as part of the religious and romantic nationalism in Iran (Ashraf, 1993). As a consequence of this cultural dominance of Iran, Farsi was accepted as a lingua franca in Afghanistan, India, Central Asia and the intellectual environment for Islamic countries (Frye, and Nelson, 1977:236). Even if the original Pahlavi language was lost, Reza Shah encouraged the Pahlavi tradition and state-sponsored language reforms to eliminate

Arabic-type words from the language of Persians. His language reform of Shah was not a discontinuity of Iranian national identity such as Ataturk's reforms which replaced the Arabic alphabet with the Latin alphabet, but a continuation of ancient Iranian national culture in modern times (Perry, 1985). Therefore, the subjectivity of the Iranian national identity and collective solidarity is more constructive than the Turkish one. However, the Persian language's current status is the result of the obligation to learn the language by all citizens and the banning of peripheral languages in the press and public education. It has increased ethnic nationalism in Iran. The language barrier between the Farsi-speaking Shia of Iran and the Arabic - speaking Shia of Iraq may have emphasized a separate linguistic national identity or consciousness (Vaziri, 1993:169-172).


The pre-Islamic Iranian religions of Mithraism, Manichaeism, and Zurvanism were embraced by Zoroastrianism which was accepted as the official religion of the Sassanid Empire. However despite discontinuity between the pre-Islamic and Islamic periods, Nasr claims that there are many cultural attitudes from the past can still be observed. Islam possesses a great capability for absorption and synthesis which has permitted it to incorporate Alexandrian and Hindu wisdom as well as many elements from pre-Islamic Persia (Nasr, 1996). Massignon and Mason (1989) argued that the spirituality of Islam has been illuminated prism through which Iran has contemplated the universe and its ancient myths. Additionally, Henry Corbin (1998) focused on the Imam in Twelver Shia political thought, who is very much like the philosopher-king in the platonic tradition and the imamate is in turn very similar to the ideal kingship among the ancient Aryans on the Persian plateau.

The movement of Persians from Sunnite to Shia combines the elements of intuition, intelligence, and light with Zoroastrianism. Shiism provides a unique cultural identity and stimulates a consciousness of collective solidarity as a unifying authority among the ethnically diverse regions of Iran (Vaziri, 1993; Peters and De Vries 1976:1-25). However, the Shia world is separated from the Sunnite territorially and Shiism is thus the mechanism of Iranian nationalism (Lampton, 1987:280). Ali Shariati identifies two equally important modes of Iranian national identity-- Iranian nationhood and Shiism (Shariati, 1979). The Islamic Iranian identity represents an attempt at bridging sacred

and secular traditions and modernity and it has been adopted increasingly by the leadership and lower echelons of the Iranian regime.

Reza Shah’s long - term nationalism and society - building programmes, unlike Musaddiq’s struggle for the nationalisation of oil in 1951, attracted more scholarly attention than his coercive reforms. Richard Cottom stresses the liberal nationalist friction in Iran (Cottam, 1979). On the other hand, racial nationalism and Anderson’s imagined society concept was adapted by Mostafa Veziri (1993). This was the secularist approach to ethnicity (Kedourie, 1993). In opposing this racial approach, Jalal Al-i Ahmed previously argued that our ancient society and tradition could not withstand the onslaught of Western technology in which European civilisation was adopted (Veziri, 1993). However, religious nationalism has changed the idea of religious and ethnic liberal nationalism in Iran, although they continue to comprise Iran’s identity. Iran is one of main pillars of Islamic civilisation, achieved through national strategic culture under religious unity (Shia). However, the ethnic sector is still vulnerable to foreign interference in the Sunni part of the modern Iran.

Map 3.1: Ethno- religious make-up of Iran



Sources: <http://yargb.blogspot.com/2006/05/ethnic-map-of-iran.html> 28 May 2006 (Accessed at 16 July 2008)



According to a 2000 report, the ethnic composition of Iran was: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%. The linguistic distribution of Iran's population is: Persian and Persian dialects 58%, Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Arab 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2%. However, the percentage of religious followers was: Shi'a Muslim 89%, Sunni Muslim 10%, and Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i 1%. (www.islamic-world.net). The sphere of Shia influence provides political power to Iran, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Kuwait.

**Table 3.3: The religious sphere of influence of Iran**

| Country      | Percentage of Shi'ites | Total Population | Population of Shi'ites |
|--------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| Iran         | % 90                   | 68,7 million     | 61,8 million           |
| Pakistan     | % 20                   | 165,5 million    | 33,2 million           |
| Iraq         | % 65                   | 26,8 million     | 17,4 million           |
| India        | % 1                    | 1.095,4 billion  | 11 million             |
| Azerbaijan   | % 75                   | 8 million        | 6 million              |
| Afghanistan  | % 19                   | 31,1 million     | 5,9 million            |
| Saudi Arabia | % 10                   | 27 million       | 2,7 million            |
| Lebanon      | % 45                   | 3,9 million      | 1,7 million            |
| Kuwait       | % 30                   | 2,4 million      | 730 thousand           |
| Bahrain      | % 75                   | 700 thousand     | 520 thousand           |
| Syria        | % 1                    | 18,9 million     | 190 thousand           |
| UAE          | % 6                    | 2,6 million      | 160 thousand           |
| Qatar        | % 16                   | 890 thousand     | 140 thousand           |

*The Shi'ite Population around the World*

*Source: Baztab News, <http://www.baztab.com/news/52316.php>*

Despite the multi-ethnic diversification of Iran, Table 3; 3 shows that the majority of Iran is Shia, which creates a pattern for the construction of the national identity. Therefore, Azeri secular nationalism cannot become a threat to Iranian national security because such a small fragment of the population. The centres of the Shia universe are still Najaf and Lebanon, where Iranian political influence is strong. Iran also plays a very important role in the Persian Gulf with this religious identity connection; Iran is considered a regional threat to the Gulf countries. If Iran were to set aside its religious identity definition, its identity could be classified within the Asiatic culture but its orientation is now towards the Middle East as far as religion is concerned.

The modern Turkish state cannot achieve a strategic national culture on Kurdish issues and authoritarian secularism, as these factors pose a threat to the territorial unity of the (Turkish) state. On the other hand, the concept of an Iranian strategic national culture presents a different picture in the region. Although Iran has achieved a strategic religious and linguistic culture, its ethnicity is very vulnerable to foreign interference.

#### **3.4.0 Conceptual framework for Turko - Persian strategic cultural synthesis**

There are similarities between Turkish and Iranian national identity definitions; they can be defined as a *Turko-Persian strategic cultural synthesis*, which is an ecumenical mix of Arab, Persian and Turkic elements blended together during the ninth and tenth centuries. To clarify this concept, both types of identities must be considered: after the Westphalian type of state emerged in the Middle East, there was no subjective identity which was defined as '*Turko-Persian identity*' exceptional from Iranian - Azeri. However, the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis is still the main cultural commonality between Turkish, Central Asian, Caucasusian and Asian and Balkan Muslim peoples. This synthesis created during an integration process which covered the period from Islamisation to the Sunnite Shia sectarian division. Alienation from this integration began with the Mongol invasions and peaked during the Ottoman-Safavid period. It has also been repeated during the modernisation process; the Pahlavi and Revolutionary Republican Islamic states.

#### **3.4.1 The Integration process of the Turko - Persian strategic cultural synthesis**

Turko - Iranian relations experienced both friendly and hostile military relationships during early periods their history, in the region of Transxonia. The first confrontation between Parthia (250 BC-226 AD) and the Hun Empire did not harm their national identities (Ogel, 1981). The second serious confrontation between Turks and Iranians occurred in the same region between the Sassanid (226 -654 AC) and the Göktürk (552-745 AC); Turkish nomadic troops were defeated in first Turkish-Hephthalite War in 538 and the second the Turkish-Hephthalite War in 619 by the Persian forces. After the war the Sassanid and the Gokturk became allies and jointly fought the White Huns (420-552) provided amicable relations and kinship between the two nations.

However, an alliance between the Gokturk and the Byzantine Empire led to Turkish - Iranian hostilities (Kafesoglu, 1984:94; Oztuna, 1983). These pre-Islamic relations were mentioned in Ferdowsi's Shahnama. He considered that the Turanians (Turks) or Turanizamin were the enemy of the Iranian nation (Firdawsi and D. Davis, 2006; Firdawsi, 1967: 126-8). After annexation by the Byzantine emperor of the Gokturk and Byzantine alliances, Heraclitus sent sorties into Iranian territory from 622 to 628 to carry out raids and maintain pressure on the border. Thus; Iranian land became very vulnerable to an invasion by Arabs (Sykes, 2004). The battle of Qadisiyyah and the Nihavend war between the Islamic and Sassanid empires resulted in the demolition of the Sassanid Empire in 651. After the war, however, the transition process of Iranian national identity to an Islamic identity took place '*two centuries silence*,' during which most were converted to Islam when the Abbasids (750-1258) took over (Lewis, 1976). The Arab-Turkish alliance in the Talas War in 751 was the main historical turning point with regard to Asian and Middle Eastern states. It ended the Chinese expansion in Central Asia (Yilmaz, 1970). After four Caliphate administrations, the Umayyads initially launched a policy of ethnic identity for Arabs. This required formal association with an Arab tribe and adaption of client status by the Mevali. The Iranian Mevali class was employed in the state bureaucracy and held intellectual positions, but was accepted as second class citizens in Arab nationalist states. The founder of the Hanafiya School, Ebu Hanifa, and Imam Ja'far, founder of the Twelver Jurisprudence schools, were persecuted and tortured by these rulers (Harald, 1999). The Turkish Mevali class also held military positions in the Abbasid period. Initially, the Abbasids strongly supported of the Turko - Iranian coalition to keep out the Umayyad State (Yildiz, 1976).

The myth of Ebu Muslim Khurasani became a key part of the transformation of the Turko - Persian cultural synthesis and Islamisation (Vámbery, 1873:1-19). Before the Turkish dynasties in Persia, the emergence of Iranian Muslim dynasties, such as the Saffarids, Samanids, Ziyarids, the Buyids, Kakuyids, Buvandids of Tabarestan and the Gilan had a great effect on the conversion of the Persian and Turkish nations. The capital of the Samanids, Bukhara, was the centre of the Turko-Iranian Islamic synthesis. But Raduki who gave credit to Aryan myth of Iranian nationalism had served as a poet in Samanids state (Frye, 1965).

The Turkish Islamic identity was generated by the Oghuz tribe who chose Islam and separated from the other Turkish tribes. Thus, the notion of Turkishness is the product of a Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis. Other identities such as Avars, Khazars, Magyar, and Bulgars were not accommodated within the Turkish national identity after the dominance of the Oghuz Turks. Halil Inalcik (2000) believes that Ottoman state (tradition) has two roots: Central Asia and Persia. Ottoman states took from this tradition the idea that the state subsisted through the maintenance of “*töre*” or “*yasa*” (codes of law). Fuad Koprulu (1992) further argued that the legitimacy of the Turkish dynasties depended on mystical “*Gaza*” and “*Gazi Warrior Sultan*” paradigms which had been transferred from the Oghuz Turks to the Karahanid, Ghaznevi (962-1187). This warrior role provided distinctive advantages for developing a Turko - Persian coalition till the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Even though the Seljuk Turks put an end to the intermezzo period of Iranian dynasties (Frye, 1967), this Turko - Iranian coalition had successfully persisted despite an Arab cultural assimilation. This Turkish warrior and Persian cultural experience created a new dynamic spirit for an Islamic expansionism spreading from Asia to the Balkans (Bertold, 1962). The question of the Turko - Persian coalition can be defined as a strategic Turko - Persian national identity or a strategic Turko - Persian cultural identity. This, however, is subject to serious debate (Canfield, 1991:1-34) because the responses to this question provide an explanation for understanding the nation - building of Central Asian states and transnational Kurdish problems in the region. The cities of Samarqand, Bukhara, Isfahan were seats of the Turko - Persian culture during the Samanids, Ghaznevi and Seljuk - Turk administrations. The legacy of Ghaznavi persisted in Afghanistan, Persia, Transoxania, and the northern part of the Indian continent, in which a Turko-Persian synthesis of Islam and Persian cultural identity was promoted (Robinson, 1991:104-131). Persian court traditions were implemented by the Abbasids, Samanids, the Ghaznavi, Seljuks and the Seljuk Rum. Farsi became the court language in Turkic dynasties and the literary language of the Turko-Persian synthesis of Islam (Mazzaoui, 1991:78-103). The manuscript of the Firdawsi (Shahnama), Kashari Mahmut’s *Divan-i Lugat ut-Turk* (Turkish Language Dictionary) and Yusuf Has Hajib’s, *Katadgu Bilig’s* (Wisdom of Royal Glory) helped to establish Turkey and Iran as states each possessing a national identity influenced by its own mythology and culture (Inalcik, 1991:1-19).

After the victory of the Seljuk Turks in the battle of Dandanakan, their legitimacy was accepted in the Middle East security complexes including the Sassanid territorial legacy. Seljuk Turks systematised the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis by develop an Islamic Turko – Persian approach to life by establishing Nizamiya Madrasas in the cities of Baghdad Nishabur, Belh, Herat and Isfahan in 1065. This school was considered an alternative scholarly institution to the Shia Fatime state’s Ezher School in Egypt (Atay, 1983). Sunni schools of thought were systematised by the el-Gazzali and Shafite jurisprudence, which was promoted in the territory of the Seljuk Empire. The Turko - Persian coalition’s legitimacy peaked during the rule of Malikshah and his Persian advisor Nizamulmulk, whose manuscript, Siyasatnameh, provided a distinctive explanation of Turko-Persian political experiences (Darke, 1978).The Seljuki Rum in Anatolia (1081-1307) and the Atabegs were the distributors of the Turko - Persian synthesis of Islam and the main defenders of Islam against Christian crusaders prior to the Ottoman conquest of the region (Hillenbrand, 1999).The se Turko - Persian experiences in religion and science provided a more distinctive explanation for the Turko-Persian synthesis. There are three paradigms which formed after Ibn Sina (Avicenna).

**Table 3.4: The formation of the Turkish and Iranian theosophical tradition**

|                         |                         |                         |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
|                         | Ibn Sina (Avicenna)     |                         |
| Ghazzali                | Ghazzali                | Suhreverdi-             |
| Fahreddin er-Razi       | Nasireddin et-Tusi      | Sehrezuri               |
| Ottoman religious roots | Iranian religious roots | Iranian religious roots |
| Sources: Karliga, 2005  |                         |                         |

Ibn Sina-Ghazzali-er-Razi theological tradition and Ibn Arabi's theo - mystical paradigms comprised the Ottoman cultural thought and identity. On the other hand, Ibn Sina - Ghazzali - Nasireddin et-Tusi and the Ibn Sina - Suhreverdi-Sehrezuri paradigms were transferred to the cultural identity of Persia (Karliga, 2005). Prior to the collapse of the Soviet empire, Khomeini sent a letter to Gorbachev, in which he advised him to read the Fusus ul-Hikem, which was written by Ibn Arabi who belonged to the third sector of the Islamic paradigm. The text shows that the tradition of Ibn Sina was still effective in the formation of a revolutionary Islamic state. Most of the Islamic scientists and philosophers as such Farabi, Ulug Beg, Biruni, Taftazani

and Cami belonged to this Turko - Iranian synthesis but the confusion about their national lineage is related to political alienation from the Turko-Persian synthesis. Their identities are not only Turkish or Persian but also a synthesis of both nations' '*strategic cultural identity*' (Sayili, 1939).

Even though the Ottoman and Safavids were distinct from each other, this cultural synthesis continued in literature but not at a political level. For example, Shah Ismail wrote his poetry using the penname *Khafi* in the Turkish language, while (Minorsky, 1942). Yavuz Selim wrote his using words borrowed from Persian (Belig, 1891). The role of Mevlana is still the main paradigm of Turko - Persian synthesis of Islam. Therefore, the legitimacy of Turko - Persian cultural identity is still a significant cultural factor in the Balkans and Asia, even though political subdivision began with the nation - building process that caused an identity crisis in Islamic civilisation. Most scholars believe that the philosophy and Islamic science were terminated after el-Ghazzali's *Tehafut'ul Felasife* (Ghazali, 1958). However, this idea cannot explain an ineffectiveness of Averroes' *Tehafu't Tehafut* in the Islamic World (Averroes and Van den Bergh, 1954). The crisis in Islamic civilisation has to be reconsidered as a political phenomena rather than a cultural one, because the alienation from Turko - Persian coalition eradicated the collective consciousness of Islamic civilisation in the Ottoman and Persian environments. It is very unfortunate that the experience of Andalusia could not transfer to the cultural geography of the Turko - Persian synthesis to create a new dynamics of Islamic civilisation. The Ottoman version of the renaissance during the disintegration period was not successful in maintaining the superiority of the Ottoman legacy in the Europe. The disintegration of the Persian national identity after the Shia externalism was a major loss for the Persian nation because neither the Kurds nor Central Asian peoples embraced the shiatisation of Iran nor did Indian and Balkan Muslims accept the new nation building of Iran. Therefore, the Ottoman and Turkish states effectively maintained their political *status quo* by conducting the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis within their territories. For instance, though Turkish flag's symbols (star and crescent) were taken from the Christian tradition of Constantinople, the Ottoman Turks distributed the flag throughout the Islamic world as a sign of political power.

### 3.4.2.0 Alienation from the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis

In the aftermath of the Mongol invasions of the Islamic World, most of the Turko-Persian cultural heritage was destroyed and, following the fall of Baghdad in 1258, Delhi became a significant cultural centre for Muslims in the East (Canfield, 1991:53-77). The status quo of the Oghuz Turks was seriously damaged in the Islamic world up until the rise to power of the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the continuity of the Ottoman legacy in modern Turkey's formation, this study looks at the scholarly discussion of Ottoman history by its doyen. Imber argues that the 14<sup>th</sup> century was basically "*a black hole*" for any scholar who attempts to reconstruct the history of this period. But Herbert Gibbons claimed that the Ottomans were a new race which ensured the continuity of Byzantine administrative practices under an Islamic guise (Lowry, 2004). It could not have emerged from purely Turko - Muslim roots, hence its Byzantine - Christian origins, but achieved a superior racial mixture, blending wild Asiatic blood with European stock. His argument basically presumes that the Ottomans were not equipped culturally to create a state. However, both Fuat Koprulu and Franz Babinger rejected his argument by arguing that Ottomans institutional roots derived from Seljuk and Ilhanid precedents (Lowry, 2004). Friedrich Giese pays attention to the mediation role played by the Akhi federation of craftsmen and merchants in the towns of Anatolia in transferring the administrative system of Anatolian Muslims states to the emerging Ottoman entity (Lowry, 2004). Paul Wittek expands his argument and focuses his attentions on the heterodox Sufi groups, Baktashi lodge played significant role to conversion of Balkanian people convert to Islam (Lowry, 2004). The coalition of Bithynian peoples and Akhi federations in the town of Anatolia provided the underpinnings of early Ottoman administrative practices as well as a bridge to bring them together. Lowry (2004) rejected the argument that the early Ottomans were not a tribe or people linked genealogically, but were rather groups of Anatolian Muslims bound by a common desire to fight the Christian infidels, which constructed the gazi ethos. Inalcik (2000) advances his argument by claiming that this common background tied together the Byzantine frontiers troops with Muslim gazi and that this led to assimilation. The Holy War and colonisation were the dynamic elements in the Ottoman conquests, and administrative forms adopted in the newly conquered territories derived from earlier Seljuk (Turko-Islamic) models. Inalcik rejects that aspect of Gibbon's work which

argues for the non-Turkish nature of the Ottoman's institutional base. On the other hand his thesis reconciles Koprulu's theory on the tribal origins of the empire with Wittek's Gazi thesis. The other Turkish Ottoman writer, Cemal Kafadar (1995) claims that gazi is only one element, but Ottoman frontier culture expresses the liquidity and fluidity of Islam and Christianity alike and emphasises the inclusionary nature of these two dominant cultures. However, without taking into account the historical approach, Dimitri Kitsikis argues that the Ottoman Empire was in reality a Turkish-Greek Empire (Lowry, 2004). When Ottoman Empire collapse, Lloyd George considered Greece to be the heir to the Ottoman Empire rather than the Turks after the end of Great War.

However, the Tamerlane Empire (1336-1405) wanted to maintain the synthesis of a pro - Sunni- Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis, and challenged the Ottoman state at the Battle of Angora in 1402. After "*forty years stagnation*" (Fetret Devri) and following the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman state was completely alienated from the Persian administrative system it created its own court system based on the Turkish language and the multinational *millet* system, which was integrated with Byzantine and Turko - Persian experiences (Kopruluzade, 1931). This decision shocked the highly Persianised Mughal Muslims in India and Central Asia, because they had copied the Persian court tradition and languages. Formation of the Janissary army and abolition of the tribal system, the transition of the Ottoman state from a tribal to a multicultural imperial *millet* system undermined the power of the Turkoman tribe in state administration such as the *Candarli* family (Kemal, 1972). This identity transformation was challenged by Aq Qoyunlu (white sheep), Uzun Hasan, in the Battle of Otlukbeli (Karateke, 2005:99-110) and Shah Ismail in the Battle of Chaldiran. The question is why Shah Ismail and his followers were perceived as arch enemies by the Ottoman states. The heterodox character of Akhi and its succeeding branch, Baktashi, played a very effective role in security of the state and the continuity of states systematic assimilation of the Anatolian people into Turkishness. However, the Alevi sect, which is proximate to the Baktashi tradition, mixed with the Shamanic and Mazdek religions and emerged as a rogue sub-religious identity that cooperated with the Shah Ismail missionary movements in Anatolia. However, after the victory of the Ottoman state, and following the Shi'atining of Iran, Alevi population left the alliance. After that the group was seen as a national security rogue



threat by the Ottoman state. The victory of the Ottoman state also provided a profound dual legitimacy of Ottoman sultan who became a Kaiser to the Europeans and Caliph for the Muslims (Kafadar, 1995). The dual legitimacy of the Ottoman state was very ambiguous in the context of Byzantine heir and Islamic Caliphate. But the Ottomans had weaknesses in both political and religious legitimacy. The argument of Lutfi Pasha clarifies the legitimacy of the Caliphate in the Ottoman state system. He claims that the legacy of Caliphate does not belong to any ethnical background such as the Kureysli paradigm (Gibb, 1962). The concept has to do with the basis of power, so that the Ottoman state received this legitimacy by enforcing its power from the Memluk state at the battle of Mercedabik in 1517 and became the main shelter for Muslims (Gibb, 1962). This realist approach to the legacy of the Caliphate was used by Mustafa Kemal in abolishing it in 1924. He transferred its legitimacy to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Kili, 2001). This long – standing authority of the Ottoman state provided real religious legitimacy for the Turks but the Ottoman state had not used this religious power until the Kucuk Kaynarca treaty with Russia on 10/21 July 1774 (Hurewitz,1956) and Abdul Hamid's Pan - Islamist defensive policies (Karateke,2005:28). He believes that Pan-Islamist policies against nationalism could create an alternative collective solidarity among Muslims but his policy did not prevent the dissolution of the Ottoman millet system. The legacy of the Byzantine Empire remained at a symbolic level in Ottoman state diplomacy until this romantic legacy was challenged by the Russian Tsar and the Austrian - Hamburg Empire, was used to justify Napoleon conquest (Karateke, 2005:20). In fact, Oghuz legitimacy is still maintaining its status quo throughout the Turkish state tradition, even after Islamisation (Kopruluzade, 1931).

On the other hand, Persian alienation from the Turko - Persian synthesis was an act of serious withdraws from the Islamic world, because it introduced Shiism into Persia and distinguished Persian society from the Ottomans millet system and the Turko - Persian synthesis of Islam. Turkoman tribes and the Azeris played a very significant role in the creation of the Safavid dynasty and nationalisation of Persia during the Safavid and Qajar periods. They partially gained power after the Islamic revolution, but the transition of Persian could not create a multi-cultural system but rather a centralised notion of Shiatinazed Persian civilisation. This transition became more durable than the Ottoman millet system after the emergence of the nation state system,

because the multicultural millet identity and decentralised system of the Ottoman state were dissolved dramatically in Arab land and the Balkans. On the other hand, Iran maintained a collective solidarity stronger than that in Turkey. There is a different interpretation of the origins of Ottoman- Safavid conflicts (Karateke, 2005:152-169); Adel Alouche pointed out that Ottoman - Safavid conflicts should be considered within the framework of the entire geopolitical pattern of Middle East and Transsoxania at the end of 15<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> rather than within the simplistic framework of Shi'ism versus Sunnism. In other words, the Ottoman - Safavid confrontation should be viewed in the light of two antagonists' relations (Allouche, 1980; Kutukoglu, 1993). The Safavid synthesis integrated with Arab Twelver Shia in Iraq, on the other hand, this Shia externalism from Najaf and Jebeli Amal centralised the administration of Persia (Stewart, 1996:81-103). The transformation from Shafi to Ja'feriye Jurisprudence made Iran a motherland of the Shia Muslim but this development abandoned the influence of Qizillbash in Persian politics and a Persian engagement of Anatolia (Turner, 1989). The battle of Chaldiran in 1514 between Selim and Shah Ismail and subsequent wars in 1723-1747, 1776-1779/80, 1812-1823 distinguished the religious and political structures of the rival states (Savory, 1987). The Fatwa of Kemal Pashazade concerning Qizilbash made this conflict a part of the status quo of the Gaza against the Safavid state, which proves that this war was not a religious war but a ciosanisation to penetrate the regions (Tekirdag, 2003). Both sides recognised one another's legitimacy with the Amasya Treaty in 1555 but dual power legitimacy in the Islamic world was reconciled by both parties signing the Qasri Shirin treaty) on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1639, which is still the main reference for supporters of Turko – Iranian friendship (Kutukoglu, 1993).The proposal of Nadir Shah caused a significant struggle to merge the Turko - Persian synthesis in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. During the Najaf conference, Shah proposed that Twelver shi'ism be considered a fifth school of Sunnism. His Ja'fari mazhab concept has been portrayed as a device to transform Iran into a Sunni country. In subsequent letters to the Mongols, the Ottomans and the Uzbeks, it was stated that he should recognise the Oghuz ancestry as a basis for closer political and cultural ties. His further offer to join the Ottoman state was unfortunately not evaluated properly by the Ottoman ruler due to internal problems between states (Tucker, 2006). The last attempt for unifying the Turko - Persian synthesis came from the Cemaledin Afghani in 19<sup>th</sup> century, when he proposed that Islamic unity against Western imperialism was

the basis for a nation state system, such as the British Commonwealth, but his philosophy clashed with the pan - Islamist policies of Abdul Hamit (Keddie, 1983). The Jon Turk proposal, Turanism initiated a new dimension during WWI but failure ended the Turko - Persian synthesis and also the millet system (Hanioglu, 1995). The last victory of the Ottoman millet system in the Dardanelles could not produce an alternative unity for dynamics but rather created new nation states which favoured new state centralisation and new imaginative society policies.

In short, though the Mongol invasion resulted in the dissolution of the Turko-Persian cultural synthesis, it drew the Turkish movement towards the West and resulted in the construction of two strategic national cultures – the Ottoman Empire in the West and the Shi'atization of Iran in the East. After that time, the position of the two states becomes competitive, with alternatives national strategic cultures in politics and society in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Mesopotamia. However, the competition of the two friends intensively continued during the Safavid period while a lower more low intensity of competition was maintained during the Qajar period. This regional competition was frozen until the collapse of the USSR. In the next section, the study briefly analyses Turkey's and Iran's establishment of this peripheral identity relationship.


### **3.5.0 Withdrawal of Turkey and Iran from the Caucasus and Central Asia**

There are three main central powers and cultural identities in the region: Russians, Turks and Persians. Peripheral identities include Georgians, Armenians, Chechens, Azeris, Circassians, Abkhazians in the Caucasus and Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kyrgyzi, and Tajiks in Central Asia and have maintained their status quo under the influence of their central identities. In addition, Afghan identity played an important role in the Great Game between Russia - Britain conflicts during the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, however, the Uzbeks always considered themselves a central power in the region with reliance on Mongol and Timur state traditions. During the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, the Uzbeks were in an alliance with the Ottoman Empire (Burton, 1991). However, the Babur governments were in alliance with the Safavids against the Uzbeks in Asia.

Throughout medieval times, peripheral identities were dominant in region as middle - power kingdoms, but after the separation of the Turko - Persian synthesis, peripheral identities had to confront the emerging power of Russian, and Persian shiatinezed Persia. Only the Azeri Turks took up the new a religious identity. The other nations who were islamised with the Turko - Persian Islamic synthesis remained under the Ottoman sphere of influence. Frye (1965) pointed out the present peoples of central Asia, whether Iranian or Turkic speaking, have one culture, one religion, one set of social values and traditions with only language separating them. Due to this separation, the nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia gradually grew more isolated from both the new Persian and Turkish identities.

The Treaty of Zuhab (Peace of Qasr-e Shirin) in 1639 divided the region into the two front lines of Safavid Iran and the Ottoman; the accord granted Yerevan in the southern Caucasus to Iran and all of Mesopotamia to the Ottomans, but the legacy of Ottomans ended in the region with the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. Similarly Iranian political power in the region ended with the Treaties of Gulistan in 1813, Turkomanchia in 1828 and Akhal in 1881. But the most harmful event for Iranian nationalism was when Northern Azerbaijan became a part of Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Between the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20th centuries, Russia annexed the Crimea (Macfie, 1996) and following the entente powers' Ggreat Game in the region showed that the Persian - Ottoman dichotomy put an end to the political power of Turko - Persian cultural synthesis. Cemaleddin Afghani's proposal signified that nation states have to be formulated by central identities but his attempts were underestimated by the Turkish and Iranian foreign policy - makers (Keddie, 1972). Subsequently, the Russian identity became the main threat to Turkish and Iranian national security.

**Map 3.2: Russian annex of Turkish and Iranian buffer security zones**



Sources: Cossa, 1999:11

After the loss of the peripheral security zones, Anglo-Russian occupation in 1907 and 1941 made clear the importance of this synthesis. Therefore, both countries diplomacy were always aware that the Russian sphere of influence could create a main threat to their national security. In fact, both countries became a peripheral security zone against Russian expansion.

Christian Georgia and Armenia maintained their national identities under Turkish and Iranian rule, and the Ghulam army brought Armenia and Georgia to the attention of the Iranian administration (Herzig and Kurkchiyan, 2005; Herzig, 1996). While Georgia played a neutral role in the region, Armenia became an ally of Russian and Persian after the establishment of a Tsarist Armenian state. This historical legacy was very important after the emergence of regional independent states in 1991.

The main transition period from a Turko-Persian identity to a Russian identity was experienced under the Soviet Union. Soviet Russia launched a state - building process in the region and states were separated from each other, allowing Russian cultural and political penetration into the regions at a rapid rate (Allworth, 1973). Therefore, the Turkish kinship model and the Iranian revolutionary strategy failed in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Empire but the relative importance of the Turko - Persian cultural synthesis had an influence on the sub-conscience of new nation states' political and cultural lives. Russian languages were replaced with Persian languages in diplomatic missions as "*lingua franca*" for the region.

During WWI, the failure of the Committee of Union and Progress Party (CUP) government's Pan-Turanist policies and Enver Pasha's personal struggle in the Caucasus and Central Asia had resulted in complete isolation for the peripheral identities. Enver Pasha aimed to establish an Azerbaijani state in the Caucasus but following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, Sultan Galiyev's Turanist attempts assisted the expansion of Soviet imperial hegemony in the region (Kakinc, 2003). With the Ankara-Moscow coalition against Enver Pasha in the Caucasus and the entente powers' invasion of Anatolia, Turkey reaffirmed the political legacy of Soviet Russia in the region, but the treaty of Kars was signed between the Ankara government and Soviet Russia in 1921. While this treaty provided the Ankara government with international legitimacy, Turkish - speaking people had lost their whole cultural and political contact with each other until the collapse of the Soviet Empire. The legitimacy of the Kars treaty was renewed by Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in their first stage of the independence process. On the other hand, the Anglo-Russian entente ignored the neutrality of Iran and occupied Iranian territory in 1907.

**Map 3.3: The Anglo - Russian Convention of 1907 and Soviet Occupation in Azerbaijan and the Socialist Republic of Gilan**



Sources: Ralph A.Cossa p.19

Due to the Russian invasion, Ottoman and Iranian bureaucrats set up an interim Movakkat government between 1916 and 1917 to defeat the Russian and English forces in Kermanshah (Cetinsaya, 2006). Indeed, during the war, the Ottoman army thrice invaded the city of Tabriz and reached Hamadan. After end of the war, Iran

sought territory from Turkey in the Paris Agreement and the Sevres Treaty but Soviet Russia filled the vacuum in Iran and supported the establishment of the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic, which lasted from June of 1920 till September of 1921. Due to the Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty (Hurewitz, 1956). Peaceful relations continued until 1933. Following the Anglo-Soviet invasion, 1941-1946, Azeri and Kurdish nationalism in modern Iran were increased. The People's Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Mahabat government established as puppet states of the Soviet Union in 1945. Because of centralisation policies, awareness of peripheral identities became an internal threat to Turkey and Iran after the 1990s. There are two main reservations for Turkey and Iran concerning the region's security and cultural sphere of influence. Iran's influence is mainly in the Dari - speaking countries of Afghanistan, and Tajikistan. However, Turkey's cultural sphere of influence covers most of Central Asia, Azerbaijan and also parts of Russia.

### **3.5.1 Middle Eastern orientation of Turkish strategic national culture and the Kurdish nationalist challenge**

In this section, the roots of Kurdish nationalism is dealt with to establish the basis for Chapter Seven and to explain the Middle Eastern orientation of Iran in Chapter Five, under the title of Shia. The origins of Kurdish people are uncertain but they have maintained their national identity for the last two thousand years whilst they had been faced with two significant identity transformations: Islamisation and modernisation. They converted to Islam from Zoroastrian in the 7<sup>th</sup> century before the Turks and Persians and served as a military regiment in the Islamic imperial army. Their Islamization integrated with the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis so that they protected their national identity and languages. The warrior role of Saladin Ayyubi against Christian crusaders provided significant prestige in the Islamic world and contributed to the Kurdish national identity during the period of the Turko - Persian Islamic cultural synthesis. One of the aims of Kurdish nationalism is to manufacture the Kurdish history with its own legends such Saladin Ayyubi.

The Kurdish language belongs to the western sub-group of Iranian languages, which in turn belong to the Indo-Iranian branch (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992). Unlike Turks and Persians, they could not systematise a written or spoken language in literature for

nation - building. They speak different dialectic groups, gradually shading into one another, such as Kurmanji or northern Kurdish, spoken in Turkey and the northernmost part of the Iraqi and Persian Kurdistan, and Sorani, spoken in southern Kurdistan. Both Sorani and Kurmanji have a written literary tradition, to some extent. Sub-dialects include Kermanshah, Leki, and Gurani, spoken in Iran and a Zaza accent spoken in Tunceli, and Bingol in Anatolia (Kreyenbroek and Sperl, 1992). Sharaf Khan's Sarafname (a history of Kurdish ruling families) in 1597 and Ahmad Khani's (1650-1706) epic poem "Mem- u Zin" distinguishes Kurds from Persians, Turks, and Arabs. Though Gellner's agro-literate society concepts are certainly relevant to the Kurdish case in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, Anderson and Gellner's explanation also supports the concept of a nation, which is a product of relatively recent technological and economic developments (Gellner, 1995). Therefore, the facilities of globalisation provide space to pan - Kurdish nationalist in their propaganda activities and create common national awareness by satellite, radio, internet etc.

After the Persian Shiatinized national identity transition, (Bruinessen, 1992) Kurds became part of the Ottoman millet system, but they differentiated themselves by adhering to the Shafi'i *madhhab*. While some unorthodox Alevi Kurds cooperated with the Safavid state, Kurdish-Safavid conflict increased in the battles of Dimdim in 1609 and 1610 and created a serious defence barrier against Shia transformation in Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia. However, Kasri Sirin's Treaty in 1639 severed the Kurdish territorial legacy even though the Kurds maintained their tribalism system, which provided them with exceptional autonomous status in tax payments and administration during the Ottoman period (McDowall, 2004). This alliance relationship between Turks and Kurdish groups continued until the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 (Hurewirtz, 1956: 189). The treaty ventured into Turko - Kurdish relations and entailed superior status for Christian minorities such as the Suriani (Syrian Orthodox) in cities of Mardin and Jazirah, Assyrians (Nestorians and Chaldean) in city of Hakkari, the Bahdinan across the Urmiya and Armenians from the city of Van northwards (Hurewirtz, 1956: 190). The first serious rebellion against the new *modus vivendi* was started by Sheikh Ubeydullah in Eastern Anatolia and Iran in 1880; he was captured by Ottoman and sent to Hijaz as an exile (Karpas, 2002). However, the terror activities of the Armenian Committee in the Kurdish region created serious tension between the two countries. The Ottoman state dealt with the expansion of



Pan-Islamist policies in mostly Arab societies, but also in Iran. In opposing the Sultan's policies, the Qajar dynasty used the Armenian political card against Ottoman influence (Cetinsaya, 2006). Abdulhamit organised Kurdish tribes by setting up the 60 Hamidiye Regiment in 1876, which was effectively used until 1918 by the Ottoman state to suppress Armenian revolts in eastern Anatolia and in WWI in the Caucasus and Palestinian front lines (McDowall, 2004). The Simqu revolt by the Kurds against state centralisation between 1918 and 1922 was suppressed by Cossack brigade leader, Reza Shah (McDowall, 2004). After Sheikh Said's rebellion in 1925 (Olson, 1992), Turkey lost negotiating power against the British Mandate in Iraq and Mosul and Kirkuk was given to the British Mandate in the Ankara agreement, as mentioned above (Olson, 1976). A claim for Kurdish statehood was made in the Sevres Treaty but ended in the Lausanne conference on 24<sup>th</sup> July 1923 (McDowall, 2004). As a result of centralisation policies, Kurdish identity faced suppression and isolation in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Whilst Iranian and Iraqi Kurds' national identities were recognised by the governments, Turkey has denied the identity of a Kurdish nation in Turkey until the 1990s. State centralisation policies against a series of Kurdish uprisings such as the Sheikh Abdurrahman rebellion in 1927, the Ararat rebellion following the establishment of an Ararat Republic by Ihsan Nuri Pasha in 1927 and 1930, and also the Dersim (Tunceli) Rebellion in 1937 provided intensive international support for the legitimacy of a Kurdish national identity against centralised state policies (Olson, 1995). The alienation of Kurds from the Turks, Persians and Arabs is mainly related to the territorial legacy of Kurdish land on which Kurds have existed for a significant time, in a semi-autonomous status. But as mentioned above, the land and their regional status quo were fragmented by the Treaty of Zuhab. Further division occurred between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia. There is a significant Kurdish population in the region. The figures for Ghasemlou show 10,409,000 in total in 1965. But the population has not increased much in Iraq due to deportation and war between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority. However Burinnessen and McDowall reported a Kurdish population of 19,800,000 in 1984 and 22,600,000 in 1992. Nevertheless, the real figures for Kurdish people are still unclear, due to non-recognition of the Kurdish national entity.

**Table 3.5: Kurdish population**

| Author | Ghassemlou( 1965) | Short & McDermott (1977) | Bruinnesen (1978) | More(1984) ) | McDowall(1992) |
|--------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Turkey | 4,900,000         | 5,600,000                | 7,500,000         | 10,000,000   | 10,800,000     |
| Iraq   | 3,300,000         | 3,400,000                | 2,500,000         | 3,000,000    | 4,100,000      |
| Iran   | 1,550,000         | 2,025,000                | 3,500,000         | 6,000,000    | 5,500,000      |
| Syria  | 400,000           | -                        | 500,000           | 800,000      | 1,000,000      |
| Other  | 259,000           | 165,000                  | 100,000           | -            | 1,200,000      |
| Total  | 10,409,000        | 11,630,000               | 14,100,000        | 19,800,000   | 22,600,000     |

Sources: (Stansfield.2005:75)

In brief, the peripheral identity relationship in the region of the Caucasus and Central Asia provides a security zone both for Turkey and Iran after the dissolution of Soviet Empire, but there are no longer a legacy of Turkishness and systematic immigration flows from the region. On the other hand, Kurdish internal immigration has replaced Turkish-oriented migration to the big cities and this assimilation process cannot be successful in creating a common national identity. Therefore, the project of a strategic Turkish cultural identity was under fire, but it certainly has capacity to develop into a common strategic identity in a Turkish and Kurdish coalition. From the point of view of Iran’s cultural lineage with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, revolutionary politics encouraged expansion of the Iranian cultural sphere of influence for Asiatic orientation politics. However, Turkey tried to return to the western backyard of the Eurasian steps rather than Middle Eastern strategic cultural reservations.

**3.5.2 Middle Eastern orientation of Iranian national identity: Shia externalism**

The paradigm of the Kerbela tragedy and the myth of Hussein had a strong influence in forming the Persian Shiite identity and the revolutionary regime of Iran (Michael, 1980:13). Due to refusing to grant legitimacy to the temporary rulers of Sunni states, their social rights deteriorated under persecution by Sunni rulers, torture, and isolation. Therefore, the substantial Shia population sustained its hatred and opposition against the central authority, becoming a marginalised anarchical ethnic group, which gravitates from the majority of society and led to the practice of systematic taqiyye (dissimulation), through which they could refuse to disclose their true opinions to avoid personal danger (Akhavi, 1980).

Until Shah Ismail, Iran was the centre of the Sunni Islamic universe in the Middle Ages, and the question of how he succeeded the apostasy of Iran and created Anderson's imaginary society in Persia can be answered by Parsons' concept of Weberian personal charisma, which can be developed in one of two directions: a traditionalised or a rationalised structure (Parsons, 1967). Despite an ignorance of Twelver Shiite law, Shah Ismail accommodated the body of Twelver Shi-ite norms by externalism and became the architect of the religious Persian identity. This identity was transferable and acted as a state religion to legitimise his political legacy, which was something neither Fâtimids nor Buyids could have encouraged in the past. Therefore, the conversion of the Persians must be seen as a wholly 'political act' rather than as a desire to promote religion per se.

The externalism of orthodox Shia clerics from southern Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon/Jabal-i Amal in order to fuse Shia jurisprudence, theology, and philosophy intensified the situation in Mesopotamian. The founder of Twelver Shia, Sheikh Ali al Karaki (d.1535) was invited to indoctrinate people with Ja'feri thought in Safavid Iran (Turner, 1989). Safavid Iran deemed its legacy to be descended from the seventh Imam Musa al Kazim which implied that Safavid's dynasty ruled on behalf of the Hidden Imam. The importance of Shia externalism for this study is related to the territorial issue of Iraq and the Qizilbash's role in Iran and transition of Alevi identity in Anatolia, because, after the Shia externalism in Iran, the polarisation between Persian nobles and the Qizilbash created an internal conflict. As a consequence of this duality, Shah Abbas the Great (1588-1629) centralised the state organisation. Alevi (Olsson and Özdalga, et al 1998) and the exalted Turkoman lost their power in government until Nadir Shah took power.

Shah Ismail ordered all preachers to lead the Friday prayers in the name of the Twelve Imams and encourage 'sabb', the cursing of the first three Rightly Guided Caliphs for usurping the rightful place of Imam Ali to increase the political adversary and division. Twelver Shi'ism was used for the aim of creating a new state rituals and traditions in Persia. The battle between the Sunnite Ottoman Empire and the Shiite Safavid Empire was also seen as an exploitation of religion to enhance rationalised authority. The religious polemic of fatwa (verdict) allowed shedding of the blood of a male and the taking of each others' women and children captive to legitimise the political conflict

in Islamic politics. Ultimately, the agreement in 1555/1590 provided two important consensuses: Iranians would stop the cursing of the first three caliphs, and Ottomans would guarantee the protection of all pilgrims to Mecca and Medina (Ragip, 2003).

### **3.5.2.1 Attempts of religious conflict resolution: Najaf Assembly**

After the Afghan occupation and following Nadir Shah's (1736-1747) seizure of power in Iran and his termination of Imamate lineage with the Ja'fari proposal and ecumenical efforts, Shia clerics were exiled from Isfahan to Iraqi holy cities and India in 1722 ( Nakash,2003:238-62). His concept of the exalted Turkmen tribe and the Ja'fari proposal urged Persia to integrate with the Ottoman state (Lockhart, 1958; Ricks, 2001). Therefore, he wanted his legacy to be part of the Ottoman vassal state. Nadir's coronation on the Mughan step in March 1736 and his success in incorporating tradition into the Council of Najaf introduced a royal legitimacy in Persia and Eurasia for unity of Muslim Umma, and succeeded the invention of tradition in the council of Najaf modified Shiism in such a way as to make it acceptable to Sunnis (Tucker, 2006). However, his attempts were regarded with Shiism to be suspicious and eschewed the vassal status request by Bab-i Ali. The Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam also issued a formal fetwa against the Ja'fari madhhab in April 1742, stating that Nadir's whole Ja'fari concept was a cloak to hide belief which was actually Shia and therefore heretical (Muhimme Defteri, 148:226). Rather than seek religious reconciliation, the Ottomans preferred to recognise the independent "*status quo*" of Iran and the "*de facto*" leadership of Nadir Shah signed the Kurdan Treaty in 1746. The agreement granted formal Ottoman recognition to Shia Iranians as fellow Muslims and made Iran part of Dar al-Islam without compromising the custodian of the Two Holy Places. Peter Avery (et al, 1991) observed that Nadir's political and military activities contributed to the final separate identity of Iran as a modern nation state. Even though Nadir's novel version of Islamic ecumenism was not implemented, the role of religion was reduced in diplomatic discourse, which accentuated the division of the Shia school as Akhbari and Usuli during the reign of Qajar dynasty.

The political role of the Shia clerics diversified in the government of Qajar (1795-1925). Shia schools have different interpretation in politics. The Akhbaris in Iraq rejected the doctrine of *ijtihad*, to state that certain judgments could be derived from them alone. They became literalistic, interested more in transmitting religious knowledge than in encouraging interpretive reasoning (*ijtihad*). The Usulis, however, contended that, in the absence of the imam, clerics could exercise the doctrine of *Ijtihad*. Clerics derive their authority from the Hidden Imam and are entitled to interpret the Sharia. The triumph of the Usuli School transformed their political strength in revolutionary ideology in Iran in twentieth century (Newman, 1986). This internal issue of Shia and ethnic nationalism is still unresolved between Iraq and Iraq. The disavowing of the Ottoman past impacts on a broad range of security and religious issues in Iraq. The Ottoman state divided Iraq into three provinces--Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, which were under the governance of the central government in Istanbul. The shrine cities of Iraq were called Atabat (Karbala, Najaf, Kazimayn and Samarra) and held semi-autonomous status until the British occupation. The Ottoman state encouraged the larger tribal confederations towards a settlement strategy which was the bedrock of the Mamluk administrative system. In contrast to Persian and Azeri mujtehdids, Iraqi mujtehdid lacked a close network interwoven with mosques, places of worship and financial connections; people were more closely linked with their resident local sayyids rather than the mujtahids in Najaf (Faleh, 2003:64). Iraq's distance from the centre of power in Istanbul reinforced the claim of the Shah as the protector of Shia interests in this frontier zone (Berkes, *Cumhuriyet* 14 February 1979).

### **3.5.2.2 The failure of Pan-Islamism for the new axis**

Shia-Sunni strife was faced with an external threat in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Consequently, the Pan-Islamist policy of Sultan Abdul Hamit (1876-1909) marked the unity of ummah against Western imperialism (Cetinsaya, 2003; Ozdalga, 2005). The proposals of Cevdet Pasha and Iraqi Question Committee set a precedent for the Ja'feri proposal to use the mujtahid's influence over the people in Iran and Iraq to create a Shia opposition movement. Anger against European penetration of Iranian and Ottoman territories greatly intensified the issuing of religious fatwa by Iraqi Shia clerics, who called an Ottoman-Iranian rapprochement.

The Pan-Islamist reformer Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1837-97), who was the architect of alliance between the clerics and radical secular elements, convinced the Marjai Taqlid, Sayyid Mirza al-Shirazi in Najaf to issue the fatwa against the autocratic Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar (1848-96), which prohibited the consumption of tobacco by Muslims (Keddie, 1981; Marcinkowski, 2004). During his exile in Istanbul, Al-Afghani cooperated with two Iranian secular dissidents, Mirza Aga Khan Kirmani (a writer and publisher of the journal Akhtar) and Sheikh Ahmad Ruhi. On the other hand, Shah rebuilt the Afghani dissident movement promoted the Ottoman covert activities in Iraq, and began to use the Armenian political card to interact with the Ottoman policies in the region (Akçam, 2004). As a result, the Ottomans had to terminate the revisionist religious policies in the region. The imperial game around the time of the war was exacerbated by the assassination of the Shah in May 1896 and the foreign occupation of Ottoman and Iranian territories. After the toppling of the Qajar dynasty, Reza Shah recruited enlightened modernists to impose nationalist and secularist social - engineering policies. However, the Shah's ambition for a republican state was faced with severe criticism because of Mustafa Kemal's abolition of the Caliphate, which was supported by the Shia clerics. Therefore a type of alternative regime theory between two nations emerged in the region.

### **3.6.0 Conclusion: the paradigm shifts in Turkish-Iranian national strategic culture in the framework of social theory**

In this chapter, the author has tried to review the evolutionary processes of Turkish and Iranian strategic cultural identity formation, the rise and fall of imperial dynasties, the experience of unification and disengagement from the Turko-Iranian strategic cultural synthesis and, lastly, the formation of separate national strategic political cultures. Historical experience can only be valuable if it determines the foreign policy maker's mindset. In this framework, the Turko - Persian cultural synthesis can be classified as an undefined common cultural identity in Turkish and Iranian idealist for the unity of both nations.

The policies of the Erbakan government and his mindset may be rooted in reference to this experience, which supports a possible axis against Christendom, as in the Middle

Ages. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran appear to be enemies when reference is made to the conflict between Selim the Grim and Shah Ismail. This policy interpretation is a key to understanding the crisis period between the two neighbours in 1989 and 1997. However, there is a moderate paradigm which provides a space for the equal co-operation between two national states. Iran and Turkey have been reliable friends since the Qasri Shirin Treaty that recognised the legitimate recognition of territory and regime theories of one another. The fourth point is that Turkey and Iran are the two entities in the Middle East, whose behaviour is based on paradigms from the period of the Shah and Ataturk. On the other hand, the concept of satellite and sovereign states' paradigm is a key to the Iranian policy - makers' agenda. Turkey is considered a satellite state of America and Israel, which are the main enemies of Iran. However, Iran is open for cooperation with the super power if it can establish pragmatic management. While Turkey has a great advantage in security and political concern, Iran lost its strategic importance after the revolution in 1979. If regime change in Iran takes place, it would likely return this client paradigm. In comparing the reconstruction of the state, Iranian national strategic identity embraces most of the society's facts and experiences. A problem does exist in the public sphere used by state. The religious right and ethnic entity definitions of the state are still in conflict with the people. After the deduction of this paradigm in theory, the social structures of both states are reducible to each country's individual foreign policy leadership. They are analysed in later chapters.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### THE RECONSTRUCTION OF TURKISH AND IRANIAN STATE IDENTITY, FAITH, SOCIETY AND A STRATEGIC CULTURE OF SECURITY

#### 4.1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the emergence of the Westphalia nation-state system, the identity definition of a state created new enthusiasm, including the formation of a new imaginary society project by Turks and Iranians during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This project and its parts were opposed to non-state actors like individuals, transnational social movements or multinational corporations. Both modern Turkey and Iran recognised the territorial and identity legitimacy of each other and managed to produce a new national state identity, faith and society. However, the modernisation project was filtered down from above by the Shah and Ataturk is still questionable due to the authoritarian practices of both countries. Whilst Turkey became a partner of the Western security system and her dependency on arm technology to NATO, Iran was viewed as “*lone a planet*” a pariah state, by the United States. International pressure forced the messianic leadership to develop a nuclear capability for Iran to be a deterrent against Western initiatives. This study argues that the virtual state conception in Turkish understanding depends on Shamanistic beliefs of the state system, which were embedded with the Islamic factor under the leadership of the Oghuz tribe. That legacy was transferred to the nation state system by the mixture of immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus, and by the local population who created a new state identity under the political discourse of Turkishness. On the other hand, the legacy of the Iranian nation-state identity moved away from a secular national identity to a religious national state in the form of a republican system. It is unfortunate that the norm and value system of both nation state systems failed to create a model of a state system acceptable for the international community but instead became part of the superior Westphalia state system. Therefore, the key concept of Peter Katzenstein’s and Jack Snyder’s “*strategic culture*” in middle-power state’s security as a pattern of identity definition will be applicable to analysing Turkey’s and Iran’s strategic national security cultures (Katzenstein, 1996), (Snyder, 1977). This chapter analyses bilateral relations and the authoritarian implemented by



both countries by dealing with the cultural and political practices during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It also contributes to the literature on nationalism by comparing the evolutionary Turkish and Iranian national identities.

#### **4.2.0 Secularist and religious centralisation: the legitimising of nation state leadership and order**

The nature of a man's identity formed the nature of strategic state formation in Turkey and Iran. Atatürk's character was formed by the political consequences of Mete Kan (209-179 B.C), the Ughuz tribe or Chengiz Khan and their imagination for Asiatic unity. This is considered an alternative model to a secular Muslim state, through strictly following a policy of Westernisation (Mango, 2002). The conservative approaches to Turkish nationalism theories contrast Turkish nationalism with Alparslan's victory in the Manzigert Valley. They include references to Kilic Arslan, Osman Beg, and Fatih Sultan Mehmet's legacy in God's state, in the road map of Westernisation politics (Topçu , 1978 ; Ozer et al: 14). Rather than adopting the only reference to the constitutional movements of Westernisation, this movement condensed Atatürkism and Kemalism within Turkish - Islamic synthesis after the 1960s. In opposing the conservative approach on Turkish nationalism, Suna Kili and Turhan Fevzioglu present Atatürkism as the model of modernisation of Turkishness (Fevzioglu, 1982; Kili, 1995).

On one hand, Reza Shah's political references originated from Cyrus the Great and Muhammad Reza's nationalist honour, driven by the myth of Persepolis and inspired driven by the light of Zarathustra, which invoked the national awareness of a nation state system by rejecting the Persian cultural influence, which was the main motivation for the Turkish dynasties in Iran. However, the myth of Mustafa Kemal in general reflects Celebi Mehmet's stagnation policy for reconstructing the new nation state. The anti-revisionist policies of Mustafa Kemal aimed to protect the "Kizil Elma" doctrine (Anatolia is considered Kizil Elma) and Constantinople as symbolic elements of this metaphor (Tansel,1952).The issue is the distinction between the revolutionary reservations of the new Turkish strategic national culture in modern Turkey and constitutional monarchy or a religious republican state's national and cultural

attributes. In this section, the study deals with secularist legitimacy. The main focus is on the origins of a strategic culture of security and reconstruction of state identity.

#### **4.2.1 The roots of political and cultural material reservations of Turkishness: Revolutions, immigration and secularism**

The political of Mustafa Kemal began with an Ottoman modernisation program. Ottoman westernisation was launched with the “New Army” (Nizam-i Cedid) at the opening of the Imperial School of Naval Engineering (Muhendishane-i Bahri-i Humayun) in 1773. The experiment proved to be successful by the early nineteenth century. The “New Army” had 22,700 soldiers and 1,600 officers at this stage (Hale, 1994). This process of modernisation was completed in 1826 by Sultan Mahmud II, who abolished the Janissary order and took over the Baktashi dervish orders’ property on the grounds that they subscribed to a heterodox belief system. The new state order transformed a solidly secular-minded and western-trained officer of the royal army. At the same time, it created a Nakshibendiyye Sunni Sufi power class in society and then placed this new religious class in the state apparatus. In order to form the state bureaucracy, the School of Administrative Sciences (Mekteb-i Mulkiye) was founded to train non-military western-type administrative bureaucrats and diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1859. These groups became the driving force of pro-Western public opinion in Turkey, pulling the rest of the country along with it (Ortayli, 1983).

Population reservation about the new Turkish state came from a number of regions. The first serious immigration wave departed from the Crimea in the aftermath of the Crimean War (1853–56). The exodus of Russian Muslims increased after the new Ottoman army and new political cadre lost the war against Russia in 1877-1878. The situation created a big hole in state confidence and also reshuffled the Ottoman state population. Russian Muslims in 1897 numbered nearly 20 million while Ottoman Muslims numbered only 14.1 million (Meyer, 2007), Karpat, 1985). Most sources place the total number of Muslims leaving Russia for the Ottoman Empire in the latter half of the 19th century and early 20th century at well over one million. A body designed to enhance supervision of immigration by moving refugees from cities to the provinces was created by the Ottoman Empire and called the Refugee Commission

(Muhacirin Komisyonu). Despite the Tsarist government's attempts to prevent Muslims emigrating, they left the Crimea in their tens of thousands towards the Ottoman Empire in 1874, 1890 and 1902 (Meyer, 2007). Ziya Gokalp criticised tanzimat (preordination) for having failed to develop cultural bases of the nation in this context. Instead of unifying the nation it had widened the gap between the rulers and the common people (Heyd, 1950).

As mentioned earlier, the Berlin treaty provided Russia with the opportunity to interfere with the Ottoman state's internal affairs. Russia became the main ally of the Armenian population which caused the Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion and later Armenians joined the opposition movement of Young Turks. The policy of the three men (Enver, Cemal, and Talat Pasha) was aimed at creating a one - nation project and was advanced by Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary cadre during the withdrawal from the imperial territories. One man died in the Asian steps for his Turanist ideology, and two men were assassinated by the Armenian Diasporas. The discussion of the Armenian issue here is limited to highlighting its role in damaging the construction of a Turkish identity and being a political card against Turkey's policy orientation of Western liberalism.

The question, therefore, comes down to the relative importance of these conceptions in determining today's Turkish identity. The founder of Turkish modernism, Sultan Abdul Hamit himself, claims that "the great Ottoman state was founded on faith, after Yavuz Selim absorbed the caliphate. But since the original state was established by Turks, in reality this Turkish state asserted its Turkishness (*devlet i Turkidir*; *Turki* in the sense of Turkish not Turkic). Since the exalted Osman established this sublime state it has stood on four principles: the ruler is Ottoman, the administration is Turkish, the faith is Islam, and the capital is Istanbul. The weakening or dismissal of any of these principles will affect the foundation of the state" (Karpas, 2001:336). The other clear response came from a pro-Turkish writer, Justin McCarthy, in his book *Death and Exile* (McCarthy, 1995). He claims that after the external immigration from Caucasus and the Balkans, the demographic structure of Turkish society was reshuffled. The new dynamic demographic transfusion facilitated the initiation of an imaginary society engineering process by Mustafa Kemal's revolutionary team (Kili, 2001). Secondly, the nation state's immigration priorities are considered by Soner

Caqaptay in his fascinating work (Cagaptay, 2006). Modern Turkey’s population composition characterises the multi-nationality of the country and the exclusion of Kurds and Arabs and the inclusion of Balkan, and Caucasus Muslims; these immigrants became the main element of the new states elite cadre.

**Table 4.1: Priority in immigration**

|  |                                |
|--|--------------------------------|
| 1. Turks   | Allowed                        |
| 2. Turkic Groups<br>(Tatars, Karapapaks)               |                                |
| 3. Stateless Balkan Muslims<br>(Pomaks, Bosnians, etc) |                                |
| 4. Caucasus Muslims                                    | Allowed<br>with<br>inspection! |
| 5. Kurds, Arabs, Albanians,<br>Jews, Christians        | Not<br>Allowed                 |

Sources: Cagaptay (2005)

However, the zones of Turkishness in the first stage of the country’s formation present a very ambiguous picture of the new state’s apparatus since Ataturk’s strategic national identity project was based on a combination of ethnicity and language (it included Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims who can speak Turkish) and territory (residents of Anatolian included non Muslims who can speak Turkish) (Hinnebusch, 2003:18). Mustafa Kemal adopted ethnic nationalism which was considered a foreign concept in the past but his project is taken up by the Young Turk movement who were looking for a linguistic based nationalism (Turkification) which was compatible with a multi-national state. This was aimed at stopping the decline of the empire and led to the Revolution of 1909 that enforced the acceptance of the constitutional and parliamentary system on the Sultan (Hinnebusch, 2003). However, both parties’ projects and their implementation resulted in the collapse of the empire, and new state faced Kurdish nationalist and Islamist challenges. Religious Kurds ask whether Turkishness represents an ethnic category or part of historical (Islamic) paradigms.

The secular Kurdish intellectuals Abdullah Cevdet and Mehmet Ziya Gokalp (1968) integrated the Durkheimian collective social solidarity theory and Jacobin French secularism methods to create the 'One Nation' under the aegis of Turkishness. Abdullah Cevdet political theory became the main policy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk by abolishing the spiritual institutions of the Ottoman dynasty and the caliphate in 1924 and the religious institutions of Seyhülislam (Sheikh of Islam). The adaption of the Swiss Code was opposed by Abdul Hamit's sublime Turkish definition mentioned above. A second man in the new Turkish Republic, the National Chief (Millî Şef), İsmet İnönü, who originally came from a Kurdish family background (city of Bitlis), did not accept the proposal of Saint-Picot or the Wilson principle at the Lausanne conference. He said that there were no ethnic minorities recognised in Turkey, only religious minorities. He had successfully imputed that "Kurdish interest is in equal consideration with Turks, and there is no question about it (Aksin, 1991:195; Heper, 1998; Hurewitz, 1956; Hale, 2002). The common interest consensus between secular Turks and Kurds ultimately achieved the establishment of a new nation state under a Turkish strategic national political culture. On the one hand, the religious leader, Şeyh Said, in providing legitimacy to the uprising, claimed that there was no legitimacy between Turks and Kurds after the abolition of the caliphate, which had provided the implicit social contract between them (Mumcu, 1991). The discussion about this revolt is whether it had a religious or an ethnic basis. Prominent Kurdish experts such as Bruniessmen (1992; Olson, 2000; McDowell 1997) evaluate the Kurdish revolt as an expression of ethnic nationalism, but in fact, Said's religious argument very effectively stimulated the Kurdish people, because most of them are more religious and remain tribal. After several Turkish military campaigns against the PKK and the Turkish Hezbollah, the societal structure of the region was completely changed. The Turkish authorities are very aware that they have to sever the religious connections amongst the Kurdish nationalist and religious people.

The religious identity of modern Turkey was redesigned but the religious movement has challenged state reformation politics during the republican period. Even though the Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu (Unification of Education Law) forced the closing of the Ottoman education institutions in 1924, the transition period continued until 1934 and most of the Kurdish madrasa schools (seminary schools) survived until the PKK

and Turkish Hezbollah terror emerged in the 1980s. The Kurdish population received both Arabic and Kurdish language education and Shafite madhab jurisprudence education from these civil educational institutions. The students were also recruited as imams in the region, because the Turkish government could not provide a Shafi or Ca'feri education in the state religious schools (Zinar, 1998). As a result of terrorism and the Turkish military campaign, the Kurdish people have been deprived of that part of their national identity in which they separated from the Ja'feri school of Iran and Hanafi school of Turks. In this context, Gramsci's claim explains the Kurdish national uprising: "*Nationalism arises in threatened and underdeveloped peripheral societies whose intelligentsia invite the people into history and modernize their vernacular culture*" (Forman, 1998:145). Though, the cultural project of nationalism was an important agent of social change (Gellner, 1983:39-58), Turkish nationalism diverged from the Turkish Islamist paradigm and lost its legacy of authority after the Lausanne conference. The Turkish scholars, Yilmaz and Aydin described the new Turkish state's religious 'modus vivendi' as "Lausanne Islam"(Yilmaz, 2005).

On one hand, the secularisation of Turkey and its Islamic synthesis do represent but rather continuity of the Ottoman state's secularist formation, because Ottoman state reconciled itself with clericalism and theocracy after Kanuni's law in the imperial council. The religious catechism points out the religious doctrine in theology is that of Maturidi, and in jurisprudence that of Hanafi. However, the Ottoman state's religious doctrine was that of Esari in akaid (essence of belief) and Hanafi in practice. On the other hand, the new state aimed to create a "*Gesellschaft Society*", as opposed to the Ottoman state's policy based on a "*Gemeinschaft society*" (Ataman, 20005). The argument by the Anthony Smith (1989:341) corroborates the fact that Kurdish nationalism arises out of the pervasive moral crisis of dual legitimisation where divine authority is challenged by secular state power. In fact, the Turkish state fabricated its national distinctiveness in terms of imagination and institution but it was a failure in building a modern nation as an artefact of an imagined political community (Anderson, 1991:37-46). However, Ataturk was very successful in the creation of a "*Gesellschaft Society*" in terms of a Turkish Islamic synthesis (Richmond, 1984:289-300). The other question of Turkey's Islamic synthesis arose during the republican period. The Turkish nationalist paradigm was faced with Turkish Islamist paradigm challenge in the periphery of society when the government forced the recital of the

Adhan (call for prayers) in Turkish in mosques, instead of Arabic from 1932 to 1950. The liberal policies of the Democrat Party paved the way for religious freedoms in society.

In summary, the state centralisation politics of Turkey and Iran do not allow non-governmental organisations an effective role in society. The cultural reservation of Turkishness and an Iranian national identity also exclude other ethnic minorities from creating a common political discourse under the leadership of Turkishness and Iranian civilisations. And countries have maintained their status quo as motherlands when immigration and ethnic cleansing occur in the peripheral zones of Turkish and Iranian society.

#### **4.2.2 Turkey Iran relations during the republican period: legitimising the territorial boundaries in the neighbourhood**

The modernisation initiatives in Turkey and Iran left behind the old religious and political disputes. The legacy of the Tehran Protocol in 1911 and Istanbul Protocol in 1913 was enforced by Kurdish rebellion in the 1920s so that both states had to reconsider making a new agreement with regard to the borders. The two countries notes exchanged in 1924, signed the Friendship and Border Security Agreement in 1926, and an additional protocol in 1928 renewed this protocol. However, Turkey used the hot pursuit right to allow military pursuits of Kurdish rebels into Iranian territory which almost led the two countries into war in 1930 (Poulantzas, 2002). During the crisis, Reza Shah used the Kurdish political card to weaken Turkish influence prior to the border agreement. Both sides called back their diplomatic personnel from each other's capitals. Ultimately, they signed a border agreement in 1932 that provided Turkey with possession of Mount Ararat but left the Kotur (near Van) to Iran. Following the Security of Border Agreement on the 14<sup>th</sup> March 1932, a Friendship, Security, Neutrality and Economic Co-operation Treaty was signed by both parties on 5<sup>th</sup> November 1932 (Soysal, 1989). Though Turkey and Iran left behind the legacy of former dynasties, they renewed the paradigm of the Qasri Shirin treaty, which is an example of longstanding relations between the two countries.

#### 4.2.3 The failure of the Sadabat axis

State-centralisation policies overwhelmingly improved relations and resulted in further diplomatic achievements in the 1930s. The relationship peaked when Reza Shah visited Turkey on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1934. He was welcomed with the *Ozsay* (*Original Lineage*, or alternately *Pure Race*) opera that music was composed by Adnan Saygun and as the book by a liberto, Münir Hayri Egeli. The composition was based on the Persian epic *Shahname* that portrays the founders of Iran and Turan, the names of regions that historically represent Persian and Turkic cultures. Reenacting this story in the opera provided a direct comparison between the first rulers of Iran and with Turan resembling Reza Shah and Atatürk, solidifying the alliance (Woodard, 2007). The performance took place in Ankara at the Halkevi (people's house) to emphasize the forward-looking reforms of the secular, democratic nation and to help in strengthening the alliance relationship that bore fruit in the form of the Sadabad Pact, which was signed in Tehran in July 1937 (Soysal, 1989; Hurewitz, 1956). After the negotiations regarding the boundary conflict between Iraq and Iran, the pact was established in the Middle East for the sake of middle - power balance against multi-polar threats (Cubin, 1977). Its members included Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Turkey; it was established all the terminal boundaries between Turkey and Iran except for those in Central Asia, the Caucasus and India. At the same time, the Shah promoted authoritarian secularist measures in Iran, similar to Mustafa Kemal's reformation.

Nevertheless, the occupation of Iran by Allied Forces also demonstrated that the agreements were not effective in a crisis, as the entry of allied troops into Iran in 1941 had severe consequences for its political stability. Turkey played the role of 'active neutrality' during the course of the war, signing the tripartite treaty with the French and British on 19<sup>th</sup> October 1939 (Deringil, 1989; Weisband, 1973; Ataov, 1965), and a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany on 18<sup>th</sup> June 1941 (Soysal, 1989). Due to the ineffectiveness of the Sadabad Pact in WWII, the two governments continuously worked to ease tensions through negotiations. Tehran was suspicious, believing that it could not depend on Turkey in those critical times. In fact Soviet Union was the main determining factor in bilateral relations in which both parties were concerned about the other's possible security ties with the Soviet sphere of influence. As a result of the failure of the Sadabat Pact, one can see that a Third



World alliance could not create an axis against great powers. During the WWII period, Turkey and Iran felt sympathy for the Nazis against Russia, which would allow them to expand their nationalist ambitions. Iran desired to regain Northern Azerbaijan. However, Turkey hoped that the Nazi government would provide freedom for Turkic states in the peripheral zone of Turkey. Neither hope materialized because Iran was occupied by the allied forces in 1941. But Turkey remained an active neutral during the war and protected itself from any engagement of war. After the end of WWII, Ankara did not show any sympathy for the Soviet-supported Azerbaijan Democratic Government in Iranian Azerbaijan (Karatay, 2003), (Keskin, 2005), or the Kurdish Republic in Mahabad (Olson, 1998:20-27). Turkey, therefore, did not object to Tehran's centralised military solution for the Azeri Turks and Kurds in Iran. The Shah's achievements against the separatist movements and his provisions for national stability gave him more credibility in Iranian society in this stage. Needless to say, WWII damaged Turkish-Iranian relations. The competition between the two neighbours was reformed in the form of a client and satellite state in the new world order.

#### **4.2.4. 0 Soviet ethnic cleansing of Turkic periphery zones**

The politics of the Bolsheviks' *Korenizatsiia* (nativatisation) integrated Turkic groups into the Soviet system in the 1920s. However, the political settlement by the Soviet leadership (Stalin) was a demographic disaster for the Kalmyks, Karachay, Chechen-Ingush, Balkars, Crimeans, Germans, Finns and Koreans during the war. It is noteworthy that the Soviet ethnic cleansing involved groups which had religious and ethnic connections with modern Turkey. This study does not consider the deportation of the Kalmyks, Koreans, Germans, Greeks and Finns. As will be explained, the nations of the Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils, Chechens and Ingush Crimean Tatars, Balkars, and Karachays were faced with massive deportations and ethnic cleansing during World War II. In fact, the Kremlin aimed to destroy both Turkey's and Iran's frontline security zones in the Caucasus, through which those nations had supported the Nazi German occupation of Russia during the war time. Otto Pohl claims that the politics of Stalin's regime were in contravention of the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide treaty which was signed on 1948 by the General Assembly of the United Nation (Pohl, 1999:3). According to the UN act,

the resettlement question of Meskheti Turk is still an immutable issue in Turkey’s periphery security zone in the the Northern Caucasus.

**4.2.4.1 Death, exile and special settlement contingent of Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils**

The Meskhetian Turks are descendents of Georgians who converted to Islam and adopted the Turkish language during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. They share the same language, religion, and customs as the Anatolian Turks (Bugai, 1995: 165-6). They were deported from the Turkish-Georgian border regions which were strategic areas for the USSR, as a routine security measure, to special settlements in Kazakhstan and Central Asia by the Soviet leadership between 1945 and 1953. Stalin moved Meskhetian Turks from Georgia to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1944. .However, it is estimated that 46,000 Meskhetian Turks fled from Uzbekistan after the ethnic clashes, which made it impossible for them to live in safety in 1989 and some of those living in Uzbekistan moved to Azerbaijan and found refuge in 1992. Their real homeland is Georgia, and they still want to return back home 50 years after Stalin deported them in Central Asia (Khazanov,1992), (Daniloff, 1997). On the other hand, Kurds first arrived to Transcaucasia as early as the 10<sup>th</sup> century and established permanent populations in the border districts of Georgia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Khemshils are ethnic Armenians who converted from Christianity to Islam. The majority of them used to live on the Turkish-Georgian border but now about 20,000 of them live on the Turkish side of the Georgian border (Ascherson, 1995).

**Table 4.2: Deportation and special settlement of Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshils**

| Nations                       | Date            | Numbers in Exile | Percentage | Death  |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|--------|
| Turks and Kurds and Khemshils | 01 October 1945 | 88,800           | 4.00%      | 6,902  |
| Turks and Kurds and Khemshils | 01 October 1946 | 84,402           | 3.40%      | 4,343  |
| Turks and Kurds and Khemshils | 01 April 1949   | 81,026           | 3.50%      | 2,259  |
| Turks and Kurds and Khemshils | 01 January 1950 | 86,164           | 3.30%      | 2,389  |
| Meskhetian Turks              | 01 January 1953 | 46,790           | 1.70%      | 4,655  |
| Kurds                         | 01 January 1953 | 8,843            | 0.30%      | 1,500  |
| Total                         |                 | 396,025          | 16.20%     | 22,048 |

Sources: Zemskov, 1990: Table 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992:Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4

Due to the deportations, many of the special settlers from Georgia suffered from malnutrition, exposure and disease. Between the beginning of 1945 and the end of 1950, it is recorded that 22.048 people died and 16% of population was deported including Turks, Kurds and Khemshils (Bugai, 1992).

**4.2.4.2 Deportation, exile and special settlement of Crimean Tatars**

The Crimean Tatars lived in the Crimean peninsula from the Middle Ages until May 1944. They are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi School and speak a Kipchak - Turkic language. They constituted only 25% of the population of the Crimean ASSR in 1923, but their population decreased to 19.36% to 218,179 while the Russian population was counted as 49.6 % with 558,481 in 1938 (Pohl,1999:109-118). Turkey’s connection with Crimean Tatars was based on the alliance of the Ottoman and Crimean Tatars against Russia and also a religious-language connections and the existence of a Crimean immigrant population in modern Turkey (Pohl, 1999:109-118). Like the other nations, they benefited from the politics of Soviet Korenzatsiia in 1920s. However, they were faced with massive ethnic cleansing during World War II. The German army occupied Sevastopol in July 1942 and executed 91,678 people, including most of the peninsulas’ Jews and Gypsies from October 1941 to April 1942. Due to Crimean Tatars fighting alongside the German Army against Soviet army units, Stalin’s regime accused them of being Nazi collaborators after the Red Army recaptured the Crimean peninsula from the Germans and arrested 5,381 anti-Soviet elements in Crimea in May 1944 (Pohl, 1999).

**Table: 4.3.Deportation and Special Settlement of Crimean Tatars**

| Nations  | Date            | Numbers in Exile | Percentage |
|----------|-----------------|------------------|------------|
| Crimeans | 01 October 1945 | 195,200          | 8.70%      |
|          | 01 October 1946 | 193,959          | 7.80%      |
|          | 01 April 1949   | 186,535          | 8.10%      |
|          | 01 January 1950 | 193,467          | 7.50%      |
|          | 01 January 1953 | 165,259          | 6.00%      |
|          | Total           | 934,420          | 38.10%     |

Sources: Zemskov, 1990; Table: 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992: Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4.

Stalin’s regime started a massive deportation of Crimean Tatars to Uzbekistan which included nearly one million or 38% of the total population. They remained exiled in Uzbekistan until Stalin’s death on 5<sup>th</sup> March 1953. However, a massive immigration flood occurred after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s. Between 1945 and 1953 the deportation and resettlement policies caused 42, 000 Crimean Tatar deaths, which was one of the most extreme examples of ethnic cleansing and collective punishment in modern history (Pohl, 1999:109-118).

**4.2.4.3 Deportation and exile and special settlement of Chechens and Ingush**

Chechens and Ingush are two related nationalities living in the area of the North Caucasus. There are even connection with Turks and Iranians because the languages belonging to the Nakh branch of the Ibero-Caucasian language group. Although they have strong religious ties with Turks, they practise a form of Sunni Islam of Hanefi School greatly influenced by Sufi the Qadiriya brotherhood and a warrior legacy in the frontline security zone of the Turks since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. The Sufi leadership guerrilla fighters resisted the Tsarist colonial subjugation from Dagestan and Chechnya, a resistance which still inspires the Gaza spirit of Turkishness. Andrew Mongo claims that 58 Turkish volunteer guerrillas joined the war against Russia during the first and second Chechen Wars in the 1990s (Sabah, 29 November 2003). The Tsarist army took Imam Shamil into custody after twenty five years’ of guerrilla warfare in 1851. However, the Soviet leadership created a separate Chechen Autonomous Oblast and an Ingush Autonomous Oblast on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1924. They merged Chechnya and Ingushetia regions and formed the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast on 5<sup>th</sup> December 1936 (Pohl, 1999:79-86).

**Table: 4.4. Deportation and Special Settlement of Chechen and Ingush**

| Nations            | Date            | Numbers of Exile | Percentage |
|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------|
| Chechen and Ingush | 01 October 1945 | 405,900          | 17.20%     |
|                    | 01 October 1946 | 400,478          | 16.30%     |
|                    | 01 April 1949   | 365,173          | 15.80%     |
|                    | 01 January 1950 | 372,189          | 14.50%     |
|                    | 01 January 1953 | 165,259          | 6.00%      |
|                    | Total           | 1,708,999        | 69.80%     |

Sources: Zemskov, 1990; Table: 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992; Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4.

A massive exodus of Chechen and Ingush peoples occurred when the Red Army expelled the German military from the Magobek and Mozdokin in December 1943, which the German army had occupied on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1942. Due to being branded as bandit nations by the Soviet leadership, between 23<sup>rd</sup> February, 29<sup>th</sup> February 387,229 Chechens and 91, 250 Ingush were deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 180 trains in 1944. Another massive deportation of Chechen and Ingush peoples occurred between 1945 and 1953 and included 1,708,999 (70 %) of the population. Nevertheless, between 1957 and 1961, 384,000 Chechens and 84, 000 Ingush returned to the Chechen-Ingush ASSR from exile. 28,000 Chechens were relocated in Dagestan and 8,000 Ingush resettled in North Ossetia and only 34,000 the Chechen and 22,000 Ingush remained in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia by 1961. In spite of this massive return to their homeland, Chechen and Ingush peoples shaped only 42% of the population because Russians still formed the largest ethnic group in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, with 49% of the population (Pohl, 1999).

#### **4.2.4.4 Deportation and Exile and Special Settlement of Balkars, and Karachays**

Karachays are a Turkic people closely related to the Balkars. Their ethnologies stem from a mixture of Huns, Bulgars, Khazars and Kipchaks. They speak the Kipchack - Turkic language which is a branch of the Ural – Altaic language groups. Balkars - Turkic groups are also descendents of the Kipchack Turks who adhere to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam and who settled in the Caucasus. Moscow formed a unified Karachay - Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast on 22<sup>nd</sup> January 1922, but split the Karachay Autonomous Oblast and the Cherkessia Autonomous Oblast on 25<sup>th</sup> April 1928. According to the 1939 Soviet census, 75,736 Karachay lived in the USSR. However, about 70,900 of them lived in the Karachay Autonomous Oblast. They constituted 28% of the oblast's population. Earlier, the Soviet government had created the Kabardino - Balkaria Autonomous Oblast on 1 September 1921. Balkars composed only 11.2 % of the population in that oblast while the Russians composed 43% of the oblast's population in 1939. Hence, most of the population was composed of the Cherkess and other nationalities. Prior to Germany's reaching the Northern Caucasus, the local Karachay dissidents started an insurgency campaign against Soviet Russia despite 25,000 Karachays and Cherkess fighting against the Nazis.

During August 1942, Germany tried to capture the oil fields of Baku, Grozny and Maikop but they only took Maikop (Pohl, 1999:73-8).

**Table 4.5: Balkars, and Karachays**

| Nations       | Date            | Numbers of Exile |
|---------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Karachay      | 01 October 1945 | 60,100           |
| Balkars       | 01 October 1945 | 33,100           |
| Karachay      | 01 October 1946 | 60,139           |
| Balkars       | 01 October 1946 | 32,817           |
| Karachay      | 01 April 1949   | 57,491           |
| Balkars       | 01 April 1949   | 31,873           |
| Karachay      | 01 January 1950 | 59,340           |
| Balkars       | 01 January 1950 | 32,645           |
| Karachay      | 01-Jan-53       | 63,327           |
| Balkars       | 01-Jan-53       | 33,214           |
| General Total |                 | 862,445          |

Sources: Zemskov, 1990: Table 3: pp. 155; Bugai, 1992:Doc.33:251-2 and 34: 253-4

During World War II, Germans occupied the area inhabited by the Balkars for five months in 1942. However, following their expulsion from the territory of the Karachay Autonomous Oblast and Balkars Autonomous Oblast in 1943, the Stalin regime accused the Karachays and Balkars of being traitors or collaborators with Nazi Germany and carried out deportations in a military fashion on 6<sup>th</sup> November 1943. As a result of this policy, the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) exiled a total of 69,267 Karachays and allowed Georgia to annex their territory, with 2,115 Georgian resettling there. Between March and October in 1944 the Stalin regime conducted the deportation of the entire Balkar nation. The NKVD deported to 112,340 on 14 train echelons to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia (Pohl, 1999).

Thus, 58,387 Chechen, Ingush, Karachays, and Balkars perished due to the special re-settlement policy of the Soviet regime in 1944. Between 1944 and 1948, a total of 144,704 (25.42 % of the population) died from the harsh conditions in exile. During 1949 and 1950 another 19,086 North Caucasian individuals were died, leading to a total of 163,790 (28.77%) deaths. 8,300 North Caucasians perished during the transportation to the special settlements. Between 6<sup>th</sup> November 1943 and 26<sup>th</sup> November 1948 the Karachay population declined by a total of 12,398 people, 17.9%

of the population. Approximately 19,000 Karachay deaths occurred from the time of their deportation to 1948. However, the Chechen and Ingush population decreased by 114,259, 23.87% of them deported. During transit and deportation, 100,000 Chechens and 23,000 Ingush people died between 29<sup>th</sup> February 1944 and 26<sup>th</sup> November 1948. Joseph Stalin perfected the modern style of ethnic cleansing between 1937 and 1949 as the regime deported 3,266,340 people to Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia (Pohl, 1999). These humanitarian issues in the Turkic World did attract attention in the international community but the tragedy assisted the Turkish Islamists and racial nationalism as well as revolutionary left-wing youth movements in the intelligentsia. Whilst Turkey did not receive many immigrants from the Caucasus exile, it had received from the Balkans in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, the dynamic of the Turkish internal identity was not only constructed from within society but by an external links. Turkey and Iran could not have had any influence on the creation of the periphery zone in the region, on the verge of dissolution of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s, because both countries' political elites were not aware of any Soviet ethnic assimilation in Central Asia or the Caucasus during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Pohl, 1999).

#### **4.2.5.0 Resettlement of international system and legitimising of the Turkish and Iranian nation state identities**

The pivotal period (1930-1945) of the transition of power encompassed the British Empire losing its global pre-eminence to the United States (McKercher, 1999). However, the end of World War II saw the Soviet Union's expansionist policies and territorial demands required Turkey to cede the provinces of Kars and Ardahan and allow it to establish a Soviet naval base in the Dardanelles Strait on 20<sup>TH</sup> May 1945. Kremlin ambitions for Iranian oil induced Ankara and Tehran to turn towards the the West. The discovery of nuclear fusion has also made fundamental changes to international history and the outset of the Cold War system pushed both countries into changes in their strategic national security and internal political settings. During the Musaddiq era (1951-1953) in Iran and the Adnan Menders governments (1950-1960) in Turkey, the Turkish state joined NATO after sending of its troops to Korea in 1952. Ankara received a great amount of economic aid from the Marshall Plan which also secured Turkey's democratic transition. Soviet Russia recognised Turkey's territorial integrity in 1953 and therefore the legitimacy of the Turkish state identity or

independency was guaranteed by the Western alliance. Hence, Turkey's democratised transition was not optional but a compulsory change that created the new face of the state, namely Kemalism rather than Atatürkism.

Iranian nationalism peaked when Musaddiq took power in Iran. The concept of "*negative equilibrium*" and a liberal Iranian nationalism had been implemented by the nationalisation of the Iranian oil fields on 15<sup>th</sup> March 1951 (Zabih, 1982). But a CIA-supported military *coup d'état*, named *Operation Ajax* ousted Musaddaq, (Gasiorowski, and Byrne, 2004). Therefore, the legacy of Muhammad Shah was mainly reliant on the alliance with United States in the international community and defeating the Kurdish and Azerbaijani uprisings. Turkey's fear of a communist takeover in Iran pushed its policy openly towards Britain and the West. During this critical time in Iran, the relationship between the two neighbours was hostile.

On the one hand, both countries' recognition of the Israeli state and diplomatic engagement with Tel Aviv were critical decisions. Turkey completely isolated itself from the historical legacy claims of the Ottoman Empire and assumed a peripheral role in the Middle East. Turkey and Israel agreed to a secret "Periphery Pact" designed to link Israel, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia in 1958 (Armaganoglu, 1991). The policies of Iran and Turkey with regard to Middle Eastern conflict were seen as pro-Israeli and pro-western by the Arab countries. Hence, Turkey had to pay for its rapprochement by receiving Arab support when the United Nation was voting on Cyprus issues in the 1960s and petrol crisis in the 1970s.

#### **4.2.5.1 Turkey Iran relations during the Cold War: the failure of the Baghdad Pact, CENTO and RCD**

The concept of a "*Northern Tier*" on the southern periphery, aimed to create a "collective security system" against the Soviet threat for both Turkey and Iran. Therefore, the Baghdad Pact was established in 1954 by Britain, Iraq and Turkey but excluded Afghanistan, which encouraged the Soviet leadership to invade Afghanistan in 1979. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in November 1955 (Kemal, 2005). Unfortunately, this Northern Tier concept was no longer viable because of the Suez crisis in 1956 and Lebanon civil war in 1956 (Ramazani, 1966). This successive



events alienated the Arab countries as well as Gamal Abdul Naser and his cause of Arab nationalism from both Turkey and Iran. The Ba'aths revolution in 1958 and the developments that followed in Iraqi politics culminated in Iraq leaving the pact in 1959 (Dawisha, 2003).

Turkey's democratisation attempts were foiled after a Turkish military coup d'état on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1960 that resulted in the tragic death of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his two top men Fatin Rustun Zorlu and Hasan Polatkan. Due to Turkey's approach to the internal politics of other countries, the Shah of Iran supported coup d'état at that time. The Islamist journalist Tamer Korkmaz (2007) focused on the transition of Turkish strategic national security and its tenure engagement with the Gladio organisation. He claims that the Ergenekon organisation, which has operated under the shelter of NATO, is the main suspect for the unresolved political murders in Turkey since the Cold War. Despite its authoritarian appearance, the new constitution of 1960 provides more freedom for ethnic groups, especially Kurds.

The relationship with Iran continued with the establishment of an organisation for economic, technical and cultural cooperation, called Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), in July 1964. It involves Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in the territory of old (Islam, 2003). In creating this new body, the three states de-played down the security aspect of CENTO (Ersoy, 1994). Such developments further substantiated Iran's and Turkey's image in the Arab world as puppets of Western imperialism within the Northern Tier. However, due to the Jupiter Missile crisis in 1963, receipt of President Johnson's letter, Cypriot issues in the 1960s. Therefore, Turkey's European cultural engagement began with the Ankara agreement in 1962 and such politics became a strategic state policy of Turkey. It revised its foreign policies in relation to Middle Eastern countries. Turkey remained neutral during the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 (Laqueur, 1967) and also joined the Organisation of Islamic countries (OIC) in 1969 because the American arm embargo against Turkey 1974-1978 forced Turkey to diversify its foreign policy. As part of improving relations with the Arab World, Turkey recognised the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1976 and allowed the PLO to open an office in Ankara in 1979 (Criss and. Bilgin 1997). Similar diversification appeared in the Iranian foreign policy with improved relations with Moscow after September 1962. With Moscow's acceptance of Tehran's

assurances regarding the American military presence on Iranian oil, US-Iran relations were not harmonious due to Kennedy's engagement in social engineering in Iran (Ramazani, 1975). However, relations between the US and Iran improved during the Johnson administration, in contrast to Turkey's previous uneven relations with the US. In February 1971 President Nixon's broad agreement with Iran to sell it a sophisticated weapons system, set the stage for Iran's current military build up. Iran was engaged in an unprecedented buying spree of defence equipment worth billions of dollars, as would befit the 'gendarme' of the Gulf. Turkey was not impressed by these developments because the aim of the Shah was to make Iran a regional power in the Middle East. Moreover, the Shah launched a new modernisation process, namely the White Revolution, which forcibly aimed at reducing the authority of the religious structure in Iran (Pahlavi, 1967). Iran started to play a role in the regional balance of power in the Middle East after Britain withdrew from the Gulf. The US and European states helped the new policy direction; Iran took the opportunity to improve relations with the West and in particular, the US. The Shah brought in over 100,000 foreign investors, professionals and technical experts to Iran. These, together with foreign bureaucrats, were used to bring massive changes to Iranian society including a new elite class. In the 1970s, Iran showed its power by seizing from the Gulf Sheikdoms of Sharjah and Ras al-Khyma, three small islands (Ebu Musa, Tunb, and Lesser Tunb) on the eve of their joining with Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah and Umm al-Qawayn to form the United Arab Emirates. However, Iran and Iraq's Shatt-al Arab waterway issues were the cause of a regional conflict between 1963 and 1967 and concluded in war in 1980 (Cubin, 1977). Despite their connection with Western security systems, both countries's engagement in the security context remained limited. Whilst Iran became the rising power in the region, Turkey was faced with internal terror and an economic crisis during the 1960s and 1970s.

Turkey-Iran's security engagements were not generally constructive. However, this long-standing alliance to the Western security system provided legitimacy for the Turkish state's identity in the international community.

#### **4.2.5.2 The roots of Alevi self-identity definition and the influence of Iran in the periphery**

Upon the religious uprising against state centralised policies in Iran, the Shah started to use Alevi’s religious card and Shia nationalism in Iran and Iraq such as the imperial legacy claim of the Safavids in Mesopotamia, to divert the attention of Iran’s clerical insurgency in 1960s and 1970s. He brought Alevi students from Eastern Anatolia to give them a Shi’a education in the city of Qum, which suggested the influence of Iran in the internal affair of Turkey. His manoeuvres did not work because of the various Alevi self identity definitions in Turkey such as Muslim, Alevi and Atheist.

**Table 4.6: Alevi self-identification**

|  |        |
|--|--------|
| Muslim only                                  | 12.10% |
| Alevi only (including Bekhtasi and Kizilbas) | 40.80% |
| Atheist                                      | 15.10% |

Sources: Dressler, 2008; Cagaptay, 2007

If Alevis defined themselves himself as Muslim, they mostly belonged to the Twelver Shiism of Ja’feri, Iran. However, the majority of Alevi mixed with the Bakstashi and Qizilbas sect, whose alliance was with the secular establishment in Turkey. The atheist identity came from a different ethnic background, dominated by left-wing groups. Alevi organisations such as the Cem Foundation claimed that Alevis constitute 10.4 % of the population, more than 20 million people ([www.cemvakfi.org](http://www.cemvakfi.org)), (Washington Times, 10 January 2007). However, others place this figure even higher at 25 million (Milliyet, 18 October 2000; Sabah, 20 November 2003). According to me identity definition of the Alevi population, Iran only has the chance to play the religion card with a small portion of Ja’feri in the province of Agri, and Kars , but the other Alevis are strictly reliant on the secularist regime of Turkey.

Many Alevi women were educated as early as in the 1930s, and were recruited as school teachers to spread the secular nationalism in devotion to Ataturk’s legacy. The Alevis showed loyalty not only to Ataturk but also to his party, the CHP, which moved to the left in the 1960s. However, in the 1970s, the Alevis played a significant role in setting up socialist, communist and secularist, political parties, militias, and even terrorist groups. Therefore, the Alevis became targets for Islamists, and Turkish nationalist parties and the Alevis were targeted by these groups during the intra-militia violence in the 1970s such as the affairs of Maras in the late 1970s.

Additionally, the militia and sympathizers of Islamists and nationalist parties killed more than 100 Alevi, wounding more than 1,000 in other clashes in the cities of Corum, Sivas and Malatya in the late 1970s (Hurriyet, 9 November 2004). As mentioned before, the Akhi Sufi tradition, the shamanistic Turks in Anatolia, produced a liberal Sufi version of Islam which is close to orthodox Islam but preserve shamanic culture to a degree. However, dance and music in worship and wine drinking celebrations and mixed-gender praying became common rituals in the Alevi faith (Zeidan, 1999). This is a rural specific version of Turkish Islam, initially called Qizilbas and later named Alevism. After the closure of Bekhtasi Sufi order in 1826, Sufis order gradually went underground and were influenced by Alevism, while Alevi incorporated elements of Bekhtasism.

Map: 4.1. Turkey: Alevi population by province



Sources: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/4616b6127d683.pdf> 2007

The Alevi come from a triangular zone in central-north Anatolia, the population spreading from Eskisehir to Erzurum, and Kahramanmaras. But the smaller Alevi communities (called Cernis, Tahtacis, Turkmen, or Yoruks) are spread on the mountain ranges along the Aegean and Mediterranean littorals, from Canakkale in north-western Turkey to Gaziantep in southern Turkey (Van Bruinessen, 1999; Shankland, 2003). On the other hand, the centre of the Baktashi is still in Kosovo,-- the country which provides a strong connection with the Central Asian cultural synthesis. On one hand, the internal immigration from the countryside to the metropolitan cities created the urbo-rural groups in the 1980s and 1990s. This urban

population jumped from 41.81 % in 1975 to 64.9% in 2000 (TUIK, 2007). Both the Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party received a great deal of support from these various reservations but the Alevi population and the urbo-rural class in the cities have been challenging the Islamist parties under the guise of the *Ulusalcilik* (nationalism) and Kemalist Turkish nationalism, as an anti-Western bloc, since the 2000s.

#### **4.2.5.3 The proxy of Kurdish and Azeri ethnic political cards**

Muhammad Reza Shah's ambition to be a regional actor undermined Turkey-Iran relations in 1970s. This process also exposed the role of the patron client - relationship between two powers in the Middle East. Taking advantage of one another, the foreign policy makers of Turkey and Iran were very careful to ensure super power support. The image of Tehran also became that of a Western capital in the Middle East. The gaining leverage against Iraq, which affected Turkey's internal issues, the Kurdish problem between Turkey and Iran and Iraq became a major issue particularly after the 1970s, when the Shah and American backed an Iraqi Kurdish guerrilla groups (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party) for an autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq. The connection between Iraqi Kurds and Iranian Kurds was stronger than with Turkey's Kurds. Thus, both sides used this ethnic card against each other. The legacy of the Barzani family on Kurdish nationalism internalised in the 1970s and peaked in the 1990s and 2000s. Turkish authorities closely watched the Shah's regional power activities involving the Iraqi Kurds. However, tensions abated when Iraq accepted the "*thalvag*" division of Shatt al-Arab. Shah stopped his support for the uprising at the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iraq. In opposing the Shah, Turkey began to use the other peripheral Iranian - Azeri political card against his revisionist policies. The Turkish ambassador stressed that "while driving from the Turkish border into Tehran I had felt as if I was in my own country" (as cited in Boruvali, 1989:90-91). That undiplomatic statement was interpreted by the Shah as an obvious reference to the prevalence of Azeris in Iranian Azerbaijan. Tehran viewed Ankara's promotion of Turkish Azeri nationalism as a method of withstanding the Soviet threat. This gave rise to heated polemics and mutual accusations in the Turkish and Iranian press. Iran called back its ambassador from Ankara for a second time during the reign of the Pahlavi regime (Tschanguiz,

1996:72).Iranian sympathy and shelter for the Kurds provided Iran with the chance to use Kurdish ethnicity to weaken Saddam's regime during the war. The status quo of this friendship is still a determining factor for understanding the regional politics.

The roots of the Kurdish revolutionary movement lay in left-wing and Islamic organisation in the 1970s which characterise similar social movements of Iranian revolutionaries, As a result of civil war in Turkey in 1970s, the leaders of the left-wing organisations, Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Arslan, and Huseyin Inan were persecuted after the military *coup d'état* in 1970. The Marxist groups also lost numerous members after the military coup d'état in 1980. On the other hand, the political Islamic movement took advantage of the space in the society and state apparatus created by the communists and nationalists in 1990s. The political Islamic movement neutralised the fundamentalist Islamist after Erbakan was called back from Sweden by the military generals in the 1960s. In fact, Erbakan played a very effective role in the movement of Islamists groups into the political centre of the state and impeded the emergence of a militarised Islam, called Akincilar at that time. Therefore political Islamic cadre simultaneously became the main prop of the secular state after the acceptance of a mistress role in state politics. However, the issue of Kurdish national entity became militarised after the military *coup d'état* in 1980.

#### **4.2.5.4 The roots of political Islam in Turkey**

The rising of a political Islam against the coercive modernisation also threatened both countries' relations. To control the Islamic movement in society, the Turkish state allowed the Islamist party a political role. They created the National Order Party in Turkey, but because of the party's manifesto, it was banned in the early 1970s. Following this, a second party was formed by the same political cadre with the name of the National Salvation Party. This was more successful, and became a junior partner in a coalition government in 1974. The party's religious discourse and demonstrations held in Konya were believed to contribute to the military takeover on 12<sup>th</sup> September 1980 but they did not have the political power to become a central power of the state or a revolutionary movement, as in Iran.

The Turkish military hierarchy saw the domestic security of Turkey as being at risk from increasingly confident hostile elements. These included not only fundamentalists but communist activists as well. Therefore, in light of the Iranian revolution, Turkey's military quickly carried out a coup d'état and banned all political parties. The advent of a military regime in Turkey also brought changes to Turkey's handling of foreign affairs, one example being the withdrawal of Turkish ambassadors from Israel (Robins, 2003). This was the forth centralisation policy of Turkey based on Kemalist nationalism. The legacy of Ataturk gained credit from the 1962 and 1982 constitutions which were integrated with '28 February - process' in 1997. However, Kemalist oligarchy was defeated when they attempted to constitutional crisis in April 2007 and in August 2008.

#### **4.2.5.5 The roots of revolutionary political Islam in Iran**

Iran's clergy began to be politically outspoken and criticised the actions of the Shah's regime (Yavuz, 2007). While Najaf maintained its religious status in the Shia community, the city of Qum emerged as the religious centre of Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty. Ayatollah Khomeini's predecessor, Sheikh Abd al Karim Hairi (1859-1936), established the Hawza-i Ilm to teach Islamic science. Ayatollah Burujerdi (1875-1961) the Merja-i taqlid of his time, made the clerics financially independent by regularising for the collection of religiously sanctioned taxes such as Zakat, Khums etc. After this financial independence of the Shia clerics, the city of Qum and religious institutions such as mosques became an alternative political centre of the Iranian opposition movement (Keddie, 1983). The Foresters rebellion in 1917 and 1921 (Munson, 1988), and demonstration of 15 Khordad 1975, the Safavi's organisation of Fedayan-i Islam in 1945, Keshani's Mujahidi-ni Muslim in 1950 and Ramadan and Black Friday in 1978 indicated that the political power of Shia Islam in Iran was rising and that the clerical movement was a threat to the Pahlavi dynasty (Munson, 1988:196). However, they could not send their message to the young generation (Shariati, 1982). Shariati's lecture in *Husayniye-i Irsad* merged this gap between the secular youth people and the clerics. The lecture series began in 1963 and continued until the Shah closed the institution in 1973. Shariati's ideological tie with Iqbal's "ego" Islamic identity project of "*reconstruction of Islamic thought*" and his conceptualisation of Islamic terms with modern sociology accentuated eligious ideology which was replaced with

the collective solidarity of Durkheimian sociology theory (Shariati, 1982). The self-identity of Ebu Zer el-Gifari was presented as that of a revolutionary figure for the Iranian youth. Both Ayatollah Motahhari's and Ali Shariati's lecture influenced the clerics and secular intellectuals but Shariati's criticism of the madrasah's curriculum and '*non-tawhidi ulema*' resulted in a split of the two scholars. While Motahhari left the *Huseyniya-i Irshad* in 1968, Khomeini preferred to remain neutral in the conflict (Erkilet, 2004). Shariati criticised the Safavid dynasty as having distorted Islam by creating dynastic to the inheritance of power and giving high status to the non-Tawhid-i clerics which are the non-political religious leaders who believe that religion is to be separated from politics and that clerics should only tend to the spiritual matters of the mosque (Hussain, 1985). Shariati's ideology was followed by military and civil organisations, the action organisation, the militant Muslim movement, the Liberal Islamic Party in 1978, and the Independency Action and Amal organisation, which played key roles in establishing an Islamic state in Iran (Erkilet, 2004). There is no comparable religious, intellectual or religious movement in Turkey.

The emergence of modern Turkey and Iran fulfilled the mission of creating a common political discourse within the nation-state establishments. The legacy of Atatürk relies on the victory in the Independence War which impeded the Balkanisation of Istanbul and the territory of Turkey. However, the legacy of the Pahlavi dynasty claims is that it is descended from the ancient emperor, Cyrus the Great. Despite the establishment an alliance relationship in Sadabat, Baghdad Pact and CENTO, the absence of a security establishment could not provide Iran with any deterrence or a structural alliance. During World War II, both Turkey and Iran lost their legitimacy in the periphery zones in Central Asia and the Caucasus. While Iran was occupied by the British and Russia, Turkey itself was threatened by the Russia. The new legitimacy of Iranian and Turkish statehood was reformulated under the Western security system. Competition between the two countries resulted in them becoming reliable clients with a super power. Iran played its client status quo during the late 1960 and 1970s. The roots of both countries also underwent completely different changes, and Turkish society was not faced with any revolutionary euphoria.



#### **4.3.0 The Construction of Turkish and Iranian strategic culture of security: nuclear ambition of Turkey and Iran**

The process of the establishing the Turkish and Iranian nation states has been explained above, but the components of Turkey's and Iran's strategic culture of security and its direct or indirect involvement in foreign policy are dealt with in this section. There are three propositions explaining the legacy of Mustafa Kemal in formation of a strategic culture of security in Turkey: the project (1) of the nation state lacked the new dynamics of an economic system and a strategic national culture of security, as an alternative system for the international community in the last two centuries; the project (2) of Turkish-Islamic synthesis demonstrated the Balkan influence on the formation of modern Turkey but the concept of Ziya Gokalp's *hars* (culture) is suspicious of this western outlook ( Heyd, 1950). The radical imaginary society theories (3) proposed by Abdullah Cevdet and Yakub Kadri Karaosmanoglu with regard to Westernisation were absent from the security theory of the state (Karaosmanoglu, 1929).

The foreign policy of Ataturk accommodated realism, anti-revisionist policy and allegiance to legality in international dealings, along with a suspicion of the West. The policy of Ataturkism is the oft-repeated "Peace at home; Peace in the World" (Feyzioglu, 1982:309). During World War II, Turkey's foreign policy - makers practised his active neutral policy. However, the foreign policy of Kemalism is different from Ataturkism, which was the reformulated legacy of Mustafa Kemal, namely Kemalism ideology. Kemalist theory became fully engaged with the Western security system and embraces the democratisation policy since the 1950s. However, the theory of Kemalism provides more power to the military, which conducted military coup d'état three times in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Since Centennial of Ataturk's birthday and 'Ataturkism-Ataturk Principles-Kemalism' in 1981, the National Security Council took the initiative and exercised a postmodern military coup d'état (*28 February - Process*) in 1997 , constitutional crisis in 2007 and 2008 against the democratically elected government. The influence of the military in the state plays a very effective role in the national security. Hence, the author considers that the security sectors in Turkey and Iran are valuable for constructing a strategic as well as a political culture of security. Rather than writing a separate chapter, this study

considers the nuclear ambition of Iran and the security setting of Turkey in this chapter due to their importance in the construction of nation state identity.


#### **4.3.1.0 The role of NATO in the construction of a Turkish strategic culture of security: the concept of a Turkish virtual state and citizenship**

Turkey's rulers are considered a shadow of the God who provides the Justice for welfare of society on Earth. This imperialist intuition of Turanism is replicated within Turkish nationalism (*ulusalcilik*), a new brand of nationalism as opposed to '*milliyetçilik*', which has been in circulation since the French Revolution. '*ulus*' is coined and filled with meanings other than '*millet*' (nation), which is a historical category encompassing belief and tradition. Hence, '*ulusalcilik*' is nationalism without a nation, or it is etatism with the nation that is mainly driven by the ancient Turkish Shamanistic religious tradition (Ergil, 2008). New laws allowed the killing even of a royal family's children to stop a possible threat to the unity of state authority. This is not an Islamic understanding of the virtual state but the continuity of the Shamanistic concept of virtual states during the Ottoman period. Mustafa Kemal's political reservation reflects the similarity to the previous imperial experience. The legacy of the state restores the national aspirations of Turkishness under the aegis of a pluralistic, democratic and organic state. One can argue that the historical legacy of the state is, therefore, more important than citizenship, or religion. This is clear from the concept of Turkish racial superiority by Ali Nihal Adsiz and statement by Turkish security staff endorsing the using of violence against the Islamic opposition movement considered the arch enemy of the secular state. For instance, Turkish general Dogu Silahcioglu and deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir clarify that "*we can kill more than three million people*" if necessary when the 28 February - process in the stage implicated Welfare Party supporters (Silahcioglu, 2008). Former deputy state security court judge of Yassiada case, Baku Tug, said that *if the communist revolution occurred on 9th March 1971, three million people will be killed* (Zaman, 3 March 2008). However, it is not fair to generalise the military's understanding of the state as the concept of the state is more Aryan claptrap or a sacred unit with untouchable principles such as secularism and statism. Since 1952, Turkey's engagement with the Western security system supports this security concern of the state elite. Therefore, the study tries to explain NATO's material engagement with Turkey's strategic

culture of state security. Turkey’s benefits from the Western security system include its air defence system and some key military technologies, especially from the United States. However, this strategic dependency has been faced with two crises—the Western arm embargo between 1974 and 1978 and the “*bag affairs*” in 2004, which undermined the strategic alliance relationship and was perceived as a threat against the confidence of Turkishness. This led to the growth of *Ulusalcilik* and anti-Americanism since the American - led invasion of Iraq. On the other hand, the former councillor of the foreign minister Abdullah Gul, Ahmed Davudoglu, stated that Turkey is part of the Western security system but outside the welfare share of Western economic system (Davutoglu, 2004). Turkey is faced with a conflict with U.S on the Kurdish question in Iraq and heated negotiations with the EU on Cyprus. However, both are considered untouchable rocks on Turkish state foreign politics’ red line.

According to a recent political survey, the public opinion on the Westernisation politics of the Turkish state shows a very ambiguous reflection in the graphics below.

Figure 4.1: General trends of Turkish public opinion (2007)



In the first graphic, 22% of Turks favoured improving relations with Iran in 2002 and the positive tendencies dramatically increased to 28% in 2007. On the other hand, anti-Americanism was very high at that time. Nevertheless, the positive politics of Washington against the PKK in 2007 dramatically decreased anti-Americanism to 9%. In the second graphic, 34 % of the Turkish people defined themselves as secular in 1999. However, the identity definition of Turks as Muslim dramatically increased to

45 % in 2007. In the last graphic, Turkey's multi-dimensional politics became more prosperous and GDP per capita jumped from US \$ 2, 675 to US \$ 6, and 548. However, there was a dramatic decrease in support directed to the AKP government for EU politics. While the number was 65 % in 2002, this figures decreased to 49% in 2007. The influence of the public on foreign policy of Turkey is not essential due to the virtual state understanding of the Turkish elite who believe that the priority is always the security of the country within the western system. Even General Kilic' proposal to ally with Russia and Iran could not find any support in Turkey's security environment (Olson, 2006). In fact, Turkey's alliance with Washington is not a political engagement but rather a constructive systematic alliance in the international community. Therefore, non- signature political parties can change the patron and client relationship between Turkey and the United States. The graphic shows the material engagement between Turkey and the Western security system.

#### **4.3.1.1 Overview of Turkey's strategic setting in the Western security system**

Following the accession to NATO in 1952, Turkey and the U.S signed their first military agreement in 1954 (Mackenzie, 1983). However, the situation was re-examined after the Turkish military invasion of Cyprus in 1974. US military aid to Turkey was essential its ngagement in the Western security system. During the years 1950-74, the average military aid to Turkey was \$165 million per annum. However, the Turkish government announced that the 1969 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DECA) and all other agreement with the U.S lost their legal validity. Turkish demand was for halt of the operations at Belbasi, Diyarbakir, Karamursel and Sinop which must be placed under the full control and custody of Turkish armed forces. But this restriction could not become reality due to structural engagement with NATO. In fact, during the embargo period the military aid only dropped to US\$ 130 million per year (Duke, 1989:274). Ultimately, the Jimmy Carter government managed to lift this restriction on security and intelligence operations in Turkey by the signing of a new DECA, so the arm embargo was lifted in 1978. This new DECA agreement came into force on 18<sup>th</sup> December 1980 and became the main document governing the US military presence in Turkey until 1990. Turkey – US Transit Terminal Agreement allows US aircraft to utilise Incirlik Air Base for in support of the UN multinational force in Lebanon in 1984. The supplementary agreements also permit the United

States to participate in joint defence measures at 12 locations and also authorises US administrative and support organisations and activities outside these installations. The agreement between George Shultz and Turkish foreign minister Vahit Halefoglu was renewed on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1987. In this context, Turkey received loans and grants of \$868 million between 1985 and 1986 and \$590 million in military and economic aid. Moreover, the Pentagon trained Turkish officers under the aegis of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programmes and provides over \$3 million of training assistance annually to Turkish security staff. There are almost 5000 US military personnel in Turkey. Following a meeting between the Turkish ambassador in Washington, Sukru Elekdag, and Michael Armacosts, the US Undersecretary of State, the military base leases will be extended on a year-by-year basis (Duke, 1989:280). However, the US Congress reduced to 40% the military assistance to Turkey by cutting \$913.5 million. In fact, the situation was clearly related to systemic changes in the international community. Turkey's new engagement with the Western security system became more concrete after the economic and military training agreement with Israel in 1996. The presence of US military installations on Turkish territory is the main component of the engagement with the Western security system by Turkey. There are three security systems of NATO on Turkish territory: radar, military bases and missile defence.

Table: 4.7. US military forces and installation in Turkey

| US Military Forces and Installations in Turkey |                |         |  |                           |  |
|--|----------------|---------|--|---------------------------|--|
| Base   | Location       | Force   | Unit   | personnel                 | Hardware   |
| Adana  | 37.00N 35.19E  | USAF    | Tail on ACE HIGH network from Cyprus: POL pipeline to Incirlik AB  |                           |  |
| Alemdag/ Samsun                                | 41.11N 29.38E  | USAF    | Troposcatter link in DCS (Cakmakli, Sahin Tepesi): USAFSS-run nodal communications   |                           |  |
| Askara AS/Gbalgat                              | 39.55N 32.50E  | USAF    | HQ TUSLOG(Logistic Support Command, US military forces in Turkey );7217th ABG : ACE High tail; TAFE main routing centre  | 457 USAF, 98 Civilian     |  |
| Balikesir AB                                   | 39.37N 27.51E  | USAF    | TUSLOG Det 184 (custodial) (Turkey), DCS tail (from Yamanlar )   |                           | F-104 G/S Turkey   |
| Batman   | 37.52N 41.02E  | USAF    | COB (US /Turkey); used for NATO alert  |                           |  |
| Belbasi  | 39.00N 32.00E  | USAF    | Det. 301, AFTAC (TUSLOG Det 18); US seismograph detection centre for monitoring Soviet nuclear tests; DCS network (Elma Dag; AFTAC   |                           |  |
| Cakmakli                                       | 39.11N 31.51E  | USAr    | HQ 528th Artillery Gp Com(TUSLOG Det 67), 70 th Ord Co (TUSLOG Det168); storage, maintaineno assembly (nuclear)  |                           | 8-in. artillery  |
| Camak  | 39.11N 31.51E  | USAr    | TUSLOG Det. 21st FA (custodial) Turkey   | 240 USAr                  |  |
| Cigli AB                                       | 38.15N 27.10E  | USAF    | SDB, Turkish tactical AF base used by USAFE druing NATO exercise; command, control and logistics facility  |                           |  |
| Corlu  | 41.11N 27.48E  | USAr    | Det. 21st FA (custodial ) (Turkey), DCS network (to Istanbul)  |                           |  |
| Edirne   | 41.40N 26.34E  | USAF    | USAFSS-run monitoring station (Soviet missile testing  |                           | HF/VHF Wullenweber   |
| Elma Dag/ Mt.                                  | 39.49N 32.58.E | USAF    | Troposcatter link in DCS; nodal communications site (Alemdag, Belbasi, Karatas,Samsun)   |                           |  |
| Erhaç/Malatya                                  | 38.22N 38.10E  | USAF    | Nuclear Weapons storage; US nuclear weapons control team; DCS network tail (to Malatya AB)   |                           |  |
| Erzurum  | 39.57N 41.17E  | USAF    | Det. 27th FA (custodial)(Turkey); munitions storage (nuclear);COB for use by USAF in NATO alerts   |                           |  |
| Eskisehir                                      | 39.46N 30.30E  | USAr    | 7392d MUNSS (TUSLOG det 100) (custodial) ( Turkey); US detachment controlling nuclear weapons within Turkish base; ACE HIGH(NATO) network ; DCS network (to Sahin Tepesi )   | 240 USAr                  | F-4E   |
| Incirlik AB / Adana                            | 36.40N 35.26E  | USAF    | 39th TG (TUSLOG Det 10)( rotates from Torrejon, Spain and Aviano,Italy ); 628th MASS (MAC); 2006th ISG;628th MASS; TUSLOG Det, 10th Com Post; INFORM Net; Cemetry Net transceiver; DCS terminal;nuclear weapons storage; SATCOM ground terminal ; strategic communications stations; transmitter for Giant Talk/Scope Signal III (SAC global communication system; USAF hospital   | 2400 USAF, 2000 civilians | F-16C/D(rotational)(1 sqdrn)Scope Signal' transmitters, HF transmitter               |
| Istanbul IAP                                   | 41.02N 28.57E  | USAF    | Used by MAC transports; DCS network; MTMC outport for Transportation Terminal Unit(Izmir)  |                           | AN/ APR-8 antennas   |
| Iskenderun                                     | 36.37N 36.08E  | USN/ AF | Storage annex Incirlik AB: POL (Naval) with 20% of the 6th Fleet fuel storage ; outport for Transportation Terminal Unit (Izmir)   |                           |  |
| Izmir AS                                       | 38.25N 27.10E  | USN/ AF | HQ, 6th ATAF , AIRSOUTH; HQ, AFSSOUTH: 7241st ABG, NATO unit support ; air support base for USAFE; HQ NATO LANDSOUTHEAST: TUSLOG facility; port facilities for visiting Mediterranean Fleet ships; accommodation for vessels up to small aircraft carries; AUTODIN terminal connected to primary routing centre(Coltano, Italy); TAFE main routing centre; MTMC Transportation Terminal Unit; support for USAF and 6th Fleet | 477 USAF,66 others        |  |
| Izmit  | 40.47N 29.55E  | USAF    | Communication terminal for INSCOM(army)  |                           |  |
| Karamursel AS                                  | 40.47N 29.37E  | USAr    | USAFSS-run monitoring station: Sigint station monitoring Soviet naval movements in the Turkish straits; receivers of telemetry from Soviet launch sites at Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam; NSA CCRC   |                           | VHF UHF, SHF receiver  |
| Karatas  | 436.32N 35.22E | USAF    | USAFSS-run troposcatter Link DCS (to Elam Dag) ; nodal communications site   |                           |  |
| Kargaburun                                     | 41.18N 27.37E  | USCG    | Loran-C station  |                           |  |
| Kirkilareli                                    | 41.A5N 27.12 E | USAF    | DCS communications network (remote duty)   |                           |  |
| Konya AB                                       | 37.51N 32.30E  | USAF    | FOB, A1w/ACS; air-to-groundbombing /strafing range (NATO renga but used almost exclusively by USAFE)   |                           |  |
| Kurecik  | 38.24N 37.55E  | USAF    | Nodal communication site (DCS)   |                           |  |
| Mahmudag                                       |                | USAF    | USAFSS-run nodal communications site (DCS)   |                           |  |
| Malatya AB                                     | 38.22N 38.10E  | USAF    | TUSLOG Det 93 (custodial) (Turkey), DSCS terminal; nuclear weapons storage   | 25 USAr                   | F-4E   |
| Muried AB                                      | 40.00N 33.000E | USAF    | TUSLOG Det 183 (custodial) (Turkey), nuclear weapons storage, DCS network tail(to Elma Dag)  |                           | F-104 G/S Turkey   |
| Mus AB   | 38.45N 41.30 E | USAF    | Wartime COB  |                           |  |
| Ortakoy  | 41.03N 29.03E  | USAF    | Det, 10th FA (custodial) ( Turkey); USAFSS-run DCS communications (to Istanbul)  |                           |  |
| Persembe                                       | 41.05N 37.46E  | USAF    | ACE HIGH (NATO) network (from Merzifon to Pazar)   |                           |  |
| Princlik AS (Diyarbakir)                       | 37.55N 40.14E  | USAF    | Princlik AS : 19 th Surveillance Sqdrn (USAFSS) ; ADCOM facility space track; USAF Aerospace Defence Company; DSCS connected to USA; A1wN linked to Croughton; ACE HIGH network; DSCS ground node; troposcatter site 106; Det 2, 2006th Information System Gp; LP radar and communication complex  | 156 USAF , 168 civilians  | 2 AN/FP-17 fan coverage and 1 AN/FP-79 rotating-head tracking radar VHF/UHF antennas |
| Sahin Tepesi                                   | 41.02N 28.51E  | USAF    | Det 12, 2006th ISG; ECCCS mobile communications ; USAFFSS-run nodal communications site  |                           |  |
| Samsun   | 41.17N 36.22E  | USAF    | USAFSS-run ESC Sigint site; DCS network  |                           | Ttroposcatter  |
| Sinop  | 42.02N 35.09E  | Usar    | Diogenes Station; radar (VHF) and HF) monitoring of Soviet air naval activities over Black Sea and missiles launched from Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam; INSCOM facility; DCS network tail (to Samsun); 4th TUSLOG det; USAr Information Systems Command (Turkey)  | 310 USAr                  |  |
| Trabzon  | 41.00N 29.17E  | USAF    | Receiver for Sigint from nide (DCS)  |                           |  |
| Yalova   | 40.40N 29.17E  | USAF    | Communications node (DCS)  |                           |  |
| Yamanlar Dag/                                  | 38.32N 27.13 E | USAF    | Tropiscatter relay (DCS) to Greece, telemetry interception station   |                           |  |
| Yumurtalik                                     | 36.46N 35.45E  | USAF    | Supply depot and storage (USAFE);POL pipeline to Incirlik AB   |                           |  |
|  |                |         |  |                           |  |
|  |                |         |  |                           |  |

Sources: Duke, 1989:288-291

The UHF radar system in eastern Turkey became operational in June 1957 (Zabetakis, and Peterson, 1964). This array of long-range radar systems in city of Diyarbakir monitors Russian military movements and missile testing and also provides communications with another key part of the US intelligence network, Croughton in the United Kingdom. A second electronic listening post was located along the Black Sea coast on the army site Sinop and in the city of Trabzon. The German-type demodulators immediately provide clear analogue signals for the channels of missile data in Kasputin Yar and Tyuratam in Russia. Many other smaller installations support these two bases, acting as relays or transmitters for the US Defence Communications System (DCS). The deployment of these US land bases is for tactical fighters in the Eastern Mediterranean at from which US fighters rotate activities from Aviano, northern Italy, and Torrejon, Spain. 20% of the 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet's fuel needs are also supplied from these bases where the US Logistics Group, Turkey (TUSLOG) is located. The other TUSLOG major facility is the Loran-C station at Kargaburun in the city of Izmir where US aircraft and sea vessels monitor the Mediterranean Sea ([www.merhabaturkey.com](http://www.merhabaturkey.com)). The air- to- ground bombing and strafing range is used by US F-111s in the city of Konya. In addition, the combat zone in the city Mus which are only 500 miles from Tehran and 700 miles from Abadan, control Iran's activities in the Persian Gulf (Duke, 1989:288-91).

NATO's Southern Region is of high common interest between the US and Turkey due to its potential for aiding the situation in Bosnia and the Balkans. Turkey willingly sends personnel to the region, including more than 2,000 to Operation Joint Endeavour (IFOR) and about 1,400 to aid the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Moreover, the country sent almost 800 armed personal to Albania to help with the peace campaign there, and the Tirana airport operation. Turkey's role in the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the Lebanon is essential for the systemic setting of Turkey (Muftuler-Bac, 2000).


According to the SIPPRI Yearbook report, the main foreign arm suppliers for Turkey are U.S, Germany, and France. Since 1980, Turkey has spent over US \$30 billion to develop its defence capability (SIPRI, 2008).

#### **4.3.1.2 Turkey's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and program**

There is a single 5 MW research nuclear reactor at the Kucuk Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Centre, as well as a 250 KW reactor at the Istanbul Technical University. The International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA supervises both facilities' operations. The country does not have any apparent enrichment capacities although studies of potential relevance are conducted in Turkish universities, into nuclear fuel properties and their fabrication. The Department of Chemical Engineering, Middle East Technical University (METU) has taken part in operations alongside the Turkey Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK). The Department of Chemistry, Cumhuriyet University, has attempted fuel fabrication and uranium experimentation. However, Turkey's strategic nuclear capabilities are under the supervision of NATO and IAEA. Turkey has 90 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs deployed by the United States at the Incirlik Air Base and has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on 6 February 2000 (Kibaroglu, 1997). These nuclear bombs were transferred from Akinci Air Base and Balikesir Air Base to the Incirlik Air Base where they continue to be earmarked for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. Turkey's ballistic, tactical cruise missiles and delivery capabilities can be classified as tactical cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, ground attack aircraft and air-launched standoff missiles ([www.carnegieendowment.org](http://www.carnegieendowment.org); [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org); Cirincione and Grotto, 2005).



#### Integrated map: 4.1. Incirlik Air Base, Turkey (2002)



**Note:** Incirlik air base, Turkey (13 December 2002): This base is located in southern Turkey (37°00'N, 35°26'E) near the Syrian border. There are 58 Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) on the base, 25 of which are equipped with WS3 vaults for nuclear weapons storage. The vaults, which have a maximum capacity of 100 weapons, were completed in 1998. Prior to that, nuclear weapons were stored in the weapons storage area. The base stores 90 B61 nuclear bombs, 50 of which are for delivery by US F-16C/Ds from the 39th Fighter wing, with the remaining 40 earmarked for delivery by the Turkish F-16 fighters of the 4<sup>th</sup> wing at Akinci and 9th wing at Balikesir. Source: Space Imaging.

Turkey's strategic fighter and ground attack aircraft include 121 F-16C, 24 F-16D; 93 F-4Es (65 in service with planned upgrades to F-4E Phantom 2000), 54 F-4E Phantom 2000s, 63 F-5A/B, 44 NF-5A/Bs, and cooperation in the F-35 JSF project. (<http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/turkey.htm>). Additionally, Turkey's strategic relations with Israel resulted in co-producing Popeye-2 air-launched standoff missiles with a 305km range and a 360kg payload in cooperation with the Israeli firm Rafael (Pipes, 1997; Jerusalem Post, 18 May 1997; Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 June 1997; Alon, 2005; Sariibrahimoglu, 2002). The Turkish Defence minister, Hilmi Guler, reported that Turkey has 230,000 tons of thorium reserves and 9,200 tons of uranium reserves (Demir, 1997; Sokolski, H., P. Clawson, et al 2005). Guler noted that, while current technology in Turkey is more suited to uranium, thorium would be considered in the future as a nuclear fuel (Turkish Brief, 2007). According

to the report, Turkey's thorium reserves comprise 14% of the world's reserves, estimated at 344, 000 tonnes.

#### **4.4.0 Overview of nuclear ambition of Iran in the construction of messianic strategic culture of security**

The US–Iranian relations go back to the December 1943 Tehran conference, convened to devise strategies against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Josef Stalin. The Pentagon talks in October 1947 between the US and Britain acknowledged the importance of the Middle East for Western interests, the strategic value of oil reserves and the necessity to impede Soviet expansionism in the region. Thus, Britain and the US agreed that the independence of Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy would have to be preserved to protect vital American and British security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean (Kibiroglu, 1997). Under the guidance of the US, France and Germany, Iran stepped on the long and painful path towards possession of a nuclear capability during the Pahlavi period (Poneman, 1981; Gigerenzer, and Todd, 1999). However, the Iran–Iraq war and the rhetoric of Khomeini suspended Iran's strategic nuclear program until the 1990s. The messianic leadership of Iran re-launched the nuclear program and cooperated with Russia and the Asian nuclear markets, such as North Korea, Pakistan and China.

#### **4.4.1 US, French and German strategic partnership on nuclear proliferation of Iran**

The legacy of Iran' nuclear program relies on the nuclear contract with United States in 1957. The Atomic Energy of Iran (AEOI) and the Nuclear Research Centre (NRC) were established as the main institutions of the nuclear strategic program under the supervision of the United States. In 1959, Iran purchased a 5MW research reactor from an American company (AMF), which became operational in 1968 after ten years of the agreement (Ehteshami, 1989: 125-128). Iran has been a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1968 and ratification was in 1970. Following the founding of the Atomic Energy Agency, Shah Pahlavi intended to build 23 fission plants using American collaboration (Barnaby, 2007). The U.S-Iran partnership moved forward after the momentum of 1973 and the American based

company Stanford Research Institute carried out nuclear energy fuel production (Rahimi, 2003). Iran then entered into a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 15 May 1974 (Clawson and Eisenstaedt, 2006). Tehran tried to diversify its dependency on its nuclear program and signed an extendable ten-year nuclear fuel contract with the French company (Framatome) to build two 950 megawatt reactors in the southern city of Ahvaz in 1974 (<http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com>). The engagement of the German company KraftWerk Union, a subsidiary of Siemens, to construct two 1,200 Mw (e) Pressurised Water Reactors (PWR) at Bushehr in 1974 was another stage for the nuclear ambition of Iran. Washington wanted to neither maintain the initiatives in the nuclear projects in Iran as part of their reliable alliance. Therefore, the Carter Government decided to allow US material to be converted into fuel in Iran for its own reactors and for pass-through to third countries with which they had agreements after the National Security Decision Memorandum 292, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1975 (National achieve in [www.ford.utexas.edu](http://www.ford.utexas.edu)). These friendly relations with Western countries encouraged the Shah to conclude another four contracts to build nuclear power stations by 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Despite payment to the Crafter Union Company for two Bushehr reactor (85 % of it is finished), the new regime of Iran suspended the nuclear program and this resulted in the withdrawal of the foreign companies from Iran in March 1979 (Zarif, 2007). Moreover, both reactors were severely damaged when, between 1984 and 1988 in the Iran-Iraq war, the Bushehr reactors were bombed repeatedly by Iraq.

#### **4.4.2 Development of Iran's nuclear program**

Iran resumed its nuclear power programme in 1991 under a bilateral agreement with China for the supply of two 300 Mw (e) VVER units (<http://www.greenpeace.org>). Although the agreement was confirmed in 1993, it was never realised (Gill, 1998).

An agreement was signed between the Atomic Energy authority of Russia and the AEOI to finalise the Bushehr reactor unit one, through the installation of a 915-MWe VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor in 1995 (Mizin,2004). In Iran, most further construction has happened since 2000 and has included the unveiling of factories producing uranium gas, a completed centrifuge cascade for uranium enrichment and a

complex to house over 50,000 centrifuges (Albright and Hinderstein, 2004). Nonetheless, serious impediments in time have occurred, likely due to US influence on Russia with the intent of slowing the supplies. The Russians have stated that Bushehr will not begin functioning until November 2007 (Quillen, 2002). Thus, Iran's present intentions to construct 7 reactors with a total power capacity of 7,000 megawatts are seen as ambitious (Quillen, 2002). The Khatami administration stated its goal of providing 6000 Mw within twenty years of the September 2002 announcement (Cordesman and Rodhan, et al. 2006). Iran received natural uranium in 1991, which has not been made known to the Agency, and which was converted into uranium metal in 2000 (Cordesman and Rodhan, et al 2006). Following the discovery of the underground facilities in Natanz and the heavy water factory at Arak in August 2002 as well as fuel production facilities at Isfahan, the country's nuclear goals attracted global coverage (BBC News, 30 March, 2005). The IAEA director, el-Baradei accused of Iran breaching the provisions of non-proliferation law. Due to international pressure, Iran had to allow to IAEA to conduct an inspection of all its nuclear facilities in September 2003. All of Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003 (Kerr, 2003; world-nuclear.org). Despite American demands to forward the Iranian issue to the United Nation Security Council, England, Germany and France troikas impeded American demands. Though the IAEA accepted that there are some platinum issues in the Iranian reactor, they announced that Iran has no nuclear programme. On the other hand, Iran signed an additional protocol of NPT in September 2003. Despite the cooperation of Iran with the IAEA, the question of concealment forced the IAEA to implement stricter procedures after revelation of Iran's connection with the nuclear black market and Pakistan's key nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. In October 2003, a CIA operation on the Italian coast of the Mediterranean Sea captured four containers full of 10,000 gas centrifuges and related manufactures devices which were compatible with nuclear warheads. This provided United States with material to use against Iran in the international community (Fallows, 2004; History Channel, 2005).

Although Iran provided 10,000 pages of document related to nuclear activities in May 2004, el-Baradei was not satisfied and accused Iran of not cooperating with the IAEA. The tension between Iran and IAEA then increased after Iran's foreign minister, Kemal Kharrazi, announced that "*Iran would not stop the nuclear program*


*that requires the recognition of the international community.*” Iran removed the IAEA seal from the Natanz plant and produced centrifuges (Cetinsaya, and Kose, 2006). On the other hand, Iran signed the Paris Agreement with EU’s perestroika on 15<sup>th</sup> September 2004 and Iran agreed to suspend the uranium enrichment program for the second time. However, the Iranian president explained that “the peaceful nuclear program of Iran could not be stopped (Cetinsaya, and Kose, 2006) and signed a nuclear fuel agreement with Russia in April 2005. Iran also found the economic package of EU’s perestroika to be unacceptable and humiliating. Iran announced the start of a nuclear enrichment program in Isfahan. On the other hand, Russia offered Iran to conduct nuclear enrichment in Russia rather than at Isfahan in Iran. The following year after Ahmedinejat’s speech at the UN in September 2005, the IAEA voted that the nuclear issue of Iran be transferred to the UN Security Council on 4<sup>th</sup> February 2006. The president of Iran, Ahmedinejat, announced that Iran had achieved uranium enrichment and was now a nuclear state on 11<sup>th</sup> April 2006. The Iranian president wrote a letter to George W. Bush to normalise Iran-U.S relations on 8<sup>th</sup> May 2006. However, after the concealment of Iranian nuclear activities from IAEA, the conflict between U.S and Iran became critical. Therefore, the last UN Security Council Resolution 1803 in March 2008 decided to extend sanctions against Iran by claiming that Iran continues to enrich uranium. The sanctions require other restrictions on the import of dual use nuclear technology for peaceful or military purposes. The resolution also added 13 names to the existing travel ban and asset freeze on companies and individuals thought to be engaged in Iran’s nuclear program (UNSR, 2008) ([www.globalpolicy.org](http://www.globalpolicy.org)).

#### **4.4.3.0. Nuclear capabilities of Iran**

There are 439 nuclear power plant units that are an important source of energy with an installed electric net capacity of about 372 GW in operation in 31 countries around the world as of 1st April 2008. The nuclear power plants (NPP) produce about 17% of the world's electricity. There are 35 nuclear power plants under construction which will provide 29 GW ([www.euronuclear.org](http://www.euronuclear.org)). There is no Islamic country with nuclear capacity except Pakistan. In fact, the nuclear programme of Pakistan is also under control and A.Q. Khan is under home-arrest (Sokolski, 2008).



**Integrated Map 4.2 :World-Wide Nuclear Power Reactors, April (2008)**



The nuclear ambition of Iran is not only a self-sufficiency security issue but also indicative of its struggle for attain a messianic status quo in the Islamic world that would have provided it with Iran self-confidence and also increase its deterrence capacity. In fact, Iran lost 40% of its arms during the Iran –Iraq war, which led it to build a domestic arm industry and resume the nuclear program after the 1990s (Cordesman, 1999:55).

However, the nuclear capability of Iran is limited to the Bushehr reactor, which is under construction and two further planned proposed (IAEA, 2008). The map shows the most significant nuclear projects. There are mainly a few nuclear research centres and some industrial complexes in various locales: The Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, the Kelaye Electric Company. The Tehran Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, the Natanz, and Karaj Nuclear Research Centres with more centres of Lashkarabad, Arak, Anarak, Gachin, Saghand, Farayand Technique, Pars Trash, the Kolehdoz Industrial Complex in Tehran, the Lavizan-Shian Physics Research Centre, and the Parchin Military Complex, Ardkan (Greenpeace International, February 2007).

Integrated map 4.3: Nuclear infrastructure of Iran



Sources: Greenpeace International, 2007

In addition, Iran has primary long - range and middle - range rockets and missile systems. The long range missile systems of Iran have become a deterrent and enhance the prestige of the messianic identity of the Islamic regime of Iran.

Table: 4.8.Iran’s Long Range Missile System

| DESIGNATION   | NUMBER    | DETAILS  |
|---|-----------|--|
| SCUD -B Normal ( 2-5 Launcher ) 300 km (Shehab - 1) | 490       | 1tones warhead (estimated 100 SCUD-B modified to 500 km) |
| SCUD -C 500 km (Shehab -2)                          | 273       | Estimated 100 and modified to 600 km                     |
|   | 6Launcher |  |
| NODONG 600 km.?                                     | 24missile | North Korea SCUD-D modified to SCUD-C                    |
| Al Husyin 650 km                                    | 1?        | It might be stolen from Iraq                             |
| M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) 600 km                            | 1?        | China -Iran origin                                       |
| Shehap -3 1200-1300 km                              | ?         | 20 tested imitated from Korean NODONG                    |
|   |           | imitated form Russian SS-4 2200- Pound payload reached   |
| Shehab -4 2000 km range                             |           | to Europe, made up by Russian help                       |
| Shehab-5 , 5,500 km range                           | 0         | Propellant liquid  |
| Shehab-6 10,000 km range                            | 0         | Propellant liquid  |

Sources: Balbay, 2006. (Note: When he was custody of Ergenekon, he confessed that he received his sources from one of the Turkish Armed General Staff. Therefore, I rely on his data to imply Turkish point of view on Iran’s nuclear ambition.

Modifications have been made to the Scud-B missile, originally capable of carrying a 1 tonne load for 300 kilometers (International Defence Review, November 1988: 1427), now extended to 5000 km. Its utility is solely in attacks on urban areas; it could only pose a significant threat or be a deterrent if tens of thousands could be launched — Iran only has 490. The development continued with the Shahab-2 using liquid propulsion (like the North Korean Scud-C) and Shahab-3. The long-range variants such as Shahab 4,5 and 6 utilise liquid propulsion also and are in development by Russia and Korea. Iran has provided funds for the research into North Korea's Nodong-1, with a capability of 1,300 km, enabling it to reach Israel from Iran. There have been reports of systematic problems with the programme including financial and engineering errors; it was only tested in May 1993, and only about ten launchers having been produced in North Korea and deployed within its army. There is no information on Iran's receipt of the missiles themselves, but it has been given the technology behind it as recompense for the support in development (Potter and Jencks, 1994:47-74.; Middle East Defence News, 18 May 1992:1-2; Defence Week, 1 May 1995, pp. 1- 14; [www.iraqwatch.org](http://www.iraqwatch.org)). Though Iran's middle range rocket and missile systems have no deterrent capacity, they play a very effective role in frontline security zones of messianic identity in Lebanon, especially in the Hezbollah - Israeli war in 2006. During this asymmetric Israeli-Hezbollah war (between 12<sup>th</sup> July and 14<sup>th</sup> August 2006), the latter fired in excess of 5,000 short and medium missiles, with over 10,000 remaining (Kulebi, 2008). The organisation's stockpile is said to include Fecr-3 (43 km range and 240 mm) and Fecr-5 (75 km range and 320 mm) and Zelzel-2 (250 km range and 600 mm). These are claimed to have been given by Iran, with the exception of the Grad (50 km range), Raad (70 km range) and Hayber 1 (100 km range) received from Syria (Kulebi, 2008).



**Table: 4.9.Iran's middle range rocket and missile system**

| DESIGNATION                          | NUMBER                   | DETAILS                    |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| FROG-7 ( 1-2 launcher ) 70 KM rocket | 100                      | Russian                    |
| CSS-8 (150 KM. middle range )        | 120                      | Chinese 15 KG warhead      |
| Missile 120 (130 KM middle range )   | ?                        | Local ( from air to land ) |
| s-24                                 | ?                        | Local                      |
| MUSHAK -120 (130 KM middle range )   | ?                        | Local                      |
| OGHAB 1-2 (45 -120 KM)               | 250 3 launcher 18 Rocket | Local tactical top 230 mm  |
| SHAHIN 1-2 ( 14-20 KM Rocket         | 10 (Shahin -2)           | Local tactical top 333 mm  |
| NEZAET 1-2-3 (45-70-100 KM)          | 350                      | Local                      |
| IRAN -130/ 160( 130 KM ROCKET)       | 10                       | Local similar to Nazaet    |
| FECR-3, 5 , 6 (45-60 KM ROCKET)      | 15                       | Local                      |
| M-18 (80-120 KM)                     |                          | Local                      |
| M-09                                 |                          | Chinese                    |
| M11                                  |                          | Chinese                    |
| TUNDEBOLT 280 KM (Iran)              |                          | Local                      |
| HOSEE 8 KM ( Iran)                   |                          | Local                      |
| ZELZAT-2 (Rocket )                   | 12                       | Local                      |
| ARASH (21.5 KM. Rocket )             | ?                        | Local 100 mm               |
| HASEB (8.5 KM Rocket)                | ?                        | Local 107 mm               |
| BM -21 Rocket                        | ?                        | Local 122 mm               |
| Long range Rocket 29 KM              |                          | Local ;122 mm              |
| NOUR 18 KM (Iran (rocket)            | 20                       | Local ;tactical top        |
| CSSA 130 KM                          |                          |                            |
| C-801                                |                          | Chinese                    |
| C-802                                |                          | Chinese                    |

Sources: Balbay, 2006

It is assumed that Iran has a self - sustaining capacity the technologies shown in the table 4.9. Production of missiles with solid propellant started with Oghab and Sahin-II and artillery rockets like Fecr, Nazeat, and Zelzel with assistance from China. It was expected that Iran would develop a missile with a 2000 km range through improvement of its Shahab-3 missiles, but it is also important that Iran has succeeded in building different platform technology. Iranian authorities consider the nuclear project as a point of national pride and a propaganda device.

During the Shah era, Iran was the fourth biggest military power in the world due to its arms purchases from the United States. Iran had the most sophisticated F-14A Tomcat and F-4 Phantom supersonic fighters, more than 70 AH-1 Cobra Attack and 35 CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters at that time. Iran lost this status after the Revolution and started to purchase the foreign arm equipment worth US \$ 13,623,000,000 from Russia and China and North Korea since 1980 (SIPRI, 2008), it has developed its own arms industry. However, the air defence system of Iran is not capable of defending against

*air strikes* by United States (SIPRI, 2008). Iran only has 48 defence aircraft; 40; Cessena, 1; F-27, 5; Shirike, 2; Mystere-Falcon and 395 Helicopter. Iranian bombardment aircrafts are 266 in total. 12; F-06 Shamyang (Chinese made), 103; F-4 D/ E Phantom, 33; SU-17/22, 89; SU-24 Fencer = Attack, 7+28; SU-25 Frogfoot (close support), 5; MIG-23/27, 24; MIR-1 Mirage (Multi purpose) (Balbay,2006), (Eisenstadt, East, et al. 2000).

#### **4.4.3. 1. Turkey's approach to Iran nuclear stand-off**

The position of Turkey on the nuclear crisis of Iran in the international community resembles the situation of hostage and economic sanctions under ILSA. However, Turkey's policy against balance of power change in the region led to a more complicated situation, because a nuclear - armed Iran would dramatically challenge Turkey's role in the region. Therefore, the Turkish defence minister, Vecdi Gonul, announced that Iran's stance on Armenia and Azerbaijan was not aligned with the Turkey's interests. Tehran's alleged work on nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry had damaged mutual relations due to the threat to the region (Sokolski and Clawson, 2004). The Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, during a conference in Ankara on 19<sup>th</sup> November 2004 stated that his country wished the region to remain nuclear-free and that Iran had a long-term position in the region. Such comments displayed a rift between the defence and foreign departments of Turkey with regard to Iran's danger level. Turkish and Israeli military and civilian functionaries portray Iran as a common risk and agree on their collaboration against this threat.

On the other hand, Turkey played mediator role during the talks between the EU and Iran on the nuclear issue. Ankara hosted EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, the head of the IAEA, Muhammad Baradei, and Iran's former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani. Turkey does not oppose any peaceful nuclear activity in Iran but is applied as conflicts between Iran and the US. Turkey's policy of non-confrontation with the international community does not allow the issue to become a negative factor between the two countries (Arslan, 2007). The policy may even legitimise Turkey's ambitions of nuclearisation with Western help.

#### **4.4.3.2. Ali Reza Asgari affairs**

The mysteries of the Ali Reza Askari event created a low intensity diplomatic conflict between the two countries after the disappearance of a retired general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a former deputy defence minister and a former member of the Iranian President Muhammad Khatami's cabinet on 7<sup>th</sup> February 2007 after flying from Damascus, Syria. Reports say that two other people had reserved a room for Asgari at the Ceylan Hotel in Istanbul for three nights, but that after arriving, Asgari reserved a room at the cheaper Hotel Ghilan. Because of claims that Israel was behind the disappearance, security was boosted at the Israeli embassies and for senior officials abroad. On 6<sup>th</sup> March, the Turkish Foreign Minister said that Turkey was conducting an extremely broad investigation (Yeni Safak; Aksam; Hurriyet, 15 March 2007). According to the Iranian newspaper, Asgari was captured by a joint team of Mossad and the CIA and then tortured by them. Iranian officials believe that the last Israeli attack on Syrians missile bases was conducted based on information provided by Asgari. The event also gave rise to the prime time TV series named the Valley of the Wolf, but the mystery still continues unclear.

In comparing the military capacity of both countries, Turkey is always on the sides of the West on security matters and is a significant customer in the Western arms market. Iran consistently longs for regional power status; however, Tehran is a significant customer of the Russian and Asian arms markets. Iran's arms technology is a reliant on local production to decrease dependency on foreign supplies. Both Iran's and Turkey's air defence systems are insufficient to protect against air attacks by a Great Power. All nuclear and cruise missiles in Iran are at the technology level of the 1960s. However, Turkey has the use of two strategic weapons, the F-16 and the F-35 (Guay, 2007). It's relations with Israel are also of a systemic necessity because Turkey has to buy the computer programmes for the F-16 aircraft and other related military technological data systems (Burwell, 2008).

#### **4.5.0 Conclusion: the definition of Turkish and Iranian strategic culture of Security**

The reconstructed state identities of Turkism and Iranianhood are a narrow expression of their national identity in territorial, cultural and political senses, but it is the wider nation a state identity which affects interstate normative structures, such as security in international relations. The variations in state identity, or changes in individual identities, affect national security interests and state policies. The norms of statehood are superior to the demands of society in the strategic culture of security. This supports our argument that the norms of statehood in Turkey and Iran are rooted in concern for national security. The different forms of oligarchy in Turkey and Iran do not allow the application of Wendt's social theory. The norms of state and society are rather shaped by national security interests or flow directly from the security policies of the state. Therefore, the reformation of Mustafa Kemal and Pahlavi and the later of the Islamic revolutionary state from above are valuable in defining a state's identity and changes an individuals identity in society. The state regime can be classified as authoritarian in the context of the virtual state of Turkism and Iranianhood. Secularism, Westernisation and nationalism defying the Ottoman and Persian legacies and attacking the former state's background to build a Westphalian state that supports nationalism, defines what Turkishness and Iranianhood is at this time.

On the other hand, the nationality dilemma lies behind the demographic aspects of settlement in Iran and resettlement in contemporary Turkey. The theories of Justin McCarty (1995) and Karpas (1978) note that the expulsion of Ottoman Turkish-Muslims immigrants focused on the peninsula as their homeland (vatan). This enhancement of the peninsula's Muslim and Turkish demographic base came at the expense of its Christian communities. After the Balkan War, the Empire lost 69% of its population and 83% of its territory in Europe. The withdrawal of the territory from an empire made Anatolia a final refuge as well as the immutable homeland of Turks and other Ottoman Muslims. Under the umbrella of the Turkishness political force, this territorialisation in Anthony Smith's nationalism theory found an echo in Turkey in the compromising deportation of the CUP's and the massacres of the Greeks and Armenians, by emphasising Young Turks common religion, shared history, and joint territory. However, the revisionist policy of the contemporary Turkish state limited its territorial and Turanist connection with the National Pact. Therefore, Turkey could not produce a policy to impede the deportation and the ethnic cleansing of the Soviet regime in its peripheral zones during WWII. Unlike the Ottoman collective religious

theory, Kemalist nationalism compels sanctions against political Islam and disregard for the Alevi religious identity. Turkishness is instead associated with the commitment to secularism, and voluntaristic -linguistic forms of citizenship. Iran is perceived as a national security threat to Turkey's vulnerable religious foundation. Therefore, secularism is defined as the strategic culture of security by the state establishment. Therefore, the legacy recognition of Turkish and Iranian state identity is based on the general principle not to interfere with the internal affairs of others. On one hand, there is a gap between Turkish citizenship and Turks-by-nationality. According to Ziya Gökalp, the nation is a community of individuals united by a shared culture, based on common education, morality, socialisation and aesthetics so that Kurds can be Turks if they are assimilated, by speaking the Turkish language and socialising within Turkish culture. However, the failure of assimilation politics challenges the Kemalist and territorial nationalism of contemporary Turkey. Foreign interference in Turkey's Kurdish question is considered a national security threat by Turkish government. Therefore, geopolitical competition in Mesopotamia has worsened the relationship between Turkey and Iran and weakened the alliance between Turkey and US and Israel.

On the other hand, the Twelver Shia religious identity definition of contemporary Iran manages to manipulate the gap between Iranian-citizenship and Iranianhood by nationality by creating a common religion, shared history, and joint territory. The nuclear ambition of Iran, therefore, is part of the strategic culture of security of Iranian nationalism. The cement of religious settlement in Iran is not only related to Islamic revolution but also dates back to the Safavid nationalism of religion in the Iranian society. Iran's competition in the Shia crescent is not a territorial claim, but rather an attempt to gain status in the international community.

The nuclear ambition of Iran and Turkey's pro-Israeli politics in the Western security system are not perceived as strategic threats by either side. Therefore, neither capital saw each other as a national security threat but the relationship is very vulnerable to both enmity and amity if either state interferes with the internal affairs or offends the regime of the other. Hence, Turkey's alliance with NATO and Iran's nuclear ambition serve as a measure of the strategic culture of security between two neighbours. This

regional and international settlement mainly preserves the legacy omnibalancing relationship of middle-power states with super - powers, etc.

## **PART II: EXPERIMENTAL MODEL FOR TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENT**

The Islamic Revolution in Iran and its relative political influence in regional politics are considered to be a transnational movement. The secularist ideology of Turkey and new political tendencies in Iran are also main dependent variables of this contentious relationship. By virtue of being internal threats, cross-border Kurdish nationalism and internal terrorist activities are part of this category, which presents a particular set of transnational factors in the examination of Turko - Iranian relations. These factors are dealt with in three different chapters.

Chapter Four analyses religious institutionalism and agent groups in Turkish and Iranian societies, which resist the counter - revolutionary export policies of one another. The myth of Khomeini and its effect on diplomatic relations is examined, alongside other major factors such as the Turban Affair, the translation of 'Satanic Verses', the Sincan issue as well as Jafari and Alevi politics; all forming a part of the proposed experimental model for Turko - Iranian relations. Chapter Five deals with the unresolved political murders in Turkey, a micro analysis of THB is a clear example of managing an internal conflict in the context of omnibalancing theory.

Moreover, the military insurgency campaign by the PKK is one of the most significant variables of contention between Turkey and Iran, as discussed in Chapter Six. The domestic, regional and international dimension of Kurdish nationalism has become the main political card used by Iran against Turkey. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran managed to keep Turkey as a neutral by exploiting the PKK insurgency while Tehran diminished the rising power of Turkey in the Middle East, the Central Asia and the Caucasus in the post Cold War period. The emergence of a Kurdish regional government in Kurdistan-Iraq and the military activities by PJAK' within the Iranian territory resulted in cooperation against the Kurdish militant movement. Turkey and Iran conducted joint military operations against the headquarters of the PKK and the PJAK in Qandil. The transnational movement of Kurdish nationalism has become an independent variable in regional politics, but for purposes of precision, this analysis will focus on the impact of Kurdish nationalism on Turko- Iranian relations.

## **CHAPTER FIVE:**

### **RELIGIOUS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION:**

#### **SECULARISM OR REVOLUTION**

##### **5.1. Introduction**

The religious and secularist ideological differences intensified the diplomatic crisis between the two neighbours twice, in the 1980s and 1990s. The compounding of the ideological confrontation and the trajectories of both societies' religious roots formed the mindset of foreign policy-makers and, as such, the main ideological and religious circumstances of Turkey and Iran will be considered in this chapter. The alternative ideological and religious formation of the two different religious and political identities became more prominent in the last three decades in which religion took a Messianic form of Shia in Iran while the secularist way of life grew in Turkey. In the context of a low-level representation of Sunni politics since the last century, the emerging revolutionary politics of Shi'i enclaves is challenging to the pivotal states in the region. As previously explained in the theoretical framework section, Steven David's omni-balancing theory gives great credit to the perception of external and internal threats. Therefore the alternative religious and ideological regime theory is considered here not only as an external threat but also as an internal one due to vulnerability in each society. This chapter will explain how two regional players interfere with each other's internal affairs and consider the outcome of this internal threat. David's omni-balancing theory basically argues that internal threats are perceived as more dangerous than external ones by middle-power state because they invite external power interference and become external threats at the national security of the country.

As part of the experimental model for Turko-Iranian relations, this study will review the trajectories of the religious and ideological factors of the two different identities, divided into two sections--Shia and Sunni. The sectarian classification covers the revolution and counter-revolutionary politics and religious political identity of the Turks. The next section presents a micro level of analysis for the religious and ideological confrontation around the myth of Ataturk and Khomeini, the Satanic



verses, the Turban Affairs, Jerusalem Night, the Xingjian Affairs and Ja'feri and Alavi crisis.

### **5.2.0. Overview of the Apocalyptic Politics of the Shia Religion**

Shiite means 'a partisan' or follower of the Ali who was accepted as the first legitimate Imam or Caliphate, and successor of the Prophet in Shia belief. Their rejection of the Three Rightly-Guided Caliphs (632-61) is the conflicting interpretation of Islamic history; Hamit Inayet emphasises that the Sunnis have since moved away from the ideal state, whereas, for the Shia there is movement towards it (Enayat:1982:24). The major concealment of Imam Muhammad in 873 and his mysterious meeting with 'Suferai Erbaa' and following the last man meeting (Lesser concealment), Ebul Hassan Ali b Muhammad es-Samarri in 940 produced the doctrine of 'Return' in Shia belief (Kohberg,2003: 135-52). The link between the 'Return' and the ultimate global sovereignty of the righteous and oppressed has made Shia historicism a potential tool of radical activism. Inayet claims that anticipation of 'Intizaar' or the 'Golden Age' pacified the Shia social movement which led them to systematize the 'taqiyye' when they are expecting Anka's idealism to be the realm in the religious politics (Enayat, 1982:25). From a religious-political point of view, the disparities vanished by the enshrinement of constitutional Islamic government (Erkilet, 2004:351). Khomeini's "velayet-e faqih" or "Imam", allegedly the only one who grasps the 'inner meaning' of the Quran and what Archangel Gabriel conveyed, is a significant part of the Shia political setting. After the revolution, the Ja'feri proposal of Nadir came on the agenda to develop Islamic ecumenism as an interaction between Muslims to strengthen the 'taqrib' movement in the twentieth century - a Unitarian rapprochement between the two antagonists (Erkilet, 2004:350).

As mentioned about the religious sphere of Iran's influence in Chapter Three, Shi'ism is divided into three main groups: the small group of Ismailis in India, the followers of the Seventh Imam, and the Zeydiye, who make up 40% of Yemenese population. Shi'ism constitutes 90% of Iran's population and 60% of the Iraqi population. Shi'ism also remains geographically peripheral in the Arab world, in Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey etc (Erkilet:

2004:350). The general Shia population includes 20% of all Muslims. Therefore, the Shia population is one of leading factors in Middle East politics.

The leadership of the Twelver Imams is basically the 'raison d'être' of Twelver Shi'ism. The innocence of the Imam is the main line of division between Sunnite and Shia beliefs. The duality of naqil (narrative) and aqli (rational) demonstrates the difference between Shia and Sunnite jurisprudence. Shia is considered mostly close to the Mu'tezile school, due to the issuing of ijtiḥād. One believes that there is no big difference in the practising of Islam between Twelver Shia and Sunnite Islam because Imam Ja'fer Sadik's method and ijtiḥād's constitute the Shia's jurisprudence.

The legitimacy of the state in Shia belief is very disputable in both the Akhbari and Usuli schools. The criticisms by Ahmed Ardebili (d.1526) and Muhammad Bagir Majlisi (d. 1699) against the Safavid legitimacy were reviewed by Ali Shariati who emphasised the differences between the Safavid Shia and Ali's Shia (Hussain:1985). His ideological religion and Usuli School's political thought have held power in Iran since 1979. In contrast to the Usuli, Akhbaris political thought could not recognise the leadership of the Ayatollah in the government (Cole, 2001:59). This internal Shai discourse highlights the importance of Velayat-e faqih after the invasion of Iraq. Khomeini developed his rationale and pragmatist political theory in Kesfu'l Esrar (Revealing of Secret) in 1942 and completed his Velayat-e Faqih thesis in al-Hukumah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Government) in 1971 (Khomeini, and Carpozi, 1983). Contrary to traditionalist approaches, he offers that taqiyyah cannot be an excuse for clergyman to renounce political involvement, given the principles of valayat, jihad, amr bi al-maruf and nahy an al-munkar. Khomeini conceptualises the theoretical/doctrinal justifications of the velayat-e faqih in the absence of Hidden Imam; he claims that the legacy of clerics in governing is, therefore, not disputable. While implicitly rejecting the subtle Shia Nash (revocation) in theory by using the temporarily rulings of clergy, it is insisted that an Islamic government be created to provide universal justice in the world until the Mehdi's arrival. Article 121 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran allows the elected Valayat-e Faqih to take power in the state. Unless one of the clerics takes power in an election, Article 107 places the leadership of clerics in the Guardian Council (Algar, 1979). Khomeini explained the power of the Valayat-e Faqih in government, as holding the power of

the prophet and his successor Ali, therefore obedience to the leader is obligatory for Muslims. According to Joyce Wiley, political authority in Iran lies with this figure (Joyce, 1993:135).

**Table: 5.1.Political authority of the Islamic Republic of Iran**



The figure signifies the difference between Shia and Sunni understandings of religious hierarchy. Faqih (Imam) was replaced with the prophet, which was contrary to the Sunni understanding of religion. However, the inter ulema relation on clergy-state continued to surface in the internal discourse in the provisional government; Sheriatmedari stated that “In Islam there is no provision that the clergy must absolutely intervene in matters of state, the ulema’s political activity could be justified only in extraordinary circumstances and marji-yi taqlid should not demean himself as a political officer, although a third-ranking clergyman, to participate in politics”(Iran Times, 25 May 1979). The opinion of Mutahhari overlaps on this issue, as he suggests that the role of marji-yi taqlid in the Islamic government is one of being an ideologue not a ruler (Milani, 1988:267). However, this difference is simplistic and a theological debate cannot be allowed to distract from the social stability of the state. The opposition of the Kurdish cleric, Husain, and the theological debate between Iraqi Shia and Iranian Shia clerics has generated a significant contribution to the analysis of Shia politics in this study. Whilst Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammed Bagir al-Sadr imparts a constitutional dimension to Khomeini’s principle of valayat-e faqih, he was executed in 1980. Ayatollah Khoi and his successor al-Sistani did not give any ground to Khamenei’s velayet-i faqih definition (Yann: 1995:116; Rahimi, 2004; Nakashs, 2003:137)

The religious roots diversified in Iran after the failure to deliver the promises of revolutionary politics. Hence the Islamic government turned to an apocalyptic vision of Shia politics which presumes the return of the cult of Mahdi (Hidden Imam) to

establish a world government. Khamenei belongs to the school of Mashhad, which is different from the school of Najaf and Qom. Instead of a rational approach to religious texts, the school interprets the text with the idea of Imam and apocalypse and a superstitious version of Shia. However, Ahmedi Nejat belongs to a secret society which believes in the return of the Hidden Imam and the end of the clerical establishment, because the clerics consider themselves as the representatives of the Imam in his absence. In comparison to Ahmedi Nejat, Khamenei is certainly less apocalyptic but both groups have a common consensus to support Iran's nuclear programme. On the other hand, this new policy approach is opposed to the perception of Ali Shariati, who is waiting for the return of the Hidden Imam and Khomeini's politics of Velayati Faqih. The essence of Khomeini's revolutionary message was the rejection of the messianic interpretation of religion (Khalaji, 8 January 2008). His theory tries to legitimise an Islamic government for the present without waiting for the Hidden Imam and provides a jurist rule in the name of the Hidden Imam, stating that believers need not stay out of politics before his return. The Apocalyptic Politics of the Shia religion in the state support of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Badr Brigade organization is a great game between the US and the pivotal states in the Middle East. The features of Shiaism's potentially alternative religious theories stand in contrast to the Turkish Islamic model. This study does not consider the influence on Iran's and Iraq's politics but touches upon the related connection with Kurdish nationalism. In the next section, the study deals with the capability of the revolution against the counter-revolutionary manipulation of international community but excludes the internal counter-revolutionary activities of SAVAK.

### **5.2.1 Revolution versus counter-revolution**

The Iranian Revolution was basically manufactured by a Shia and Marxist (Tudeh Party) anarchist coalition in 1987 (Moghadam, 1987). In the first stage of the revolution, whilst revolutionaries proclaimed the formation of 'God's State' in Iran, the international community wanted to perceive it as a nationalist revolution against the Pahlavi monarchy, but Khomeini's critics of the Westphalia nation state and nationalism accused them of playing an imperialist game of divide and rule to exploit the Islamic countries' natural sources - an essential paradigm of the Third World

country politics. He believed that the unity of Muslim nations is one of the essential elements of Islam (Zengin, 1988:73). Therefore, the revolution was seen as necessary not only for Iran but also as an essential step for the other (Islamic) nations. Khomeini ensured that Iran did not aim to control other Islamic countries but rather to support any struggle against imperialism. As part of such an anti-imperialist bloc, the revolutionaries aimed to establish a military, economic and political bloc against Christendom (Zengin, 1988:72). This religious political rhetoric is the new expression of the Pan-Islamist policies of the Ottoman state in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, but it is more factual than the previous one and forms a challenge to the capitalist and communist regimes in the international system. Abrahamian (1993:15) pointed out that Khomeini does not qualify as a fundamentalist because he both implicitly and explicitly accepts the existence of the territorial nation state by talking in terms of an Iranian land and an Iranian nation (Abrahamian, 1993). Ehteshami suggests that his utilitarianism placed Islam in service of the Muslim community's temporal needs rather than the supreme spiritual dictates of Islam. The charismatic leadership in Weberian terms influenced the Iranian constitution of 1979 and its 1989 reforms (Abrahamian, 1993:15). The first phase of Iranian foreign policy which celebrated "na sharghi na gharbi" (neither east nor west) achieved a negative equilibrium under Mosaddiq (Abrahamian, 1993:15). In this context, the Iranian foreign ministry announced that Iran was no longer a Western ally through the "CENTO" on 12<sup>th</sup> January 1979 and also cancelled the 1959 Soviet-Iran defence agreement on 1<sup>st</sup> November 1979 (Ari, 1996:142). At this critical time, the Ecevit government sent the foreign minister, Gunduz Okcun, to Iran (Brifing, 13 June 1979), and Turkey recognised the legitimacy of regime within 24 hours on 13<sup>th</sup> February 1979 and declared that its policy was to develop relations with the new regime of Iran and not to interfere with its internal affairs. After the American embassy take-over and seizure of 52 American diplomats as hostages in Tehran (Carswell, 1981) and following the American economic embargo imposed on Iran, Turkey (Demirel government) preferred to condemn Iranian behaviour which it considered an act of defiance of the global enemy's 'world arrogance' in the mechanism of export of revolution. But it rejected US demands for the use of the Incirlik base in case of a military intervention inside Iran (Brifing, 26 December 1979). This decision might be closely related to the 1974-1978 US arms embargo on Turkey and also related to the rising role in the region for the Western security purposes. Bolukbasi (1992) claims that "even though the Turkish government rejected

the request by the Americans, their policies worked in paralleled to maintain the need for the strategic alliance relationship in the Middle East” (p.17-8). Because the military government suppressed the growing Marxist and religious radicalism in Turkey, America found a secure place to use their communication devices to monitor the activities of the Soviets and Iranians. As mentioned earlier, the F-16 aircraft deal and the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) were signed in 1980.

The United States launched the counter revolution, which refers to a policy of trying to reverse a revolution, and by extension, policies designated to prevent revolutionary movements that have already gained some momentum from coming to power (Halliday, 1992:207). The activities encompassed reversal, demolition, suppression, containment in the region to manipulate the Islamic character of regime in the 1980s. The CIA spent \$30 million in the mid-1980s, founding anti Khomeini groups in the region, while the Saudis poured \$25 million on a failed coup attempt in 1982. Between 1979 and 1982 Baghdad squandered \$150 million to overthrow the Khomeini regime late in the Iran-Iraq War (Crenshaw, (1995). The armaments of the regional countries grew- the United State supplied four AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia, (Cordesman, 1981) and Israel expended its nuclear technology. In the 1990s a commitment to international militancy fostered clashes between Iran and the United States. Thus Iran was cast as a rogue state by the United Nations which sanctioned the application of a dual contentment policy. In the 2000s, Iran retained its international status quo as an “axis evil” member for the West.

Whilst the United State lost an important ally in the region, the Islamic Revolution created as alternative political theory to impede the expansion of the Soviet Union (Halliday, 1992). The new regime contained elements for a fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world; however, it had a different rhetoric than the Selefi Islamic movement in the Arab world and the characteristics of the Iranian Islamic revolution which distinguished it from French, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish revolutions as an alternative regime theory in the Middle East was highlighted (Halliday, 1999). The Turkish secular establishment feared that the new regime of Iran would inspire /establish ties with the reactionaries (irticacilar) to weaken Turkey’s western outlook. Instead of religious arguments by Iran, these young radicals of the Islamic movement in 1990s subscribed to the political version of Iran’s revolution. The different rhetoric

and perceptions signify that neither the Turkish state nor the Turkish Islamists understood the realities of Iran or the Middle East. Even though the Iran-Iraq War postponed the ideological conflict temporarily, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, undiplomatic behaviour and misperceptions of each side's social realities created a two-time diplomatic crisis in political relations in 1988 and 1997.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran had to pursue pragmatist policies towards Turkey to ensure it remained neutral, as it needed to acquire iron urgently. However the military government launched a counter-revolution process against the pro-Soviet leftist movement and the rising Islamist fundamentalism from Iran. The critics at the foreign ministry of Iran characterised the Turko-Iranian relationship in the first stage of revolution by reference to Ibrahim Yazdi, who wrote three articles claiming in the Kayhan newspaper that the military coup took the power against the rising Islam in Turkey with the help of the American-supported military forces, so that the government had to help Turkey's Islamist movement in this transition period (Halliday, 2007). In an echo, Yazdi proposed a federation of Muslim countries (BBC, 24 July 1979). However, the Turkish Ambassador was instructed to warn his Iranian counterpart that this kind of criticism has interference in their internal affairs.

Iran did not apply any systematic revolutionary politics towards Turkey, but supported small groups whose personal connections did not have a place in Turkish society. Iran's revolution also diminished the expansion of the Soviet regime in the Middle East and strengthened Turkey's position in the Western security system.

### **5.3.0. The overview of the embedment of Sunni politics into secular religious ideology**

Sunni political thought is outlined by Al-Mawardi (1031) who defined the caliphate as a necessity derived from the divine law rather than reason (Al-Mawardi, 1983). The doctrine of the Quraysh tribe in Sunni political thought is a version of the "Imamiyye" but the Turkish caliphate's implementation is very close to Ibn Taymiyya's political theory which offers the unity of the umma and the methodology of law in "al-Siyasa al-Shariyya" based on power coercion and similarity with the Lutfi Pasha proposal for the legacy of Caliphate of Ottoman. Whilst the ideal state of Muslim society is a

recession from the ideal state (*asr-i saadet*) in Sunni, it is the course of progress to the ideal state in Shia political ideology. The differences between two versions on the issues of the Imam's or caliphate's *ismat* (innocence) are highlighted in al-Ghazali's (1111) political theory. He suggests that the devout Muslim should avoid the court and company of an unjust ruler, and should rebuke him: by words if he can safely do so, by silence if words might encourage rebellion (al-Ghazali, 1829).

Despite the Turkish people's generally evident reliance on Hanafi-Mâturidi theology, the Ottoman state preferred to apply its *Es'ari* passive political theory which provides civil obedience and shelter to the heterodox Sufi order in Turkish society. The continuity of this tradition is partially diverted in the new Turkish state's religious establishment. Turkish secularism uses the Hanefi-Maturidi theology, with the theory of *irade-i cuziyye* (the man who creates his own action in general philosophy of this religious theory) which allows civil disobedience against injustice rulers; this develops a self-identity for Turkish Islam (synthesis) integrated with secular religious *étatisme* (Yorukan, 1953). Due to an unofficial social contract between the and the religious establishment (Minister of Religious Affairs, *jemeats*, and *tarikats*), the Turkish Islamic movement could have promoted an alternative regime theory but it preferred to ally itself with the modernisation program by integrating in a global system under the surveillance of the Jacobin branch of secularism. However, this orthodox stance of the Minister of the Religious Affairs and the religious groups ignored the reality of Islam and the Alevi and Ja'feri who compose a quarter of the population of the country. Contrary to the fundamentalist movement in the Islamic world, the Turkish Islamic movement is based on Sufi-oriented liberal thought much punctuated by the tolerance of Rumi, the love of Yunus and the reasonableness of Hacı Bektas-i Veli. The response of the balance of power to the Turkish Islamic model is to export the liberal democracy throughout the Middle Eastern countries (the Great Middle East Project) have been the subject of scholarly discussion. Sociologist Nilufer Gole suggested that the clash between Islamism and secularism is the struggle for a centralised control (Göle, 1996). In considering liberalist aspects of secularism, Delanty employs Habermas's public sphere concept - which is a space in society, seen to reside between the civil and the state's domain while remaining a domain for discourse (Habermas, 1991). Turkish laicism is different from Anglo-Saxon secularism. The questions are - Where are the limits of the public sphere? or Who is



its owner? Whilst the secular state-establishment claims that schools and state offices belong to the state authority and, therefore, can set scarf rules, Islamists claim that these places must respect personal privacy. The legacy of the state depends on this liberal commitment but the state bourgeoisie perceives these public critiques or demands as penetrating the secular-establishment of the absolute state. Therefore, Turkey's public sphere loses its strictly public nature and the state penetrates this private domain: amounts to re-feudalism (Habermas, 1991). Both Turkey's secular and Iran's Islamist regimes unfortunately lack the liberal political thought and space to maintain state authority rather than privatise this property. Secularism is generally based on withdrawing jurisdiction of the religious authority (Berkes, 1998). In this vein, Alev Erkilet classifies the Islamic movement in Turkey. She suggests that there is no Islamist movement to promote the sacred law and forces of change in Turkey. Ercument Ozkan's Hizbuttahrir caliphate proposal however, is exceptional, which is contrary to Turkish Islamic tradition. However, this remains marginal in the Islamic environment.

In brief, the nature of the Turkish Islamic synthesis is mostly parallel with the secular establishment on the issue of Kurdish nationalism so that Kurdish nationalism could not exploit any rhetoric to revolt against the state in an Islamic environment. Rather, the Kurds are organised within left-wing organizations using the socialist rhetoric since the Sheikh Said rebellion. The Turkish religious establishment does not allow any revolutionary interference with society. Hence, this study explains the main characteristics of the Turkish Islamic model by exemplifying the roots of the various Islamic groups and their approach to revolutionary fluctuations in the region.

### **5.3.1 Islamic political identity in Turkey**

The construction of the Turkish religious identity is based on various roots, which are completely different from the messianic roots of Iranian religious identity. Turkish authoritarian modernisation also provides a new form of Turkish Islamic synthesis in which these reformation programmes from above generate religious groups integrated with secular state establishment. These Islamist groups provide a great contribution to the modernisation of Turkey. However, Kemalist republican nationalism could not replace the multi-level appeal of Islam--it had to bandwagon with traditional Islam to

balance the threat emerging from the radical Islamic movements. The relations between these Islamist groups and the secular establishment resembles the metaphor of 'mistress relations'. This study excludes the process of Islamic resurgence before the military coup d'état in 1980s and focuses on the escalation of a new semi-peripheral conservative class against the rising fundamentalist movements from the Islamic world. The theoretical form of Turkish Islamic synthesis (TIS) accepts authoritarian regime principles in general, but not the hostile revolutionary model of Iran. Religion is considered the essence of culture and social control, which must be fostered in school but should not be used for political aims. Hence the military government is committed to religious education in state and private schools. However, the incorporation of the Islamist parties and the state establishment has reduced the impact on political ideology of such business associations as MUSIAD, Islamic banks (Kuwait Turk, Faisal Finans), private schools (Gulen's schools), Imam Hatip Schools (Tapper, 1991) and Quran courses, (Cakir, and Bozaslan 2004) and Islamic media which jolt the status quo of the secular bourgeoisie, and stimulate the modernised Islamic awareness which is now challenging the Kemalist establishment at the political economic, cultural, and social levels (Ataman, 1999). However, the military interference with internal politics by using a post-modern military coup d'état (the 28<sup>th</sup> February process) curtailed the rising power of the semi-peripheral class in Turkey. Subsequently centre-periphery relations were more oppressive. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership is continuing its legacy on the basis of Kemalist and liberal rhetoric. However, the creation process of liberal political Islamic model of AKP was undermined by the constitutional crisis in 2007 and the justice coup in 2008. Thus, the study concludes that neither a religious political ideology nor a militarist type of Islam could be accommodating in the Turkish Islamic model of understanding. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis did not result in Islamist fundamentalists like Hasan al-Banna, Syed Qutb, Abul Ala Mawdudi, or Ali Shari'ati. The country's Muslim intelligentsia originates largely in writers and poets such as Necip Fazil Kısakurek, Nurettin Topcu and Sezai Karakoc - supporters of Turkish Islam. These individuals see Islam as a 'melting pot' for integration of ethnicities in Turkey but they do not offer any direct resolution of ethnic entity recognition (Yavuz, 2003). On the other hand, the other Islamic groups (associations/communities) constitute the traditionalist Islam and political Islam which is considered within this category. But the pro-Sunni Islamic radical group, IBDA-C (The Islamic Great East

Raiders' Front) is exceptional in Turkey and have not found any logistic support from society so far.

#### **5.3.1.1 The formation of Islamic groups against revolutionary Islam**

Islamic groups are divided into Sufi-oriented and Islamic Jama'ats in Turkey. In this section, the author tries to explain the lack of success of Iran's revolutionary export policies. Even though Iran did not apply a systematic revolutionary politics towards Turkey, there is no place for the revolutionary model in Turkish Islamism.

According to Hilmi Ulken, Turkish Sufism differentiates itself from Persian Sufism by stressing morality over an anthropomorphic (human-centred) understanding of religion (as cited in Yavuz, 2003). The basic Sufi-oriented Islamic movement in Turkey supports the redefinition of Islamic and changes the values system in the society. Therefore, the Turkish construction of Islam is certainly based on Turkish culture, political history and geography - giving rise to a model of secularism. The role of the Sufi-order mostly characterises Turkish-Islamic self-determination, which is the continuity of Ottoman imperial non-governmental organisations. Even though the Kemalist leadership abolished Tekke and Zaviyeler (Sufi orders and their lodge) in 1925, the Sufi groups went underground to form a counter revolutionary movement against Kemalist reformation. The multi-party system provided a space in the society to integrate with the secular system of Sufi-order (Kara, 1977). The state did not refrain from using Sufi communities to impede radicalisation in the newly urbanised cities (Bulac, Aksam 25 Sep 2006). Instead of promoting an alternative regime theory, the Sufi-orders became a part of the secular shrines of Turkey, such as the Iskender Pasha Group - one of the pro-Sunni Nakshi Sufi orders which have been very influential in Turkish politics during the last 50 years (Cakir, 1995). Prior to the advent of the revolution, Turkey's political Islam was monitored by Sheik Mehmet Zaid Kutku of the Iskender Pasha mosque in the suburbs of Istanbul (Gurdogan, 1991). The group prefers to integrate into the system and manipulate the radical tendencies of Islamists (Erkilet, 2004). This policy played an important role in avoiding terrorist activities in the 1970s but led to the political participation of the Islamists in Turkish democratic politics by actively supporting of Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party), Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) , and Refah Partisi (Welfare

Party) which twice achieved a coalition government in 1974 and 1997 (Kavli, 2003). Erbakan became the first Islamist prime minister in Turkey's democratic history, but he and his party were banned in the 28<sup>th</sup> February process in 1997 (Onis 1999). Even though his political roots and ideology still remain politically active with Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), the achievements of the AKP changed their Islamist political theory (Çakir and Çalmuk, 2001). The ideology of Erbakan is summarised as national outlook and just order. His claims of an Islamic unity under an Islamic NATO and an Islamic EU reflect similarities with Khomeini's political theory. Erbakan successfully manipulated the religious dispute between the two opposite perspectives and emphasised the political role of revolution, placing it opposite semitism and imperialism. Erbakan's movement is a kind of disintegrated political model against state formation and religious order in Turkey (Cakir, 1994). Additionally, the other Sufi-order, the Adiyaman group, played a balancing role to create a Sunnite periphery balance against Shia expansionism from Iran and PKK terror activities in southern Anatolia (Cakir, 1995).

On the other hand, the Islamic groups demonstrated a different picture from that of the Sufi groups but also had unofficial contacts or engagements with the secular establishment. Despite the personal struggle of Said Nursi against the Kemalist reformation, his "risale-i nur" (Epistle of light) became the main religious text to inspire the Islamic movement in Turkey. Said's general ideas are considered in the context of a Sunnite interpretation of Holy Quran but his reconciliation of the positivism with Islamic science is essential for the Islamic model of Nursi's groups in Turkey (Mardin, c1989). In opposing Sheikh Said's ethnic religious political theory, Nursi focuses on the positive nationalism of Islamo-Turkism as long as that nationalism could be used in the service of Islam (Yavuz, 2003). The continuity of pan-Islamism is perceived as an alienation from the Kemalist-establishment and a subversion of the Turkish society. However, the followers of Said Nursi are divided into various sub-Islamist groups and became part of religious theory of the TIS (Bonner, 2004). The most influential groups among them in the Turkish politics is the Gulen movement which captured domestic and international attention. For instance, former prime minister Ecevit stressed the importance of Gulen's schools in Central Asia and Azerbaijan to diminish the influence of Iranian fundamentalism; making this a valuable part of this study (TDNs, 9 June 1999). Nilufer Narli (1999) pointed out

that the relationship between Nursi and Gulen was at one time that of a disciple of Said Nursi, a religious leader associated with radicalism on the Kurdish issue. However, Gulen now avoids being identified with Nursi and has founded his own religious society, known until recent times for its moderation and loyalty to the secular state. It is interesting that despite being pro-Sunni and nationalist in thought, Gulen uses Shia methods and proposals to organise his group. He claims that “if religious missionaries receive their wages from the state, they cannot be treated as religious actors in society.” He implies that economic independency is essential for the Islamic movement; therefore, he established a financial network system, such as the Shia clerical web amongst the public. Gulen also benefited from the counter revolutionary politics of state against Iran and liberal economic policies of conservative governments by gaining economic independency--so that Gulen groups now sponsor many Turkish private schools in many countries (Yavuz, and Esposito, 2003). It also runs an organisation called Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi (Journalists' and Writers' Foundation), which holds inter-faith seminars and supports the daily newspaper, Zaman, as well as various television channels and radio stations throughout Turkey ([www.axt.org.uk/antisem](http://www.axt.org.uk/antisem)). The second method of Gulen groups is Taqiyye (concealment) – intended to infiltrate the state- central establishment. But it is essential that Gulen movements have no direct conflicts with the secular establishment. They avoid involvement in politics and prefer to support the conservative parties rather than Erdogan's party. Gulen proclaimed that the headscarf is a part of religion but education is more essential, (Yurtsever, 1998). Therefore the followers of Gulen took off their headscarves at university, supporting the idea that the public sphere belongs to the state authority. It is accepted that the Gulen movement is very hostile to the Iranian type Islamization or Salafi-type of Arab Islam in Turkey (Calislar and Celik, 2000). His Jerusalem proposal and anti-semitist transnational habits also contrasts with political Islam (Erdogan) and Iran's rapprochement on that issue (Gundem, 1998). The concept of TIS takes a new form in his moderate Islamic theory. It is undeniable that transnational missionary activities of the groups in many countries serve the political aims of Turkey and also present an alternative model against the Shia and Selefi Islamic fundamentalist politics. Whilst the Gulen movement partially lost their support in the government after the 28<sup>th</sup> February process in 1997, the American government sheltered them in the United States and promoted them as a moderate Islamic model against terrorism (Unal, 2002).

Even though the group creates a bridge between the and Islamist worlds, the secular establishment expressed its mistrust of this dialogue. Similarly an Islamist journalist in Zaman (Gulen group's press), Ali Bulac, by Medina Vesikasi (Medina Record) proposal occupied the scholarly discussion, on the topic of living in peace in the same territory demonstrated that Islamic groups could not aim to establish an Iranian-style Islamic state (Meeker, 1994:197-205).

Another amazing explanation which signifies the relation between Islamic groups and the state came from Ismail Amasyali who is one of the decision-makers of the Suleymanci Islamist groups in Turkey which runs domestic and international networks. He said that "Islamic groups are not a party or Sufi groups but they are established for the social needs of Turkey by intelligent and wealthy people and they aim to live as part of the state regime and system" (Hurriyet, 22 May 2007:3). Therefore, Islamic groups never go to conflict with the military and constitutional organisations.

The only Islamist group which applauded the Iranian Islamic revolution was the Radicaller (Fundamentalist) in the 1980s and 1990s. Bulut (1993:426) claims that these small Islamist groups number about 300 in Turkey and that some of the group members financed the jihad in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Most of them have generally rejected the traditionalist Islam identity construction of the state, Sufi-based Islam and other religious traditionalist groups, but the Turkish state has allowed them access to the necessary Sunni fundamentalist resources or books as such Sayyid Qutb's *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Milestones) to impede the Shia political rhetoric in Turkey. Though Rusen Cakir claims that political Islam ended after the 1990s, the reason for their demise is based on their marginal and anarchical complex identity. Hence, the groups could not survive in the Turkish community and vanished in the Islamic environment in western part of Turkey after the 28<sup>th</sup> February process in 1997. However, these radical Islamic groups have found more secure places in the Kurdish society such as within the Turkish Hezbollah in south-eastern Anatolia. It is a fact that the radical movement contributes to the Islamic intellectual life in Turkey and breaks the traditionalist Islamic groups' hegemony by translating Iranian and Arab Salafi books. They are creating a great awareness in Turkish intellectual life and causing the intelligentsia's transition from the left-wing to right wing-- now they are the

alternative rulers of the state. There were some intellectuals connected with the Iranian government as such the Mehmet Metiner, Atasoy Muftuoglu and Nurettin Sirin in 1980s and 1990s, and pro-Iranian press produce small periodicals “Sehadet” (Martyrdom), “Girisim” (Activity), “Yeryuzu” (the earth) and “Iktibas” (Citation) which capture the attention of these small radical groups (Cakir,1995). However, Khomeini’s letter to Gorbachew which emphasised the Sufi-orientation of Islamic understandings, namely that religious theory is opposed to the Salafi model of Islam, led, following his death, to the cutting of links between radicals and Iranian revolutionaries.

Thus, the Turkish Sufi oriented and Islamist-positivist theories of Said Nursi and the liberal Islamic Gulen groups could not permit the promotion of any revolutionary or Salafi militant political models in Turkey. Secondly, Iran has no influence on Alevi society which is seen by the society in general as having a separate religious identity. The connection to the radicals was also cut off by Khomeini’s death. Hence, only Twelver Ja’feri groups are now open to Iranian religious influence in Turkey--but they are under supervision by the state and are forced to go to Najaf for religious training rather than to Qum. The revolutionary activities of Iran in Turkey are dealt with by giving a micro analysis of five cases in the next section.

#### **5.4.0 Religious and ideological confrontation: the politics of export of the revolution**

Khomeini’s main aim was to create a systemic revolution and export policies to other Islamic countries. Hence the revolutionary state operates its politics under the supervision of the Ministry of the Irsad-i Islam (Yalcin, 1995) and the Iranian embassies abroad. Khomeini (as cited in Zengin, 1988) stated that “Our revolution has been exported to the world in spite of all the opposition the trend has encountered”. He also said “Do not say our revolution must not be exported” (p.27). The Imam Khomeini has himself reiterated several times that the revolution’s concept is the same as the soft spring weather. It does not recognise borders and frontiers, it will go through them. However, the Iranian doyen of foreign policy, Ramazani, points that the legitimate means for exporting the revolution was unclear (Ramazani, 2005). Despite its universalistic discourse, the critics of Menashri suggest that Khomeini’s

Islamic government concept did not present a blueprint for the unification of the whole Muslim people nor did Khomeini lay down specific guidelines for a new scheme of foreign relations (Menashri, 2001).

The adventure of Iranian revolutionary policies is eventually being adapted to changing global developments and the internal economic, political and social constraints in Iran (Erkilet, 2004). In the course of revolution, the foreign policy of Iran aims to defend the Islamic regime, to guarantee regional security for Iran, to export Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries. Shia communities of the Gulf, and especially in Lebanon, were chosen as a first target for the export of revolution to establish a peripheral security zone in the region. In this vein, Turkey is considered a second target country for the revolutionary activities of Iran. However the realist and idealist approach to the export of revolution divided Iranian politics into conservative and reformist. Whilst Khomeini, Khamenei, Hussein Mosavi and Rafsanjani prefer to use soft power for the revolution export policies, idealists, the more doctrinaire group, then led by Ayatollah Montazeri, advocated a hard power in way of exporting revolution, referencing Khomeini's earlier words literally. These activities were to include political and military intervention in support of Islamic revolutionaries in other states, violent activities directed against US and other western targets, and covert actions against the conservative Arab governments and opponents of the regime.

In 1984 the relative balance between internationalist militancy and diplomatic accommodation shifted. The Iranian foreign ministry set out to remove radical elements from embassies abroad and proponents of revolutionary internationalism within the state; a unit of Revolutionary Guards was put in charge of militarist groups abroad to impede corruption, subversion and counter revolutionary activities. It was mainly for these reasons that Mahdi Hashemi, who was involved in such activities, was executed in September 1987 (Green, 1995:552-4). After Khomeini, Rafsanjani gave up adventurist policies against neighbouring countries and returned to a moderate course in its relations with the countries of the region, because the growing internal difficulties stemming from the ongoing war with Iraq, economic deterioration, domestic dissidence and a power struggle within the regime started to create a sense of disillusionment and posed a challenge to the stability of the regime after the failure



of militarist revolutionary export politics at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Iran's revolutionary activities in Turkey escalated dramatically, because its dependency on Turkey was spontaneously reduced and ideological bipolarity initiated its dominance in the two countries' relations. Both countries' press attitudes were very oppressive and unfriendly to each other and this was called a 'press war'. However, the initiatives of the Khatemi government were applauded by the Turkish press and the state apparatus; nonetheless, the situation is again critical under the leadership of Ahmedinejat as a neo-conservative Islamist (Ehteshami, and Zweiri, 2007).

The revolutionary rhetoric of Iran is exceptional in political theory. Using religious symbolic terms to challenge Turkey's alliance, such as the "Greater Satan" for the United States and "Lesser Satan" for Israel, attacking the Turkey's symbolic secular establishment (Ataturk), the issue of headscarves, the Salman Rushdie Affair and Jerusalem Night have provided a critical understanding of Turkey-Iran religious and ideological confrontation, as set out in the next section.

#### **5.4.1 The myth of Ataturk's and Khomeini's confrontation**

Ataturk and Khomeini are main figures of the new imaginary state identity which has formulated two different political theories against Western imperialism. These alternative regime myths had caused a diplomatic crisis when no bilateral visits occurred until the end of the 1980s. The new regime of Iran perceives Ataturk as an ally of Reza Shah, an arch-enemy of Islam and worse than a communist dictator who changed the country's path from an Islamic tradition to Western culture by abolishing the caliphate and promoting anti-Islamist modernisation (Fuller, 1991:203). Kemalism is also presented as a modernisation model for Islamic countries by active participation in western cultural, economic, political and military organisations (Kili, 1981:15). However, Khomeini's myth challenges this secularist modernisation (Abrahamian, 1993). Therefore, this alternative regime theory makes relations complicated in the bipolarity system of the Middle East (Tulumen, 1998:87). Khomeini's direct criticisms of Ataturk's secularist modernisation programmes (as cited in Zengin, 1988) toughened the ideological dispute, such as in a speech given on 24<sup>th</sup> August 1986. "The clergy has to believe that they had to obey the tyrants, oppressors, and the holders of naked power. Certain lackeys preferred to obey Ataturk,

who destroyed the rule of Islam, instead of obeying the orders of the prophet. How can a reasonable mind accept this? Today, the clergy in Turkey who are the puppets of Paranoiac forces, teach the people the orders of God and the prophet, but at the same time call on them to obey Ataturk.... How can one argue that this is consistent with the notion of Islamic rulers, whom God ordered us to obey? Obviously, Islamic rulers in the real sense can only be those who follow the order of God and his messenger” (pp.168-9). Turkey’s diplomatic response was severe to that kind of internal interference in secular politics. To this end, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Vahit Halefoglu visited Tehran on 26-30 August 1986 and gave warnings to his counterpart to use diplomatic language and not to interfere with internal affairs. However undiplomatic actions may have been, merely fleshing out the existing ideological divide between the two countries became the general attitude of diplomatic envoys from Iran. Prime Minister Musavi publicly criticised the reforms of Ataturk and refused to pay homage at his mausoleum - a protocol requirement for visiting dignitaries – during his visit to Turkey in the summer of 1987. He declared that he would rather be visiting the Mawlana shrine in Konya. However, Prime Minister Ozal did not respond to his undiplomatic behaviour due to growing economic ties with Iran. However, the chief of the general staff, Necip Oztorun, and his colleagues, as protectors of regime, responded that “this was nothing short of a personal insult” (Robins 1991:55). They were particularly outraged by the deferential treatment shown by Ozal toward the Iranian Prime Minister. In fact, Musavi was being consistent with the clerical tradition in Iran, in the state of revolutionary resentments and its aspirations.

A series of ideological diplomatic crises occurred between the two countries in November 1988 when the Iranian Embassy in Ankara refused to follow all other foreign missions and lower its flag to half-mast to commemorate the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Ataturk’s death. This was severely criticised by the Turkish press and was described as “unforgivable insolence.” In November 1988, a supporter of the Islamic regime attempted to kidnap an Iranian opposition leader and smuggle him back to Iran. The boot of the assailants’ car failed to work while the man was driven across Anatolia. Staff at the Iranian embassy was accused of involvement in this affair. The incident showed that Iran was prepared to use Turkish territory to settle scores with its opponents and use its diplomatic mission to that end (Robins, 1991:56). However, in

June 1988, Turgut Ozal instructed all flags to be lowered to half-mast as a sign of respect for the recently deceased Ayatollah Khomeini. The other revolutionary propaganda manifestation was heard on the Voice of the Islamic Republic, an Iranian Radio broadcast, which harshly criticised secularist establishments such as communism and pagan states and called on the Islamist groups to fight the secularist state authority in Turkey on 27<sup>th</sup> November 1986 (Tekin, 1997).

In addition, the Turkish press often focused on the Shi'i nature of the Iranian revolution and its propaganda activities against the Turkish regime. Some articles attacked Khomeini personally, with one journal claiming sexual improprieties when he was in exile in Bursa, Turkey. In retaliation, the Iranian daily 'Islamic Republic' responded by saying "How much do the Turks respect our live leaders that they expect us to respect the rotten bones of their dead leader Ataturk" (as cited in Metiner, 2008). The humiliating of Khomeini in a cartoon produced by Bedri Karaman published in Hurriyet newspaper created another diplomatic incident so that Iran demanded a diplomatic apology from its Turkish counterpart but Cetin Emec, who is general editor of the Hurriyet newspaper, did not do so while diplomatic pressure highlighted the crisis between two countries. Both sides have complained about the vitriolic attacks directed at them by the opposing press.

Ataturk and Khomeini still remain the main figures for the Islamic World. Turkey presents a Western type of identity while Iran exemplifies the politicised Islamic type of identity. In the next section, the Salman Rushdie event provides a description of another ideological dispute in bilateral relations.

#### **5.4.2. Satanic verses' translation by Aziz Nesin: Sivas and Basbaglar events**

Salman Rushdie was announced as a *mahdur ad-damn* (one whose blood is invalid or forfeit) on 14<sup>th</sup> February 1989 by Khomeini's edict. Halliday (1999) suggested that this edict was an essential stage of export of the revolution (p.207). Iran evaluated this affair as an attack on the identity of the Muslims by liberalism, an enemy of Islam (Hampsher-Monk 1991:162). After the Turkish longstanding leadership of the Islamic world, Iran is now revealed as a protector or representative of the Muslim identity in the Islamic world. However, Ruzin (1989) suggests that Iran sacrificed its domestic

priorities for the sake of foreign policy objectives (p.201). Though Turkey stuck with a secularist identity (not a liberal one), suspicion was raised on Turkey's desired membership of the European Union in 1992 (Ihsan, and Kidwai 1991). The Iranian ambassador in Ankara, Monusher Mottaki, expressed Iran's dissatisfaction with the lack of a firm stand against Rushdie's Satanic Verses in the Jerusalem Night in his speech in the city of Konya on 10<sup>th</sup> April 1988 (Hurriyet, 21 April 1988). Iranians exerted pressure to have the book banned and the Iranian council (Ali Asghar Shafi) in the city of Erzurum distributed copies of the Khomeini fatwa to the muftis throughout eastern Anatolia for dissemination among the Kurdish Alewi population (Nokta, 2 April 1989). When the Turkish authorities discovered that Iran had sent the religious propaganda leaflet as a diplomatic paper to the Iranian consulate on 15<sup>th</sup> March 1989, the Turkish foreign ministry emphasised that the new principles of a diplomatic mission would state that more than 50 kg of baggage would not be allowed into Turkey without an examination by Turkish officers. As a consequence of these two events, the Turban affair arose in April 1989, dealt with in a subsequent section. Turkey announced that Manushehr Mottaki is "*persona non grata*" and Iran had to call back its ambassador from Turkey. Moreover, the legacy of Khomeini's fatwa was not accepted by Turkey but the Turkish government had been on the right side of the Salman Rushdie affair –not only banning the book in Turkey but also publicly criticising the author for trampling upon the genuine feelings of Muslims around the world. Prime Minister Ozal took to uttering such enigmatic statements as, "A crazy man threw a stone in the well, and a thousand intellectuals are doing battle to get it out". While Ankara did sign the OIC communiqué calling for a ban on the book, no legislation to this effect was introduced (Der Spiegel, 6 March 1989). Turkey was the only Muslim country where the book remained quietly legal. The big protest rally against the Satanic Verses in Istanbul on 4<sup>th</sup> March 1989 was effective in Turkish foreign policy. Despite unofficial critics of him, the Social Democrat Party leader, Erdal Inonu, announced that "killing somebody for what he has written is simply murder" (The Economist, 18 March 1989). Middle East editor of the Cumhuriyet newspaper Ali Sirmen called Khomeini "a nearly 90-years-old man who still thirsts for blood as a terrorist activist and waxed nostalgic of the Shah" (Cumhuriyet, 22 February 1989, and 24 March 1989). Altan Oymen also labelled the Iranian regime as "a terrorist administration" (Cumhuriyet , 26 February 1989; Milliyet, 22 March 1989). The only religious criticism came from Mehmet Hatipoglu, a professor at the

Theology Faculty at Ankara University, who suggested that Khomeini's fatwa is un-Islamic (Olson, 2005), but neither religious criticisms nor intellectual research was produced in Turkey about the Rushdie Affair. A satirical author, Aziz Nesin, vowed to translate Selman Rushdie's Satanic Verses into Turkish, and to publish it to some experts. Pragmatist leader Rafsanjani argued that the fatwa was a religious verdict, but did not accept the death edict (Tehran Television, 8 June 1989). After Khomeini's death, Iran did not take it seriously and a repeated order would not be accepted even if issued, just as in the case of Nesin's order (Sick, 1985). Rafsanjani resisted repetition of another Rushdie Affair, this time with Turkey (Olson, 2004) in light of Turkey's potential for gains in the Iranian market, and in view of the strained diplomatic and trade relations between the EEC and Iran (Boruvalli, 1989:90-91). Yusuf Ozal (brother of the prime minister) called the Satanic Verses affair "a blessing on Turkey from God" but this cynical delight did not last long, and was replaced by a dilemma. Though Iran had no direct connection with the events of Sivas and Basbaglar, the Turkish government operated manipulation politics against the possible religious influences of Iran in Turkey. The tragic event of Sivas, a fault line city between the Sunnite and Alevi populations, in which the Islamist rioters set fire to the Madimak Hotel, and accused those at the convention of spreading atheism on 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1993, brought considerable attention. Thirty-seven people lost their lives in this act. However, Aziz Nesin managed to escape from the hotel fire. Anger between the Alevi and Sunni population increased after the genocide of Basbaglar, when in the village near Erzincan city, thirty-three people were murdered in a mosque in revenge for Sivas-Madimak by Alevi militants on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1993 (Hurriyet, 8 August 2005). The state court decided to issue a death sentence for the 33 radical Islamist who were involved in the Madimak massacre in June 2000.

In fact, the religious verdict of by Khomeini politicised the Salman Rushdie affair and broke relations with the EU countries. However, this strengthened Turkey's liberal orientation towards Western culture. Whilst the verdict increased the rogue image of Iran, there was no chance it would overshadow the Satanic Verses affair. The intelligence connection of Aziz Nesin, revealed after his death, also highlighted Turkey's state sponsored terrorism activities which manipulated the sectarian differences by creating a terrorist-image in society, especially in the events around Madimak (Sabah, 25 August 2007).

#### **5.4.3. Merve Kavakci Affairs: Turban (Headscarf) war**

Kemalist project of modernisation provided a symbolic value to the new identity of women/men integrating them into western civilisation by adopting the Headwear Law of 1925, the Turkish Civil law of 1926 and Electoral Rights in 1934 (Toprak, 1981). State-modernisation aimed to engineer a civil society at this stage. However, rather than providing modernisation facilities at a public place, Kemalist modernisation preferred to change the identity of the gender that would be considered essential for the creation of a liberal society (Tickner, 1992). However, the new engineered bourgeois class became more autarchic in opposition to the peripheries' preferences and held central power to protect the militarised secularist policy. For instance, the founders of Turkey's first women's research centre at Istanbul University, Necla Arat (Radical 30 April 2007), noted that "we are here to defend Turkey's secular structure, to stop those who want to change it step by step" (p. 5). But this authoritarian type modernisation has been challenging after Turkey's engagement with the global system in 1980s. This provided space for the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in which Islamist women were legitimised by the veil. Nilufer Gole focused on the issue of the turban, which she calls a clash between central and periphery in the sharing of the state's wellbeing (Gole, 1997). On the other hand, the debate between reformist and conservative movements in Iran coincidentally was seen as the other side of the same coin with regard to the state centralisation. The tension-ridden struggles between organs of state and social movements resulted in demands for an ideal autonomous public sphere (Navaro-Yashin, 2002). Whilst the Iranian regime obliged the wearing of chador in the public sphere (streets belong to the state), Turkey enforced a ban on the wearing of the turban in the state organs (universities, offices belonging to the state).

The headscarf question first broke out in 1981 and has raged on and off ever since, after the military seizure of power in Turkey. President Kenan Evren delivered a televised speech in which he branded Islamic resurgence as a subversive threat comparable to communism and banned the headscarf on 20<sup>th</sup> December 1982. This decision was perceived as an act against Islam in society (Milli Gazete 11 January 1983). However, the issue emerged again at the end of 1980s in which Iran was closely interested in the "turban affair" in March 1989 and protested against Turkey's

law on dress code at the Constitutional Court, which banned the wearing of Islamic attire in schools (Resmi Gazete, 5 July 1989). Rallies were organised in Tehran and resulted in 150 deputies' signatures to a letter to condemn the ban of the headscarf to support Islamic tendencies in Turkey. The tension peaked between Turkey and Iran when Manochehr Mottaki, the Iranian ambassador to Turkey, declared (Ghasemi, 1995) that "Iran is considering to implement economic sanctions against Turkey" as a consequence of constitutional resolution in Turkey (pp.237-8). He was then announced as a persona non grata by the Turkish foreign ministry and both sides recalled their ambassadors.

In fact, once the system was installed, Turkish and Iranian woman did not benefit from justice, and gender injustice was legitimised in the opposing regime's theory. Whilst French secularism was in power in Turkey, Iran's liberalist demonstration in Tehran condemned gender discrimination against the Muslim woman. The case of Merve Kavakci internationalised the turban issue and emphasised the duality of Islamic women's identities. Merve Kavakci was elected a deputy of the Turkish parliament from Fazilet Partisi (Felicity Party) in April 1999. She vowed to wear the headscarf at the swearing-in ceremony for MPs in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Prime Minister Ecevit and his cabinet booed and verbally abused her personally upon entering the parliamentary chamber. She was later compelled to withdraw from the assembly and was stripped of her Turkish citizenship by Turkey's highest administrative court on 20<sup>th</sup> September 1999. Although she could re-claim her Turkish citizenship, she was not able to take her parliamentary seat in the Assembly. Kemal Kahrrazi, the Iranian foreign minister stated that "Iran does not like Turkey's secular policies, hence respect for peoples' values and beliefs' is required to establish democracy" (TDN, 18 May 2000). On 8-9 May hundreds of Iranian students, most likely prompted by Iranian officials, demonstrated for the right of Turkish women to wear the turban and other Islamic attire. Turkey was quick to go on the attack against Iran during Kavakci affair. Prime Minister Ecevit claimed (as cited in Olson, 2004) that "Iran tries to export its revolutionary ideas into Turkey" (p. 85). In response to Faziye Rafsanjani's supporting letter, the daughter of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and a member of the Iranian parliament, Kavakci responded that "we wanted no support from a country such as Iran where there is no freedom" which demonstrated the differences in gender identity definitions in Turkey and Iran. This

was certainly a clear evidence of women in society, claiming that democratic rights were vital for the new modern identity of Muslim woman (Tehran Times, 13 May 1999). In the same vein, the Iranian response to the closure of the pro-reform “Salam” daily by the judiciary in July 1999 provoked large-scale demonstrations in Iran. In the aftermath of these demonstrations, Prime Minister Ecevit stated that “violence is a natural reaction of the Iranian people to an oppressive regime. The Iranian people have a rich historical and cultural background. They cannot be expected to bear the out-dated regime of oppression for a long time” (Hurriyet, 14 July 1999). The opposition to the Iranian women’s demands for the right to throw off the chador is a critical subject in evaluating both societies’ contradictions. However, it is obvious that both regimes have failed in creating a liberal or a welfare society.

The terrorist attack in the Danistay (State Council) brought new tensions between the Islamists and secularists on 17<sup>th</sup> May 2006. The incident occurred after the state council’s final decision on the Aytac Kilic case that prohibited the wearing of the headscarf in class and at state offices. President Ahmed Necdet Sezer criticised the Islamist newspapers for trying to attack secularist establishments on 13<sup>th</sup> February 2006. The funeral of Mustafa Ozbilgen became a battlefield between secularists and Islamists. Demonstrators bawled “...Turkey is secularist and remains secular...”; “...Turkey will not be Iran” (Tehran Times, 19 July 1999). On the other hand, the columnist Can Dunder wrote a speculative article in his column in which he claimed that the murderer, Alpaslan Aslan had received a military education in Iran between 1995 and 1997 through a connection with THB ( Milliyet, 18 May 2006). But this was not accepted in the Turkish press. With regard to the presence of the US in the region, most journalists warned that somebody was trying to create political conflict between Turkey and Iran. This attempt was not acceptable for Turkey’s national security.

In April 2007 the presidential candidate Abdullah Gul was given a military muhtira (warning) due to his wife’s wearing of a headscarf, and his religious background. Demonstrations against the growing power of the AKP party were organised by the secular civil organisation such as Necla Arat, and Nur Serter, who at the Caglayan meeting, encouraged another military coup d’état while Turkey was at the edge of its European Union candidacy (Arat, 1992). Howe (2002) claimed that the headscarf



issue polarised the Turkish nation. The justice coup also caused the renewal of the turban law in March 2008. The constitutional and justice coup attempts signified that the secularist establishment had openly excluded an Islamist identity in the state, which could bring about structural changes in society.

From the point of view of Turkish Western-type modernisation, the headscarf issue is the most sensitive issue for the secularist establishment and the peripheral identity struggle. Merve's Kavakci' response to Faize Rafsanjani provides a critical analysis of two different forms of identity in which neither person would accept the other's religious theory or morality. Turkish modernisation from above has failed to transform society towards a liberal outlook and the turban issue threaten the secular establishment, as an essential model contrary to Kemalist modernisation. As mentioned above, this created a direct diplomatic crisis that shows that secular establishment sees revolutionary policies or reactionary movements as being more dangerous than Kurdish nationalism. The other religious dispute also related to the revolution export policies of Iran, described in the next section.

#### **5. 4.4. The Jerusalem Memorial Night and the Sincan (Xingjian) Affair**

After Israel declared that a unified Jerusalem was its capital on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1980, the diplomatic representation of Israel was formally confined to the deputy-secretary level on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1980 (Robins, 2002: 239). A demonstration in Konya, a central-Anatolian city with long-standing Islamic traditions, was led by Necmettin Erbakan, the head of the Islamic party and an ally of the ruling coalition. One account stated that he spoke to the demonstration asking Turkey to move away from Israel and for Muslims to take back Jerusalem and stating that a campaign had begun to finish Western influence on Turkey. Posters and banners attesting to the power of Allah and the importance of Sharia were unfurled and the protest included the incineration of Israeli, American and Soviet flags - the countries portrayed as 'Satans' (Tirman, 1997). On the other hand, the dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1996 caused a change in Turkey's foreign policy, with the Turkey-Israel tie becoming the entente axis in the Middle East. However, Turkey's foreign policy route changed after the Erbakan's (the Refahiyol government) seizure of power on 28<sup>th</sup> June 1996 (Yalcin, 1997; Onbir, 1998; Arcayurek, 2003). Whilst Erbakan tried to improve the

relationship with Iran, military pressure broadened security ties with Israel. The contradiction between state and government was revealed at the highest level when the municipal leader of Sincan, Bekir Yildiz from the Welfare Party, organised the 'Jerusalem Memorial Night' on 31 January-2 February 1997. The memorial was initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini and had been held in Iran every year on the last Friday of Ramadan. It was also the anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Sincan's mayor Bekir Yildiz, invited the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey, Mohammed Reza Baqeri,<sup>i</sup> and PLO representative in Turkey, Muhammad bin Yasini, to speak. The organisers put together a gala occasion for which they put up posters of Abbas Musavi, Musa Sadr and Fathi Shakaki who were Hezbollah and Hamas leaders in Lebanon, and among the Palestinians (Olson, 2004). Baqeri criticised (Babak, 2006) Israel in his speech: "The English gave birth to this illegitimate child and the Americans raised it. They (the Americans) are still helping it to grow and providing it with force in its (Israel's) war with the Arabs. If America had not protected it, this illegitimate child would not have lived" (p.49).

The Sincan event created a political firestorm in Turkey on 4<sup>th</sup> February 1997 when the TAF send 50 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and other military vehicles through Sincan's Ataturk Boulevard. Prime Minister Erbakan tried to prevent the expulsion of Baqeri and other Iranians from Turkey. After Erbakan's ouster of Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the Motherland Party said that "Baqeri is a terrorist not a diplomat." He demanded that Baqeri and Muhammad Reza Rashid, the head of the Iranian consulate in Istanbul, be sent home immediately on 19<sup>th</sup> February. Hence, Baqeri and Muhammad Rashid were immediately declared "persona non grata" and expelled from Turkey. In addition to this, Said Zare, head of the Iranian consulate in Erzurum, was also expelled on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1997 due to his criticism of Deputy Chief-of-Staff General Cevik Bir who declared that Iran was a "state that supported terrorism" in Washington D.C., during the Turkish - American Business Council meeting in February 1997. Iran's foreign ministry summoned Turkey's ambassador and told him that Bir's remarks in Washington were ugly and inappropriate for a Turkish official. Iran retaliated for the expulsion of its diplomats by evicting Osman Koruturk, Turkey's Ambassador to Iran, and Ufuk Ozsancak, the Turkish consul in Urmiya( Olson, 2004)

After this event Onur Oymen, the undersecretary of the foreign minister, (TDNs, 1 February 1997) pointed out Iran's support of terrorism which could not be a part of a friendly neighbourhood relationship. He stated that "we can choose our friends but we can not choose our neighbours" at the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. He also emphasised that cultural linkage of Turkey and Iran, where half of the Iranian population speaks Turkish and also has a very strong cultural and ethnic linkage with the Turkish people. In a realistic political manner he said that "Turkey's dependency on oil is essential to maintain good relations with Iran" (p.3).

In brief, the myth of "Jerusalem" as a religious phenomenon has the power to captivate the masses. In opposing Gulen's interfaith proposal, both Erbakan's party and Erdogan's party supported Iranian and Arab political thought on the status of Jerusalem. Turkey is still keeping its embassy in Tel Aviv rather than Jerusalem due to this contention. On the other hand, Iran directly supports Palestinian groups against the Israeli state and wants to "wipe Israel from the map" of the Middle East. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the experimental confrontation of religious dispute and politics is dealt with in the next section.

#### **5.4.5 Ja'feri and Alevi politics**

After the abolition of the Janissary in 1826, the properties (Tekke and Zaviyeler) of the Bakteshi order were transferred to the Nakshi Sufi orders, which was the main transition of religious power from folk Islam to a Sunni state establishment. As mentioned above, the new Turkish republican religious policy was based on a state-controlled pro-Sunni establishment that ignored the realm of the Alevi population. In addition to this, State Minister Namik Kemal Zeybek announced that the Ja'feri population in Turkey is estimated at about three million, in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Aksiyon, 11 April 2004). The assimilation politics of folk Islam in Turkey was driven by three different sources the scholar Esad Cosan (leader of the Iskender Pasha Nakshi order) claimed that the Makalat was written as a Sunni religious text (Cosan, 1990). However, Yasar Nuri Ozturk tried to define the Alevi identity in terms of the Turkish Islamic synthesis but did not rationalise it in the Turkish community (Ozturk, 1995). Secondly, the Directorate of Religious Affairs supported the Jaferisation of the Alevi in the city of Corum which was chosen as a

pilot area for the assimilation policy (Cakir, 1998). Thirdly, the secular establishment made unofficial social contract with Alevi --the main supporters of the Kemalist secularist state against the oppressive pro-Sunni politics that interrupts Iranian influence in Anatolia, and also impedes radical Islamism in Turkey. Namik Kemal Zeybek pointed out that Turkey's suspicions about antagonism are groundless, because the Shia did not come from Iran, that nation did not protect its identity from the Islamisation and the religion represents the same realities in a different manner of expression (Tercuman, 6 May 2007). It is unfortunate that Turkey has faced tragic sectarian civil disturbances in the last three decades in the cities of Maras and Corum in 1978. This left the nation divided over the Madimak and Gazi events, along the lines of Sunni/Shia, secular/ religious. The complex status quo of Alevis in Turkey was apparent after the muhtura (military warning) in April 2007. They consolidated their social contracts by emphasising the continuity of the secular establishment at the Chaglayan and Tandogan meetings.

The importance of religious minority issues in Turkey and Iran was highlighted in 1998 after the 28<sup>th</sup> February process. The chief inspector for religious affair, Abdulkadir Sezgin, filed a report for the state court which accused Iran of paying the salaries of Ja'feri imams in the province of Igdir on 5 March 1998. He implied that Iran was using 300 imams to export its revolutionary policy. In response his accusation, Huseyin Yesil (leader of the imam in Igdir) severely criticised the religious discrimination by the Directorate of Religious Affairs, arguing that public denotations supported the 200 mosques' expenses in Igdir province (Hurriyet, 3 March 1998). The leader of the Ja'feri community in Istanbul, Selahattin Ozgunduz, complained that they had to send their children to Iran to be trained in Ja'feri religious theology, but the Turkish authorities then suspected the students of being Iranian spies while religiously discriminating against the community. The issue of the Turkish Ja'feri population was discussed at a high-level conference of Shia and Sunni scholars in Istanbul on 14 - 15 April 2007 (Ay Gazete, 16 April 2007). Following the Sunni coalition summit in Ankara, and Saudi versus Iranian influence in Iraq, Ayatollah Mekarim Shirazi emphasised the importance of unity in religion on 23<sup>rd</sup> February 2007 (Ay Gazete, 16 April 2007).

On the other hand, unofficial contract between Kemalist and Alevis cut off the Iranian religious influence on the Alevi population. The integration of the Baktashi and Alevi populations still remains a potential source of political power in the Republican People's Party in Turkey. Turkey's pilot Jaferisation policies also signify that the Turkish state prefers to see Twelven Shiism rather than Alevi antagonism in society. There are no tendencies by the Turkish state to use the Sunni religion as a foreign policy tool in real politics.

## **5.5. Conclusion**

While religious and ideological confrontation was experienced in five different cases between the two reluctant neighbours, the alternative religious theory of Iran intensified under the political Islam. This created a great amount of excitement in the Islamic environment of Turkey. Although the Velayeti faqih religious theory of Ayatollah Khomeini gave a great deal of credit to the Tagreeb movement, the messianic religious theories of Khamenei and Ahmed Nejat increased Persian religious nationalism. In this vein, the counter-revolutionary activities of the regional and super powers against political Islam certainly managed to a manipulation of this internal threat for the regional state as well as Turkey. The ideological circumstances in Turkey depended on positivism and capitalism as alternative theories to Islamic political theory. In reality, Iran could not implement an Islamic political model but underwent a pragmatist management process. As argued above, the Islamic groups in Turkey are part of the secular system and their relationships cannot be defined as alternative regime theory against the secularist model of the Turkish state, but only as the remains of an inefficient secular oligarchic system. In the context of this theory, both states consider the state concept superior with regard to public choice and security to that of individual liberty. This reality reflects a different side of the same coin, as an oppressive organic state. Hence, both states' internal threat perception on religious and ideological issues is more intensive than other ethnic conflicts and competition in the region. The five micro analyses in this chapter provide an answer to the question of how ideological and religious settings created two diplomatic crises. Despite their lengthy bureaucratic association with foreign policy, these cases exemplify the undiplomatic behaviours of two middle-power state and also show the weakness of realist politics, as neither country follow a realist political model when

the ideological and religious disputes arose. As an alternative approach to the religious and ideological problems in the two states, I consider that these religious and ideological issues can be distinguished from ethnic nationalism despite these being internal factors in both countries. Therefore, this study will detail these issues separately.

## **CHAPTER SIX:**

### **THE PORTRAITS OF RELIGIOUS TERROR IN TURKO-IRANIAN RELATIONS**

#### **6.1. Introduction**

The architecture of terror is one of the instruments of middle-sized state centralisation policies. Using the potentiality of a society for violence as a counter-terror strategy has allowed Turkey to counter anti-regime groups and also permitted it to take control of these groups' activities. The politics of terror from above, driven mostly by the headscarf issue in Turkey, were spontaneously perceived as an attack on the personal identity of Muslims by Islamists. Dress codes and turban affair should not be underestimated in Turkish and Iranian politics as such a conflict between good and evil, recalls memories of Prophet Muhammad's war against the Jewish people in Medina. There will always be unsolved political murders even in a strict secular environment but the prime suspects here are always connected with radical Islamist groups and Iran. Turkish secularists have managed to convince the public to be concerned about the Islamic revolution in Iran and the political Islamic tendencies in Turkish society. The portrait of religious terror also magnifies the dangers of suspicion in politics - assassinations relevant to the two countries' relations are always analysed to better understand these dynamics. A micro level analysis of political assassinations and of the Turkish Hezbollah mainly aims to answer the question of how the state manipulates or transforms religious issues into political terror. However the author has tried to avoid the conspiracy explanation in this section. Rather than using a purely theoretical approach, the author has mainly aimed to present the power of religious and ideological circumstances in real politics within Turko-Iranian relations in the last three decades. The study applies Steven David's omnibalancing theory which explains the operational measurements of religious terror as an internal threat by a middle-power state.

#### **6.2.0 The tapestry of political religious terror in Turkey**

The concept of terror is derived from the French Revolution in general; politics of terror were also adopted by Ittihad-Terakki Firkasi (Community of Union Party) in

Turkey. Counter terrorism (Ergil, 1980) was systematised in Turkey as part of the NATO operation Gladio, through recruiting pan-Turkism movements, known as Gray Wolf. As mentioned above, a Turkish Islamic synthesis could not harbour any terror activities or compel revolutionary politics in society, but terror in Turkey originates in ideo-ethnocentric charismatic sources, that aim to set up an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East (Chasdi, 2002:13). However, the Marxist ethnic recession of the and KONTRA-GEL could not be supported by any Kurdish Islamist groups or Sufi groups. Therefore, the functioning role of Islamic groups in the society impedes the alliance between Islamist and pan-Kurdish nationalists. The fact that on four occasions military coup d'états occurred in Turkey makes it clear that 'irticaci' (reactionaries) are a bigger threat than Kurdish nationalists. However, the structure of society has changed since the 1990s and the new post-modern type of Muslim identity (Kurdish Radicals) is challenging the state apparatus on various levels. The availability of power for these unorganised social protest groups is defused by counter-terror strategies which apply terror from above, for instance by using Turkish Hezbollah terror tactics. The stripping of Kavakci of her Turkish citizenship is a valuable historical fact in understanding Turkish state policy. Even though she was an elected deputy of Turkish Parliament, and had no ties with any terrorist organisations, she was stripped of Turkish citizenship, while the citizenship of militants and guerrilla leaders is not disputed. The unsolved political murders are always focused on by the strictly secular, anti-religious authors and academicians who always link them to Iran and religious groups under suspicion. The mass media of Turkey and politicians have accused Iran of being a state of terror many times after each assassination (Olson, 2004). It is a fact that there are a few Middle Eastern Islamist groups involved in Turkey's internal terror, such as Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Da'wa Party, Hizbuttahrir, Rabita and Kaplancilar. However, the security forces have announced that there are 600 illegal organisations within Turkey but most of them are mafia and ethnic and ideological organisations based in Turkey ([www.tem.iem.gov.tr](http://www.tem.iem.gov.tr)). The major internal terrorist organisations motivated by religion are the Turkish Hezbollah and the Islamic Great Orient Raiders (IBDA-C) which are pro-Sunni military organisations. This study excludes the IBDA-C because they do not have any connection with Iran and are against Shia religious theory.



#### **6.2.1.0 Unsolved political murders in Turkey: Iran as the usual suspect**

The Association for Turkey's Journalist announced that 62 journalists have been murdered since the 1920s ([www.tgc.org.tr](http://www.tgc.org.tr)) The prime suspicion has been cast on religious groups, which have possible connections with Iran, which undermines the improved relations between the countries, including through the press war and low level diplomatic relations in 1990s. The power of the media is the main determinant factor in these cases. The study scrutinises the unsolved political murders to consider the possibility of Iran's terror engagement in Turkey and the reliability of both sides' arguments by explaining the key political murders in the following section and also considering how Turkey manages its counter-revolutionary politics.

##### **6.2.1.1 The assassination of Professor Dr. Muammer Aksoy**

Prof. Aksoy was the founder of Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi (the Association of Ataturk's thought), a speaker of the 1961 constitution, supporter of the national petrol case against petrol law in 1954 and a rival of the Turban Affair, as a strict secularist left-wing intellectual. He was assassinated on 31<sup>st</sup> January 1990 (Milliyet, 2 February 1990). Islamic Action and the Islamic Revenge organization were the main suspects. However, former retired Turkish intelligence officer, Mahir Kaynak, claims that this was not carried out by Islamists because they fear that the involvement in any kind of action could be provocative, especially when the turban affair was so controversial in the Turkish parliament. In fact, there is no concrete evidence of an Iranian connection in this assassination.

##### **6.2.1.2 The assassination of Cetin Emec**

Cetin Emec was the chief editor of the Hurriyet newspaper, assassinated in front of his property on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1990 (Milliyet/ Hurriyet, 8 March 1990 ) Due to this event Irfan Cagirci, the leader of the Islamic terror group, Islamic Action; was arrested in March 1999 when he was receiving money transferred from Iran. Later the court decision announced the death penalty was issued on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2000 (Hurriyet, 25 July 2000). The connection with Iran brought on a crisis between Turkish and Iranian officials as well as among the mass media of both countries. Cakir provides more information

about the connection between Iran and Cagirci by claiming that he had a very close relationship with the Iranian consulate in Istanbul and had also received military training in Iran (Cakir, 2001). It is certain that the connection of Iranian revolutionary groups with small group or individuals in Turkey always increases diplomatic tension between the countries.

#### **6.2.1.3 The assassination of Turan Dursun**

Turan Dursun was an atheist religious researcher who was assassinated on the outskirts of Istanbul in September 1990 (Cumhuriyet 6 September 1990). The pro-Iranian weekly newspaper in Turkey, "Vahdet" (Unity), announced that Turkey's Salman Rushdie was dead. Selahaddin Es who is an immigrant from Turkey and the presenter of Iranian Radio compared his death to the case of Ahmedi Kesevi who was an atheist activist in Iran, murdered by Fedaiyani Islam in 1953. One of the prime suspects in the Dursun case, a member of Islamic Action, Mehmet Ali Seker, explained that he went to Iran for military training, provided in Qum by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Aksam, 25 December 2000). The brouhaha of an Iranian connection continued as it is the usual suspect for Turkish politicians and the press. The only forensic proof is was that the German-made CZE rifle was sold by Iran.

#### **6.2.1.4 The assassination of Professor Bahriye Ucok**

Bahriye Ucok who was a lecturer at the Theology Faculty in Ankara University and a well-known anti-Islamist activist, especially on the headscarf issue, was assassinated by a postal bombing on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1990 (Milliyet 8 October 1990. Cumhuriyet 14 October). Even though she had been trained by bomb experts of the Turkish Intelligence service, the explosion killed her (Yeni Safak, 16 December 2005). The case still remains unsolved.

#### **6.2.1.5 The assassination of Onat Kutlar**

Kutlar, who was the prominent writer for the Cumhuriyet newspaper and cinema director was killed by a gun shot in the Marmara Hotel in Istanbul on 11<sup>th</sup> January

1995 (Kutlar, 2006). There were suggestions of an Iranian connection, but the case remains unsolved.

#### **6.2.1.6 The assassination of Professor Ahmet Taner Kislali**

The other symbolic attack targeted Kislali, who was a prominent secularist figure opposing the Turban affair and a well-known professor in the Political Science Faculty in Ankara University. He was assassinated by a car bomb in Ankara on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1999 (Cumhuriyet, 22 October 1999). One day after his assassination, the crisis between the two countries emerged again--three Iranians were detained at Istanbul airport in connection with this case, while alleging fleeing the country. Deputy Prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz declared that the Iranians were the organizers of the crime (Cumhuriyet 23 October 1999). The Iranian president, Khatemi, pointed out that “Zionist elements in decision-making body in Turkey are always active. Whenever the Turkey - Iran relation improves, secularist and Zionist circles try to undermine the growing relations of Turkey and Iran” (Tehran Times, 24 October 1999; p.2). In general, this Iranian defensive rhetoric and accusations of a Jewish connection are very valuable to understand the two countries’ political behaviour at times of crisis.

#### **6.2.1.6 The assassination of Necip Hablemitoglu**

Necip Hablemitoglu, the associate professor in Ankara University in the Faculty of Political Science, was murdered in the capital on 18<sup>th</sup> December 2002. His studies focused on Islamic groups, especially the Gulen movement and the German charity foundation as well as its connections with gold mines in the province of Bergama. This increased the suspicion in the Turkish press of Iranian involvement (Hablemioglu, 2007). However, the investigation found some forensic evidence to connect the crime with Turkish Gladio in a house in Umraniye in Istanbul in 2007.

#### **6.2.1.7 The assassination of Ugur Mumcu**

One of the key political assassinations in Turkey was the symbolic attack on Ugur Mumcu, who was a well-known journalist on the Cumhuriyet daily newspaper. He was murdered by a car bomb in Ankara on 24<sup>th</sup> January 1993. After the incident,

President Turgut Ozal responded that this was a provocation against the Turkish state, when he was visiting the United States (Zaman, 25 January 1999). A Turkish Grand National Assembly member, Bulent Caparoglu, drew attention to the unsolved murder's connection with the headscarf issue saying "whenever this issue comes to the agenda of Turkish Grand National assembly, one of the secularists is assassinated such as Emec. Dusun, Ucok etc." He pointed out that "Whoever convinced Evren to dispose of the headscarf decision in 1989, they are certainly the perpetrator of these political murders." (Caparoglu, and Duzdag, 1999).

The assassination of Mumcu created a crisis between secularists and Islamists. The secularists said it could divide Turkish society on the anniversary of the death. While they continued to claim an Iranian connection with Islamic terror organisations in Turkey, the unsolved political murders' research commission carried out a serious debate in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1993. MP Adnan Keskin addressed the research commission report on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1997. However, it was unfortunate that the commission report could not clear up any cases but merely raised suspicion over foreign and 'deep state' terror connections. The Turkish interior minister, Ismet Sezgin, claimed that Turkish intelligence services had found some evidence on the killing of Mumcu to connect it with terror organisations located in Iran. He also stated that these organisations were involved in the murders of Çetin Emeç and Turan Dursun. These claims and those by another interior minister, Hikmet Cetin, seriously damaged the countries' relations. However, (the then) Prime Minister Demirel called for a 'cool headed' approach to the Iranian linkage in order to not disrupt bilateral relations unnecessarily. About 200.000 people shouted 'Mullahs to Iran' at Mumcu's funeral, which signifies that press influence, is a main factor in Turko-Iranian relations. However, despite growing public pressure, Turkey continued to pursue a moderate and pragmatist policy towards Iran due to the economic interdependency theory. Hence Turkey avoided imposing visas on Iranian citizens and sustained its political and economic relations with Iran. Furthermore, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatically refrained from accusing Iran of involvement in illegal activities in Turkey by arguing that there was no concrete evidence of an Iranian connection.

However, in response to Turkish accusations, Ali Akbar Valayeti, former foreign minister of Iran, in an interview to Turkish TV, denied Iran had planned activities against Turkey, and proposed to discuss these ‘mutual allegations’ within the framework of the common security committee. Yet, he also said that even if there were any groups in Turkey, which desired an ‘Iranian mode’” and were inspired by its values, this did not mean that Iran encouraged or directed them. Similarly, Erk newspaper in Iranian Azerbaijan claimed that the perpetrators of political murders in Turkey are mainly the CIA and Mossad (Erk, 14 February 1993). However, Resalat newspaper printed the news on Mumcu without giving any comment in Tehran (Resalat, January 1993). Newspapers in Israel also stressed that terror caused tensions between Turkey and Iran (Davar and Haanetz, 20 February 1993).

Unsolved political assassinations clearly play a negative role in bilateral relations. Turkish accusations against Iran and the power of the press are very valuable in understanding the character of Turkey-Iran relations. In fact, there was no clear connection to Iran with regard to these political assassinations, but the Turkish press and politicians tried to damage the revolutionary export policies of Iran by linking religion and terror. On the other hand, there is an ongoing operation by Turkish security forces against the Ergenekon terror group, which has connections with the unresolved political murders. In the next section, the operations of Turkish Hezbollah are described; the study draws a bloody picture of religious terror and uses the information to support the theoretical framework of how Turkey operates against internal threats. Iran directly interferes with Turkey’s vulnerable aspects to reduce Turkey’s regional power capability on the domestic and international levels.

### **6.3.0 The counter terror operation by Turkey: Turkish Hezbollah**

Even though the legacy of counter terror strategies is disputable in international law, the Turkish state has played this dangerous game against Kurdish nationalists for some time (Orttung and Makarychev, 2006). These counter violence strategies also create enormous fear in society. They demonstrate the brutal nature of religious terror and damage the fluctuating rise of Islamism in Turkey in 1990s. These forces are still capable of creating another insurgency campaign against the secular state establishment in Turkey.

### 6.3.1 The origin of the Turkish Hezbollah

The origin of Turkish Hezbollah is disputable. There have been five critical articles which highlight the mysteries of radical religious terrorism and counter terrorism strategy of the state. John Nugent supports the idea that counter-terrorism by Turkish security forces successfully managed to devastate the Islamist groups (THB) in the country. However, the leader of THB, Isa Altsoy rejected the claim saying that their actions are not counter-terrorist in his book manuscript. He argues (Altsoy, 2006) that the Islamist movement against the Kemalist oppression and PKK terrorists was driven by their own Kurdish Islamic synthesis without any internal or external connection with the Iran model. However, Professors Bulent Aras and Bagcik's critical article claims that the connection between the security forces and THB is a good example of counter-terror management in international relation (Aras and Bacik ,2 002). Although the origin of the Turkish Hezbollah is very ambiguous, the prominent Turkish journalist Cakir believes that Islamic radicalism in the Kurdish region produced the violence by the Islamists against the PKK and state apparatus. Similarly Faik Bulut and Farac claim that the anatomy of the THB is the product of the 1980 military coup d'état. Pro-nationalist people in the prisons and also isolated people in the urban areas have created the new violent face of Islamic radicalism in Turkey. There is potential civil disobedience against the state's terror operations and the PKK's terror activities in the region. The question is who monitored this sensitive side of the society? As usual, Turkish security officers and the Turkish press directly accuse the Iranian terror networks. However, due to the direct targeting of the Nurcu groups and the PKK leadership, moderate Islamists realise that this organisation attacks the religious leaders and pious business classes in Turkey. The pro-Islamist author Dilipak pointed out that the THB is a well-organized contra-guerrilla outfit in his article (Vahdet, 4 December 1990). Both the PKK and the Islamists agree that the state-made alliance with the THB is eliminating the rising ethno-religious sentiments and ideo-ethno nationalism in the region. It is unfortunate that policy-makers such as Prime Minister Tansu Ciller admit that they sacrificed everything to fight terrorism. However, Land Forces' commander Muhittin Fusunoglu defines the THB as a religious group against THE PKK in the Kurdish region. But President Demirel admitted that the state sometimes cooperates with illegal organisations. Mehmet Agar, who was the chief of the Police forces by the time, also admits to some security staff

cooperation with the THB to aid the war against terrorism in the region. Thus one can see that the Turkish security forces have an unofficial agreement with THB--they aim to control radical tendencies in Kurdish nationalism and growing radicalism of the Kurdish Islamists in the region.

### **6.3.2 The emergence of Turkish Hezbollah**

The organisation was formed after the September 12<sup>th</sup> military coup and around the time of the Iranian Islamic revolution by a small Sunni Islamist Kurdish group in the Vahdet Bookstore in the city of Diyarbakir in 1980. They gathered at a second meeting in the city of Batman in 1981. After the third meeting in the province of Kasimpasa in Istanbul, the group split into the 'Ilim' (scientists) faction which advocated using violence to achieve the goal of an Islamic state, and 'Menzil' (rangers) who advocated religious education and a more peaceful movement towards an Islamist state. The leader of the 'Ilim' faction opened the Ilim Bookstore in the city of Batman in 1987. However, the leader of the 'Menzil' faction, Fidan Gungor launched his activities at the Menzil Bookstore, but due to ideological differences, the Menzil faction did not support the fight against the PKK. The group was eliminated by its counterpart and the leader of the group was killed in 1991 (Hurriyet, 24 January 2000). Iran only has connections with small religious groups in Turkey. For instance, one of the religious leaders of Menzil groups, Mulla Musa Guzelsoy, received medical support from Iran but then he died there (Çakir, 2001).

In the early stage of its development, Turkish Hezbollah members received military training in PKK camps, but this collaboration did not last long and the two groups became brutal enemies (Aras, and Bacik, 2002). The THB accused the PKK of murdering Muslims, cooperating with Armenians, serving communism, and seeking to divide the Muslim community ([www.cdi.org/program](http://www.cdi.org/program)). The friction was initiated when the PKK abducted Serif Karaaslan's family and killed his father Sabri and his mother Hayriye in the province of Idil in Sirnak city. By the end of September 1991 both sides lost 13 people. After this, Halkin Emekci Partisi (HADEP - Public Labour Party) leader, Feridun Yazar, complained that obscure powers were attempting to create a civil war in the region. The Undersecretary of Turkish Intelligence, Teoman Koman, claimed that this is Islamist terror (Cumhuriyet/ Nokta, 14/2 December 1990),

but former Turkish Intelligence Services' author, Mahir Kaynak, (Milliyet, 14 October 1990) suggested that this is merely a provocation. Similarly, Nazli Ilıcak, who is a prominent journalist, pointed out that "Real Muslims cannot commit this kind of homicide. It is absurd to establish any connection between Islamists and terror" (Tercuman, 17 March 1990). On the other hand, the secular response arose from the University of Bosporus in Istanbul in which 139 academic staffs expressed their opinion publicly that "terrorists could not destroy our secularist belief and Turkey could never be Iran" (Cumhuriyet, October 1990:p.1). The revelation of the new face of Kurdish Islam was restrained by the state successfully so that Turkey managed its internal threat at the first stage and then targeted the external connections.

### **6.3.3 The operations of Turkish Hezbollah**

THB launched its brutal assassination against PKK cadre in the Kurdish provinces as part of an internal conflict against the Partiya Kafirin Kurdistan (Kurdish Infidel Party, PKK), which raged between 1991 and 1995, reaching its climax in 1993. As result of the conflict, both sides lost over 700 close sympathisers or militants. The report demonstrated that 500 of these attacks were conducted by the THB but 200 of them were executed by the PKK. Ultimately, in March 1993, the ceasefire and cooperation protocol was signed to end the conflict and both sides proposed the new arrangement struggle for joint operation against Turkish state (Cumhuriyet, 16 February 1993). The leader of the THB, Huseyin Velioglu, and the PKK official, Nizamettin Tas, signed a peace agreement at the Keleresh camp in Iran under the auspices of the Iranian intelligence service SAVAMA on 13<sup>th</sup> November 1998 (Milliyet, 25 January 2000). The other mediation effort came from Sheikh Osman and Ethem Barzani, the leaders of the Kurdistan Islamic movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan and the Iraqi Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah party, respectively (Cakir, 2007). On the other hand, the THB completed its mission by killing more than 1500 people who were conservative Kurdish religious class members and operators of Kurdish religious charitable foundations. After the abduction of a small Kurdish Nurcu-Group and a friend who belonged to the Zehra foundation, the THB tried to eliminate not only radical Kurdish Islamists but also moderate Islamist groups. The THB also murdered 200 prominent Kurdish businessmen as a result of their policy. They also killed 22 leading Kurdish religious clerics who taught the strict orthodox Shafi jurisprudence in Kurdish and




Arabic in Kurdish madrasa (seminary education). The widespread madrasa education is seen as the main artery of Kurdish national identity in the region (Kara, 1996 and Bulac ,2005). After the Baktashi Sufi order closed, the arrival of Sufi Naqshbandi and Qadiriya orders to enforce Islamic identity resulted in the creation of a strong clergy class of sayyeds, meles and Sheikhs (Zinar, 1988). Due to the PKK and THB operations, these religious classes' power weakened in the region and the society is now open to the discourse of secular Kurdish nationalism.

#### **6.3.4.0 The crackdown on Turkish Hezbollah**

The THB received public attention for the first time when the grenade attack on the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople occurred in April 1997. Since 1993, the state security forces continued their sophisticated operations after the key hit man, Abdurrahman Tunc, surrendered and asked for protection from the head of the Diyarbakir Police, Gaffar Ozkan. Tunc provided a large amount of intelligence information on the THB military's and other groups' logistics. Until 1999, the security forces conducted 500 operations against the THB. The most significant were the Beykoz operations which purged the THB in 1999. The Turkish security forces also continued other operations in various cities in Turkey such as Diyarbakir, Mardin, and Batman. During intensive raids, they seized 20,000.000 pages of secret files by Hezbollah in March 1999 (Aras and Bagcik, 2002). The police also discovered 20,000 members' personal data information on a computer disc in an operation in June 1999. After the summit of police and gendarme forces for joint operations against the THB on 20th December 1999, the security forces tracked one of the absent businessmen's credit cards to a small house in the Beykoz district. As a result of a five-hour police raid, the leader of the Hezbollah, Huseyin Velioglu, was killed and key lieutenants of organisation, Edib Gumus and Cemal Tutar, were captured on 17th January 2000. The Beykoz cell was a treasury of documentary, computer, video and forensic evidence. Tortured and mutilated bodies of Hezbollah victims were taken out of the basement as well as identification cards, photographs and videotapes of their torturous interrogations and lastly 60,000,000 pages of secret Hezbollah documents were found at the cell (Cakir, 2007). The confessions of two THB lieutenants provided other locations all around the country. Police uncovered dozens of corpses of missing Kurds and Islamists and evidence of the interrogations of THB victims in several houses.

THB Mediterranean regional director, Mehmet Emin Ekici, was captured and provided information on the location of other bodies across Turkey. The military leader of the organisation, Mahmut Demir, was also arrested in Ankara.

**Figure 6.1: The incident Hezbollah involved (1), The number of Arrested THB members (2), Turkish Police Forces Operation against THB (3)**



Sources: compiled by author

The director of counter-terrorism operations, Suleyman Ekizer, reported that from January 1992 to November 2001 security forces conducted 3801 operations which resulted in 1691 incidents and 1450 terrorist deaths. On the other hand, security forces lost 251 personnel but arrested 4000 Hezbollah militants, solving 400 unresolved political murders in all around Turkey. As explained above, the figures above indicate the main statistics in this regard.

**6.3.4.1 The assassination of Police Chief, Gaffar Ozkan and JITEM leader, Cem Ersever**

The governor of OHAL (state of emergency), Gokhan Aydemir, received a report from Gaffar Ozkan including 20,000 biographies of Hezbollah members and sympathisers and their logistics connections. Aydemir established a Special Intelligence Assessment Unit to control the activities of 9 radical Islamist groups and 93 left-wing terror organisations in the country (Hurriyet, 13 October 2002). The assassination of the chief of the Diyarbakir police, Gaffar Ozkan and five security officers created an enormous storm which demonstrated that the THB was not

completely finished with Beykoz operations. This assassination also brought the suspicion of state supported terrorism and implied other external connections to the THB. The commander of the Turkish Air Force, Faruk Comert, admitted that the state had used the THB against PKK, as counter-terrorism. These political murders have a likely connection with the three top security officers' killings: the land forces commander, Esref Bitlis and Cem Ersever, a high level intelligence officer. The case of Cem Ersever is mentioned in the Susurluk report (Mete and Kaynak, 2005). His solicitor, Emir Emin, pointed out that the relations between Ersever and Velioglu were clear in his statement. The death of Cem Ersever after his interview at the Aydinlik newspaper showed signs of state counter-revolution strategies. His body was found in Elmadag in Ankara by local security forces. The deaths of Esref Bitlis and Gaffar Ozkan have the same connection with Ersever and other state undercover organisations but still remain unsolved.

#### **6.3.4.2 Vali Sarman affairs**

The governor of the Batman province, Salih Sarman, had imported \$2.8 million worth of weapons into Turkey, which brought accusations regarding the the absence of arms equipment to transfer to the THB (Radical, 11 February 2000). In addition to the THB, Batman governor Sarman recruited Kurds and established the Batman Joint Special Armed Forces (Batman Karma Ozel Harekat Birligi) against the PKK. Due to the missing arms' case and illegitimate affairs, he was jailed and later published his memories that explained how to operate such a state policy, though Chief of Staff, Dogan Gures, said that he did not know the governor of the Batman province (Sarman, 2007). However, State Minister, Eyup Asik, accepted that Hezbollah had existed for more than ten years, and was aimed at destroying the PKK. He also admitted that Hezbollah had made a great deal with security officers against the PKK (Aras and Bagcik, 2002). As a result, the Turkish state gained control and cleaned the province from THB and PKK militias through this undercover operation.

#### **6.3.4.3 Suicide attacks by the THB**

For the first time another terror method, revealed as a threat for the national security of Turkey, was connected with the THB. PKK/ CONGRA- GEL did not use this tactic before the THB. Between 30 June and 15 July 1999, fifteen suicide attacks occurred

and caused numerous casualties, including those of women and children. Dogu Ergil pointed out that it was the first time terrorists had attacked children and women in a suicide attack in Turkey (Ergil, 2001). However, suicide attacks by terrorist groups in Turkey have not continued at present and have not attracted any public attention to the region.

#### **6.3.5 Al-Qaeda connection**

After 9/11, the THB was considered as the perpetrator of attacks with four bombs, which killed over 60, and wounded 700 people. The targets were a well-known British Bank, HSBC, the British consulate and a synagogue on 15<sup>th</sup> November 2003 (Pryce-Jones, 2003). While the THB maintained their status quo as a local terror group, chosen targets related to the West were symbolic and captured the attention of international journalists and terror experts (Boycott and Smith, et al 2003). Operations to investigate al-Qaeda connections in Turkey continue. After the Gaffar Okkan incident, a brouhaha was raised and Prime Minister Ecevit and interior minister Tantan considered the international connections of the THB. Whilst Ecevit claims that the order came from Germany, the Interior Minister, Sadettin Tantan considered three sources--Germany, Russia and Iran (Cakir, 2007). The active leader of the THB, Isa Altsoy, lives in Germany and published the THB's first manuscript (Altsoy, 2006). Its activities centre around 20 mosques in different European countries. Its underground activities are continuing in the Kurdish region and city centres. Rusen Cakir says, based on internet sources, that Hezbollah made a public announcement that it does not have any type of organisational, political, or operational relationship or cooperation with al-Qaida. In fact there is no evidence to demonstrate that the THB has any connection with al-Qaida operations in Turkey (Cakir, 2007).

#### **6.3.6 The question of the Iranian connection**

As the usual suspect, Turkish security officers accused Iran of providing military training to 92 Hezbollah members who had been arrested by Turkish security forces in the 1990s (Kislali, 1996). Former president Evren proclaimed that Hezbollah has been active since the 1980s and their connection with Iran is not disputable because Iran has always been an enemy of Turkey from the time of Selim the Grim (Hurriyet 24

January 2000). As mentioned in Chapter Two, this statement is a great example in support of the argument on the paradigm shift and approach to foreign policy-making in bilateral relations. The other accusation of the emergency governor in South-eastern Anatolia, Aydemir, was that Iran provided guerrilla warfare training to the THB and operated espionage activities inside Turkey—as the THB platform matched Iran’s goals, their operations, tactics and methods resembling those used by Iran. Additionally, the chief of police in Ankara, Kemal Iskender, said that all Hezbollah leaders receive military trainings from the revolutionary guards. He also stated that “Iran’s secret service is (deeply involved in) this work” (TDNs, 9 May 2001). Additionally, due to suspicious connections to Iran with the THB, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, and the Interior Minister, Sadettin Tanttan, accompanied by General Ali Aksiz, head of the intelligence department of the Gendarme, and Muzaffer Erkan, head of the intelligence department of Turkey’s security directorate visited Tehran and Tabriz on 9<sup>th</sup> May 2001. However, the Iranian officers rejected the accusations. Though Rusen Cakir offered some personnel-based evidence about the THB and Iranian officers in his recent article, there is no concrete evidence for an Iranian connection with THB. The leader of the FP (Felicity Party), Recai Kutan, gave a speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly stating that “the creation of the Hezbollah is similar to the state’s cooperation with organized crime and international terrorists such as the Susurluk event. Why did those who regulate the democratic balance run their tanks through Sinjan instead of sending them against the Hezbollah?” (Atakli and Tamer, 2000 and Ulsever, 2000). This last connection between the THB and Iran was revealed in the Turkish press. A journalist, Tuncay Ozkan, elaborated on the story of the THB leaders, Abdullah Velioglu and Isa Altsoy. Both of them used Iranian passports to travel to Germany (Ozkan, 2001). Hurriyet newspaper wrote that the leader of the THB, Isa Altsoy, was captured in Germany but this was still not confirmed by German authorities (Hurriyet, 7 November 2007).

#### **6.3.6.1 Turkish soldiers’ affairs**

After Khatami’s seizure of power in Iran, diplomatic relations and bilateral visits between the sides increased in the 2000s. For instance, since the Islamic Revolution, the first visit by the president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Hikmet Cetin, occurred in Iran on 3<sup>rd</sup> August 1999. On the other hand, Kemal Kharrazi’s second

visit to Turkey coincided with the arrest by Iranian troops of Turkish soldiers on Iranian territory. Iran accused Turkey of bombing Iranian villages. However, the crisis was solved after a meeting of Iranian Ambassador Lavasimi with the Turkish foreign ministry's undersecretary, Turkel Kurttekin. During the same day, Lavasimi had joined the second meeting with the Chief of Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu to resolve the arrested Turkish soldiers' problems (Anadolu Ajansi, 3 August 1999). This event provided Iran with a counter-balance to Turkey's pressure and accusations during the Ugur Mumcu Hope operations.

#### **6.3.6.2 Ugur Mumcu Hope Operation**

The Operation for Ugur Mumcu Hope coincided with Kemal Kharrazi's third visit on 17<sup>th</sup> January 2000, which caused damage to the improving relations between the two neighbours. Due to the brutal violence of the THB, Turkish society became very sensitive to Islamist and Iranian connections in political murders (Hurriyet, 20 January 2000). As the usual suspect, the Turkish policy-makers and media directly accused Iran, claiming it had a connection with the Selamcilar terror group, who were under investigation for the unsolved murders of 17 well-known secular elite representatives. Yusuf Karakus, Hasan Kilic and Arig Tari were arrested as prime suspects. According to police reports, their testimony supported the Turkish allegations - they admitted they received military training and financial support from agents of Iranian intelligence in the Jerusalem Warriors Organization (Qod's Force), attached to the Revolutionary Guards (Belgenet, 1997). In a press conference on 17<sup>th</sup> May 2000, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit stated that "Iran had been providing shelter to separatist terrorists for years and is still trying to export its revolution. Supporting the separatist terrorism in Turkey could be seen as interference in our domestic affairs. Unfortunately, certain separatist terrorists and fundamentalist organizations in Turkey have, in different ways, benefited from Iranian support and have been exploited by Iran in its policy of exporting its revolution." However, the Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, who advocated a moderate and pragmatist policy (as cited in Olson, 2004) stated that "this kind of approach and attitude against our neighbours damages our relations. We have realized the distinction between the former government and the new reformist Khatemi government" (p.61.). On one hand, in early June 2000 the Turkish media announced that the head of security forces for Rafsanjani, Ahmed

Behbahani, was the coordinator of terrorist activities by Iran inside and outside the country and had turned himself over to the MIT (National Intelligence Agency of Turkey), (Milliyet June 5, 2000). The statements were attributed to Behbahani, who was revealed by the MIT and CIA to as an impostor. Nevertheless, the mainstream Turkish media went on accusing Iran of conducting covert activities in Turkey (Milliyet, 7 June 2000). However, in contrast to his previous accusations, Prime Minister Ecevit used a softer tone in relation to Iranian affairs. He said that “we need [primarily] to prove that Iranian extremists or agents contributed to the assassination of prominent Turks.” However, Foreign Minister of Iran Kemal Kharrazi criticised the statement by the Turkish Prime Minister at a July 2000 demonstration in Tehran. He said that is unacceptable to accept the interference in Iran’s internal affairs. The Iranian media also pointed out that the growing Islamic trend in Turkey was of no use to the Islamic revolution regime in Iran. Robert Olson considered other negative dynamics of Turkey-Iran relations. He claims that Turkey cited accusations regarding a Jewish spy and a bombing raid to pressure Iran into severing its relationship with the PKK and the THB, which were considered Turkey’s internal and external threats. Iran was satisfied that the Turkish state created the THB for its own counter-terrorism purposes, to weaken the PKK and Iran’s political influence in northern Iraq (Olson, 2004:61). The allegations by both sides increased dramatically because of the Turkish bombing raid on Iranian territory, THB operations, and Ecevit’s remark supporting the July reformist demonstrations against the Iranian regime in Tehran in 2000. However, these disputes did not result in a diplomats’ expulsion, as in 1989 and 1997. Both sides are now familiar with how to manage conflict resolution (Olson, 2004:60). On the other hand, the ongoing operation by Ergenekon would explain the unresolved political murders in Turkey. The European Stability Initiative briefing in April 2008 elaborated on the conspiracy theories regarding Turkey cases and criticised the future of Turkish democracy. There is no inclusion of an Iranian connection in this analysis (Alpay, 2008).

The process is an important step for the secularisation of the Kurdish region, to control growing Islamization and Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish Intelligence service could find out the foreign connections of terrorism in Turkey. However, the legality of the state’s counter terrorism actions and the unsolved murderers are still crucial issues to the public and for Turkey’s human rights record. With regard to

counter-terrorism actions against PKK/ KONGRA-GEL, the THB demolished the power of the PKK after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. Kurdish Madrasas (seminary education) were completely closed and leading scholars were murdered by both the PKK and the THB. Even though some Iranian officers have connections with the THB, which always casts a shadow on relations between the two countries, the situation continues to revolve around suspicions against Iran. It is correct to state that some social motive does exist for Iranian support of the terrorist actions. The emergence of the new THB was clear in Diyarbakir after a 100,000-people demonstration in Diyarbakir in February and April 2006. The new face of the THB is now a soft power approach rather than violence, such as Gulen's activities in the region under the Civil Initiative (Sivil Insiyatif) organisation in various cities throughout Turkey. It is also said that the THB have a weak connection with the AKP government against the PKK insurgency which is still a potential power in Kurdish religious nationalism.

#### **6.4. Conclusion**

The result of this analysis is a moderately optimistic finding that is likely to not only pertain to the dark side of counter-terrorism but also provide operational measurements of the internal threat with regard to the Turkish security forces. This study argues that the predominant goal of re-establishing security cannot be compromise the national security of the state. The dangers of counter-terrorism strategies warrant considering even more costly alternatives in the future in relation to political protests in the region. The study proposes alternatives for dealing with the serious danger of an organised crime campaign of state terrorism within the framework of international law, because the portfolio of state actions and the core of state legitimacy affect public choices in a middle-power state.

The creation of a secular archetype in the Kurdish region would certainly increase popular secular nationalism, which is in competition with secular Turkish nationalism, following the closure of the seminary schools and the measures against the conservative business classes in the region. On the other hand, the ignorance of Iranian policy-makers of the dark side in Turkish politics is evaluated as one of the significant flaws in conflict-resolution in the last 20 years. One can also conclude that



the perception of an internal threat (religion and ideology) is the main impediment to trade between the two neighbours despite the compulsory interdependency relations addressed in Chapter Ten.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN:**

### **THE IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONAL KURDISH NATIONALISM ON TURKO- IRANIAN RELATIONS**

#### **7.1. Introduction**

The roots of Kurdish nationalism arose from the role of notable Kurdish families in the Ottoman Empire and the competing loyalties and shifting boundaries evolving through the identity definition of Kurduyati, “Kurdish nationalism”, in the environment of tribal societies and the new secular Kurdish nobility class in the context of Turkish politics. The creation of the “Ayan” class who were new and smaller political units within the vilayet (province) which was administered only by Muslim nobles, who assumed local authority over Christian millet leaders, played a significant role in the politics realm of the Ottoman Empire (Hourani, and Khoury, et al 2004). Through the lower house (Meclis-i Mebusan) and the upper house (Meclis-i Ayan), locals and Kurdish notables found a new way to participate in Ottoman politics. Hakan Ozoglu argues that the Kurdish Semdinan and Bedirhani families were the leaders of the Kurdish nationalist revolt in the 19<sup>th</sup> century which generated Kurdish nationalism, later characterized as cultural, religious and military forms of rebellion. For instance, the revolts of Bedir Khan Pasha by the Bedirhan family in 1847, and Sheikh Ubeydullah from the Semdinian family in 1880-81 used religious-based nationalism to achieve Kurdish territorial integrity. The role of the Kurds in the military unit, the Hamidiye Regiment (Hamidiye Alaylari), and the intelligence unit, Teshkilat-i Mahsusa (1895-1915) and political participation by the Committee of Union Progress (CUP) created a two-dimensional movement in Kurdish and Turkish nationalism (Ozoglu, 2004). For instance, two of the four founders of the CUP, Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti, were Kurds. Among the participants in the 1902 Young Turk Congress in Paris were Bedir Khan and Hikmet Baban (Ozoglu, 2004) while Said Nursi was the first speaker in the Salonika congress of the CUP (Vahide, 1992). The publication of the first Kurdish newspaper in 1898 and the cultural and political activism of Kurds in Istanbul in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 were cultural manifestations of Kurdish nationalism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Kingship and religious ties existed among the members of the “Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti” or the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK) which was

established in December 1918 and was shut the following year by the CUP due to the rise of Turkish nationalism following their defeat in the Balkan War between 1911 and 1912 (Ozoglu, 2004). Hakan Ozoglu argues (Ozoglu, 2004:85-117) that the increase in Kurdish nationalism was part of the collapsing empire which ended with the re-distribution of the Ottoman part of Kurdistan through the Sevres Treaty, and the Ankara agreement in 1926 (Olson, 1989). The Kurdish people were ultimately divided among Middle Eastern nation states - Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. However, the notable tribal system protected the cultural identity of the Kurds and separated them from their Turkish, Arab and Persian neighbours.

The shifting political space in the nation state system and the new identity definitions are critical in analysing Kurdish nationalism, because the Kurdish notables did not constitute a harmonious group - which Kurduyati fractured by the long-standing disputes of notable families and which was limited by the Islamic concerns of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Therefore, most of the early revolts against the Turkish Republic in 1925 and 1937-38, the Iraqi state (Sheikh Mahmud, 1918-19 and 1922-24), and the Pahlavi monarchy (Smail Agha Simko, 1919-22 and 1926) were led by a tribal and feudal nobility who were accepted as the agents of a new secular establishment in Pahlavi's Iran, Turkey and Iraq. One of the privileges enjoyed by the Turkish Kurd nationalist movement as compared to the others, it is also essential to review in order to understand Kurdish nationalism and to explain the establishment of the nation state system of Turkey under a Turkishness identity. This has been constructed by secular Turks-Kurds' imaginary society project such as that by Ziya Gokalp, a founder of Turkish nationalism. Abdullah Cevdet was another revolutionary modernisers of contemporary Turkey and with a Kurdish background.

Even the first modernist regime, the Kurdish Republic (Mahabat Republic) of 1946, was a compromise between the landed, tribal, and religious elites, on one hand, and the urban middle classes, on the other. The 1961 revolt against the Iraqi state, which Kurdish nationalists consider a "revolution," began as a resistance by the feudal nobility against the land reforms of the state regime, but the Sufi-oriented tribal system of Iraqi Kurds united under the aegis of the Barzan family, and formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the 1970s. The rebellion and its suppression created a direct interaction between Iranian and Iraqi Kurds. The legendary leader Mustafa

Barzani's political activities in Iran and Russia, and lastly his death in the United States in 1979 were the first diplomatic activities of the sub-nation group movement of the 1970s. The Iranian version of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran originated from a similar feudal systemic Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, the formation of Komeley Shorishgeri Zehmetkeshani Kurdistan (Revolutionary Organisation of the Toilers of Kurdistan) standing for "Komala" in the 1970s was one of the radical separations between feudalism and nationalism in Iran; this new organisation, formed by young urban intellectuals inspired by Marxism and Maoism, advocated the elimination of feudalism through radical land reforms and the liberation of urban workers. In Turkey, too, the leadership of the nationalist movement, which re-appeared in the 1960s, was transferred to urban intellectuals, radicalised in the 1970s, and organised in different, mostly ephemeral, organisations, one of which emerged as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK, in Kurdish acronyms). In reaction to the feudal Kurdish notable families' coalition of militant secularism in the nation-state system, the military insurgency campaign of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) started in the 1980s and culminated in the 1990s. This was different from the Sufi-oriented religious Kurdish rebellion of Sheikh Ubaydallah in 1880 (Kilic, 2006), and Sheikh Said in 1925 (Olson, 2000). Therefore, the PKK started its military campaign against Kurdish people to move an imaginary Kurdish society from a tribal to a unitarian society, through a secular model, aiming to have it revolve around a federalist structure with a Kurdish state bound up with Turkey, Iran and Iraq (White, 2000; Chasdi, 2005) defines the PKK as an "ideo-ethno-nationalist charismatic" insurgency group. The military nationalist leadership of the present PKK portrays itself as the main 'revolutionary moderniser' in the Middle East. The PKK targeted the break-up of the secular Kurd-Turk coalition in the nation system and revealed it as an eternal threat for the secular state-establishment in Turkey, because the ruling elites are happy to keep a duality system of society and state glued together by religious tradition. Turkey benefited from the Kurdish feudal system in Iraq by making alliances against PKK in the 1990s, because the PKK movement is not only a threat to Turkey but to all feudal systems in the region. The Marxist/Maoist social engineering project of the PKK was welded this religious and tribal attachment of Kurds to the state. It has resulted in the main crackdown on all manifestations of Kemalist identity. The establishment of a political headquarters in Damascus (1980-1998) and military headquarters in Beqaa Valley (1979-1988) transformed secular Kurdish nationalism

into a transnational movement. However, the PKK had no relations with Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian Kurds until 1990s, though they launched the military insurgency campaign against Turkey in 1984. In general, Kurdish nationalism has been exploited as a pawn on the regional chessboard by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, whose governments have acted as a regional polarity system in the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s. The West became involved in the Kurdish question with the “Operation Provide Comfort” and “Oil for Food” programmes, and the creation of safe havens in Northern Iraq after the Second Gulf War in 1991 and pawned tripartite security commission between Turkey-Iran Syria.

Turkey’s Kemalist identity dilemma, and Iran’s religious national identity enforcement in domestic and foreign policy must include an analysis of the Kurdish problems on the difficult relations between the countries and the European Union/ United States. This requires a reconsideration of the basic tenets of Turkish militarist secularism-nationalism and the Iranian religious political discourse (Taspinar, 2003), because the recent growth of the PKK and PJAK has revitalised the buried body of Turkish nationalism (Ozcan, 2005), and the Islamic regime of Iran in the region. A rapprochement between these two countries was enforced by military co-operation against the PKK-Kongra-Gel and PJAK in the operation at Qandil in 2007. The US-led invasion of Iraq and the development of capitalism have also been significant factors for state-formation in Kurdistan-Iraq.

Kurdish nationalism is the prime political movement which requires the application of Omni-balancing theory by Steven David in analysing the middle-power state, as explained in Chapter One (as cited in Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). The challenge of Kurdish military insurgency against the feudal system of Kurdish society and the secular Kurdish-Turkish coalition is considered to be an internal threat which is still manageable. However, as an external threat, a cross-border unification of Kurds seems to be no longer manageable. Whilst being on the periphery, transnational Kurdish nationalism became the main independent variable in the regional system. Hence, this study is based on the politics of a Kurdish nationalist movement within the broader context of Middle East regional politics. It also focuses on its impact on the Turko-Iranian relationship, with a secondary emphasis on developing Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan-Iraq. I believe that the outline of Robert Olson’s valuable


works made significant contributions to a modern historiography of the Kurdish question, which is helpful in clarifying the impact of Kurdish nationalism on the regional, domestic and international levels of political analysis within the three main phases of the Turko-Iranian case study. These are: from the Iranian Islamic revolution to the Persian Gulf War (1979-1991); the emergence of a Kurdish Autonomous Region (1991-2003); and state formation in Kurdistan-Iraq (2003-2008) (Olson, 2005).

### **7.2.0 The formation of Ethno-Kurdish nationalism: from the revolution to the Persian Gulf War, 1979-1991**

The military campaign by the PKK, and the rise of secular nationalism in Kurdish regional politics overlapped with regional developments such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the military coup d'état in Turkey (1980), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982) and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990). In response to these developments, Kurdish groups (KDP-PUK-PKK-KDPI-Komala) made alliances with regional states and the other irredentist militant sub-groups. The dynamics of Kurdish nationalism can be seen through three levels of analysis: international, regional and domestic. Within this section the study will focus on the domestic and regional foreign policies of Kurdish groups and their impact on Turko-Iranian relations during the Cold War.

Figure 7.1 below explains the internal and external triangle system in the environment of Kurdish nationalism. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iran-Syria axis supported the Kurdish group against the Iraqi government, and Moscow-Tehran and Damascus used the PKK as a regional political card against Turkish interests in the region. There was no cooperation between Turkish Kurds and Iraqi-Kurdish groups in Iraq and the Beqaa Valley, but Iran-Iraq Kurds were very close to each other. While Turkey-Iraq-KDPI relations were very cooperative regarding the Kurdish question until end of the First Gulf War in 1988, US/European Union-Iraqi relations were concerned with cooperation against the Islamic regime of Iran in the aftermath of the Anfal genocide campaign by Saddam Husein regime, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. During this time the Western powers penetrated Kurdish regional politics.

Figure7.1: The dynamics of Kurdish conflict and cooperation (1979-1989)



Sources: complied by author

The domestic political change in Iran and Turkey redesigned the religious and ethnic policies to suppress the recession of the Kurdish entity. Ayatollah Khomeini (1979-1989) used the religious political discourse against the sub-groups ethno-nationalism, but did not refrain from using the military coercion against the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Komala's demanded a "*de facto*" autonomy from Iran and the KDPI leader Dr. Abdul Rahman Qassemlou and the Sunni religious authority; Sheikh Ezzedin Hussein presented an "*eight-point plan*" for the new autonomous status of Kurdistan-Iran (Whitley, 1983). But their demand was refused by Khomeini who declared a holy war against what he called the "*atheist people of Kurdistan*" in August 1979 (Koochi-Kamali, 1992: 171-192). The 18 - month armed conflict resulted in the deaths of ten thousand guerrillas including civilians and five thousand Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) (McDowall, 2004:262). The Kurdish revolt in the first stage of the Islamic Revolution created two main concerns on the Turks-- the spreading of Kurdish nationalism and the sovereignty of Iran. The solidarity between Iranian Kurdish groups (KDPI-Komala), the Iraqi Kurdish groups (KDP and PUK) and the Iranian guerrilla groups (Mujahideen-e Khalq and Fadaian-e Khalq organisation based in Iraq) contributed to a joint response against the new Iranian

regime. The expert on Kurdish affairs, McDowall, argues that five thousand PKK guerrillas fought alongside Iranian Kurds. But this is disputable ( McDowell, 1992), because there are few political connections between Iranian and Turkish Kurds — at least they did not exist until the establishment of PJAK. Turkey feared that a power vacuum in Iran would increase Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, the Turkish General Chief of Staff, Kenan Evren, visited Baghdad to coordinate the two countries' response to the Kurdish rebellion in Iran (Taspinar, 2005), but Colonel Sayyad Shirazi's series of highly intensive attacks against the KDPI forces resulted in withdrawal by the Kurdish guerrilla forces from the cities of Mahabad, Sanandaj and Kamyaran to Iraqi territory (Entessar, 1992:130). As a result of the Iranian achievements during the Kurdish revolt, Turkey reduced the number of troops in the Turkish-Iranian border. The Turkish military government (1980-1983) pacified the Kurdish and leftist organisations inside Turkey to consolidate Iraqi and Turkish security concerns in 1982. The military government's counter revolutionary programme against Iran's revolutionary - export policies and the rising fundamentalist movements emanating from Islamic countries led to squashing of the Islamist/Turkish nationalists groups, and a military strengthening of the state capacity in the 1980s. In the period 1981-1982, 80 thousand Kurds were reportedly arrested in Turkey and two thousand more were detained in custody 1983 (Entessar, 1992).

With the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian Kurds became marginal instruments of the Iraqi government and five thousand KDPI guerrillas were sheltered in the military camps in Bahirka, Bekhma, and Pisdar and the cities of Suleymaniye, Erbil, Harir, Koysancak and Baghdad. They also opened a political bureau in Kirkuk while Iraqi the government suppressed its own Kurds during the war (Entessar, 1992). Meanwhile, cooperation between Hafiz Esad and the Iraqi Kurdish groups strengthened the power of Mesut Barzani, who recovered his father's former territory in Kurdistan-Iraq (Brifkani, 2000) while his opposite, the Kurdish leader Jelal Talabani's political power was rising in northern Iraq. As the result of the Syrian-Iran alliance against Saddam's forces, the logistic support of Iraqi-Turkish Kurds are either critical or not in Turko-Iranian relations during the Second Cold War period. Therefore, the politics of Turkey diversified under the leadership of Turgut Ozal (1983-1991-3), who reconstructed the internal and external politics of Turkey, to the benefit of "*Black Turks*" (Islamists and Kurds) ( Ataman,2002). Though the Kemalist



elites (white Turks) had questioned the direction of Ozal's liberal policies, who outlawed laws 163 and 141-142 promoting Turkish Islamic synthesis, religious and ethnic rights, there were those who still considered the main threat to the secular state to be Ozal's attempts to provide religious and ethnic language rights (Bolugiray, 1992).

The origins of the PKK and its foreign policy with regard to regional states and the other separatist groups go back to the class struggle between the elite notable Kurdish families and the secular Kurdish movement in modern Turkey. In fact, there has been no discussion about the origins of Komala, the KDPI, the KDP, and the PUK but the politics of PKK and PJAK are disputable. Pro-nationalist scholar, Umit Ozdag, claims that the PKK is the project of an Iranian-Syrian alliance in the 1980s (Ozdag, 2003). However, the amateur, left-wing journalist Ugur Mumcu believes that the PKK is the child of the "deep state" parvenu groups linked with a sub-NATO organisation (Vakit, 6 January 2007) such as the Turkish organisation Ergenekon (Duzel, 2003). In fact Kurdish nationalism has its origins in the nation state system and the ethnic discrimination by regional countries trying to undermine society's structure.

Günter and Olson claim that the PKK achieved a sustainable connection with the Syrian President, Hafiz Assad, interconnection with Armenia, and used including through the Nagorno-Karabakh situation to strengthen its relations with Iran, Greece and Greek Cyprus. These connections include financial aid, military training and weapon smuggling (Kurubas, 2004:95-185). Gunter has pointed out (as cited in Barkey, 1996:33) the critical relationship between the PKK and the sub-national terrorist groups such as "*Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)*" (Barkey, 1996:33). For instance, the military cooperation agreement between PKK with ASALA in Lebanon was signed on 6<sup>th</sup> April, 1980, against Turkey (Ozoglu, 2006). The PKK also received guerrilla training from George Habbash of the *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine* and Naif Hawatmeh of the *Democratic Front*. It is reported that Ahmet Cibril trained the 300 PKK members for guerrilla warfare in 1981-1982 (Ozdag, 2007).

The outbreak of the Iran-Iran war which continued for 8 years played an effective role in the development of Kurdish nationalism and had a negative impact on Turko-Iranian relations. The war created a power vacuum in northern Iraq to be exploited by

PKK militants, while the Israeli invasion of Lebanon removed the sub-nationalist groups from the Beqaa Valley (PKK, Hezbollah, and PLO) in 1982, forcing the relocation of PKK militants towards Northern Iraq in which the absence of power provided an operational setting for their forces, these were deployed in three modes: defence, balance of forces, and attacks into Turkish territory from northern Iraq (Chaliand, 1994:48). Therefore, prior to the PKK-KDP accord in July 1983 (www.krg.org), Turkey attacked the PKK and KDP camps in northern Iraq with seven to eight thousand troops, penetrating up to 25 miles into Iraqi territory and capturing several hundred PKK members in May 1983 (Ozdog, 2007). Iran preferred to remain silent during this first Turkish incursion into northern Iraq, but combined Iraqi-Turkish attacks on Kurdish villages forced Barzani's KDP to make alliance with Iran to counteract this new threat. This allowed Iran to recapture Hajj Omran in Iraq in July 1983 (Entessar, 1992:132). However, the Iranian Kurds were able to take such advantage of Iraq's surprise attack on Iran less than a year later that they created a security zone in a substantial part of Iranian Kurdistan in 1983. However, Iran not only regained territories captured by Iraq but also virtually pushed the KDPI out of Iran, except for Hawraman, in which the KDPI was reduced to desultory guerrilla warfare. On the other hand the developments in northern Iraq concerned Turkey, especially the negotiations between Saddam and Talabani for the new autonomy law, publicly revealed in November 1983. However, this co-operation was terminated on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1984 (Entessar, 1992:132). Therefore, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal sent his foreign minister Vahit Halefoglu the Baghdad to solve the Kurdish issues in northern Iraq. The '*hard talk*' between Iraqi and Turkish governments resulted in the signing of the "*Turkish Iraqi Border and Security agreement*" on 18<sup>th</sup> October 1984. The agreement was the continuation of the 1928 border agreement, Sadabat Pact, Baghdad Pact and the 1981 border agreement. Turkey was "*hot pursuit*" rights which allowed Turkish troops to hold back the terrorist guerrillas of PKK, PUK and KDP to 30 km of Iraqi territory. However, Turkish-Iraqi cooperation was criticised by the Iran-Syrian axis due to the alliance of Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Turkey's similar request from Tehran was refused, but Iran preferred to make a security agreement requiring each country to prohibit any activity on its territory against the other's security (Olson, 1996). The agreement was signed by Ali Tanriyar, and second chief of staff, Necdet Ozturun on 28 November 1984. On the other hand, the cooperation between Barzani and Ocalan increased the PKK's capacity to infiltrate

Turkish territory directly from Syria and through Iraqi Kurdistan. Therefore, the PKK embarked on its *armed propaganda* (Gunter, 1990:71) strikes on the Eruh-Semdinli districts on 15 August 1984. The appendages of the PKK enhanced its propaganda activities in Turkey (Ozcan, 1999:42) and the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK) and the Metropolitan Revenge Brigade increased the *hit and run operations* into Turkish territory (Ozdag, 2007).

The KDP-Iran alliance's attacks on Iraq and PUK forces concerned Turkey in the integration of Iraqi Kurdish land such as the seizure of Kirkuk and its oilfields. Turkey openly threatened Iran in the critical war period by accusing Tehran of aiding anti-Iraq Kurdish groups in Iraq. Turkey reminded Iran of its historical claims on Kirkuk and Mosul, but the crisis was ultimately resolved by the Iranian foreign minister visit to Ankara in October 1986. The foreign minister of Turkey, Halefoglu, ensured that Turkey would stay neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, but wanted the Kirkuk-Iskenderun oil pipeline to remain immune from either direct Iranian attacks or those conducted by Iranian-supported Kurds. Even though Iranian foreign ministry officials did not give any assurances, Iran did not attack the pipeline during the course of the war but the issue of security of pipeline remained a point of contention between Tehran and Ankara.

After the Turkish air force bombed a number of Kurdish villages in northern Iraq on the pretext of destroying PKK camps in late 1986, the Iranian government filed a bitter protest with Turkish authorities over the bombings of the Iraqi Kurds. Tehran organised a conference on the cooperation of the Iraqi people in December 1986; the conference brought together the representatives of anti-Saddam elements including Kurds. Although Iranian officials did not directly address the Turkish claims on Mosul and Kirkuk, Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani openly accused Ankara of planning to seize the Kirkuk oilfield by saying that *controlling the oilfields of northern Iraq would means control of the million of Kurds in northern Iraq* (Olson, 2001).

The Kirkuk and Mosul disputes aroused much scholarly discussion on Kirkuk and Mosul dispute. Whilst Graham Fuller (Fuller and Lesser 1993; Entessar, 1992) express the same opinion on Iranian fears that oil is still an important factor for

Turkey's intention, Halliday (1993) and Berkay (1993) claimed that oil was not a prime concern for Turkey's policy in northern Iraq. However, Olson argues that Iran's feared that the extension of Turkey's security borders a few hundred miles to the south and east would encourage Azeri nationalism in Iran increased Turkish influence in Iranian domestic politics (Olson, 2001). However, Turkey had given up the Ottoman territorial claim so as to avoid interference in Iran's internal affairs.

Ankara's main policy was driven by one goal--to eliminate any influence that encourages Turkey's Kurds to seek autonomy or independence, because Turkey's internal Kurdish problem were becoming increasingly tense. The third PKK congress was held in Damascus, Syria from 25-30<sup>th</sup> October 1986. It aimed at destroying the "temporary village guards system" (Tapan, 2007), and its incumbent activities which were relatives who are seen as difficulties for the development of the organisation and looting and setting houses on fire between 1987 and 1988. The PKK called it 'the revolutionary propaganda policy.' As a consequence of the PKK's brutal guerrilla strategy, *kill one, frighten ten thousand*, (Tse-tung, 1967). Turkey had to implement state emergency laws in eight major Kurdish cities in 1987, and improve its relations with the KDP.

While the PKK lost its alliances in northern Iraq, Talabani and Ocalan signed a memorandum of understanding in Damascus on May 1988, which made the PKK a close ally of the Iran-Syrian axis. Similar alliances between the PKK and left-wing organisations such as the Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol) and the Turkish Worker's Peasants Liberation Army (TIKKO) made the PKK a leader of Kurdish forces in Turkey in 1989, because, at that time the PKK directly targeted Kurdish collaborators with the Turkish state to break up the feudal system and to punish agents of the state in the Kurdish region. Hence, the Turkish military launched the third heaviest series of air attacks over PKK bases and Kurdish villages in northern Iraq in 1987. Due to strategic relations with Kurdish groups, critics in Iran were now more critical than ever, calling the Turkish incursion the *genocide of Kurdish people* (Ataman, 1999). However, the situation became even more severe between Turkey and Iran after Iran formally accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598—a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1988. Regional powers and sub-national actors in the Kurdish political fray changed; Iran acquired more flexible capability to use the Kurdish cards

against Turkey by allowing the opening of an ERNK branch in Iran and handing over the 20 KDPI camps to PKK control in Iranian Kurdistan in 1989 (Gunter, 1997:95)

The consequence of the Iran-Iraq war for Iranian Kurds was more drastic because they held a poor position in Iran and Tehran executed the members of Komala on the ground that communists are, by definition, apostates (Mohaddessin, 1993). But even if Tehran seemed to be more tolerant in its relationship with KDPI, the veteran leader Abd-al Rahman Qasimlu was assassinated during secret talks with government representatives from Tehran in Vienna in July 1989 (Report from Kurdistan, April 1, 1988:10-12)

Suha Bolukbasi (1989:95) pointed out that Ankara's attitude towards the Islamic Revolution was very successful in coexisting with Iran, namely maintaining active neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war and taking advantage of the war to expand its economic ties with Iran and Iraq. Turkey's decision to cope with Iran was mainly a deliberate attempt to prevent Tehran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. On the other hand, Iran was very successful in playing the Kurdish card against Turkey's historical claims to weaken its influence in Kirkuk and Mosul and northern Iraq, generally. The Iran-Syrian alliance was also an important barrier against the twin threat of Turkey and Israel (Olson, 2001), but after the ceasefire Kurdish nationalists were deserted again under the Iraqi government. This time, the nation was faced with an intensive ethnic cleansing campaign in Anfal, headed by Ali Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, and nicknamed Chemical Ali, between February 23 and September 1988 (Report from Kurdistan, 8 March 1988:8-11).

#### **7.2.1 The operation of the Anfal genocide campaigns: transition from sub-group action to the sub-nation self-determination**

The Iraqi government conducted eight brutal campaigns in the areas controlled by the KDP and the PUK in the aftermath of a ceasefire with Iran, which allowed the transfer of two thousand troops with air support for use against their own Kurdish citizens (McDowall, 1992:127-8). The Iraqis dropped chemical bombs including mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, in the final Anfal raids in north-east Iraq. According to this report, the Iraqi government killed 180,000 through mass

summary executions and the widespread use of chemical weapons. 2,000 villages razed and the rural economy and infrastructure ruined with 1,754 schools, 270 hospitals, 2,450 mosques, 27 churches destroyed and the deaths of 4,000-5,000 civilians (PHRS, 22 October 1988; FRCR, 21 September 1988). This campaign not only caused the alienation of the Kurdish nation from the Iraqi state and internationalised the Kurdish issue but also created an influx of half a million Kurdish refugees entering into Turkey and Iran in August-September Channel 4, 1989). Turkey accepted 60,000 Iraqi Kurds in August but 17,000 of them were voluntarily transferred to Iran in October 1988. They were settled in tent camps near the cities of Mardin, Diyarbakir, and Mus. Turkey called migrants displaced people *but not refugees*” (Laizer, 1991:112). Turkey’s main concern was that this interaction encourages common identity awareness between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds as well as placing an economic burden on Turkish economic stability. On the other hand, Iran received more than 300,000 Kurdish refugees in that period. Hence, the better estimate is that half a million Kurds were removed from their home to some holding detention camps as a result of this brutal campaign. Even though both Iran and Turkey requested UN financial help, the UN only pressured the Iraqi government to announce a general amnesty for the Kurdish people to encourage their return to Iraq. Some stayed in Turkey and Iran but many of them immigrated to Western countries which made Kurdish nationalism an international question (MRG, 1989). In fact, the Anfal genocide legitimised the sub-group entities’ national identity but the systemic setting did not give the necessary help against the Iraqi government’s ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish nation. For instance, Talabani’s first visit to Washington, demanding an autonomous Kurdish state, did not receive any support from Secretary of State George Shultz in June 1988.

On the other hand, due to turmoil after the Iran-Iraq ceasefire, the Iraqi government cancelled the Turkish “hot pursuit” right to invade northern Iraq and made a secret deal with the PKK to exert pressure on Turkey’s water policies. The Iraqi government announced that Baghdad did not recognise the Syrian - Turkey water protocol which was signed by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and Hafiz Esad in 1987. Turkish-Iraqi relations were uneasy prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut’s visit on 5-7 April 1990 to Baghdad demonstrates that Turkish-Iraqi relations could not solve this unease but only put further strain on their relationship. Therefore, the new reshuffle and regional political change such as the Iran-Syrian

alliance and the rise of a rogue Iraqi regime forced Turkey to improve its relations with Israel. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal accused Syria of being a terrorist-supporting country and threatened to breach the contract of 1987 which guaranteed the Euphrates and Tigris water flow quota in October 1989. However, the Syrian response came from the brother of Hafiz Esad-- Jamal Esad who was the main liaison with the separatist groups in the Beqaa Valley, and who said that the Kurds had to establish their own state in the region, including Turkish territory in November 1989. At this time 5,000 Syrian troops and 1,200 tanks and SAM missiles were located in Lebanon along with three military divisions in the Beqaa Valley. Nevertheless, Turkey reopened its embassy in Tel Aviv in February 1990.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused systemic changes in the region on 2<sup>nd</sup> August 1990. According to the UN Resolution 666 to attack Iraq, Turkey was actively involved in the Gulf War crisis in 1991. Through the Yumurtalik-Kirkuk oil pipeline, Turkey lost 1.5 million barrels of oil per day in imports from the Mediterranean port ( Hurriyet 4 August 1990). Turkish Grand National Assembly' Decision 108 allowed the deployment of US forces on Turkish soil to attack Iraq on 12th August 1990 ( TGNA report, 14 Aug and 7 Sept 1990). Ozal called on the "Poised Hammer" forces to deter any possible Iraqi attack against Turkey--42 aircraft were deployed at the Erhac air bases in December 1990 and 100.000 Turkish troops were mobilised on the Turkish-Iraqi border in September to send troops to the Persian Gulf prior to the any Assembly Decision, but the Turkish assembly later suspended the sending of troops to foreign countries with assembly decision 126 (TGNA report, 17 January 1991). Turkey allowed the deployment of 41 American aircraft to the Incirlik installation; the aircraft launched an attack on Iraqi bases on the same day. However, Iran pursued active neutral politics against Saddam's regime (Oran, 1996:42-3).

On the other hand, the Kurdish group tried to take advantage of the autonomous status in Iraq. Though Talabani made his second trip from Damascus to Washington on 12<sup>th</sup> August 1990 and demanded an increase in the number of coalition troops to 35,000 in northern Iraq, as well as cooperation to topple the Saddam regime on behalf of the US. A meeting was held between Talabani and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Claiborne Pell along with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism John Kerry. However, due to the fear of possible use of Saddam's chemical

weapons, the KDP's leader, Masoud Barzani, aimed to keep Kurdish areas out of the war zone by not opening a second front against the Saddam regime. The Second Gulf War normalised Iran-Syria relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the international community while Iraq was isolated from the international system by being seen as the aggressor in the Iran-Iraq war.

As a result of the Iran-Iraq war, Kurdish nationalist joined allied themselves with the Iran-Syria axis to minimise Turkey's regional influence and to keep Turkey as an active neutral player during the war. However, Saddam's attack on the Kurdish region and the invasion of Kuwait brought Western powers into the region, allowing the Kurds to be independent players in the Middle East. As a result of the Gulf War in 1991, Turkey returned to the Middle East began diplomatic relations with Israel and also formed an alliance of Kurdish groups in Kurdistan-Iraq in 1990s. Iran was not happy about Turkey's active involvement in the territory of Iraq. In addition to their issues competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Kurdish question became the most dynamic issues between Turkey and Iran in the Middle East.


### **7.3. 0.The emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region: From the Persian Gulf War to the US-British led invasion of Iraq (1991-2003)**

The figure 7.2 below highlights the main turning point of the Kurdish issue in the regional politics. At the end of the Cold War, the Kurdish question became a transnational issue, with each Kurdish groups acting as a regional player in northern Iraq. Due to the internal war between the KDP-PUK, Turkey became the main shelter and guarantor of the Kurdish autonomous region. On the other hand, the PKK received logistic and military support from Iran, Syria and Iraq. Together with Barzani's Pashmarga, Turkish armed forces conducted lethal operations against PKK. In opposing the Turkish Armed Forces-Pasmargha coalition, the 'diplomatic dance' of Talabani caused tensions between Turkey and Iran. The international political diplomacy of Kurdistan's independence process subsequently began in Dublin, moved to Ankara, and Washington them through tripartite security commissions between Iran, Syria and Turkey. But no diplomatic results were achieved.



This section focuses on how super - power involvement assisted Kurdish nationalism in the bringing about of a *de facto Kurdish state* accommodated within four main processes: the silent process (1990-4); the Dublin process (1996); the Ankara process; the Tehran process (1997); and the Washington process (1998). Secondly, this study tries to explain how Turkey gained the initiative in regional politics by being an ally of the United States.

**Figure 7.2: The dynamics of the Kurdish Question conflict and cooperation (1991-2003)**



So  
urces: compiled by author

### 7.3.1.0 The silent process: recognition of the Kurdish entity

Super - power involvement in the Kurdish issue began with Operation Desert Shield as it transformed into Operation Desert Storm the elimination process of the Saddam regime in regional politics and the restoration of the al-Sabah family in Kuwait (Doganay, and Fikret 1994:203-298). After the American and UN announcements of a ceasefire on 27<sup>th</sup> February and 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1991, Turkey was positioned at the side of the American- led alliance by giving up anti-revisionist policy model and improving its relations with the KDP and PUK in northern Iraq, (Turan, 1993:126). But the long-

term Kurdish politics of the U.S undermined Turkish influence in the region (Hurriyet 27 March 1995). Therefore, Prime Minister Ozal wanted to oust the Saddam regime, so as to recover the "*National Pact*" by taking over the Kurdish region in Iraq. However, predictions by Ozal did not become reality-- to invade Iraq or become the protector of the Kurdish nation (Torumtay, 1994). In fact, the active politics of Turkey and active neutral politics of Iran eliminated the effects of the rising rogue power, Iraq, in the Middle East. However, the United States' second stage of operations in the Gulf was in conflict with the regional countries' Kurdish politics; George Bush called on the anti-Saddam regime elements (Shia and Kurdish groups) to topple the Saddam regime in February 1991. The majority of the Shia rebels forced the Iraqi troops to move from north to south, creating a power vacuum in northern Iraq which encouraged the Kurdish groups to stage the second largest rebellion against the Iraqi regime (Observer, 31 March 1991:21; Kurdistan Focus, 1 January 1993).

In opposing the Kemalist establishment, President Turgut Ozal launched the controversial "silence process" to take the initiative in Kurdish politics by solving the Kurdish question. In the first stage, President Ozal and Prime Minister Demirel sent their envoys, Cengiz Candar and Ismet Imset, to negotiate with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in the Beqaa Valley. Talabani and KDP secretary Muhsin Dizai want to Turkey as mediators between Ocalan and Turkey and held a talk with foreign ministry and intelligence officials on 8<sup>th</sup> March 1991. President Turgut Ozal had taken the necessary military precaution to expand the liberalisation process by solving the internal Kurdish question. In that scenario, Ozal planned to use the pro-Kurdish Worker's Party of the People (HEP).

However, the situation changed on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1991, when the wrath of the Iraqi army embarked on an effort to eliminate the country's Kurdish population by using helicopters after a UN decision allowed Baghdad to use helicopters and land forces but not aircraft. Iraqi troops recaptured Kirkuk, Dahuk, Erbil, Suleymaniye and Zhao and removed the Kurdish, Suryani and Arabs populations, driving them through the Turkish and Iranian borders (Yinanc and et al 1999; Lichfield, 1991:21; Hardie-Forsythe, 1992:1). However, Turkey closed its south-eastern border knowing that it did not have enough financial resources to provide food, shelter, and health care for the Kurdish refugees. Instead of accepting the refugees, Ankara proposed a plan to

establish a security zone in northern Iraq where the Kurds would be protected- in a “no-fly zone.” It is estimated that half a million Iraqi Kurds crossed into Turkey and 1.5 million Kurds entered through the Iranian border, with some 35,000 becoming permanent refugees who created an international humanitarian crisis in April 1991. Ankara-Tehran-Barzani’s demand for financial and security help from the UN and the EU to avoid the same situation as in 1988, was responded to by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which immediately passed Resolution 688 to carry out humanitarian help on 5<sup>th</sup> April. This coincided with the European Community’s emergency summit in Luxemburg which aimed at endorsing a proposal by British Prime Minister John Major to establish a *safe haven* for the Kurds in northern Iraq (Bulloch and Morris, 1993:27-49; Laurence, 1991:61)

Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and safe haven in northern Iraq (February 1991-18 July 1991) allowed Western powers to take initiatives on the Kurdish question; George Bush firstly extended the no flying zone from Dahuk in the north of the 36<sup>th</sup> parallel, located just south of Irbil, to supply security and financial help in May and 16 April 1991 (Bozarslan, 1993:61). The PKK was not happy to see this Turkish – Western coalition and began to attack their base in early July 1991. Therefore, Turkish security forces launched a massive five - day operation against the PKK bases in northern Iraq on 7 August 1991. Moreover, Ozal wanted to continue his silence policy and take over the foreign initiative after talks with Talabani in June 1991 and January talks in the following year between President Ozal and Talabani-Barzani. This was one of the main milestones in the recognition of a Kurdish entity. Prior to this joint Turkish-Pesmerga operation against the PKK, Gendarme Commander General Esref Bitlis and Security General Necati Dogru signed the *hot pursuit* agreement with Kurdish groups. Ozal’s double - track policy provided the Turkish Special Forces with opportunities in northern Iraq but also the chance to support the Kurdish autonomous regional government. They even considered a possible federal solution for Turkey’s Kurdish question. Ozal aimed to pacify the PKK during the fifth congress, held from on 26-31 December 1990, which overlapped with the Kurdish self - determination *serhildan movement* (public demonstration), in Southeast Anatolia. For instance, the Newrooz demonstrations on 21 March 1992 resulted in 57 deaths, signifying that the new political power of the PKK which organise the public masses against the government ( Feeney , 1992), but their hope for possible political

solutions were facilitated PKK's ceasefire which was extended until the Kurdish New Year celebration in 1993.

Map 7.1 : Iraq: No-fly Zones



The no-fly zone in Iraq arose as part of the cease-fire agreement ending the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Initially it involved only the northern line at the 36th parallel. This was initiated to support humanitarian operations to the Kurds in the north by preventing Iraqi military operations in this area. The southern no-fly zone was created in 1992 and was extended to the thirty-third parallel in 1996. It was intended to protect the Shiite Muslims in the southern areas from Iraqi fighter aircraft. Sources: online at: <http://www.af.mil/art/index.asp?galleryID=177&page=8>

Whilst Iran downplayed Kurdish issues, the stationing of five thousand US, British and French troops, called the Combined Task Forces (18 July 1991-31 December 1996) in the Turkish province of Silopi made Turkey a regional power in the Middle East (Hurriyet, 14 July 1991). However, the presence of Western powers under the media-bestrewed name *Operation Poised Hammer* produced negative reactions in Turkey due to these forces' stationing in Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish foreign ministry had to explain the status quo and the main duties and principles of the task force (Milliyet, 25 July 1991). However the mandate for the allied air force in Incirlik had to be renewed by the Turkish parliament every 6 months--It was 32 times renewed by the assembly. The CTF was disbanded after the Kurds started to receive support from Tehran or Baghdad and this time the Turkish parliament refused to renew the allied mandate. Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan stated that *the CTF is*

*abolished. It is now history for us*” (Hurriyet, 25 December 1996:29). However, the plan was replaced by a similar operation Northern Watch that continued the activities of OPC under a somewhat reduced mandate and without further French participation.

One of the main effects of the foreign forces in the Kurdish region was to encourage the *de facto sovereignty of the Kurdish Autonomous Region* (27 May 1992; 27 May 1994) in Northern Iraq, although the Turkish *Turkoman Front* did not join the election in northern Iraq (Qadir, 1992). Due to Turkey’s fear of a possible PKK filling of the power vacuum in the northern Iraq, President Ozal supported Kurdish parliamentary elections, held on 19 May (Stansfield, 2003; Gunter, 1993). Barzani’s KDP and PUK receive 44.58% and 44.33% of votes in this election. Talabani’s assistant. Fuat Masum, became the first prime minister of the Iraqi Kurdish Front in Erbil on 4<sup>th</sup> July. Barzani emphasised that the Kurdish people had the right to make their own decisions under the Iraqi constitution on 6<sup>th</sup> October 1992. Turkey’s close relations with the Kurds concerned Iran after a joint Turkish Pesmerga operation into northern Iraq on October 4-12 November 1992. Under the guidance of Ozal (Bolugiray, 1993:295-320) the cabinet accepted the adoption of *Terrorist Act* and the suspension of the *Language-Ban-Act* of 1983 and, later, Turkish policy - makers had to recognise the Kurdish reality (Imset, 1995).

On the other hand, Iraqi parliamentary speaker, Sadi Mehdi Salih, visited Ankara to discuss the Kurdish parliament, but the IKF parliament speaker, Cevher Namik, assured him that the Kurdish regional government respected the unity of Iraqi territory and aimed to set up a democratic regional autonomous state for the Kurdish people in northern Iraq (Oran, 2005:116-117). Even though Barzani stated that relations with Turkey were vital for the Kurdish nation, as a sign to the outside world, the Kurdish parliament’s decision on the status quo of Kirkuk undermined Kurdish-Turkish cooperation and also forced Turkey to review relations with Iraq and Iran.

On the other hand, from an Iranian point of view, the post-Cold War Iranian politics on the Kurdish question centred on military options; the General Secretary of the KDPI, Dr Sadiq Sharafkandi, together with a member of the central committee and the representative of the KDPI in Europe Fettah Abduli, and the KDPI representative in Germany, Humayun Ardalan, were murdered by the Iranian intelligence operatives

in Berlin in September 1992. Barzani and Talabani condemned the Iranian covert action against Iranian Kurdish leaders. The leader of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan to Kemal Burkay said that *"The silence in the face of years of ruthless terrorism by the Iranian regime is entirely incomprehensible and encouraging the Iranian regime to continue its assassination."* The new leader of the KDPI, Mustafa Hijri said that the killing of individuals will not or cannot affect the forward march of Kurdish people toward liberation. Hence the common identity feeling of the Kurds in Iran, Iraq and Turkey overlapped with this internal dynamic of Kurdish nationalism in 1990s (Resideyan's personal archive)

#### **7.3.1.1 Low intensity conflict with the PKK**

After Ozal's unfortunate death, the secular establishment returned to an authoritarian track under the coalition governments from 1993 to 2002. The chief of the general staff told President Demirel that Turkey has in a low intensity clash with the PKK, but the regional security setting was related with the post-Cold War reconstruction in the Middle East. Turkey reopened its embassy in Baghdad in 1993 and the Khabur crossing point in August 1994. Though the regional state had to acquiesce to U.S and EU support for an autonomous Kurdish federative state, Tehran and Ankara (along with Syria and Iraq) signed security protocols to avoid the rise of a Kurdish state (1993-1994) in Northern Iraq. The essence of the 1992 security protocol was a decision taken on the basis of the tripartite security agreement-- conferences related to which were held at ministry level and with lower ranking foreign policy officials, every six months. Their goal was to not allow any terrorist organisations, such as the PKK and the Mujahidin Khalq Organization to gain power. The protocol was signed by Ankara--Tehran-Damascus on 30 November 1993 (Olson, 2004). Therefore, the PKK's ceasefire between 17<sup>th</sup> March- 08<sup>th</sup> June 1993, awaiting a possible democratic solution, did not resolve the Kurdish issue, but rather increased military conflict in Turkey. Turkey's policy became more severe against the politicising of Kurdish nationalism, such as in the context of the 57 unsolved murders and the killing of Democratic Labour Party's MP, Mehmet Sincar, which created serious tensions in the Kurdish region in July 1993. The internal politics of the Kurdish question in Turkey were very intensive and failed to deliver a democratic solution. For instance, the DEP was banned on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1994, and 6 MP's fled to Europe and took part in the

foundation of a Kurdish Parliament in Exile at the Hague on 12<sup>th</sup> April 1995. 8 MPs ended up with harsh 15 - year sentences. The other Kurdish party, HADEP, had already been established on 11<sup>th</sup> May 1994, but Turkey managed to secure a ban on the PKK in Germany on 26<sup>th</sup> November 1993.

When Turkish armies combined with an air attack into northern Iraq on 9<sup>th</sup> October 1993 and renewed attacks on 26/30 November and 18<sup>th</sup> December 1993, they managed to suppress the Kurdish rebellions. However, Iran-Turkey relations were strained due to Kurdish issues, but the foreign policy delegations' meetings increased the security communications, to recover both countries' initiative on the Kurdish question. The representative of President Rafsanjani, Gholam Hosseini Bolandjijan, ensured that *Iran would take measures for PKK members to be shot regardless of whether they are wearing PKK uniforms or are smugglers* (Olson, 2005). However, the security relations remained uncertain for both parties. In response to the 1994 Turkish-Iranian security protocols, Iranian president Rafsanjani evaluated the security protocols by saying that *"The regional security is great importance to both countries. We are interested in saving that the security in Turkey. However, this should be based on reciprocity. The activities directed towards Iran by the Iranian rebels operating out of Turkey must be discontinued. In this sense our co-operation will be directed according to, the abandonment of Turkish policies"* (Pope, 1993). Despite suspicion between three - partite parties on the security protocols, Turkey received some positive responses from Iran. For instance, the interior minister Nahit Mentese announced that Iran had turned over to Turkey 28 members of the PKK, 10 of whom were dead. But this cooperation did not mean that the hot pursuit right given to Turkey because of Turkey's demand for bombing the PKK bases located around the areas of Mt. Ararat and Mt. Tendurek (lesser Ararat) near the Iranian border was not officially accepted by Iranian foreign ministry. The visit by the Iranian interior minister, Mohammed Besharati on 13<sup>th</sup> June, only gave guarantees to Turkey to prevent PKK members crossing from northern Iraq to Iran, and from Armenia and thence to Russia. But he did not confirm permission for a bombing raid by Turkey at the press conference but rather stated that Iran would cooperate with Turkey at every level against their common enemies on 16<sup>th</sup> June 1994 (Hurriyet 17 June 1994).

The Turkish interior minister, Mentese, offered assurances that Turkey would not allow any group operating from Turkish territory to harm the Iranian government. Turkey's first presidential level visit to Iran after the Revolution received wide media coverage in both the Iranian and Turkish press on 15-17 July 1994. President Demirel's and Rafsanjani's talk focused on the Kurdish question. Both countries agreed not to allow a Kurdish state to arise. In this vein, a delegation of senior Turkish diplomats visited Tehran with a dossier chock-full of evidence of terrorist activities of PKK. The amendment to section eight of the Anti - Terrorist Act on 25<sup>th</sup> October 1995 could not resolve the Kurdish question. In the aftermath of the civil war between Kurdish groups, Turkey repeatedly made military incursions into northern Iraq involving 35,000 soldiers against PKK positions between 20<sup>th</sup> March and May of the same year. Turkish-Iranian politics relating to Kurdish affairs became contentious in Northern Iraq. Ankara accused Iran of providing logistical support to the PKK to establish more bases in northern Iraq, which legitimised the Turkish military incursions into Northern Iraq in June and gave rise to the possibility bombing Iranian territory, but Turkish policy - makers refrained from such drastic action. These strained relations dominated the first foreign ministry level talks at the 7<sup>th</sup> tripartite meeting in Tehran on 8<sup>th</sup> September. Tehran and Damascus denounced Turkey's spring incursion into Iraq as violating the territorial integrity of Iraq and threatening to fragment the country but the three foreign ministers reaffirmed their decisions: to oppose the division of Iraq, to stand against terrorism, and to impede the stockpiling of weapons in northern Iraq (Olson, 2004). The fluctuating relationship between Turkey and Iran was evident during the visit of the Iranian minister of economic and financial affairs, Mortaza Mohammed Khan, on 7<sup>th</sup> November. President Demirel stated that Western powers aimed to form a Kurdish state by supporting the separatists. He stated that Turkey and Iran should not be competitive with each other and fully agreed with the decision of the seventh talks held in Tehran. During this visit Khan emphasised the importance of improving economic relations. The Turkish foreign secretary Onur Oymen, visited President Rafsanjani's envoy on 1<sup>st</sup> December 1995 and both countries took the initiative on Kurdish nationalism. The civil war (in 1994 and 1996-8) between the Suleymaniye and Erbil governments increased the Turkey-Iran competition in northern Iraq. A double economic embargo by the UN and the Iraqi government increased the dependency of Kurdish groups on tax revenue from the Khabur border crossing between Turkey and the Kurdish region.



Whilst Turkey became an ally of the KDP, which strengthened the economic power of Barzani, by spending tax revenues estimated at \$200.000 to \$ 300.000 KDP's per day, Iran allied with the PUK. In fact Talabani's tax revenue was not as high as Barzani's, from the border crossing with Iran. On the other hand, the Talabani-Iran alliance provided Iran with the military initiative in Northern Iraq in 1995.

### **7.3.2 The Dublin Process: International recognition of the Kurdish entity**

Turkey was not happy about the power vacuum in northern Iraq after the friction of the Kurdish civil war. Turkey used its initiative in the Western coalition as a mediator to end the internal war between Barzani and Talabani. The two Kurdish leaders came together under the guidance of the United Task forces in Silopi/Turkey in June 1994. However, Turkey lost the initiative on the Kurdish issue after the meeting of these two leaders was held under the French authority in Paris in July 1994. The Turkish foreign minister, Mumtaz Soysal, pressured the French government to cancel the second Kurdish initiative meeting in France, which demonstrated that Turkish-EU relations seem to be in conflict on the Kurdish issue (Oran, 2005). Even if there was some consensus on the Turkish and French initiatives, the peace talks could not put an end to the Kurdish civil war; Talabani invaded the KDP-controlled city of Erbil in order to gain advantage in negotiations over revenue- sharing, but Barzani's response was to launch an intensive war against him in December 1994. The Balkanisation of the Kurdish issue transformed Kurdish nationalism to the point that Turkish could not overcome the evolution of the internal threat into an external one. Turkish initiatives were terminated after the failure of the silence process under President Turgut Ozal. Therefore, the United States took the initiative on the Kurdish politics after the civil war peaked in June-July 1995. The US threatened Kurdish leaders with the abolition of the Combined Task Forces and achieved a peace negotiation between the Kurdish groups in Drogheda/Dublin, in which U.S foreign ministry official Robert Dutch, Barzani's representative, Sami Abdurrahman and Iraqi National Congress secretary, Ahmet Celebi joined the conference on 9-11 August 1995. While Turkey was an observer at the talks, Tehran's position was more severe on the Kurdish initiative after the American dual containment policy against Iraq and Iran. Even though Turkey was actively involved in redesigning Iraq and was the main participant in Northern Watch

to disarm the northern Iraq (Hurriyet, 13 August 1995:25), the United States became the main guarantor of Kurdish nationalism. However, the Kurdish “de facto” state had to recognise the authority of Iraq, which coincided with Turkey’s Iraqi politics in the first Dublin conference. However, the Syrian-Iranian axis was not happy to see the Turkey’s initiative involvement with Western powers in regional politics. Therefore, Iran-Syria-Talabani supported the PKK attack on the KDP territory, organised to take control of the Khabur border crossing. The war between KDP-PKK and PUK-KDP continuously breached the peace accords which were signed under Turkish-French and US initiatives. After the failure of the ceasefire in following the second Drogheda meeting on 12-13 September 1995, Turkey’s relations with Iran and later Iraq worsened. Iran launched its regional game by strengthening its relations with Talabani. The conference stated that “*PKK is not a terrorist but sometimes they apply violence activities in the conference.*” The report signified that Turkey-Iran relations were becoming strained in the four-sides meeting of the PUK-Iran–Syria-Ocalan axis on 10<sup>th</sup> September 1995. In the aftermath of the failure of Turkey’s Kurdish policy, Turkish foreign minister, Emre Gonensay announced that “*Talabani and Barzani no longer have valid Turkish passports*” ( Hurriyet, 4 April 1996:1). On the other hand, due to Turkey’s role in the Dublin process, Turkey-Iraq relations deteriorated due to the closure of Iraqi embassies in Ankara and Istanbul on 31<sup>st</sup> October 1995.

### **7.3.3 Tehran and Ankara process: low intensity regional conflict**

Tehran’s attempts at taking the initiatives on the Kurdish issue was a good example of Turko-Iranian competition in Mesopotamia, especially during the five - day peace talks between KDP representative, Sami Abdurrahman and PUK representative, Fuat Masum on 5<sup>th</sup> October 1995. The Iranian commission was in charge of disarming Erbil and solving some other issues. on 11<sup>th</sup> October (Oran, 2005:175-77). The Iran-Kurdish rapprochement not only provided Iranian troops with a place in Northern Iraq as a peace force in November 1995 but also restored the Hezbollah camps in the Beqaa Valley which had been destroyed by the Israeli *Operation Grapes of Wrath*, during the sixteen-day military blitz against Lebanon in 1996 (Kirisci and Winrow 1997). However, the alliance between Iran-Talabani became more significant against foreign forces and the growing influence of Turkey in the region. The deployment of 5,000 Iranian forces which contained Hezbollah and Shia militants in some parts of

northern Iraq also undermined the U.S dual containment policy (Cetinsaya, 2006). The militia had fled to Iraq and were now under the control of Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, who was a member of the Supreme Assembly in the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) (Cetinsaya, 2006). Even though Talabani announced that this joint taskforce would be formed against Saddam, the presence of Iranian forces in northern Iraq was clearly aimed to destroy the Western initiative in the Middle East. The subgroup alliance in Turko-Iranian relations became real in the form of Iran-PUK-PKK and Turkey-KDP in northern Iraq. Ankara's policy against the Iranian presence in Northern Iraq includes its Iraqi policy, in which Turkey launched its historical claims by highlighting Turkoman rights in the region. The leader of the Turkoman Front, Aziz Kadir, provided intelligence information on Shia forces in Iraq. He claimed that the Iranian government paid him a salary to control the Iraqi Shia region. The diplomatic officer of the KDP in Ankara, Safa Dizai, ensured that the KDP had nothing to do with Iranian military deployment but that this was entirely Talabani's decision. He also criticised Iran and Talabani for breaching the authority of Iraqi National Congress (INC). After the PKK launched an attack on the KDP forces and seized some border crossings between Turkey and Iraq in August 1995, the Tehran-PUK-PKK alliance not only threatened Turkey's internal security but also Turkey's EU accession. Meanwhile, PKK guerrillas used Iran and Northern Iraq to travel to European countries.

Thus, Kurdish nationalists were able to establish financial and broadcasting installations in Western countries. On the other hand, after the Islamic government seized power in Turkey, the first time bilateral relations reached a peak but the Kurdish issue remained uncertain during the Erbakan government (28 June 1996-18 June 1997). In hopes for a possible political solution from the new government, the PKK announced another unilateral ceasefire between 15 Dec 1995 and 16 August 1996. On 21st February 1994 the leader of the Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, said that *"the children of this nation for centuries have started their classes with prayer. They came and abolished this prayer. What did they put in its place? I am a Turk, I am right, I am industrious. When you say that, a Muslim who is ethnically a Kurd has the right to say, oh really I am a Kurd, I am more right, and more industrious. After this parliament passes into the hands of believers, all these rights, without spelling blood, will be realized,"* Therefore, the Diyarbakir court ruled that

Erbakan had incited racial hatred and religious enmity in this speech, violating Article 312 of the Turkish Penal code (Hurriyet, 11 March 2000). However, the politics of PKK were not met positively by the Islamist government. Therefore, the PKK changed its military propaganda tactics by using, for the first time, three suicide bombers in the city of Tunceli, Adana, and Sivas in July, but the capture of fourteen Turkish soldiers by PKK members created prominent public attention on Kurdish issues. However, one of the thirty Kurdish MP's of Erbakan's Islamist Party, Fethullah Erbas and the chairman of human rights association, Akin Birdal, convinced the PKK to release eight Turkish soldiers in August and six more in December 1996.

Erbakan's eastern foreign policy aimed to establish a big-four axis of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria to solve Kurdish question. This was rejected by the Western - oriented Turkish foreign policy makers, especially the TAF, who claimed that Turkey should stick to a realist policy and not romantic/religious nationalism. In fact, during Erbakan's visit to Tehran in early August 1996 to February 1997, despite some economic and political success, Kurdish politics in both countries were under mutual suspicion. Whilst Turkey insisted that Iran was giving sanctuary to the PKK and charged Iran with supporting the PKK-KDP cooperation, providing a potential corridor via northern Iraq between Syria and Iran, Iran pointed to the Mojahidin-i Khalq Organisation in defence. After the Rafsanjani-Erbakan talk, Rafsanjani said that Erbakan was talking through the mouthpiece of the Jewish lobby, which was the bankrupt legacy of the Erbakan's romantic Islamist foreign policy (Houston, 2001). In fact, Turkey was not happy to see the expansion of Iranian influence in the northern Iraq ever since 1995, because the Iran-PUK-PKK axis was capable of transferring Russian weapons from the Central Asian arms market to northern Iraq, so that the KDP-Baghdad-Turkish axis's attack on the PUK's territories increased the possibility of a hot confrontation between the two counties on 31<sup>st</sup> August. So both Tehran and Ankara encouraged the Islamist Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) led by Sheikh Othman who resided in Ranya. He attended the wedding ceremony of Ihsan Dag, the Ankara branch director of Erbakan's Welfare Party on 11-12 August 1996. Despite Erbakan's pro-Iranian and pro-Islamist policy, the Kurdish policies of both countries became more intensive between the Erbakan and Rafsanjani governments.

On the other hand, Barzani's invitation to Iraqi troops to eradicate the Iranian presence in northern Iraq on 22<sup>nd</sup> August gave a new initiative to the Iraqi government. Tarik Aziz stated that Iraq had a right to defend the unity of the country from foreign occupation and, as such, the presence of the CTF was illegal and the demanded their withdrawal. The KDP-Baghdad forces attacked Erbil to defeat the Iranian forces from 50 miles inside of the Iraqi border on 31 August 1996. However, the KDP-Baghdad-Ankara axis against Tehran's PUK ally erupted in conflict and surprised U.S policy makers. Therefore, Foreign Minister Warren Christopher's letter to the Turkish foreign minister, Tansu Ciller, demanded that the Iraqi involvement in the Kurdish issue must be stopped. Turkey's position is critical on civil war between Iraqi Kurdish groups and KDP-Baghdad alliance, but Turkey preferred to force Iraq to halts its rogue policy in the fragile region as Ankara would not allow the US to use its bases for sorties into Iraq (Hurriyet, 1 September 1996:16). On the other hand, Iran had to react slowly against this new development in the region; President Rafsanjani emphasised that Iran was able to offer some help to the PUK forces after they fled from the KDP-Baghdad attack. In fact, Talabani's forces received help from Iran and had recovered their former territory by the end of the year.

The regional game between Iran and Turkey led the US to neglect the KDP-Baghdad alliance because the presence of Iran in Northern Iraq challenged the Western coalition, which extended the no-flying-zone in northern Iraq through a Tomahawk missile attack from Jordan to northern Baghdad on 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1996. The United Kingdom security minister, Michael Portillo, announced that the no-flying zone extended from the 32<sup>nd</sup> to the 33<sup>rd</sup> parallels. However, after Clinton's election in the US, the operation was stopped when Clinton said that the operation had been was fulfilled successfully (Hurriyet, 2/4 September 1996:14 /13). In fact, Baghdad's new initiatives resulted in further violation of Turkoman interests in the city of Mosul and Kirkuk, which created tension between Baghdad and Ankara.

The civil war between the Kurdish groups further increased the likelihood of causing a possible war between regional countries. Therefore, Ankara offered a new peaceful solution called the '*Ankara process*', to make progress in the Kurdish question. Barzani came to Ankara to negotiate a new arrangement under the guidance of the

United States on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1996. Under the guidance of the US foreign policy deputy minister, Robert Pelletam, and the official in charge of northern Iraqi affairs on behalf of England, Frank Baker and the observer of the Turkish foreign ministry, Kurdish groups agreed to accept the new arrangement, so as to end the hostilities on 18<sup>th</sup> September 1996. However, Turkey's demand for 'temporary dangerous region settlements' within a 15 mile radius in northern Iraq was not accepted by either the allied forces or the Iraqi government. After the acceptance of this new initiative, Turkey made another military incursion into northern Iraq, which caused to halted the first stage of the Ankara process in May. On the other hand, Iran was strongly opposed to the Ankara process and stated that the aim of negotiations was to create a spying base and a spring board to carry out malicious schemes in the region, such as the creation of another Israel. However, the Turkish foreign ministry and Robert Pelletrau reached the peaceful agreement on Kurdish question on 23 October 1996.

Further peace talks occurred between Syria and Iraq to open the Banyas oil pipeline in December 1996, which had been shut in 1981. The Erbakan government sent its two top ministers to try open the Yumurtalik-Kirkuk oil pipeline in the following month, but both peace talks failed to reach a settlement due to the UN economic embargo against Iraq. Prior to these visits, the PKK also announced its sabotage attack on the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline on 19<sup>th</sup> September 1996. It neither had done this action.

As a consequence of Erbakan's foreign policy, Turkey's relations with its neighbours and Western allies worsened. Erbakan's regional Kurdish politics could not also solve the civil war between Kurdish groups. Therefore, the EU cancelled its foreign aid to Turkey over the protracted human rights issue on the Kurds on 19<sup>th</sup> September 1996 and, similarly, the US stopped its arms deals with the Turkish military. The attitudes of the super - power and the regional powers demonstrated the influence of systemic and regional circumstances on Turkey's internal politics. Therefore, the 28<sup>th</sup> February 1997 National Security Council meeting, named the '28 February Process' was convened and ousted the Erbakan government in June 1997. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was terminated with the closure of Imam-Hatip secondary schools, the closing down of private Quran courses, and the imposition of a dress code in state institutions. A Sanliurfa MP from Erbakan's party, Ibrahim Halil Celik, stated that "... the military has not managed to cope with 3500 PKK members, how would they

manage the 6 million Islamists? If they are against the wind, it will come to their face. I will hit back whoever slaps my face. I am an Islamist to the every end, I want to Sharia law to come” (Akpinar, 2001:168-9). However, his statement could not represent the domestic Islamist policy of Erbakan which did not accept any violent acts against the state establishment. Therefore, Erbakan’s signature to the new National Military and Strategic Concept was not a surprise in the Islamic environment in Iran and Turkey. The 28 February Process followed the new National Military and Strategic Concept throughout April and May and was focused on the possible Kurdish-Islamist axis against the state-establishment. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Turkey charged Iran with interfering in Turkey’s internal affairs with regard to Kavakci, THB, and the events in Sinjan as well as the unresolved political murders. This resulted in a second expulsion of ambassadors since the Revolution. During the 28 February Process, two events dominated Turkey-Iran relations, including the Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq.

The assassination of the KDPI’s EU representative, Sadegh Sharafkandi, party representative to the German branch of Fattah Abdouli, Homayun Ardalan and four other opposition leaders of Iran in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin on 10<sup>th</sup> April harshly damaged the international reputation of Iran. A German court accused the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenie, and President Rafsanjani of planning state terror against the Kurdish national leaders. This caused the termination of diplomatic ties between the EU countries and Iran. The Mykonos verdict also spelled the end of the critical dialogue that the EU countries had with Iran, their opposition to the dual containment policy of US. On the other hand, the event did not create any strain in the relationship between Turkey and Iran but rather restored the February and March crisis. A foreign ministry spokesman, Onur Akbel, explained that Turkey-Iran relations are different from Turkey’s relations with Germany and other EU countries.

During the 1990s, Turkey conducted twenty-nine cross border incursions into Northern Iraq to eliminate the PKK militants but the operation in May comprised fifty or sixty thousands troops equipped with two hundred or three hundred tanks crossing 125 miles Iraqi territory, destroying PKK’s warehouse and caves. Three thousand militants were captured and ten thousand KDP troops. Turkish army’s power against the Islamist government became clear after the general chief of staff, Ismail Hakki

Karadayi announced that he had not even told the Prime Minister about the incursion, to impede a possible leak of the news to the PKK through the government. However, the government dealt with the establishment of the Developing Eight (D-8), and the TAF continuously accused Iran of sponsoring terrorism. For instance, the TAF announced that fourteen PKK militants were captured in the border village of Dambat in Iran but fifty militants managed to cross the border into Iran in August. Ankara's further accusation against Iran for logistic and arm equipment transfers from Russia, Syria, Greece, and Greek Republic resulted in a near-hot confrontation between the two countries after two Turkish helicopters shot down a Russian-made SA-7B land-to-air missile on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1997. Ultimately, Turkey and Iran preferred a diplomatic solution. President Demirel and Rafsanjani had short talks at the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) summit in Ashkhabad. The talks mostly focused on the Israel-Turkish alliance and Iran's interference in Turkey's religious affairs but the deputy foreign minister, Alaaddin Borojerdi, and foreign ministry deputy secretary, Onur Oymen, held five hours of talks to work out a possible solution at the High Security Commission on 9-10 June 1997. On the same day, the governors of Van and Khoy districts had come together at the 14th border security sub-commission. Borojerdi informed them that President Rafsanjani would attend the D-8 meeting on 15-16 June 1997, but many Turkish politicians were very critical about the D-8 project. The first meeting was held in Istanbul, but the leader of the Motherland Party, Mesut Yilmaz, accused the Erbakan government of the murder of 13 Turkish soldiers in a skirmish battle at the Iranian border. On 18 June, he further threatened Iran by saying that if Iran provided missiles to PKK militants, it would certainly cause a war between the two countries on 18<sup>th</sup> June and labelled Iran as the number one enemy for Turkey. After the D-8 meeting, Erbakan left his post and Yilmaz was promoted to form a new coalition government, but his party paid the price by losing the parliament in the 2002 election. As a consequence of the military conflicts between Turkey and the PKK, 20,822 PKK fighters and 4,239 members of the security forces were killed; 9,277 members of security forces were injured; 4,276 civilians were killed; 5,083 civilians were injured; 3,223 schools were shut down in the war zone; and about 3,00 villages were destroyed (Hurriyet 13 August 1997). In addition, the economic losses were estimated at around \$8 -10 bn a year and decreased Turkish influence in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the EU (Olson, 2004: 127).



#### **7.3.4 The consolidation of regional bipolarity: Turkish-Israeli alliance**

After the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights in November 1981, Syria and Iran signed trade and economic protocols in Tehran in March 1982. This was done as a balancing act against Iraq, Israel and Turkey. The intensive conflict between Iranian backed militant groups and Syrian forces in Lebanon after the public emergence of Hezbollah in September 1984 marked a new watershed. Syria's close ties with the Soviet Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council provided an extra push to this axis in the Middle East. Whilst the evacuation of Israel from Sinai in April 1982 signified the implementation of the *Camp David* accord, it still gives Israel a prominent position in the region. An anti-Israeli war effort in the form of a relatively small contingent of some 800-1000 Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) sent to the Beqaa Valley gave the Iran-Syria axis a fundamental foothold against the Iraqi and Israeli revisionist policies.

After the Cold War, Syria and Egypt jointly signed the the Damascus Declaration to isolate Turkey from regional politics in 1991. Syria, offensively, raised the water proposal for the Euphrates River in the *Arab League* and GCC summits in 1994. It also supported the PKK guerrilla operation in the Taurus Mountains and in the city of Hatay which increased the tensions between the Iran-Syria and Turkish-Israel axes in 1995. PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, challenged the TAF by saying that the region would become another Bohtan (Kurdish battlefield; Siirt, Hakkari, Van) (Ozdag, 2007:42), and force Turkey to build up contra-guerrilla forces and a village guard system in the region of Cukurova (Hurriyet 17 September 1995). Olson explained that Ankara was hesitants to use military action against the Syrian-Iranian axis until 1998 became. Turkey did not want to attack a major regional triangle country, Egypt, when it was involved in peace negotiations with Israel because, if Turkey attacked its relations with the entire Arab World could be harshly damaged (Olson, 2004:107). However, the Turkey-Israel alliance emerged as a regional axis against the Syria-Iran alliance after the signing of the secret security agreement on terrorism on 13<sup>th</sup> March 1994 and the Military Training Agreement between deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir and the director-general of the Israeli ministry of defence in February 1996, which further improved Turkish-Israeli ties. However, the Defence Industry Co-operation Agreement on 28<sup>th</sup> August 1996 created a shift in power within the Middle East and in

the domestic politics of Turkey which became evident two weeks after Prime Minister Erbakan's visit to Tehran. The Israeli ambassador, Zvi Elpeleg, visited to Hatay city with intelligence and military officials on 24-25 May and the Prime Minister's internal trip to the same city to celebrate the anniversary of the annexation of Hatay from Syria in April 1997 challenged the Syrian-Iran axis. Yilmaz continuously accused Syria of being a bandit state which sought to divide Turkey. He said that "*Turks are a patient people, but when their patience runs out, their response is harsh*" (Hurriyet, 22 April 1997).

As mentioned earlier, Turkey-Iran diplomatic relations were ended completely after the Sinjan Affair. The chief of Staff, Ismail Hakki Karadayi's visit to Israel aimed to discuss the Russian missile transfer from Iran to Syria on 24<sup>th</sup> February 1997. However, the deputy chief of staff, Cevik Bir's statement ruined Turkish-Iranian relations by saying that *Iran is a state that supported terrorism* in the meeting of the Turkish-American business Council in Washington (TDNs, 25 February 1997). During the visit of the Israeli foreign minister, both Tansu Ciller and David Levy emphasised that Syria and Iran were the "headquarters of terrorism", which threatened Turkey and Israel on 4-5 May. President Benjamin Netanyahu and the Turkish defence minister Turhan Tayan also stressed that Turkey-Israel pacts were directed against terrorist-supporting countries such as Iran and Syria and accused them of stockpiling ballistic missiles. The Iranian-Syrian axis harshly criticised the Turkish-Jewish alliance (Tehran Times, 4 May 1997). The toppling of the Erbakan government coincided with the visit of a five-vessel naval battle group to the Israeli port of Haifa following the Denizkurdu-97 (Sea Wolf-97) exercise. Turkey also improved its relationship with the American Jewish lobby (Anti- Detamation League, ADL) to gain the initiatives against the Armenian lobby in the United States. In December, the Israeli defence minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, was welcomed to Ankara while President Demeirel's ICO summit in Tehran was being criticised by Tehran. Prior to the "Horizon" (Safak) operation in October 1997, the Turkish press reported that Semdin Sakik had moved into Hatay from Syria with forty PKK guerrillas by passing the Amanus mountains, Samandag, Hassa, Iskenderun, Dortyol, Erzin in September (Hurriyet, 27 October 1997). In January 1998 Israel-Turkish-American vessels took part in operation *Reliant Mermaid*, a controversial air-sea rescue manoeuvre in the eastern Mediterranean during which Turkey received criticism from

Syria, Iran and other GCC countries. Iran-Syria offensively called the Ankara-Tel-Aviv alliance “*a satanic alliance*” when Turkey and Israel reached agreement over missile production and other technology cooperation (TDNs, 24 December 1997).

The Turkish military-political solution reached its highest level of achievement after Turkey-KDP forces achieved the capture of a prominent PKK leader, Semdin Sakik, in northern Iraq on 13<sup>th</sup> April 1998. His confession at the Diyarbakir trial also supported Turkey’s charges of state-support linkage by Syria and Iran. Foreign minister Ismail Cem’s visit to Tehran reduced the tension between two countries while the US launched the Washington Process to take the leading role in Kurdish politics. The Turkish National Security Council discussed the possible economic, diplomatic and military attack options on Syria (TDNs, 26 September 1998). The Jordanian delegation at the strategic dialogue meeting which took place in Tel Aviv in June 1998 cemented the Turkish-Jewish alliance against Syria’s initiatives on the Kurdish issue.

Turkey’s further pressure on Syria to expel PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan increased Turkey’s role in the Middle East in October 1998. Land forces commander Atilla Ates revealed Turkey’s undeclared war (September-October 1998) against Syria by saying that they had tried to co-operate with Syria but had not received a positive response. With its patience with terror-supporting states expended, it had to make sure that it was capable of giving the necessary answer to the hostile behaviour of the Syrian government. If Turkey did not receive a positive response, it was stated, it would take necessary actions against its enemies (TDNs 26 September 1998). On the other hand, Syrian deputy prime minister, Abdulhalim Haddam’s visit to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates and Foreign Minister Faruk el- Sara’s visit to Moscow, to gain Russian and Arab support against the Turkish-Israeli alliance, did not receive the necessary support. Even though Iraq and Libya assured them that they would support Syria in this conflict, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iran sought to work out a possible diplomatic solution.

Syria moved troops 30-40 km from the Turkish and Israeli borders in October. President Demirel openly declared Turkey’s demands at the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 1<sup>st</sup> October, saying that if the Syrian government insisted on its hostile

relationship with Turkey, It held the right to take action against that terror-supporter country. On the same day, the chief of staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu clarified that Turkey and Syria were in an “*undeclared war*.” After Turkish troops arrived at the Syrian border on the 5<sup>th</sup> October, all diplomatic relations ended between Turkey and Syria on the 16<sup>th</sup> October. Ultimately, Egypt’s and Iran’s mediation efforts to stop the war between Turkey and Syria were successful. One day before Husni Mubarak’s visit to Damascus and Ankara, Mesut Yilmaz directly accused Syria of being the headquarters of terrorism in the Middle East and called for the Syrian government to hand over the terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan (TDNs, 4 October 1998). Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Musa and Iranian foreign minister Kemal Kharrazi played a very important role in the mediation of the Turkey–Syrian conflict, which resulted in the expulsion of Ocalan from Damascus on 17<sup>th</sup> October 1998 and the Adana agreement which was signed by foreign minister secretary, Ugur Ziyal and the president of security General Adnan Badr Al- Hassan, on October 19-20, 1998. Syria’s acceptance of the PKK as a terrorist organisation forced it to prohibit all activities of other active terror groups or logistic organisations in Syrian-controlled areas. Olson argues that Turkey’s action against Syria relied on the politicising of the Kurdish parliament-in-exile in the European countries. However, the situation in Iraq was still very critical when the United States and Great Britain began a massive air campaign named “*Operation Desert Fox*” against key military targets in Iraq on 16 December 1998.

After 19 years’ shelter in Syria, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan travelled many European states, including Russia, Greece and Italy to find another base. Though some European politicians, including Germans, Italians, British and French, openly visited him, he was arrested in Rome on 12 November 1998. Ocalan requested that Rome grant him political asylum, but neither the Italian government nor any EU countries gave support under the Anti-Terrorism Act. However, the Greek and Russian authorities refrained from arresting Ocalan. Ultimately Ocalan was captured with a Greek Cyprus passport at the Greek embassy in Kenya on 16<sup>th</sup> February 1999. Turkey clearly received US aid in its capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, expelled from Syria in 1998 under the imminent threat of Turkish military action against Syria. However, the attendance of President Ahmet Sezer at the funeral of Hafiz Esad, on 7 June 2000 normalized Turkey-Syrian relations. The new president,

Bashar Esad rejected the demands from the chief leader of the PKK chairmanship council, Cemil Bayik to relocate the PKK camps in Syria. The capturing of the terrorist leader changed the internal political tendencies of Turkey as well. The National Movement Party became the major coalition partner with Bulent Ecevit's DSP and Mesut Yilmaz's MP, but they did not implement capital punishment in Ocalan's case. Furthermore Turkey's initiative in regional politics normalised the relationship between Turkey and Iran; while Turkey announced that Sencar Ozsoy was appointed as its new ambassador to Iran, and Tehran confirmed that Muhammad Hussein Lavasani would be Iran's ambassador to Turkey on March 1999 (TDNs 22 January 1998).

Despite the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the Khatemi and Ecevit governments, a Turkish incursion into northern Iraq in February, and the report of Turkish security forces and PKK militants crossing of the Piranşehir, Sardost and Osmaniye districts signified that Iranian officials had handed over PKK guerrillas who were captured in Kermanshah/ Divanderre to Turkish officers on 10 April 1999 (Balbay, 2006: 230). Turkey made a further incursion into Iranian Salmas-Keleres territory, forcing the militants to move to northern Iraq in June. A Turkish intelligence report claimed that PKK militant camps had been organised in the Sehidan and Dolamper mountains--a strategic location for border crossings between Iran-Iraq and from Turkey by Iran (Balbay, 2006: 230). Though Turkey increased the tension between the two neighbours by bombing the border village of Piranshahr, killing at least five people and injuring tens of others on 18<sup>th</sup> July 1999, Iran downplayed the tension by saying that the incident was a possible mistake. However, five days later, the infiltration of the Turkish Army in Qatour to cut off the transit route from Armenia to Iran was faced with Iranian forces' presence across the border. A statement by Ecevit regarding the summer student revolt in 1999, in which he said that demonstrations were a natural reaction by the Iranian public against an oppressive regime, annoyed the Khatemi government. Turkey further charged Iran with deliveries of logistics, including medical and food supplies to PKK camps in Sardasht-Sazgaz Mountain and Urumiye. This reaffirmed the intense relations between the neighbours on 22 December 1999 (Balbay, 2006). Nevertheless, both

countries successfully managed to defuse tensions by conducting a high-level meeting which resulted in a border security agreement.

Until Erdogan government's seizure of power in 2003, Turkey's counter terror strategy (THB) and the Israel-Turkish alliance strengthened Turkey's charges against Iran and undermined Iran's regional alliance with Syria. While Turkey downplayed the PKK claim that "*we behave a democratic republic within the framework of the unitary state system*", on 26<sup>th</sup> June 1999, Turkey lost its initiative in Kurdish politics by attacking Turkish Kurds in northern Iraq because they had established their camps in the Qandil Mountain's Dola Koge regions. The formation of the Democratic Working Groups (Turkiye Calisma Gruplari) empowered the more educated professional militants to manage the new civil disobedience model against the state. But Turkish security forces captured more than seventy members of the organisation in August 2000. Turkey also secured special sanctions from the EU Council signed in Brussels on 27<sup>th</sup> December 2001 in fighting against terrorism, which included the PKK being listed as a terrorist organization. Therefore, PKK abolished itself on this date and replaced itself with KADEK, the so-called *Kurdistan Democratic and Freedom Congress* but resumed terrorist attacks until 10th April 2002.

### **7.3.5 The Washington process**

After the failure of the silence approach, the Dublin and the Tehran-Ankara processes, Washington directly assumed the initiative on Kurdish nationalism in early 1998. David Welsh, the principal deputy assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs, visited Iraqi Kurdistan on July 1998 and met with Barzani and Talabani, inviting both leaders to Washington DC for talks. The previous Shaqlawa-Koysinjaq meetings culminated with the Washington Agreement of 17th September 1998 which was signed to create a federative Kurdish political entity within a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq by Talabani and Barzani. The relation between the cities of Erbil, Suleymaniye and were Dohuk normalised but the unification of KRG could reach one government system—a goal still due to be completed following the US-led Iraqi invasion (Stansfield, 2003: 5-7).


Prime Minister Ecevit's statement supported the conspiracy theories of the Ugur Mumcu about the origins of PKK by saying that "I could not understand why the United States delivered the terrorist leader Abdullah Ocalan to Turkey (Narli, 2000:107-127). In fact Turkey had to stop the military incursion into northern Iraq. They undermined its influence on regional politics and state formation in Kurdistan-Iraq after the failure of the March resolution of TGNA not to allow the American troops to invade Iraq. Barzani did not join the meeting of Iraqi opposition groups in Washington in August 2002, due to being in an alliance with Turkey, and because Iraqi Kurdish groups had lost 3,000 men when fighting the PKK (Aras, 2004: 168). which was then challenging the Turkish initiatives in the region. He demanded that the Peace Monitoring Forces (PMF) consisting of some 400 troops, comprised mostly of Turkoman and Assyrians but commanded by Turkish officers, should be removed from Kurdish regional government territory as it created friction between former state-to-government alliances. The force was established to secure a ceasefire between the two Kurdish groups after the Washington Accord in 1998. However, the state-formation in Kurdistan-Iraq was the result of the Washington process, in which the United States took an initiative on the Kurdish Question. Turkey maintained its influence in northern Iraq until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Bahadir, 2007). The onset of Khatemi's "*thermidor politics*" improved Turkish-Iran relations but resulted in the nuclear-proliferation attempts by Iran (Wells, 1999).

The regional and systemic development provided ample space for Kurdish independence in northern Iraq, but it became vulnerable to external penetration in the 1990s. Turkey's and Iran's "*double-track*" policy and security meetings every 6 months failed to ensure cooperation against foreign influence and Kurdish nationalist ambition. On the other hand, the emergence of the Kurdish regional authority in northern Iraq brought about a civil war between the Kurdish groups, which gave an opportunity for involvement to Turkey, and its Western allies, in Kurdish politics. Turkey benefited from being part of the Western security system; along with the coalition of TAF-Pasmargha forces, the Sandwich Operation resulted in fatal damage to the PKK militants in northern Iraq. The proxy alliance relationship with Kurdish groups delivered practical results for the TAF. In this regard, Turkey placed 2,000 peace troops in four different locations in Northern Iraq, to take control of peace and a possible civil war between the KDP and the PUK. When the internal war broke out

between the Kurdish groups, 3,000 people were died, 30,000 were injured and 100,000 were driven to remove from their lands (Ihsan, 2001:90).

After the Turkey-Syrian 1997 crisis on the Kurdish question between the two neighbours and following the capture of the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the Turkey- Israeli alliance diminished the power of the Syrian-Iran axis--which was the driving force for Kurdish nationalism in regional politics between Turkey and Iran after the Cold War. Neither the Tehran not Ankara process brought any diplomatic results for either in the mid-1990s. However, the parties realised that Kurdish nationalism could not be controlled because the liberal rhetoric of Western countries did not sympathizes with Turkey's and Iran's military solution and ethnic assimilation after the Washington process, because the Kurdish diasporas in Europe and the United States have provided the financial support and political support for the military Kurdish movement into northern Iraq.

**Integrated Map: 7.1.Kurdish Autonomous Region as of early 2003**



Sources: Global Security org, "Kurdish autonomous region as of early 2003" online at: [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/kurdistan\\_control-map2003.gif](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/images/kurdistan_control-map2003.gif)




#### **7.4. 0. State formation in Kurdistan-Iraq: from occupation to withdrawal (2003-2007)**

Since the American-led invasion of Iraq, Turko - Iranian relations have faced three types of paradoxes: how to deal with the state-to-state situation (Iraq-US-UK), state-to-government (KRG) relationships; and how to manage regional cooperative and competitive relationships between each other after Iraq became a war zone between Shia and Sunni; Kurds, Arab and Turkoman: how to provide shelter for al-Qaida and the PKK. However, this study will focus on the impact of state formation in Kurdistan-Iraq in Turko - Iranian relations. The capacity of middle-power -states to act independently offer a prime example such states' capability against a super power in the Middle East. The role of capitalism and super power engagement in regional politics assisted the unification process of the Suleymaniye and Erbil governments. Turkey became a primary economic partner of the KRG and a way to the Kurdish people from the outside world. The emergence of PJAK as a proxy has normalised Turko-Iranian relations since 2004.

Figure 7.3, an outline of the regional and systemic circumstances of the Kurdish Question in the wider context of Middle East region is portrayed. After 9/11 and following the American-led occupation of Iraq, the Turkey-Iran-Syria triangle became more cooperative on the Kurdish question. The failure of the 1 March memorandum in the Turkish parliament in 2003, the policy differences between America, Israel and Turkey became more visible. As a historical fact, the US has not recognised the Lausanne conference so far, especially on the Kurdish issue. Hence, Wilson's principles are essential for American liberal politics on the Kurdish question. He recommended a Kurdish independent state. At the present, the George Bush government sees Iraqi Kurds as an ally against the internal and regional states. Tel Aviv gives military and logistics support for the liberation of Kurdistan and also wants to see a peripheral Kurdish state in the region. This figure 7.3 includes different picture in regional politics and super power penetration into region due to Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, after the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the military and political power of PKK decreased, but co-operation between PKK-KongraGel and PJAK would be the first systematic contact between Turkish and Iranian Kurds for four hundred years. The situation for the Kurdish regional

government seems to be one of multidimensional politics-- for the survival and representation of the Kurdish liberation movement. Up to now, the systemic and regional circumstances did not allow Kurds to establish a “de facto Kurdish state” but rather enforce to integrated federative Kurdish Regional government of Iraq in the Middle East.

Figure: 7.3.The dynamics of the Kurdish question conflict and cooperation (2003-2008)



Sources: compiled by author

**7.4.1.0 The dichotomy of the super -power and middle-power politics of rising of Kurdish nationalism**

The Turkish-American alliance has experienced ups and down during the half century since the Jupiter/Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the arms embargo in 1974. This time, the Turkey-US relations faced a more systematic problem when American forces captured 11 Turkish Special Forces (TSF) troops along with 19 Turkomen in the headquarter of the *Iraqi Turkoman Front* (ITF) in the city of Kirkuk, because the

“bag” affair (cuval olayi) was perceived as very offensive against the Turkish Armed Forces by most of the public. The chief of staff, General Hilmi Ozkok stated that *“This incident has unfortunately created a biggest loss in confidence over fifty years of the alliance relationship”* (The New York Times, 7 July 2003). However, the American Special Forces’ squad commander claimed that Turkish Special Forces were planning to assassinate the newly elected Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk, without any evidence. The Pentagon clearly punished the Turkish armed forces but Washington and Ankara were quick to overcome this unfortunate accident with Turkey’s active participation in the US- led Wider Middle East Initiative (WMEI) and *Wider Middle East and North Africa Initiative* (WMENAE). This was affirmed in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI-Istanbul Isbirligi Grisimi), issued at the conclusion of the summit in 2004 (Olson, 2006). The project mainly aimed to democratise Arab countries and Iran through regime change, but Turkey only expanded its economic relations with the GCC (Olson, 2008), and moved forward with its own democratisation in the accession process of the European Union. With the exclusion of Turkey from Iraqi affairs, Washington made an alliance with the Iraqi Kurds and supported the Kurdish guerrilla fighters, especially the PKK’s sister organisation, PJAK, to undermine Iranian influence in Iraqi politics. The American and Jewish connections also put to question Turkey’s alliance relations with Jerusalem and Washington. The American-Kurdish coalition forces captured Kirkuk and commenced an attack on the Sunni city of Tal Afar—a predominantly Turkoman-Shia city of some 200,000 population, from September 2004. This created tensions between middle-power and super -power states in Iraqi relations. The Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul, accused the coalition forces of harming civilians but the secretary of state, Colin Powell, found this criticism to be unfair and exaggerated. Moreover, Iraqi Turkoman Front representatives, Ahmet Muratli and Faruk Abdurrahman, further claimed that the coalition forces had conducted an ethnic cleansing against the Turkoman population. The Turkish side also accused the mayor of Tal Afar Abb al-Khaliq of a Kurdish bias, as his policies had made systematic demographic changes in the city by bringing in Syrians from Syria (Hurriyet 12 September 2004). A member of the Turkish parliament from the Justice and Development Party, Mehmet Elkatmis, further called this operation a *“genocide campaign by the United States.”* It is obvious that neither Turkey nor Iran was happy to see a super-power neighbour act in the Middle East. The presence of a super power caused an increase in Turkish

nationalism and also caused fluctuations in the nuclear ambitions of the Iranian Islamic regime. The Iranian anger at Washington was due to an onslaught on Fallujah, Najaf, Kufa, Samarra and Ramadi, to promote further involvement by Tehran in the civil war in Iraq (Elkhamri, 2007). Despite the United States' disarmament of the Mujahidin-e Khalq organisation in 2003, and adding PJAK to its global terrorist list along with PKK-Kongra-Gel, Tehran-Washington cooperation was still minimal in Iraq. On the other hand, Ankara and Washington set up a new co-ordination system, which aimed to provide intelligence information between Ankara-Washington-Baghdad-Irbil against sub- PKK groups. Unfortunately, General Joseph Ralston, who had been vice-chancellor of the joint chiefs of staff from 1996 to 2000, and a former NATO commander and General Edib Baser, a land forces commander who retired in 2000, could not achieve any progress against the PKK insurgency campaign in Northern Iraq. Therefore, Washington and Ankara terminated this co-ordination unit in June 2007 (Laciner, 2007). The systemic circumstance of Turkey's alliance relations with the Western security system was tested in Afghanistan and Lebanon, especially over the largest strategic arms deal between the two parties.

On the other hand, Turkey's relationship with its proxy ally, Israel, went sour after the Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh's' statement publicised the issue of Israeli-Kurdish cooperation in northern Iraq (Hersh, 2004). The prominent Islamist journalist, Fehmi Koru claimed that Israel wanted to use northern Iraq as a *spring board* to other places in the Middle East (Yeni Safak, 22 June 2004). Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan condemned the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yasin and Israeli operations in Ranya and the Gaza strip as "*act of state terror*" in May 2004. The Israeli ambassador to Turkey immediately denied all the claims. However, Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul calmed the tension by saying that it was necessary to trust Israel's statements that they were not involved in northern Iraq because Israel and Turkey are the only two democratic countries in the region. Gul also rejected the theory of Henry Barkey, who claims that an independent Kurdish state within Iraq would be beneficial to restoring Turkish-American relations (Barkey, 2004), (TDNs, 2 June 2004). George W. Bush's June visit to Turkey and Olmert's July visit seemed to confirm the view that Washington would not allow Turkey to challenge Israel's geo-strategic value to the US but found Ankara's effort to achieve geopolitical balance in the Middle East to be understandable. Thus, relations between

Syria and Turkey in 2004 and the Turkish mediation effort between Damascus and Tel-Aviv in 2008 further challenged the Tehran-Damascus alliance (Aras, 2008) -- the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Abdullah Gul, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made trips to Damascus on a number of occasions. In response, the Syrian minister, Farouq al-Shara and Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa Miro visited Ankara yet Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's visit in January 2004 had the most significant pacifying effect on relations (Aras, 2008). On one hand, Turkey's invitation of the Hamas leader in Syria, Halid Masal, was another problem for the troubled alliances during the war, but the economic and military ties between Turkey-US and Israel overcame the strained relationship for the Justice and Development Party government. While the US encouraged Turkey's economic relations with Baghdad to rebuild Iraq so as to undermine opposition against the KRG, Iran's economic relations with regional countries were limited due to the sectarian influence of Iran in Iraq. Despite the deterioration in Israeli--Turkey relations, they two countries agreed to the *Industrialised Qualified Zones* (QIZs) plan. The unknown future of Iraqi-Kurdish politics directly affects Turkey's relations with its alliances, Israel and the US and its neighbours, especially Syria and Iran. Hence, the slow talks between Tehran and Washington have to be evaluated as a special regional scenario in which Iran is a significant player on the Iraqi question.

#### **7.4.1.1 Turkey's and Iran's relations with the government of Iraq and the Kurdish regional government**

The short- term American-Iranian quasi-cooperation in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was terminated after George W. Bush's announcement of the metaphor of the "*axis of evil*" in January 2002. The process of state- building in Iraq and Kurdistan-Iraq, the dichotomy of US-Iran and Anglo-Iranian minor talks and dialogue continued in the hidden context of the Iranian religious influence on Iraqi affairs, especially the mediation role of Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Shia leader of the Iraqi Hawza (BBC monitoring, 8 August, 2004). Despite the harsh relationship between Tehran and Washington, they kept discuss resolution of Iraqi security and stability in May and September 2007. However, nuclear ambitions and a possible Pentagon air attack on Iran than discouraged future cooperation. The other Shia leader in Iraq, Muqtada Al-Sadr organised political and military activities against the occupation of the allied

forces in an example of the balance of power in Iraqi politics. Compared to Turkey, Iran is a better able to use these religious and political ties to penetrate the internal affairs of Iraq. British officials claimed that Iran supplied the bombs and arms to the Shia Muslim insurgents in southern Iraq (Kemp, 2005). On the other hand, the new domestic setting resulted in structural changes in the Iraqi state. Hence, with a secular Shia religious background, Iyad Allawi was appointed as prime minister of the *Iraqi Interim Government* by the Iraqi government council on 28<sup>th</sup> March 2004. The process of state-building in Iraq includes the Shia and Kurdish identities but minimises the political influence of Iran and Turkey. The Iraqi interim government also prepared the temporary constitution named the *Transitional Administrative Law* in March 2004. The election on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2005 and the appointment of Jalal Talabani as president of Iraq caused further movement towards Mesut Barzani being sworn in as the new president of the Kurdish regional government in April 2005. The last draft of the Iraqi constitution was voted on 18<sup>th</sup> October 2005. The following month, the Shia-led *United Iraqi Alliance* won the election that resulted in the distribution of power between the Kurds and Shia but excluded the Turkomen and Sunnis in the state. President Jalal Talabani appointed Nouri al-Maliki to form the government on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2006. Since the permanent government was formed in Iraq and Kurdish regional government in Kurdistan-Iraq, the state-to-government relation has been at a weak level between Turkey and Iran. However, Iran managed to maintain its relations at the state-to-state level. Both Iran and Iraq made high level diplomatic visits to each other. For instance, Tehran entertained the Iraqi president in November 2005. However, Turkey's diplomatic interactions were limited to the ambassadorial level even though Turkey received two visits from Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari in May 2005 and February 2006, hosted Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in September 2007, and lastly received Talabani on 10<sup>th</sup> March 2008. The Iraqi Conference of Neighbouring Countries in Istanbul in 2005 and the International Ministerial Conference of the Neighbouring Countries of Iraq at Sharm al-Sheikh in 2007 to stabilise Iraq did not result in a resolution. The slow talks among neighbouring countries at foreign ministry level would have made more progress.

#### **7.4.1.2 The settlement of Ankara-Erbil-Tehran trouble triangle: Turkish presence in northern Iraq**

Turkey pursued active politics on Iraqi- Kurdish issues during the 1990s. With the active engagement of Ankara, the TAF established four permanent military bases in northern Iraq. These military units not only gather intelligence against the PKK, but also keep an eye on Iraqi Kurds should they move for greater autonomy or even independence. Ankara did not consider the Kurdish group as an external threat to national security as long as they are weak and divided in northern Iraq. However, Turkey's influence on Kurdistan-Iraq relations has weakened after the US-brokered peace accord was signed between Iraqi Kurdish groups in 1998. Following the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, United States took control of the Kurdish question prior to invading of the Iraq. With Washington support, the Iraqi Kurdish groups (KDP-PUK) agreed to work in joint session of the Kurdish parliament in Irbil in March 2003. After the fall of the Baghdad government, Kurdish groups did not only take the initiative in Iraqi politics but also consolidated the power of the Kurdish regional government in Kurdistan-Iraq. After the elections, Iraqi-Kurdish alliance parties sent 77 deputies to the interim government of Iraq. The American-Kurdish alliance also resulted in the presidency of Jalal Talabani for the Iraqi states. The election of Mesut Barzani as president of the Kurdish regional Government in Erbil (Hawler) in 2005 increased the power capacity of Kurdish-state formation in the northern Iraq, even though the unification agreement between the PUK and the KDP could not unify the ministries of permerga, finance, and the interior under the Erbil government.

Barzani had his own policies on coordination between Ankara-Washington-Baghdad-Irbil, and aspirations for the Kurdish independent state. Hence he had ordered that the Kurdish tricolour (red, green and yellow) flag replace the current should flag as flown on all government buildings in the Kurd-controlled region. However, Iraq's prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, rejected these nationalist demands against the unity of Iraq in September 2006. On the other hand, the KRG allowed the taking over of responsibility for security in three Kurdish provinces from the US forces in May 2007. Moreover, the Kurdistan regional government signed *production sharing contracts (PSC)* covering petroleum exploration in Kurdistan-Iraq, and creating a dispute

between the two authorities (Pedro van Meurs, 2008). In spite of Turkish involvement with oil companies, such as Pet–Oil and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Turkey’s fears in relation to using oil in the Kurdish state formation in Iraq increased. Hence, Turkey eased its oppressive economic policies against the Kurds of northern Iraq. Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Pet–Oil and Jalal Talabani signed a 40 - year oil contract which is still valid after the invasion of Iraq (TDNs, 16 October 2007). The Turkish and Irbil governments arranged flights (Fly Air) from Istanbul to Irbil and to Sulaimaniye in Kurdistan-Iraq to increase business and cultural interaction. The Irbil government also allowed Turkish citizens to have without any visa restrictions to northern Iraq. The economic relationship with Turkey and the KRG was proclaimed by the Irbil chamber of commerce of the 440 overseas firms registered there, 321 were Turkish, with the second largest group being German with 45. It is thought that approximate 600 Turkish firms have business in northern Iraq, which undertook with contracts worth US \$ 1.5 billion in 2005 and over US \$3.5 billion in 2008.

**Table 7.1: Turkish economic and cultural presence in northern Iraq (2003-2007)**

| Cities           | Construction companies | Factories, mall and shop | woodwork & installation companies | Fezalar Education Ltd. (Gulen Groups) | Habur border gate vehicle crossing (2003-2008) |
|------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| Erbil ( Hawler ) | 260                    | 67                       | 13                                | 4                                     | 4 thousand daily crossing                      |
| Suleymaniye      | 225                    | 40                       | 11                                | 3                                     |  |
| Dohuk            | 97                     | 30                       | 11                                | 1 expected                            |  |
| Zakho            | 45                     | 55                       | 7                                 | -                                     |  |
| Acre             | 7                      | 6                        | 1                                 | -                                     |  |
| Kirkuk           |                        |                          |                                   | 1                                     |  |
| Total            | 634                    | 198                      | 43                                | 8                                     | over 1 million ( 2003-2008)                    |

Sources: TDNs, 12 -19 April 2007

The lion’s share is taken by the leading companies of Turkey: Tepe Group (building the Suleymaniye University); Mak-Yol (building Arbil airport for \$480 million); Gunay Insaat and Cevikler (building viaducts in Suleymaniya). While Merinos owns 80 % of the carpet market, Turkish food sector giant Ulker is competing with the Sabanci holding in food. Turkish exports constitute up to 80% of the retail volume at the Nazemall Shopping Centre in Arbil.Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Fund (OYAK) supplies Iraq’s cement, construction materials and paper demands. The KDP’s foreign policy representative, Safeen Dizayee, and Arbil’s chamber of commerce chairman, Daarel Celil Hayat, states that “*Turkey should take a leadership*




*role in the area by sending businessmen instead of troops. Turkey won't send the military troops to northern Iraq*" (TDNs, 12-19 April 2007). Robert Olson (2004) claims that this economic dependency enhanced the state formation process of Kurdistan-Iraq. Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani expect to "*come to an understanding*" with Turkey via the lobbying power of the capital. However, politically, excluding Turkey to form the Kurdish regional politics increased the tension between Turkey and the Kurds, and anti-Turkish demonstrators took to the streets of a Kurdish town in February 2003 and when the deputy foreign minister, Ugur Ziyal, visited Washington to guarantee that Turkey could send 10,000 troops into Iraq to support the coalition forces, this caused criticism from the Kurdish groups in 2004. Hence, Turkey's recognition of a de facto Kurdish state relies on the Iraqi constitution, which Turkey called it the Kurdish Regional Authority rather than Kurdish Regional Government (Official letter from Turkish Embassy in London). There is no Turkish diplomatic representation in Erbil but there have been Turkish tank battalions based in Bameri and around 2000 Turkish Special Forces troops in Batufa, Kanimasi and Dilmantepe since 1997. The mission of Turkish troops generally was to provide security between the PUK and the KDP before the US invasion of Iraq. However, after the invasion, the troops not only coordinate the relations between Baghdad-Erbil-Washington-Ankara but also arrange Turkey's trade relations with the Kurdish regional government. It is unfortunate that US-Iraq forces and Turkish troops cannot provide security for Turkish labour in Iraq. It is estimated that 150 truck drivers have been killed by Iraqi resistance forces so far. The Iraqi resistance forces attacked Mosul on 17 December which resulted in 22 people including 14 American soldiers and 5 Turkish special forces being killed and renewed another nationalistic rage against the US and the Kurds. The First Army Corps General Hursit Tolon noted that "the attack had taken place in a country controlled by a country we consider to be a friend and ally" (TDNs 21 December 2004).

However, Iran was the first country which opened a fully accredited consulate in Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan-Iraq ([www.krg.org](http://www.krg.org)). The consulate was opened before the American invasion of Iraq but became more functional after the occupation. Despite the political relations between Tehran and Erbil, Iran's economic presence is minimal in northern Iraq. Iran's economic connection with Erbil and the Baghdad

government cannot be measured officially; it may be higher than the IMF data suggests, given in Figure 14 below.

Figure 7.4: Turkey and Iran exports / imports to Iraq (2001-2007)



Sources: ESDS International Direction of Trade Statistics] [Annual values] [June 2008] [Units: US\$]

According to the latest data revealed by the State Institute of Statistics (DIE), Turkey’s exports to neighbouring countries have reached \$18.4 billion with a 43.5 percent increase in the first six months of this year. Among its immediate neighbours, Iraq ranked first with a 2.7 percent increase in Turkey’s exports during the same period, followed by Greece (2.2 %), Bulgaria (1.9%) and Iran (1.2%). The Turkey-Iraq commercial ties were at about \$3 billion in 2006 and predicted to achieve \$5 billion by 2008. Turkey is the chief supplier of Iraq’s refined oil demand. In 2005, 50% of Iraq’s and 90% of northern Iraq’s oil supplies came in through Turkey. More than 10 million tonnes were sold to Iraq by Turkish firms between January 2003 and January 2006. Such firms have an active part in the area since the Iraqi government was overthrown, with a total volume of \$3.5 billion. The cumulative worth of projects done by these companies forms a significant chunk of the reconstruction efforts there, including 275 megawatts of electricity, with planned increases to 1200 mw, which constitutes a quarter of the country’s needs.

One can argue that Turkish-Kurds small businesses and Anatolian capital improved the northern Iraq market and politically influenced the balance of power in Turkish domestic politics. With the 28 February Process (post-modern military coup d’état),

the Kemalist oligarchy excluded the Anatolian business groups, especially the Kurdish companies, from the privatisation of the state sector. Now, Iraqi Kurdistan seems to be another open door for Anatolian capital and Kurdish businessmen. However, the Turkish state establishment is not very pleased with the growth of capital of the Kurdish business class, but Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq are undermining the growing business class in the region due to the PKK-KongraGel's military campaign commencement after a five year unilateral ceasefire.

#### **7.4.1.3. The Kirkuk question**

The question of Kirkuk goes back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Lausanne conference and lastly, the Ankara agreement in 1926. The oil-rich region of Kirkuk was recorded as the personal property of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. At the Ankara agreement, Turkey completely withdrew from Middle East politics but also cut off the cultural and political ties between Iraqi Kurds and Turkish Kurds by excluding Mosul and Kirkuk from the *national pact*. Turkey abandoned its historical claims and protector role of Turks in Soviet Russia and the Balkans. The Turko-Kurdish alliance also failed to maintain the guardianship of the Kurdish and Turkoman nations against the Ba'ath party's oppressive politics in Iraq. As mentioned above, Turkey's active politics during Gulf War in 1991 was aimed at getting Kirkuk and Mosul back from Iraq. Meanwhile, the Turkish foreign minister, Yasar Yakis reclaimed Turkish right under the Ankara agreement prior to the US invasion of Iraq, but this neo-Ottoman political approach further excluded Turkey from regional politics after the failure of the March memorandum in the Turkish parliament in 2003. The situation changed under the leadership of Tayyip Erdogan, of the Justice and Development Party. The internal dynamics in Turkish politics and the power struggles between the militarist secular and the moderate secular (liberals and Islamists) determine regional politics in Turkey, especially on the issue of Kirkuk. The new Iraqi government regulates the status of Kirkuk, granted in Article 53 by the TAL but the demographic change of Kirkuk concerns Turkey, because the referendum about Kirkuk will be held in May 2008 which could define the political and economic status of the city. In order to take the initiative Turkey announced its Kirkuk doctrine consisting of four points: Land Forces commander Ilker Basbug spoke out that (1) Iraqi unity should not be threatened; (2) Kirkuk's oil revenue must be distributed in an


equal and just manner; (3) Turkey had a blood ties with the Turkoman; (4) Turkey's ties with Kirkuk relied on historical consideration; if the security situation reaches a stage of serious risk, Turkey has the right to take the requisite preventive actions against Kurdish expansion (Hurriyet, 10 July 2004). However, Turkey's historical claim on Kirkuk and ethnic guardianship politics on Turkoman could not work effectively despite the economic dependency of Iraqi Kurds. The Kurdish entity now perceives Turks as the 'archenemy'. Therefore, the Iraqi Government council member, Mahmud Osman stated that "*These people (PKK) are not terrorists but they are simply requesting their democratic right in Turkey.*" On the one hand, the prime minister of the KRG, Nechervan Barzani stated that the Turkish Special Forces were no longer needed after the Saddam regime was toppled, but Ankara threatened the Kurds with military measures if Kurdish forces attack Turkish bases in Bameri, Batufa, Kanimasi and Dilmentepe on 22 January 2004 (Hurriyet, 28 January 2004). On the other hand, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Erdogan held a meeting on 23 June to discuss Turkey's concerns on Kirkuk issues. Talabani ensured that "*Turkoman and Kirkuk would have been a symbol of the integrity of Iraq*" (Hurriyet, 23 June 2004), but Kurdish demands for the cities of Makhmur, Shiwan, Qara Hanjir, and Qadir Karam in the province of Kirkuk were considered to cross Turkey's red lines in the region. Due to tensions between Turkey and KRG, Prime minister, Nechirvan Barzani and Talabani held talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to discuss this issue on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2004. Both sides agreed that the safety of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, which is protected by 10,000 Peshmarga forces, was essential for good economic relations (TDNs, 23 December 2004). On the other hand, Land Forces commander Ilker Bagbug, highlighted the military's opinion on Kirkuk's referendum, saying that "*the election will make the Kirkuk question almost impossible to resolve through a fair and lasting solution in this state*" (TDNs, 27 January 2005). The demographic changes in the region increased the concerns of Turkish parties, because the Iraqi trade ministry record demonstrated that 350,000 Kurds had entered Kirkuk and its provinces since the US occupation (Hurriyet 27 January 2005).

The consensus is that 1957 is the most reliable year to evaluate the demographic figure for Kirkuk, which contain Kurdish, Assyrians, Turkoman, and Arabs, but with



Kurds people composing the majority of population with 64 % at that time. Population transfers from other cities in northern Iraq intended to relocate the deported Kurdish population during the Baath regime.

Figure 7.5: The ethnic breakdown of Kirkuk (1957)



Sources: compiled by author in from in the North, a new war may pit Kurd against Arab" Associated Press NBC World News available online at <http://www.msn.com/id/17136209/page/2/>

Turkey uses diplomatic tools to maintain its guardianship role on Turkoman people and political engagement with Iraqi internal affairs. Hence, Ankara openly announced that Turkey would not tolerate a possible civil war in Kirkuk. In this regard, the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, clarified the Turkish attitude in his statement. He stated, that *"you may not wish to embark on a road but developments force you to take certain action, governments do not have the luxury of ignoring sentiments"* (TDNs, 23 January 2005:3). Similarly, Prime Minister Tayyib Erdogan criticised the duality of American politics of the Middle East in Davos Economic Summit in Switzerland held in 1 February 2005. He said that *"Turkey won't allow this geography to be delivered to chaos that will last for many years"* (TDNs, 1 February 2005:2). Turkey's pressure and diplomatic power varies. For instance, under secretary of defence for policy, Douglas Feith, and Turkish land forces commander General Ilker Basbug held a meeting in February to discuss the various scenarios regarding the Persian Gulf, the civil war in Iraq and the Kirkuk question. Despite reiterating the importance of Turkey-U.S cooperation in Iraq, Feith neither accepted Turkey's military incursion request into northern Iraq nor affirmed Turkey's Kirkuk doctrine. He stated that *Kirkuk was a problem that Iraqi people can solve* (Hurriyet 2 February 2005:1). In fact, Turkey did not have enough bargaining power against the super -

power at that stage. Washington encouraged Kurdish nationalism-- President of the KRG, Mesut Barzani said that *Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with Kurdish identity. Neither Turkey nor any other country has any right to say anything about Kirkuk or about any other Iraqi city....and an independent Kurdish state is indeed going to be established but I do not know when it will be established. The preference of the people of Kirkuk will become clear following the election. A referendum will be conducted in accordance with the desires of the people* (Middle East Report, 26 January 2005). In fact, Mesoud Barzani aimed to increase his political influence as a political leader of the entire Kurdistan. Therefore, the Turkish general chief of staff, Yasar Büyükanit, and the Erdogan government have repeatedly said that *Turkey would start a cross-border operation to fire at PKK-KongraGel bases in Northern Iraq if the United States or Iraqi government fail to take any action to eliminate the PKK-KongraGel camps*. During the constitutional crisis on 28<sup>th</sup> April and the general election in July 2007, the possible military incursion into Northern Iraq and the Kirkuk issue dominated Turkish internal politics. The leader of the Democratic Society Party's branch in the mainly Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, Hilmi Aydogdu created internal tension by saying that *the two sides in this war would be Turkey and the Kurds in Iraq. There are some 20 million Kurds in Turkey, and the 20 million Kurds would regard such a war as an attack against them. Hence, any attack on Kirkuk would be considered an attack on Diyarbakir* (Associated Press, 4 February 2007). In response to DTP's common identity linkage with Iraqi Kurds, Mesut Barzani found the opportunity to become involved in Turkey's internal Kurdish politics directly for the first time. He said that *if Turkey interferes in Kirkuk, Turkey's internal politics will be trespassed on as well*. However, both the DTP and Barzani's struggles to take the initiatives in Kurdish politics was defeated by the Justice and Development Party which increased its vote share from 34% in 2002 to 47%. The AKP seemed to have persuaded the predominantly Kurdish southeast region and doubled its vote from around 26% to approximately 53%; Erdogan's party won 53.5 % of votes in Van, 63 % in Agri, 65.2 % in Adiyaman, 60 % in Urfa, 71 % in Bingöl, 60 % in Bitlis and 41 % in Osman Baydemir's fort, Diyarbakir. This means that almost one in two citizens in Diyarbakir voted for the Justice and Development Party (AKP), but this doesn't mean that those who did not vote for AKP voted for the DTP ([www.secim20007ntvmsnbc.com](http://www.secim20007ntvmsnbc.com)). The other positive gain in Turkey's Kurdish politics is the postponing of the Kirkuk referendum, mandated under article 140 of Iraq's

constitution. The new scheduled referendum will be at the end of May 2008. Sami Kohen (Milliyet, 15 September 2007) wrote that this decision is the outcome of the pressure coming from several countries including Turkey and various elements in Iraq. Ultimately, the United Nations took the initiative to delay the referendum demanded by the Kurds for the future of Kirkuk. United Nations' envoy, Steffan de Mistura, offered a solution to the Kirkuk dispute at a meeting held in Salahaddin on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2008. In fact, Kirkuk is the mother of all issues in Iraqi internal affairs, due to having one of the largest oil reserves in Iraq (Weinberg, 08 May 2008). Turkey's main concern is that Iraq's Kurds want Kirkuk's oil revenue to fund a bid for independence that could encourage the separatist Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey who have been fighting for autonomy since 1984.


According to the Government of Iraq (GoI), the country has around 9 fields that are considered "*super giants*" (over 5 billion bbls reserves) as well as 22 known "*giant*" fields (over 1 billion barrels). The concentration of super-giant deposits in south-eastern Iraq constitutes the largest explored area, globally, and makes up 70-80% of the state's known reserves. About 20% of the reserves lie in northern Iraq in the Kurkuk, Mosul and Khanaqin areas. Ownership over these fields is a rock of contention between Kurds and other powers in that region. KRG has signed thousands of oil contracts with foreign countries, including Turkey's TPAO and the Iranian national oil company (EIA, 2006).

However, the Iraqi government opened six oil fields to international bidding on 30<sup>th</sup> June 2008 as the nation attempted to boost its daily production by 60 % and Iraq's oil minister, al-Shahrastani, said that the new contracts would raise Iraq's production by 1.5 million barrels per day. Iraq currently produces 2.5 million barrels per day and hopes to raise that to 4.5 million by 2013 (Sameer, 2008). The Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate of the Ministry of Oil announced the outcome of the pre-qualification process of the International oil Companies (IOC), which submitted their qualification documents within the period 9 January to 18 February 2008 (<http://www.oil.gov.iq/pclld-outcoming.pdf>). However, both Turkey and Iran were excluded from the 35 international and 6 Iraqi companies' oil bids, scheduled to be signed during the next year (International Herald Tribune, 30 June 2008). The Turkish Prime Minister's, Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Baghdad on 11 July 2008 was the first by



a Turkish prime minister since 1990. Erdogan conducted discussions with al-Maliki and President Jalal Talabani, culminating with the signing of a “*high-level council for strategic cooperation*” pursuant to which the heads of security, energy, trade, investment and water resources will together convene a meeting thrice annually. The heads of state will convene at least yearly to consider progress. Iraqi President Jalal Talabani also set out a certificate formally permitting the state Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to look for oil and gas in Iraq (Today’s Zaman, 12 July 2008).

Integrated map 7.2: Iraqi super- giant oil field bid



Sources: (Financial Times, 30 June 2008)

The Kirkuk question is still the most difficult situation in Iraqi as well as Turkish and Kurdish politics. Iraqi Kurdish leaders were not happy about the new report by UN officials who had called for a phased solution to the Kirkuk issue where Kurds, Turkmen and Arabs are to run the province through a power-sharing arrangement (New Anatolian, 17 June 2008). The solution certainly relies on the oil sharing agreement between Iraq and the international companies which Turkey and Iran have no direct involvement. Therefore, the initiatives of the UN are a main factor in the Kirkuk Question.



#### **4.2 The mystery of Partiya Jiyana Azadî ya Kurdistanê (Party for Free Life in Kurdistan, PJAK)**

The origins of the PJAK are still ambiguous in the regional political environment of the Middle East. An Iranian expert at the Centre for Eurasians Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Turkey, Arif Keskin, claims that the PJAK is an offshoot organisation of the PKK seeking a new vision in regional politics (Keskin, 2007). Both are members of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KCK), designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the governments of Iran, Turkey and the United States. The political leader of the militarised Iranian Kurdish separatist movement, Abdul Rahman Haji Ahmadi, who was born in Iran in 1941, (Stafan Buchen et al,2008) is a former member of the KDPI and now lives in Cologne with a German passport under surveillance or protection of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) (German foreign intelligence service) and the Verfassungsschutz (domestic intelligence service). As mentioned above regarding the Mykonos verdict, Germany now agreed to release the Iranian nationals, Kazem Darabi, and Abbas Rhyael who were convicted of assassinating the Iranian Kurdish leaders at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992 (Timmerman,2007), but allowed PJAK's to hide in Germany. The PJAK leaders and Haji Ahmedi explained the ideas of the organisation in 1993 during an interview at the U.S-based Persian TV (Rojhelat Times, 19 September 2007). However, due to PKK-Iran relations, the emergence of the organisation was postponed until US-led occupation of Iraq. As mentioned above, Iran used the PKK as a proxy political card against Turkey. For instance, Iran's cultural minister published Abdullah Ocalan's books and Tehran allowed the establishment of Kurdish institutions in Iran. With Iranian support, the PKK attempted to establish a Kurdish city named Mokriyan near the Turkish border in Iran. On the other hand, Iran does not refrain from killing guerrillas of the Komala (Komala-Jani-Kurt) and the KDPI, which have both been pacified in regional politics since 1991 (Keskin, 2007). It is estimated that there are 1,000 Kurdish Iranian refugees in northern Iraq (Iranian Refugees' Alliance, 1998), and propaganda facilities such as ROJ TV increase the popularity of PJAK among the Iranian Kurdish nationalists. PJAK influences Shia Kurds (33% of Kurds) as well as Sunnite Kurds by using the PKK's political and military propaganda tactics in Iran. It is estimated that 5 million Kurds live in the West Azerbaijan province, Kurdistan Province, Kermanshah

Province and Ilam Province (Iranian Refugees' Alliance, 1998). PJAK has around 3,000 troops based in northern Iraq, but claims that tens of thousands of activists are working inside Iran to promote a Kurdish identity, democracy and women's rights (Renard, 2008). The military fighters Hezen Rizgariya Kurdistan (HRK) are trained in hit-and-run tactics and armed with Kalashnikov rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, Russian-made sniper rifles and machine guns (Mervan, 2007). Half of the members of PJAK are women, who are gathered under a branch named the Eastern Kurdistan Women's Union (YJRK). PJAK declared its aims are to unite the Kurdish and Iranian opposition, to change the oppressive Islamic regime in Iran and to establish a free democratic federal system for Kurds and the Iranian peoples ([www.pjak.com/](http://www.pjak.com/)). The group began its activities as a student-based human rights movement in 1997 and held its first congress under the name PJAK on 25 March 2004.

Haji Ahmedi confirmed the PJAK connection with the US intelligence officers. He said that American and Israeli officers visited them from time to time in the Qandil Mountain (Kurdish news paper, 11 September 2007). According to Robert Baer, a former CIA operative with close ties to Kurdish northern Iraq: *I understand that the US provides intelligence to PJAK so that they are better able to protect themselves in any conflict with the Iranians. Their force protection intelligence is given to them through the Delta Forces* (Stefan and Buchen and et al 2008). On the other hand, the secretary general of Komala, a long-standing Kurdish-Stalinist party, Abdullah Mohtadi, told the Pittsburgh Tribune Review: "If PJAK can be an independent party, we welcome them. But they are just taking their orders from somewhere else. They are just like PKK... It does not help the Kurdish movement in Iran, and it doesn't help the Iraqi Kurds" (Seymond, 2007). In fact, most PJAK "*engagements*" appear to be in West Azerbaijan, rather than in the two Kurdish majority provinces of Kurdistan and Kermanshah. Thus, the Azerbaijan people in Urumiye established the Defence Committee of Western Azerbaijan against the activities of the PJAK and the PKK in the region ([www.bati-azerbaycan.blogfa.com/](http://www.bati-azerbaycan.blogfa.com/)). Therefore, a possible armed civil conflict between Azerbaijanis and Kurds would create a national security threat to Iran.

#### **7.4.2.1 Turkey-Iran High Security Commission: escalation of PJAK and PKK military insurgency campaigns in Iran and Turkey**

PJAK launched a military insurgency campaign against Iran two days before Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's visit to Tehran on 4-5 July 2004. The guerrillas attacked the Iranian security forces and killed 20 soldiers and they lost 4 PJAK militants in the towns of Salmas and Khoy (Reuters, 6 July 2004). The Iranian government reported that PJAK killed at least 120 revolutionary guards in 2005. The dozen sorties by guerrillas from its camps in the Qandil Mountain and from its underground cell in Iran itself killed more Revolutionary Guards in 2006 than in the previous year.

Furthermore, the PKK returned to using violence following a five -year unilateral ceasefire in May 2004. Now because both PJAK and PKK are internal threats for Turkey and Iran, this can improve Turkey-Iran security relations. The Iranian deputy interior minister, Asqar Ahmedi, met with Turkish military and intelligence officers to discuss possible joint-actions against the PKK and PJAK in Ankara. Iran's ambassador to Turkey, Firuz Devlatabadi, announced that Iran intended to declare PKK-Kongra-Gel as a terrorist organisation on 29 July after the 10 Turkey- Iran -high security meeting in Ankara on 13 July 2004. During the visit by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan on 28 to 30 July, Erdogan held talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Kemal Kharrazi, President Khatemi, and the President of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani. Both countries decided to take military action against both PKK-PJAK and the Mojahidin-i Khalq (MEK) organisation, and signed the *Memorandum of Understanding* on security matters on the issues of the PKK, Mojahideen-e Khalq and Kurdistan-Iraq. However, the Iranian ambassador Develetabadi in Ankara stated that a joint military operation with Turkey would require too much paperwork to be considered in the near future (Al-jazeera News, 1 August 2004 ).

**Table 7.2: Iran-Turkey High Security Commission (the deputy of interior ministerial level)**  
(Generated by author)

|                  | Years               | Iran-Turkey High Security Commission ( the deputy of interior ministerial level) | Place  | Outcome                                |
|------------------|---------------------|--|--------|--|
| 1 <sup>st</sup>  | 30 August 1993      | Bekir Aksoy, Mohammed Besharati  | Ankara |  |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup>  | 25 September 1994   | Bekir Aksoy, Mohammed Besharati and Hasan Habibi                                 | Ankara |  |
| 3 <sup>rd</sup>  | 25 December 1995    | Ahmet Mithat Balkan Gholam Hossein Bolandian                                     | Tehran |  |
| 4 <sup>th</sup>  | 12 July 1996        | Mehmet Agar, Alaaddin Burujerdi  | Ankara |  |
| 5 <sup>th</sup>  | 9-10 June 1997      | Onur Oymen, Alaaddin Borojerdi   | Tehran |  |
| 6 <sup>th</sup>  | 13 August 1999      | Yahya Gur , Gholam Hoseyn Bolandian  | Ankara | MoU                                    |
| 7 <sup>th</sup>  | 16 Ocober 2000      | Saim Kotur , Abdulvahid Musevi Lari  | Tehran | MoU                                    |
| 8 <sup>th</sup>  | 23 October 2001     | Muzffer Ecemis ,Gholam Hoseyn Bolandian  | Ankara |  |
| 9 <sup>th</sup>  | 29 June 2002        | Muzaffer Ecemis ,Ali Asghar Ahmadi and Abdovahed Mousavi-Lari                    | Tehran |  |
| 10 <sup>th</sup> | 12-13 July 2004     | Sahabettin Harput , Ali Asghar Ahmedi  | Ankara | MoU                                    |
| 11 <sup>th</sup> | 21-23 February 2006 | Sahabettin Harput ,Muhammed-Baqer zolgadir                                       | Tehran | MoU                                    |
| 12 <sup>th</sup> | 14-18 April 2008    | Osman Gunes , Ali Akbar Mohtaj (Iranian)   | Ankara | MoU                                    |
| 13 <sup>th</sup> | 01 April 2009       | -  | Tehran | -<br>150 PKK guerrilla given to Turkey |

Sources: compiled by author

There are three institutional security bodies organising the security and border meetings between Turkey and Iran: the Turkey-Iran High Security Commission (deputy interior ministry level), Turkey-Iran Joint-Security Commission (security forces level meeting) and Border Security Commission (border security and governor of province), but the High security commission at the deputy interior ministry level is the most significant for this study's purposes (Hurriyet 1 April 2008).The Turkey-Iran High Security Commission was first established in 1988 and it was ratified under the Security Cooperation agreement in 1992. The commission held its first round serious talks in a bid to secure the foundation of security cooperation over the extradition of criminals and anti-drug trafficking in 25<sup>th</sup> September 1994 (Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 1994). Iranian government was worried about the US support for anti-The Iranian groups in Turkey because the Clinton administration had approved a \$20 million covert action plan to destabilise the Iranian government. President Demirel

assured the deputy interior minister for security and disciplinary affairs, Gholam Hossein Bolandian, that Turkey would not allow anti-Iranian elements onto Turkish soil. Thus, the Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Ahmet Mithat Balkan, said that no change in the governments of the two countries would affect Tehran-Ankara ties (Xinhua News Agency, 25 December 1994). However, the Iran-Turkey High Security Commission meetings could aid in the increase of Turkish-Iranian security ties, because during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Iran's logistic support to small groups to carry out attacks inside Turkey tolerated the organisation's activities inside Iran and provided a safe haven for PKK militants being pursued by Turkish security forces, which impeded security cooperation. After the diplomatic crisis in 1997, the sixth session of the Turkey mentioned in Table 7.2 witnessed an intense dispute on Turkish Hezbollah, MEK and border crossing issue on 22<sup>nd</sup>. Although they signed a MoU at the end of the meeting (IRNA, and BBC Monitoring, 13 August 1999), Iran verbally accepted that Turkish Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation at the 8<sup>th</sup> session of the commission meeting in October 2001 (Radical, 25 October 2001). Nevertheless, the situation has been updated since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took the power in November 2002 and particularly since the establishment of PJAK in 2004 has the commission's security cooperation improved dramatically. For instance, after the signing of the MoU on 29<sup>th</sup> July 2004, Iran officially classified the PKK as a terrorist organisation and delivered 22 PKK militants to Turkey (Hilal, 2004). On the other hand, PJAK escalated its *hit- and -run* assault tactics against Iranian forces in 2006. Turkish and Iranian officials gathered in Tehran for the 11<sup>th</sup> round of the Iran-Turkey High Security Commission meeting to actively cooperate against PJAK and the PKK in February 2006. The Turkish deputy interior minister Sahabettin Harput and his Iranian counterpart, Muhammed Bager Zolghadr signed the MoU and described it as a constructive agreement to eliminate all terror in the region (TDNs, 23 February 2006). On the other hand, the alliance relationship between Turkey and US and Israel became very weak after the revelation of the connections between Washington-Tel Aviv and PKK-PJAK. Journalist Seymour Hersh also claims that PJAK is covertly supported by the United States and Israel. They receive arms, training, and targeting information in order to create internal pressure in Iran (Hersh, 2008). However, the White House has dismissed or ignored Hersh's reports and the Israeli government has officially denied any involvement with PJAK. However, in early 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sought US\$75 million in extra funding for so-called pro-

democracy activities to finance anti-government propaganda and opposition groups inside Iran (Today's Zaman, 1 July 2008). The leader of PJAK, Haji Ahmedi visited Washington DC in the summer of 2007 and had talks with low-level US officials, but could not achieve any practical results. This increased suspicion of American covert activities in the region. Especially when PJAK shot down an Iranian military helicopter that was conducting forward bombing operations in August—which increased for the first time the Turkey-Iran security co-operation in 2007. However, Ankara's relations normalised with the Iraqi government and the Bush administration after the signing of the MoUs in July and November 2007. The US started providing intelligence about the PKK and PJAK to Turkey, leading to the latter's harsher stance in its propaganda materials in relation to the US. Therefore, after April 2007, Ahmed denied that the PJAK was receiving support from the US *We have no relations with the Americans, and Iran's claim that we have an alliance with America is not true* (Jenkins, 2008). Haji Ahmadi told the foreign reporters at the Kurdish Institute in Brussels that the military intelligence information which was given by the US to Turkey, is used against Iranian Kurds with the intention of combining military actions by Turkey and Iran. In fact, Turkey provided the intelligence about the rebel locations around the Qandil Mountain which Iran used to directly attack the PJAK's camp and Kurdish villages in northern Iraq despite the US presence in Iraq. The Suleymaniye government claimed that Turkey and Iran were bombarding the Kurdish villages--Keste, Hakurk, Sidekan and Hineke, Guli in Batufa on 7 June 2007 (Hurriyet, 8 June 2007). However, there was no evidence of Turkish-Iranian joint operations into northern Iraq. The 12<sup>th</sup> meeting of the 2 -year- old bi-national Iran-Turkey High Security Commission constituted the first senior-level gathering in the security field between Iranian and Turkish officials: an eight-member Iranian delegation was led by the deputy interior minister Abbas Mohtaj, while Turkish negotiators were headed by deputy interior minister Osman Gunes and included representatives of the national intelligence organization (MIT), the Gendarmerie Command and the Foreign Ministry, (TDNs, 15 April 2008). During the meeting, the delegates examined the joint military operation against the separatist threat, the PJAK and the PKK in northern Iraq. The commander of the Turkish land forces, the second most powerful man in the Turkish armed forces, General Ilker Basbug clarified that *Iran and Turkey had been conducting coordinated simultaneous operations on their respective borders ...We are*


*sharing intelligence, talking and making plans with Iran* (Milliyet, Hurriyet, 6 June 2008).

On the other hand, the relationship between the PJAK-PKK and the KRG was getting worse after the Turkish and Iranian shelling of northern Iraq. The KRG understood that because of the presence of PJAK –PKK elements, Turkey and Iran were making military incursions into Iraqi territory. KRG announced that Iran is a very important neighbour with a very long common border. He said that *We will not allow any armed group to attack any neighbouring countries from the territory of the Kurdistan Region* (Al-Sharq al- Awsat, 10 May 2008). In response to Barzani, the PJAK leadership recently accused Nechirvan Barzani, the prime minister of the Kurdistan regional government (KRG), of collaborating with Turkey and Iran, warning that this could lead to a “*national tragedy*” for Kurdistan-Iraq on 11<sup>th</sup> May 2008. In a press conference in Sulaimaniya, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani also warned the PKK and its Iranian offshoot, the PJAK to stop attacks on Turkey and Iran from Iraqi bases. He said that *we will never let these groups hide in our territory, attack neighbouring countries and then come back here, and these organisations must stop this behaviour. Otherwise we do not want them on our soil* (Renard, 2008).

#### **7.4.4.2 Financial sources of PJAK and PKK**

According to research at John Hopkins University conducted in 2004, it is estimated that 80 - 90 % of drugs come from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran is a major transit corridor for opiates and hashish smuggled from Afghanistan and eventually through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Europe and Russia (Cornell, and Swanström 2006). The question becomes how the PKK (3,000-3,500 guerrillas)-PJAK (2,000-3,000 guerrillas) evolved from an idealistic and poverty-stricken movement in the early 1980s, to a sophisticated organisation with multinational corporation-size revenues which they are today (Adams, 1986).

Figure 7.6: Financial sources of PKK (generated by author)



Sources: PKK revenues reach 500 mln Euros' TODAY'S ZAMAN with wires Istanbul, 12 March 2008, online at: <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=136169>

General, Ergin Saygun, Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff, gave a speech on the second day of an international conference on terrorism organised by the Turkish military at the Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism in Ankara on March 10 and 11 2008. He claimed that the PKK has a yearly income of 400-500 million Euros obtained from drug-dealing, human-trafficking, smuggling and donations. According to his classification, the PKK gains € 200-250 mn from drug - dealing, 100-150 million from its various smuggling activities and 15-20 million from donations. Saygun indicated that the PKK provides arms not only to its members but also to the terrorists of other organisations (TDNs, March 13, 2008). Jane's Intelligence Review suggests a smaller revenue for the PKK from various countries and sources which is estimated as \$200-500 million annually during the 1990s but decreased to tens of millions during the early 2000s because of the withdrawal of support by Syria and Iran. Turks were estimated to control 70 % of the heroin arriving in the UK and 80 % of the French heroin traffic (Jane's Intelligence Review, 13 Marc 2008), (Chilluffo, 2000; BBC News, 13 December 2000). Michael Braun, the assistant administrator and chief of operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) also claimed that the PKK receive a great share from the international drug market which is estimated \$322 billion (Hurriyet, 22 July 2008). In Europe, the PKK controls 2 news agencies, 4 TV broadcasting stations, 13 radio stations, 10 newspapers, 19 magazines, 3 publishing companies and a variety of




internet websites. The PKK-PJAK uses these broadcasting agencies for political propaganda to recruit guerrillas. The PKK also helps the establishment of many Kurdish small businesses, Kurdish cultural centres, and families in the Kurdish diasporas in Europe to increase their income around to around \$50 million annually (BBC News, 14 November 2002). Max-Peter Ratzel, Director of Europol, emphasises that the establishment and management of small companies is one of the more significant sources of terrorists' income (Brady, 2008). Cagaptay and Eroglu observe that the PJAK was formed by PKK members who settled in Iran before the 2003 Iraq War (Ögütçü, 2007). The two organisations have no disagreements on issues of political objectives and have similar financial sources. Both have bases in the Qandil mountains in Iraq. However, there is no information on PJAK's financial sources. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran started military operations against the PKK-PJAK to curtail their military power in northern Iraq and diplomatic operations to stop their economic connections with Europe; in a more recent development in 2005 Germany closed the E.Xani Presse und Verlag, the publisher of the pro-PKK newspaper *Ozgur Politika*. Soon afterwards the Welt Press Verlag, operator of *Mezopotamia-Nachrichtenagentur* and *Roj online*, were also closed down. NATO's Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and its Reinforced Economic Committee issued report reports persuading European agencies that PKK activities in the drug market human trafficking, and money laundering in Europe were widespread and clearly illegal.

#### **4.3 Turkish armed forces military incursion into northern Iraq**

Before the US-led invasion of Iraq, the KDP/ PUK had supported more than 20 operations since 1995, providing Turkish military incursions into northern Iraq against the PKK since 1995. The agreement reached between Turkey and the KDP/ PUK in 1997 is still effective. Thus, the KRG is obliged to comply with the 2007. The MOU signed between Iraq and Turkey that provides for joint combating of terrorism, including the PKK (CNN News, 18 September 2000). After the visit by Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gul to Washington, both capitals announced that the PKK is a mutual enemy of Ankara, Baghdad and Washington. Turkey also agreed the general principles of an MoU with Washington on 4<sup>th</sup> November 2007. Similarly, Turkey and Iran signed the MoU after the High Security Commission meeting to conduct joint operations against the PJAK-PKK in February

2006. Turkey initiated the first of many air attacks in December 2007, targeting PKK outposts in northern Iraq with reliance on US intelligence. Turkish Special Forces crossed the border to attack PKK camps in Zap valley in February, whilst Iranian artillery fired on PJAK outposts in the Qandil mountains. Turkish military operations ended after the US minister of national defence, Robert Gate, came to Turkey for a working visit on 3 March 2008 (Candar, 2008). Turkish armed forces explained that they had killed 240 Kurdish guerrillas but the army had lost 27 men. However, Turkey’s slow-going military incursion into Northern Iraq effectively attacked the guerrillas camps in Haftanin (6), Melina (7), Zap (16), Gara (5), Avara (5) Hakurk (5), Qandil (20), and Mahmur (1). It is estimated that the PKK has over 10, 000 bombs, 3,000 kalashnikov rifles and stinger missiles in these camps. The Qandil mountains are 2 km. from the Turkish border but some parts of mountain remain in Iranian territory. Turkey can only use air-support from Malatya and Diyarbakir bases (456 km).

Integrated map 7.3: PKK camps in northern Iraq




Sources: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 19 February 2008

President Talabani, during his visit to Ankara, and Erdogan on his visit to Baghdad, agreed to set up a new unit to wipe out the PKK in the regional politics. The Kurdish Nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) tried to act as Turkey’ Sinn Fein. In fact,

neither the PKK nor the DTP could represent the people of the region, because neither party's programmes satisfy the Kurdish population's political and economic demands. It can instead be considered a Kemalist-type social engineering attempt in Kurdish society. A prominent political leader of the DTP, Leyla Zana, in her speech in the last election campaign referenced their religious origin as Zarathustra before the conversion of Islam—a reference to a Turkish nationalist project in the 1920s.

Since 1983, the Turkish armed forces have carried out some 24 incursions into northern Iraq at a cost of 628 soldiers' lives. The latest operation has so far claimed 24 soldiers and three government-funded village guards. Some 4,776 PKK members were killed in past operations. Turkey's 28 -year long war with the PKK has been at the human cost of 5,595 civilians, 4,749 security, 205 police forces, 1,302 village guards and 26,128 Kurdish guerrillas. According to records, 7,620 civilians and 10,752 security forces were injured during the conflict (Hurriyet 22 June 2007). Cemil Cicek explains that Turkey has spent \$300 billion during the 28- year war against the military insurgency campaign of PKK (Ihlas Haber Ajansi, 21July 2008). On the other hand, Iran has lost around 500 soldiers during the conflict with PJAK so far.

Figure 7.7: TAF and PKK casualties (1984-2007)



Sources: (as cited Emin Colasan in Hurriyet, 22 June 2007) complied by author

## 7.5. Conclusion

The alliance relationship between Turkey and Kurds has played an historically significant role in expanding Turkish occupation in Anatolia and the Middle East. The *Turkish-Kurdish axis* first gained credibility in the Battle of Manzigert against the Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes in 1071. The Amasya contract between the Ottomans and Kurds against the Safavid in 1514 strengthened this axis until the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Ottoman–Persian conflict sustained historical competition in the conflict zone in northern Iraq and the southern Caucasus. Turks and Iran left behind this geopolitical competition in Mesopotamia and Caucasus until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the dissolution of Soviet Empire. Kurdiyati, Kurdish ethnic and territorial nationalism has been one of the main determinant factors in Turkish-Iranian geopolitical competition since 1980. The nation-state system devastated the Kurdish national entity in the Middle East. The nation-state system of Turkey ignores the Kurdish and Islamist entities within the state apparatus, which was founded by secular Kurds and Turkish nationalists. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) gradually influenced the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. The war created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq during which PKK militants relocated to this safe haven. Despite Turkey being a neutral player, it did not refrain from military incursions into northern Iraq during the war. Turkey achieved a “*hot pursuit*” agreement with Saddam’s regime and made three major incursions into northern Iraq. Iran condemned these activities in the Kurdish region as genocide against the Kurdish people in 1987. Turkey’s activities in the region also challenged the Iran-Syrian axis in the 1980s and 1990s. During the critical time of war, the Iran-Kurdish alliance’s attack on Iraq concerned Turkey due to the possible Iranian seizure of the giant oilfield at Kirkuk. Turkey reminded Iran of its historical claims on Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey and Iran managed this geopolitical conflict; Iran did not attack the pipeline during the course of the war. On one hand, Iran used the proxy Kurdish card by allowing in PKK militants and providing logistic support for their activities against Turkey. However, Iran assassinated the leader of the KDPI, Abd-al Rahman Qasimlu, in Vienna in July 1989 (Olson, 2004). Turkey and Iran were very successful in coexisting and increased economic ties with each other. Turkey’s main concern was to prevent Iran from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence.

After the Anfal genocide, and the Gulf war in 1991, Kurdish nationalism became a transnational issue which worsened Turkey's relationship with Iraq and increased geopolitical competition between Turkey and Iran. To take the initiative in the regional politics and the new world order, Turkey turned its attention back to the Middle East by signing contracts with the de facto Kurdish Regional Authority, and military training and economic agreements with Israel. Turkey both challenged the Iran-Syrian axis and the Saddam regime in Iraq. However, both Iran's and Turkey's peace-keeping attempts failed in the 1990s and both Ankara and Tehran lost their control on the militarist and political activities of Kurdish nationalism movement in Middle East and Kurdish diasporas in Europe. The major drug traffic route through Iran-Turkey and Europe serves as the main financial source for Kurdish military insurgency campaigns against Turkey and Iran. On the other hand, the major turning point on the Kurdish question was the capture of PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan in 1999. The PKK has made with them a unilateral ceasefire offer until the emergence of PJAK in 2004. Turkey and Iran have got three institutional bodies to solve the security issues and the last three meetings of the *Iran-Turkey High Security Commission* provided efficient results for the struggle against the PKK and PJAK. Both capitals have been cooperative in sharing intelligence and joint-military incursions into the Qandil mountains. However, possible Israel and American air attacks to Iran would increase the geopolitical competition between Turkey and Iran in the future. Hence, the Kurdish nationalist movement is one of the major factors in regional political politics, whether as an active or a proxy actor.



### **PART III: THE EXPERIMENTAL MODEL IN REGIONALISM**

The domestic roots of instability have been determined by regional politics after the collapse of the Soviet empire. In Chapter Eight, ethnic complexities in the Southern Caucasus and Islamic extremism show the potential strength of middle-power states in regional power competition. Due to the failure of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) policy in their domestic politics, Turkey-Iran was excluded from conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations in these Southern Caucasus.

In Chapter Nine, Turkey-Iran competition is shown to have been based on false arguments by Cold War scholars, as no Great Game politics were experienced in regional politics. This chapter tries to outline the relevant aspects of middle-power competition and pipeline politics in the Great Game relating to Caspian Sea energy sources.

In Chapter Ten, Turkey-Iran economic relations will be classified as regional rather than bilateral trade relations, because regional developments primarily influence trade contracts such as natural gas agreements with Iran; the Iran-Iraq war improved the trade volume between the countries. The institutional capacity relating to the trade regimes of middle-powers will also be examined in Chapters Nine and Ten.

## CHAPTER EIGHT:

# THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKO-IRANIAN REGIONAL COMPETITION

### 8.1. Introduction

Transcaucasia is separated from Russia by the Caucasian mountains and bordered on each side by the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. It is the home for over fifty different nationalities, mainly Georgian, Azeri, and Armenian, which have dominant state identities, while Abkhazians and South Ossetian, and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians claim similar nationalist aspirations, causing the ethnic conflict in the Southern Caucasus (Zviagelskaia, 1996:80). The Kremlin directly interfered with the Armenian-Azeri conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the Abkhazian-Georgian and Ossetes-Georgian conflicts in Georgia in order to control possible ethnic friction in the northern Caucasus. Thus it deployed troops and peacekeeping forces in these southern conflict zones, which have emerged as a pivotal geo-strategic region within which the interests of the US, Europe, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the broader Islamic world intersect. In opposition to Russian aggression, the president of Georgia, Edward Shevardnadze, and his successor, Mikhail Saakashvili have consistently tried to maintain transatlantic aspirations and to secure a Membership Action Plan (MAP) from NATO--supported by most NATO members in Bucharest in April 2008, but without current success due owing to Russian pressure.

On the other hand, the Turkey-Iran confrontation became intense when the Azerbaijani president started the pan-Turkism politics following the exclusion of Iran from the international oil consortia. The presence of Russian military bases in Armenia, and the Iran – Armenian pipeline contract increased mistrust between Moscow and Tehran. The policies of Iran and Russia have been to pursue a *strategic alliance* against Turkish and American initiatives in conflict zones. The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 has also weakened the pro-western policy of Georgia and its quasi-alliance in the southern Caucasus, but reduced the international pressure against Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation.

On the other hand, both Turkey and Iran are opposed to the Saudi-backed fundamentalist movement in the Fergana Valley which is jointly occupied by the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Islamic fundamentalism has challenged the state authority in Uzbekistan and resulted in an unequal civil war in Tajikistan. Over one million Kazakh diaspora members in Xinjiang represent another significant means of leverage between Sino-Central Asian security systems and economic and cultural ties. More than half a million Uighur émigrés have established a common identity with the Turkic states. Nevertheless, the border security concerns of these regional states against militant religious fundamentalists and illegal drug traffickers at the border crossings necessitates institutionalising security cooperation between the Sino and Central Asian states under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Whilst Turkey's soft-power presence and pan-Turkic organisations have failed to establish friendly relations with the potential regional player, Uzbekistan, Iran has a natural geographical advantage by gaining observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The creation of a Pan-Turkic community from the Adriatic Sea to China, and Turkish initiatives involving TIKA, the Turkic Summit and the Great Student Project are supported by Washington and Brussels, but Turkey has not been able to seize the historical opportunity and Ankara undertook these initiatives in vain.

The post-Soviet policy in Central Asia can be assessed on its domestic, regional and international performance though the Cold War security order remains in the regional complex with regard to arm sales, alliances and financial stakes in natural resources. Hence, demarcation of ethnicity in the region became the major political card between the regional powers. As mentioned in Chapter One, for the regional level of analysis, Buzan and Weaver's prediction would explain the political development in Central Asia; RSCT dictates that Central Asia will become an independent regional security system. However, the Caucasus mini sub-complex is vulnerable to foreign penetration. Hence, the competition between Turkey and Russia-Iran materialises in the IR theory of regionalism, in general. For the dynamics of internal politics, Tocqueville claims that autocratic states dramatically encounter domestic instability when they start the democratisation process (Tocqueville, 1968). Hence the influx of *colourful revolutions* was perceived as a threat for the *clan bases politics* of the Central Asian states. His analytical volume consists of eleven case studies on the theoretical nature



of regional disorder in the post-Soviet and post-9/11 situations. Each of these analytical narratives sheds some light on the micro-politics of organised violence originating from the Caucasus and Central Asia.

### **8.2.0 The ethnic roots of instability in the southern Caucasus**


After the withdrawal of the super- power from the region, the ethnic conflict raged in the early 1990s between the contested states of Armenia and Azerbaijan and between Russia and Georgia in Abkhazia, Adjara, and South Ossetia, which resulted in the deaths of over 50,000 people, great material destruction, economic hardships and transnational crime that have permeated the region in the last two decades. Up to now neither the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) nor the Joint-CIS peacekeeping forces has found a negotiated solution to unfreeze the situation in the southern Caucasus. In August 2008, the outbreak of war in Georgian-South Ossetia between Russia and Georgia undermined the effectiveness of the Western - Turkish initiatives in the region. This chapter deals with the ethnic conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Russia-Georgian conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the impact of the Russian military presence in the region on Turko-Iranian regional competition in this section..

#### **8.2.1.0 The ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh**

Turko-Iranian rivalry over the Caucasus goes back to the policy of aggression in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries in the southern Caucasus. According to the Treaty of Amasya, 1555, and Zuhab, 1639, Armenia was divided into western and eastern portions. In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, Tsarist Russia took eastern Armenia from Iran and part of western Armenia from the Ottomans. Whilst the Turkish massacre (1895-6) and relocation of Armenians (191-1918) left an ineradicable imprint on contemporary Armenian self determination ( Herzig, 1996), the territorial settlement in 1921 between the Soviet Union and Turkey (Treaties of Moscow and Kars) provided Turkey with a guarantee of Nakhichevan's status, separated by Armenian Zangezur, as a potential pretext for Turkish intervention. Turkey probably maintains the guarantor position over Nagorno-Karabakh as well. Consequently, Turkey cannot be defined as an outsider in the conflict, as any change in the status of Nagorno-Karabakh or Nakhichevan would

necessitate Turkish approval (Cornel, 1998). Other border disputes with Georgia over Adjara and Akhalkalak were also settled to the Armenian detriment (Hassassian, 1990). However, Armenians never fully accepted this decision, and have repeatedly questioned the enclave's status, demanding its transfer to the Armenian SSR in 1929, 1935, 1963, 1966, 1977, and 1987. On the one hand, Iran lost northern Azerbaijan due to the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828 and the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, ceded by Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Iran was concerned about the potential impact on Iranian Azeris of the establishment of an independent Azerbaijan state, and of the calls from Baku for unification of the divided Azeri people. Tehran, therefore, sided with Yerevan and Moscow against the Azerbaijani Nationalist Front (ANF). Iran and Russia encouraged and financed ethnic groups in Azerbaijan in their opposition to state Turkification policies. If Nagorno-Karabakh was to be sovereign, it would be a client of Russia within Azerbaijan just as Abkhazia and South Ossetia are in Georgia. The formation of the Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan axis and Iranian revolutionary ideology rely for clarification on the ethno-demographic realm of the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, 4,400 km (Fuller, and Francke 2001). In Nagorno-Karabakh between 1921 and 1979, Russian anthropologist Yamskov claimed that the Armenian population of the oblast (region) declined from 95 % in the early 1920s to 76 % in 1979 – that is, 123,000 out of a total of 161,000 (Yamskov, 1991). T. Sarkisian, A. Vartanov, and G. Starovoitova cited the general population of the region as 133,200 (74%) Armenians and 43,900 (24.4%) Azeris in 1987. They also give the percentage of the Azeri population in the districts of Mardakertskii as 14.8% (6,800), Askeranskii 16.7% (3,000), Shushinskii 90.1% (19,000), Martuninskii 22.7% (6,200), Gadrutskii 14.6% (2,100); Stepanakert City 12.8% (6,800) and in Nagorno-Karabakh (Starovoitova, and Krupnik, (1988). The Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh had a population in 1989 recorded as 189,000, the majority of whom were Armenians, 76.9%, Azeris, 21.5%, and Russian and Kurdish minorities of 1.6 %.

**Figure 8.1**The ethnic division of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan



Sources: Figure: Nagorno-Karabakh) Armenia Press, 11 July 2005; Figure: Azerbaijan) Bremmer, and Taras 1993:550-60; compiled by author

**8.2.1.1 Turkey-Iran competition over the outbreak and escalation of the ethnic conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh**

The first ethnic strife became apparent in Nagorno-Karabakh after the pro-Armenian leadership campaign in Stepanakert, to become part of Armenia in 1988. Trouble arose Kremlin’s decision to annex the status of this region on 12 June 1989. However, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet rejected this resolution as unconstitutional and Azerbaijan attacked its Armenian citizens in Azerbaijan (Tahirzade, 1997). Nagorno-Karabakh formally remained under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction until the disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991. During this brief interlude, the Soviet authorities sided, in general, with Azerbaijan but the power transition in Russia changed the balance in favour of the Armenians; geopolitical calculations in relation to Turkey and Iran, consequently, prompted Russia to support Armenia which, in turn, translated to military victories on the ground. The demonstrations near the Azadliq monument against this pro-Armenian policy of the Soviet regime resulted in 131 people deaths, 744 wounded and 400 arrests in Baku during Black January 1990 (Ismayilov, 1995; Mesbahi, 1994: 99-114). Russian destabilisation policy towards the region opened a Pandora’s Box that gradually transformed into a full-fledged war between Azerbaijani and Armenia over Karabakh, although both Yerevan and Baku kept the status quo of an undeclared war with one another. As a result of this conflict, 250,000 Armenians in Baku and 149,000 peoples in Nagorno-Karabakh were drawn into a conflict with the Azeri people (Statistiki, 1990). Turkish opposition party leader Suleyman Demirel

criticised the Soviet - Armenian slaughter of so many people as a contradiction of the Soviet policy of glasnost and perestroika. He said that *one cannot remain just an observer* (Hurriyet, 21 January 1990). The Armenian government's further challenge pertaining to the imposition of economic sanctions against the Nachichevans attracted the attention of outside parties-- Turkey and Iran. Moscow was critical of the Turkish opposition and warned against sending military equipment to Nachichevan for Turkey was a grantor state according to Kars treaty in 1921. However, **Armenia asserted that the Treaties of Gymrui 1920 and the Kars 1921, which determined the border between Turkey and Armenia, were no longer in effect** (Ankara Television, 22 January, 1990). Azerbaijan has a short border with Turkey, 12 km in length, along with the western frontiers of the Nachichevan Autonomous Republic. Hence, Armenian policy seems to consist of blockading Azeri lands and cutting off direct links with Turkish territory (Ataov, 1992:103).

The conflict in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh initially pushed the Baku government closer to Iran, which was considered a powerful ally. But trouble flared along the border between the Nachichevan exclave and Iran as rioters destroyed border installations, an incident which was pushing Iran into the regional conflict. On the other hand, Turkey maintained a '*pay-off policy*' towards the region in 1989-1991. President Turgut Ozal, who was visiting Washington at the time, said *that the Azerbaijan crisis was more of a concern to Iran than to his country because the Azerbaijanis were Shi'a* (Hunter, 1995:88). It is estimated that 65 % of Azerbaijanis are Shia but Azerbaijanis largely ignore this religious aspect. They rather define themselves as a secular society after two hundred years of Russian domination. Pan-Persian nationalists believe that *Greater Iran* (Iran-i bozorg) (Minorsky and Boyle, 1978) is possible through a unification of northern Azerbaijan, considered an historical part of Iran (Nesipli, 2000). In response to Ozal's statement, Democratic Left Party leader Bulent Ecevit criticised Turkey's policy neglect as forcing Azerbaijan into the arms of Iran (Hunter, 1995:88). Nevertheless, Ozal's trip to Moscow, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan opened a new chapter in Turkish foreign policy which concluded in technical and economic co-operation agreements with Moscow, Alma Ata and Baku between 11 and 16 March 1991 (TDNs, 17 March 1991). President Ozal's visit emphasised Russian superiority in the region and highlighted the value of Azerbaijan in the Caucasus and of Kazakhstan in Central

Asia (Hale, 2000). However, Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayeti, who visited Baku in November 1991 after a Moscow visit, said that the establishment of a powerful Soviet confederation would prevent the West from gaining control over the independent republic (Ekici, 2002: 41).

On the other hand, the power transition in the internal politics of Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted in a policy of independence. Heydar Aliyev became leader of the Azerbaijani exclave of Nachichevan in 1991 (Vasiliev, 1994; TIKa, 2006). However, on 2 September 1991, four days after Azerbaijan's declaration of independence from the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh oblast declared its independence from Azerbaijan. Turkey was the first country to recognise the independent Republic of Azerbaijan on 9 November 1991 and the first capital to launch diplomatic relations with Baku after talks between Azerbaijani leader Muttalibov and the head of the Turkish foreign ministry's office of political affairs, Bilal Simsir on 14 January 1992 (Hunter, 1995). Through its ambivalent approaches to regional politics, Iran recognized the Republic of Azerbaijan to restore its relations in December 1991 and opened an embassy in Baku in January 1992. The independence of Azerbaijan also hastened the independence declaration of other Turkic states in Central Asia. During the period of euphoria, the Newly Independent States (NIS) leaders made a round of visits to Ankara was made by Nursultan Nazarbayev, Sepermirad Niyazov, Islam Kerimow, and Askar Akayev, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kirghizstan respectively (Vasiliev, 1994). In December 1991, the President of Kazakhstan announced that 21st century will be a *Turkish century* (The Economist, 25 April 1992:60).

During the Ayaz Muttalibov government (18 May 1990- March 1992) Iran's initiative was stronger than that of the Turkish government; therefore, Muttalibov mediated the Russian-Iranian relations and made his first visit to Tehran in December 1991. Due to the Armenian blockade, Iran agreed to allow Azerbaijan to use Iranian territory to get to Nachichevan, and both parties agreed that Nachichevan should become *free trade zone* between the two neighbours (Nesibli, 2000:143). On the other hand, Muttalibov's visit to Turkey on 23-24 January 1992 concluded with the signing of a \$US 2 billion trade and cultural agreement in Baku in the autumn of 1992 and Turkish state television started broadcasting in Azerbaijan in the early months of the same

year. Muttalibov's second trip to Tehran was meant to link the anniversary celebration of the Iranian Islamic revolution and strengthen the Iran-Azeri connections, on which he stated that *The unification of two Azerbaijan is not impossible* (Durdular, 1995:128). Though Iran propagated the promotion of Arabic script, by publishing newspapers, magazines and books in Baku in the Krill alphabet (Nesibli, 2000:141), the Turkish model of development became real and Azerbaijan adopted the Latin alphabet on 25 December 1991. The US urging of Turkey to act against the Iranian-Saudi backed radical Islamic movement in Central Asia coincided with Yeltsin's pro-Western policy, giving at this stage another advantage to Turkish foreign policy. This policy direction coincided with the American strategic policy in the region; when Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visited to Washington, George Bush told him that *Turkey is a model for the countries in the region* in February 1992 (Hunter, 1995:103). The US secretary of state James Baker visited Turkic states and Baku on 12 February 1992 and also presented Turkey as an economic and political model, urged by NIS to integrate with Western economic and political system (Ekici, 2002). Therefore, Turkish policy aimed to increase the connections between the Turkic states and international organisations to strengthen their independence against the Russian hegemony while Iran's position was against Western initiatives and the powerful Azerbaijan state. The pan-Turkish element in the Turkic states raised common nationalist feelings amongst the Turkic states' leaders. For instance, President of Uzbekistan Islam Kerimov said that *We looked up to Turkey as an elder brother* and President Akayev compared Turkey with *the morning star*, guiding the Turkic republics along with the *ad hoc* organisation of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in Azerbaijan. In fact, the euphoric Turkish stance was initiated by the inauguration speech of President Turgut Ozal in the Turkish Grand National Assembly where he said that *The end of the cold war and the dissolution of the USSR provided Turkey with a historical opportunity to be leader of the region and Turkey should have not missed such an opportunity that appeared for the first time after 400 years* (as cited by Ekici, 2002:41).

The situation was critical for Azerbaijan independence after the withdrawal of the CIS forces of the 366<sup>th</sup> Motorized Infantry regiment from Nagorno-Karabakh region. The conversation between the Armenian foreign minister, and his counterpart, Ali Akbar Velayeti resulted in an offer of Iran's assistance to resolve the ethnic conflict in

November 1991 but the proposal was not been taken up by the either party (Winrow, 1995). On the other hand, Azerbaijan's Prime minister, Hasan Hasanov held talks with Turkish Minister of State, Serif Eren and Education Minister, Koksal Toptan, in Ankara and signed a mutual education cooperation agreement on 29 February 1992 (yeogm.meb.gov.tr). Due to Iranian initiatives, the Turkish-Azerbaijani ties were not particularly strong until the de facto leadership of Elchibey. But after his seizure of power in Baku, Turkey-Azerbaijan cultural interaction resulted in state-supported private schools, press services, and television and radio broadcasting, which facilitated Turkey's highlighting of the regions geographical difficulties and promote the pro-Western and secular education in Azerbaijan.

#### **8.2.1.2 The failure of the Iranian mediation effort (February to May 1992)**

Iranian mediation efforts began when the ethnic Armenian forces broke through the Azerbaijani territory to create a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, causing the resignation of Muttalibov on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1992 (Hiro, 1994:64). The next visit of the Iranian foreign minister, Velayeti, to Baku and Yerevan, resulted in a tripartite presidential summit in Tehran which led to the signing of a short-term cease-fire, called the "*Tehran Memorandum*" on 16 March 1992 (Winrow, 1995:93-110). President Rafsanjani brought together Ter-Petrosian and acting Azerbaijani president Yacub Mamedov on 8 May to sign another agreement in Tehran, whereby the economic blockade of Armenia would be lifted. But due to the subsequent Armenian conquest of the last Azeri strongholds in Nagorno-Karabakh and the shelling of the Azerbaijani enclave of Nachichevan in May 1992, the Iranian unilateral mediation efforts were stalled (Winrow, 1995:98). In response to Armenian occupation of Shusha on 9 May, and a second corridor, Lachin, on 17 May 1992, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Vaezi, denounced the acts: *It is an undisguised aggression by Armenia. Hence, Iran considered Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan and was totally opposed to any change of borders in the region* (as cited in Rubenstein, 1995:99)

### 8.2.1.3 Turkey's intervention into regional conflict

Turkey's initiatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began with Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Washington on 11 February 1992, during which Turkey wanted to use the political power of NATO and the EU for its own interests. On the other hand, Turkish President Turgut Ozal's policy was different from that of Prime Minister Demirel, who warned the Western countries in his speech at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on 17 February 1992 that *If Western countries support Armenia which does not accept any peace talks or negotiations, therefore, on regional war will be inevitable between both parties* (Taskiran, 1995:164). Turkey started a military exercise in the eastern part of Anatolia which was perceived as threat to the Russian presence in the region. CIS supreme commander, Marshall Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, stressed that *We are carefully watching Turkey's activities in the Caucasus* (Taskiran, 1995:166). Turkey had been helpful as a member of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as it sponsored the Minsk Group peace process on Nagorno-Karabakh, but after the fall of Lachin on 17 May, the Nachichevan Majlis speaker, Heydar Aliyev, called for Turkish military intervention. In response to the Turkish initiative, CIS supreme commander Shapasnikov warned that *foreign military intervention in the Karabakh dispute could lead the world into Third World War* (Hiro, 1993:97). American and European liberal rhetoric which pressured Turkey to abandon the economic blockade and provide humanitarian aid to Yerevan, created a great tension amongst the Turkish public. According to a deal by the Demirel government with Armenia, Turkey would export 100,000 tons of wheat to Armenia. Turkey also signed an energy deal with Yerevan which required Ankara to supply 300 million kilowatts during the 1992-1993. This seen as unacceptable by the Azerbaijan government and the foreign minister of Azerbaijan, Tofiq Gasimov, stated that *Turkey's policy as it is, is a stab in the back of Azerbaijan*. However, due to public dissatisfaction and opposition critique, the Demirel government suspended the energy agreements and Turkey only recognised the Republic of Armenia but without starting economic and diplomatic relations, on the condition that Armenia withdrew from occupied territory of Azerbaijan. In return, Armenia did not recognise the Kars and Gyumri Treaty (1921). Nevertheless, pro-Turkish-nationalist Elchibey had less faith in mediation and had initially hoped that Turkey would become more actively involved in the dispute when he took power in



Azerbaijan in June 1992 but his pro-Turkish policy and dream of the *Greater Azerbaijan* increased Turkey's informal political and economic penetration into the region (Bayir,1999).

#### **8.2.1.4 The failure of the pan-Turkism politics in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict**

During the Elchibey government (June 1992-June 1993), the political relations between Azerbaijan and Iran were virtually suspended, but economic ties between the two were consolidated. During a visit by Foreign Minister Tofig Gasimov on 18-20 August 1992, to Tehran, the two countries renewed economic and diplomatic relations by deciding to open new consulates in Tabriz and Nachichevan ( Hezirev, 1992:6). Elchibey's speech on 2 February 1993 guaranteed that southern Azerbaijani people could be recruited to the state bureaucracy, aimed at decreasing the anti-Turkish internal politics of Iran (Cafersoy, 2001). Elchibey made his first foreign visit to the Black Sea Economic Corporation Organisation (BSEC) meeting on 24-27 June 1992. He said that *We consider Turkey as a model on the path of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk* (Hezirev, 1992:6). Turkey also provided military training for the Azerbaijan military forces. It is reported that 520 military personnel were trained in Turkey. During his second nine-day trip to Turkey between 28 October and 5 November 1992, he gave a speech at the Turkic speaking countries summit in Ankara on 31 October 1992, but his pro-Turkish rhetoric was not applauded by the other Turkic states ( Hezirev, 1992). However, Elchibey sent the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) director, Sabit Bagirov, to Ankara and the two countries then signed the secret Baku-Ceyhan pipeline agreement in March 1993. But after the June military coup of Aliyev, this agreement was cancelled (Cafersoy, 2001). By April 1993, Armenians had used this opportunity and captured Kelbajer with the support of the 7<sup>th</sup> Russian army in Armenia, opening a second corridor between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. President Turgut Ozal said that *If we do not show our teeth, this question will never be solved*, which implied a military option could be ordered. Ozal appointed Mustafa Afsin who sought legal bases for possible military action against the Armenian intervention into Nachichevan. When President Turgut Ozal made his last visit to Turkic state in April 1993, he said *Turkey is always with Azerbaijan but Armenians are forcing our patience* in Baku (Hunter, 1995). Since 1993, Turkey-Armenian

diplomatic relations and border crossings have been frozen (Henze, 1996). After Ozal's death, Turkey abandoned his revisionist policy and returned to a bureaucratic policy model towards the region (Uslu, 2003). On the other hand, the relations between Russia and the Azerbaijan government were uneasy. Even though the Muttalibov government joined the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) in December 1991, Majlis speaker Yacub Memmedov did not recognise the agreement, and tension between Russia and Azerbaijan grew during the leadership of Abulfaz Elchibey because Azerbaijan only joined the CIS summit with 'observer' status (Cafersoy, 2001). While the close periphery doctrine (similar to the Monroe doctrine) of Russian foreign policy in the *near abroad* recognized the independence of the Azerbaijan Republic in April 1992, Elchibey asked for Yeltsin to remove Russian troops from Azerbaijani territory during a Moscow meeting on 12 -13 October 1992. 10,000 Russian troops withdrew ahead of schedule, but left a huge arsenal of weapons under the control of Colonel Suret Hussein—a political enemy of the anti-Russian and pro-Turkish Elchibey (Cafersoy, 2001).

As a result of the military coup, Elchibey fled to Nachichevan succeeding, Heydar Aliyev, a former Soviet intelligence chief of the Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosty (KGB) in Azerbaijan and a member of Brezhnev's Politburo, who eventually become president of Azerbaijan and choose Huseinov as his prime minister (Cafersoy, 2001). In 1993, Armenian forces broke the cease-fire and attacked the town of Agdam in July and captured Fizuli and Goradiz on the Iranian border. In spite of UN Security Council Resolution 822, which called for immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from recently occupied areas of Azerbaijan in August, Armenia held on to about one-fifth of Azerbaijan's territory and caused some 1 million civilians to flee their homes (Durch, 1996). It is estimated that 40,000 people were evicted in this conflict (Kanbolat, 2007). Turkey and Iran repeatedly warned Armenia after the fall of Goradiz and Iranian troops did crossed into Azerbaijan, provoking a strong reaction by Moscow. Azerbaijan's counter attack in mid -December provided an incentive for action by the UN Security Council, with Turkey and Russia encouraging the Minsk group initiative, set up in 1992. However, in September 1993, President Aliyev visited Moscow and announced that Azerbaijan would join the CIS (Cafersoy, 2007). After this rapprochement, Kremlin's new initiatives to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue brought together Levon Ter-

Petrosian and Aliyev in Moscow and they came together for another negotiation in September and later in the Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) meeting in December 1993 (Smolansky, 1995:213). In January 1994, Yeltsin's special representative on Nagorno-Karabakh, Vladimir Kazimirov, conducted negotiations with officials from the Iranian foreign ministry (Smolansky, 1995:215). After Moscow and Tbilisi signed a treaty of mutual assistance, which provided for the establishment of Russian bases on Georgian territory and the stationing of the Russian border troops along the frontier with Turkey, Grachev announced that Russia wanted to establish military bases along the Azerbaijani border with Iran (Smolansky, 1995:215). Nevertheless, in late 1993, Azerbaijan-Iran relations entered a new stage as Heydar Aliyev's foreign policy priorities switched from Russian-Iranian relations to Turkish-Western ones. Therefore, President Aliyev visited Ankara to strengthen his hand against Moscow and Erevan in the negotiations (Cafersoy, 2001).

#### **8.2.1.5 The achievement of Russian mediation efforts: ceasefire in May 1994**

A Russian-brokered ceasefire was signed in May 1994 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek under the auspices of the CIS Parliamentary Assembly. Armenian forces had resoundingly defeated the Azeri army and gained control of almost all of Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving it *de facto* under ethnic Armenian control and freeing the enclave from any kind of Azerbaijani rule or influence. In addition, the entire territory between Karabakh and Armenia (Kelbajar and Lachin), and areas in the east and south of Nagorno-Karabakh (Aghdam and Fizuli to the border with Iran) were taken under control by Armenian guerillas. However, no final settlement has ever been signed, even though Minsk initiatives have produced 15 presidential talks since 1994 (Adler, 1998:69-118). Despite the declaration of independence by Nagorno-Karabakh after the unilateral referendum held in the region in December 2006, the international community still recognises the region as a *de jure* part of the Azerbaijan state (Agacan, 2006).

The failure of Iran's initiatives in mediation and its pro-Armenian policy irritated the Azeri population in Iran, and ended the Caspian energy development project, called the *Contract of the Century* thereby accelerating the growth of Washington-Baku relations. After 9/11, Azerbaijan provided airspace and intelligence to support US

policy of the War on Terror, thus leading to the lifting of the American aid ban, imposed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But the assembly's foreign policy decision to recognize the Armenian genocide between 1915 -1918 is still an effective political card against both Baku and Ankara (Palabiyik, 2007). Tehran followed a rational and pragmatic course after the ceasefire. The freezing of the conflict helped develop Tehran-Baku relations, especially in trade with Nachichevan and cooperation on oil transactions with Turkey. Nevertheless, The Kremlin politics still play a deterrent role in the region because Russia still operates a military base in Armenia itself. Furthermore, in April 2006, Russia bought Armenian pipelines and a power generation facility, exchanging it for a 50% gas discount in comparison to European tariffs until 2009. Russia also gained control of the pipeline running from Iran into Armenia as the result, permitting it to affect Iranian influence in the Caucasus. Armenians were appreciative of the Russian armed forces as a counterweight to Turkey's influence, particularly as Armenia is a traditional Russian diplomatic ally. The map shows the final border and Armenian occupied territory in Azerbaijan as of the ceasefire in May 1994.

Integrated maps 8.1: Final border of May 1994 in Nagorno-Karabakh



From Azerbaijan's perspective, the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh undermines its territorial integrity. Azeris believe that Armenia wishes to usurp the areas of upper Karabakh, and Nakichichevan and accuse it of conducting ethnic cleansing in these areas. Baku alleges that the Armenian stance and boycott of Nagorno-Karabakh is

proportionate in the light of rebel opposition by Armenian forces, and refusing diplomatic efforts with the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), which it does not consider as a legal entity. Azerbaijan stated that diplomatic acknowledgment of (NKR) by Armenia will be taken declaration of war. Turkey supports all mediation efforts as well as Azerbaijan's politics (Szayna, Larrabee, 1995). On the other hand, though Armenia supports the resolution of 1989, stating that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Armenia, Yerevan has neither enforced this resolution nor recognised the NKR government, fearing that such action may result in war and provoke the surrounding countries such as Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan. The co-chaired mediation efforts by the OSCE-Minsk Group will continue, but the situation will unlikely to produce a resolution.


#### **8.2.1.6 The activities of the United Azerbaijan Movement (UAM)**

Azerbaijan and Turkey began to use the Azeri ethnic political card to lessen Iran's and Armenia's influence in the region (Cornell, 1999:92). Turkey also has a reason to support Azeri nationalism, namely to reduce Iran's support for the PKK insurgency. With parallel nationalist intuition, Baku allowed the opening of a headquarters of the National Liberation Movement of South Azerbaijan (NLMSA) and the United Azerbaijan Movement (UAM) in Azerbaijan. In return, Tehran closed the Shams Tabriz newspaper and its chief editor, Ali Hamidian, was arrested by the Tabriz Aras court on 11 December 2001 (Olson, 2006). Muhammad Ali Johragani's separatist activities intensified relations between Azerbaijan and Iran when he began to criticise Persian chauvinism and discrimination against Iranian Azeris during his visit of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and European countries. His Washington visit was critical as it coincided with the Bush government's announcement of an "Axis of Evil." He said that 70 million Iranians were grateful for President Bush's 29 January 2002 declaration that Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea were part of the Axis of Evil (Olson, 2004:207-13). In return, Khatami called the Caspian Sea the Mazandaran Sea, angering Aliyev during his Tehran visit. Aliyev said *There is no such name as the Mazandaran Sea on world map. If there is a lake with that name in Iran let me know about it* (Olson, 2004:207-13). The visit of the Turkish President, Ahmed Necdet Sezer with a 120-member trade delegation to Tabriz on 3 June and Tehran on 17-18 June 2002 diminished the tension between the two countries (Olson, 2004:148). Sezer



held talks with Khatami, vice president Muhammad Reza Aref and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad M. Aminzade on issues ranging from improving trade relations to security issues. Six months after Sezer’s visit to Tehran, Mahmud Ali Johragani arrived in Washington DC on 8 August 2003, stayed in Washington between August and June 2003 and met with Pentagon officials, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. He said that the role of the US is to communicate to the Iranian people their firm support for their democratic aspirations and human rights and to let them know their voice is heard (Olson, 2004). However, Turkey always refrains from using the Azeri ethnic political card against its counterpart despite the activities of Azeri nationalists in Turkey, and even though Iran’s demographic structure is vulnerable for penetration by Turkey. Turkey maintains this policy that respects and ensures Iranian sovereignty for the sake of regional stability. Hence, Azerbaijani nationalism is not considered a prime issue between Turkey and Iran but the potential capacity of Turkish nationalism always results in suspicions by Iran against Turanism ideology, which is the main reason for the mistrustful relationship between Turkey and Iran.

Figure 8.2: Ethnic Groups in Iran



Sources: The Institute for National Security in cooperation with Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, Iran military balance Online at: [www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1198577424.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1198577424.pdf); compiled by author

### 8.2.1.7 Russian military presence Armenia (1992-2017)

The Russian 102<sup>nd</sup> military base in Gyumri, about 120 kilometers (75 miles) from the Armenian capital, Yerevan, includes constitutes a portion of the anti-air system of the

CIS and was installed in 1995 (<http://en.rian.ru/world/20061006/54574689.html>). The 5,000 - person outpost is subordinate to the South Caucasus Russian command and wields S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) systems and MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters (Ridder, 2007). In 2005, the 102<sup>nd</sup> military base had 74 tanks, 17 infantry fighting vehicles, 148 armored personnel carriers, 84 artillery pieces, 30 MiG-29 fighters and a number of batteries of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles. Russian forces have 29 gendarme stations: 12 stations in Gyumri, 4 in Ahuryan, 2 in Aragac, 1 in Esterek, 7 in Yerevan, and 1 in Kafan. There are 2 in military bases in Nubarasan. According to a 25-year strategic military agreement between Moscow and Yerevan signed in February 1992, the Russian border command operates on the borders of Armenia with Turkey and Iran uses 1500 soldiers (Cababrlı, 2004). According to SIPRI databases, Russia has sold US\$ 531 millions of armaments to Yerevan since independence (SIPRI, 2008). On the other hand, this dependency on Russia undermines Armenia's independency process, because Moscow bought a military factory at Nairit, the Mars and Hrazdan Hydroelectric stations and other 5 major other factories from Armenia on 17 July 2002(SIPRI:2008).

**Table 8.1: Russian military bases in Armenia (1992-2017) (Generated by author)**

| Number of<br>Military bases | Location                              | Numbers of bases | Location                                     |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|--|
| 1                           | Gyumri, Big castle                    | 1                | The city of Aragats ,<br>Kervansaray village |
| 2                           | Gyumri, Kirpic street.                | 2                | The city of Aragats, Gehadzor<br>village     |
| 3                           | Gyumri, Kars road                     | 1                | The city of Ahuryan , Ket<br>village         |
| 5                           | Gyumri, Bulvar street.                | 54               | Yerevan, Kenakeri street/54                  |
| 6                           | Gyumri, Cerkesdzor street.            | 1                | Esterek/Egvard                               |
| 8                           | Gyumri, Sirakaci street.              | 41               | Yerevan, Orbeli street/29                    |
| 9                           | Gyumri, Ozanyan street /1             | 63               | Yerevan, Siraki/24 Babayan<br>street /4      |
| 5                           | Gyumri, Plehanov street/20            | 58               | Yerevan, Babayan street/4                    |
| 21                          | Gyumri, Sverdlov street/222           | 3                | Nubarsen town                                |
| 16                          | Gyumri, Kamo street/46                | 4                | Nubarsen town                                |
| 56                          | Gyumri, Bulvar street.                | 52               | Yerevan, Ayvazovski street<br>/13            |
| 57                          | Gyumri, Bulvar street.                | 60               | Yerevan, Arinderd steet                      |
| 1                           | The city of Ahuryan, Ovuni<br>village | 61               | Yerevan, Araratyan street                    |
| 1                           | The city of Ahuryan, Açık village     | 1                | The city of Kafan, Ohtar<br>village          |
| 1                           | The city Ahuryan, Azatan village      |                  |  |

Sources: (Kenjetaev, 1997)



#### 8.2.1.8 Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan (1985-2012)

The strategically important Russian early-warning system in Azerbaijan maintains the global security connection between Russia and the southern Caucasus. The major Soviet Union air defence structure, the Daryal-type Gabala Radar Station, was constructed in Azerbaijan's Gabala region (320 kilometres northwest of Baku) in 1978 and began its operations in 1985. It is designed to monitor the launch of inter-continental ballistic missiles in the southern hemisphere. The speaker of the Turkish parliament, Omer Izci, expressed concerns about the Gabala-contract's ongoing expansion until 2012 during a February 2003 trip. Nonetheless, the Azerbaijani parliament's speaker, Murtuz Eleskerov stated that "Turkey might use this base in the future, and the information to be obtained by Gabala might be shared with Turkey" (cited in Ogan, 2003). The Daryal-class station can cover range of 7,200 kilometres with the capacity to follow ballistic objects and other entities in 2-3 seconds, calculated speed, and direction to one millimetre precision. It can cover Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and India, parts of China, Africa, Australia and portions of the Indian and Atlantic oceans. The mid-range and ICBM weapons that can be fired from these areas may be tracked with superior accuracy by this installation when juxtaposed against satellites. It is said that Tomahawk and cruise missiles fired from American ships and planes during the Afghanistan war were located right away by Russia through the Qabala installation (Ogan, 2003). It also reportedly yielded intelligence on the Iran-Iraq and the second Gulf War. An agreement was signed in 1996 to declare the base's affiliation with Azerbaijan (Ogan, 2003). It stipulated a maximum of 1,500 persons at the installations, both Russian and Azerbaijani, with the latter numbering about 500. The Gabala station is a significant card which Azerbaijan wishes to deploy against Armenia. Baku wishes to trade Gabala for Russia's alliance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as it considers its position to have been very generous on the base previous. Russia is expected to cut Yerevan's support in exchange. Nonetheless, Putin stated that *The Nagorno-Karabakh problem should be solved through a formula, which contains no winners or losers*. This brought forth the fact that Russia tries to avoid strategic commitments against third party countries including Armenia (Ogan, 2003). A statement by the Russian Air Force Commander General Anatoli Kornukov is useful in understanding the situation, as he stated that CIS air systems completely controlled Turkish air space. In February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey


Lavrov stated that Russia will not permit NATO enlargement to the southern borders of the country. Putin suggested joint use with the US of the Azerbaijani station to solve the US missile defence conflict over Eastern Europe whilst at a G8 summit in June 2007. He stated that this installation could detect Iranian experimentation with missiles capable of European attack and could nullify the need for US installations in the Czech Republic and missiles in Poland. Whilst his delegation looked over the site President Aliyev on 10 June corroborated the proposal by considering it to be enhancing of his country's ties with the country. However, the officials emphasised they would refuse cooperation if any attacks were launched against Iran, as it has a large Azeri minority. They also rejected speculation that the US shield will be deployed in the country, despite its cooperation with US and NATO. Neither Yeni Azerbaijan, MP Mirzazade nor analyst Musabekov believes Iran's reaction to be a grievous threat to Azerbaijan. They stated that "it is possible that Iran will not be happy with the idea. However, we should know that *It [Gabala station] is a defensive system* (Iran Press, 12 June 2007). After the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the possible Russian interference in Azerbaijan will become critical for both Turkey and Iran. The Ukraine and Georgia are now major arms-trade partners of Azerbaijan while Turkey provides military training, only having sold \$US 3 million worth of military equipment to Baku in 2001. As a GUAM member state, the Ukraine sold \$US 250 million arms and equipment to Azerbaijan (SIPRI, 2008). U/I Infantry Company of Azerbaijan also sent 150 military troops for operation in Iraq, whereas, the U/I Support Unit of Armenia only send 46 troops (globalsecurity.org). The Pentagon gives practical training to the Caucasian states' military personnel in war zones in Iraq. Whilst the US Turkish and Israeli initiatives in Azerbaijan seem to be mostly an exhibit of soft power, the Russia-Iran axis has a more systematic relationship with Armenia.

#### **8.2.2.0 The ethnic instability in Georgia and its impact on Turko-Iranian regional competition**

Georgia is located at the intersection of the East and the West and played an important role by hosting 150,000 Soviet troops during the Cold War. The post-Soviet and post-9/11 international order dramatically increased the significance of Tbilisi's new policy orientation towards NATO–EU. Georgia transports between 5 and 45 million tonnes

of oil annually by means of its ports and the southern Caucasus pipelines from Azerbaijan, including possibly oil from Kazakstan and Turkmenistan as well as Uzbek cotton, and Kazakh metal ores, now shipped through Georgia. It also has control over an important portion of the Black Sea coast which borders Turkey, land locking Armenia from the West at the geographic intersection of Turkey, Iran and Russia. Its importance has increased since the finale of the Cold War. The *Silk Road*, a massive venture, will one day include roads (*TERRACE*) railroads (Kars-Tbilisi-Baku), airports, and communications networks extending from London to China. The effect would be to change entirely the economic and political landscape of the region, in ways likely to undermine Turkish and Iranian priorities. The rebels usually form alliances with one of the blocs, including Abkhazian, Armenian and Ossetes rebels placing their weight behind the Eastern bloc of Russia, Armenia, Iran, Greece and Turkmenistan in exchange for Caspian Sea oil and pipelines, while Chechnya's and Azeris prefer the Western bloc including Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the United States. Despite having Russian peacekeeping forces in the pro-Russian Abkhazia at Sukhumi and mixed peace forces in the pro-Russian Tskhinvali in South Ossetia, Georgian president Saakashvili's pro-Western policy has faced a train crash in Bucharest and a miscalculated attack that led to the deaths of over 2000 Ossetians and re-involvement of Russia in the region. Since the declaration of independence, Georgia has played no significant role in determining the international borders in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The diagram below, based on the last Soviet Russian census in 1989, is valuable in understanding the ethnic instability in the southern Caucasus.

**Figure 8.3: Ethnic distribution in Georgia & Abkhazia, 1989**



Sources:Soviet Census, 1989; compiled by author

### **8.2.2.1 Abkhazian- Georgian war/conflict**

Abkhazia spans 3,300 square miles between the eastern shores of the Black Sea and the main Caucasus range; from the rivers Psou (in the north) and Ingur (in the south). To the north, Abkhazia is bordered by Russia and to the south by the Georgian provinces of Svanetia and Mingrelia. It was annexed by Russia in 1864, with 60% of its population forcibly relocated to Turkey, resulting in empty villages and swaths of land. According to the Turkish census in 1945, 8,602 speakers of Abkhaz were recorded. It is now estimated that more than half the Abkhazian people live in Turkey and regularly apply pressure on the Turkish government against Georgian pro-nationalist policies in the region. Therefore, Turkey is not considered to be an outsider to the Abkhazian conflict. But Ankara and Tbilisi have managed their differences and maintained a geostrategic partnership during the war. Georgia's more prolonged war with Abkhazian separatists, which broke out in August 1992, ended in Edward Shevardnadze's government's defeat in September 1993. This led to loss of the Abkhazian Republic in Sukhumi in which separatists achieved an 83 % control of the region, the deaths of 20,000 and the dislocation of 200,000-300,000 Georgian people from their homes in areas controlled by Abkhaz allies (Mooney, 1995). In the course of the conflict, Russian, Chechen, Cossack and Muslim fighters from the north Caucasus and Abkhaz volunteers from Turkey fought Georgia. Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, proposed a similar-sized counterbalancing force to end the ethnic dispute. Four Russian bases in Georgia and 1,000 CIS peacekeepers in Abkhazia to be exchanged for Georgian integrity of territory. Georgia had to agree although Russia reneged on its end of the deal by supporting the Vladislav Ardzinba group in Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital.

### **8.2.2.2 The mediation effort of regional players in the Abkhazian-Georgian conflict**

Georgia had to sign the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbouring agreement with Russia and agree to join the CIS on 8 October 1993 after a visit by the Russian defence minister, Pavel Garachev. According to the CIS security arrangement, the Russians agreed to establish four military bases in Georgia's ethnic conflict zones

(Bradshaw, 1994). Whilst the agreement on military facilities gave 15,000 Russian troops joint use of all Georgian ports, airfields and border guards, which remained on the Georgian part of the Turkish border, the Georgian parliament never ratified these agreements (Fuller, 2006:26). The peace talks between Georgia and Abkhazia under Russian and UN auspices (the UN had been active in Georgia since autumn 1992) resulted in the December 1993 signing of a MoU and in May 1994 a ceasefire agreement as well as a deal on the deployment of a Commonwealth Independent States, Peacekeeping Force (CIS, PKF), to be monitored by the United Nations Observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). These arrangements put in place 1,500 Russian peace-keepers patrolling 24 km-wide security zones. The UN was not a major help to Abkhazia regardless of its participation in peace dialogue since 1994 for it failed to solve the dispute and integrate Abkhazia back into Georgia. Though the city of Batumi was accepted in the *National Pact* and has guarantor status of Turkey over the question of Georgian Muslim minority right in Ajara, and Khemsili Muslim, Turkey has supported the Tbilisi government and every solution which the counterparts has accepted under UNOMIG (Stavropoulou, 1998). Moreover, the foreign minister of Turkey, Hikmet Cetin, visited Georgia in May 1992 and signed the diplomatic protocols according to which both parties recognise the legacy of the Kars Treaty in 1921 (Celikpala, 2006). Ankara only pressured Georgia to make active policies for repatriating the Meskheta Turkish diaspora. However, the demographic settlement made it impossible to relocate the returnees due to the fact that Javakhetia Armenians compose 60 % of the population after the deportation of Meskheta Turks in 1944 from the region (Aydingün, 2002). Turkey commenced active diplomacy with President Demirel's visit to Georgia. Both parties signed the friendship cooperation and neighbouring agreement on 30 July 1994 (Hurriyet 14 May 1994; Newspot, 13 May 1994; Moscow News, 15 July 1994). However, the ethnic conflict and guerrilla activities of Georgian guerrilla forces undermined the peacekeeping activities of the UN despite some achievement. For instance, between 1993 and 1998, 40,000 Georgian refugees returned home to the Gali district, where in 1993 they made up 100% of population after the peacekeepers were deployed in a security zone along the Inguri River. On May 19, 1998, Abkhazia transported heavy guns and armour into Gali, a Georgian-demographic part of Abkhazia, exiling 30,000 Georgians and demolishing homes. Since the CIS-PKF's inception, although there have been discussions both within the CIS and the UNOMIG, 1,500 to 2,000 men have

controlled the zone of responsibility. But by the end of June 2008, their numbers have had increased to 3,000. On the other hand, the UNOMIG observer mission currently consists of some 121 observers and the UN Security Council regularly extends its mandate.

**Integrated map 8.2: the peacekeeping arrangement of CIS PKF and UNOMIG in the conflict zones of Georgia**




Sources: UNOMIG, 2007

**8.2.2.3 The Ajara, Javakhati (Akhalkalak) and Meskhetian repatriation question and presence or removal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Georgia**

Conflicts perservere between Tbilisi government and Aslan Abashidze, a pro-Russian figure in the Georgian region of Ajara near the Black Sea, facilitated by Russian military forces stationed there. Georgia has doubts about the feelings and loyalty of the Armenian groups in the Javakheti region near Armenia, where a Russian military base is located near the town of Akhalkalaki.



Figure 8.4: Ethnic distribution in Adjara in 1989



Sources: Soviet Cencus, 1989; complied by author

The 1989 census indicates that the Ajar Republic contained a total population of 381,000. Georgians constituted 317,000 of that number. The number of Ajar (Georgian Muslims) has been estimated to be around 130,000-160,000 or 34-42% of regional population. Most of the Ajar see themselves as Georgian. However, for most locals, ‘Georgian’ means being Georgian. The Ajars are Muslim and are therefore, not considered real Georgians. Before the election in January 2008 in Georgia, President M. Saakashili revealed his conversation with Putin who said that “I would make Georgia a second Cyprus” in the summit in 2006 (Kamalov, 2007). Turkey is still the guarantor of the Ajara region where most of the population is Georgian Muslim. Georgian troops at the frontier in Ajara regions are directed by Aslan Abashidze, using recruitment within that region. The Russian base in Batumi and Akhalkalak sparks further conflicts. At the OSCE Istanbul Summit on 17 November 1999, which was a part of the adaption of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, in accordance with the Istanbul joint statement, Russia promised to shut the Vaziani base in Abkhazia and stated in June 2002 that its Gudauta installation was shut, with only 320 soldiers remaining to aid the Russian “*peacekeepers*” (Oliker, Szayna 2003:36). It has already done so. Whilst Russia agreed to close down its military bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki at the end of 2003, it only reduced its military hardware to 241 tanks 153 armoured combat vehicles and 140 artillery pieces. A train composed of 32 carriages, moved 60 122 mm artillery shells and parts to a howitzer, totalling 200 tons of cargo, from the Batumi base on the Black Sea to Russia via Azerbaijan.

By the end of 2006 all the heavy military equipment will be removed from Akhalkalaki and remaining weapons from Batumi by 1 October 2007 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 23-29 November, 2007: p.3).

**Integrated Map: 8.3. Russian military presence in Georgia, (1992-2008)**




Sources: <http://www.kommersant.com/pda/doc.asp?id=850612>

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Meskhetian Muslims, or Meskhetian Turks (Ahiska Turkleri) were deported in 1944 from Samtskhe-Javakheti to Central Asia. In 1989 and 1990 Meskhetians survived a pogrom They were targets of local ethnic violence in Central Asia and many of them left Uzbekistan for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia and were resettled in Azerbaijan, in Krasnodar and Stavropo, Krai Ukraine and in Kabardino-Balkaria in Russia (Calep, 1997:12-16). According to the last Soviet census of 1989, Meskhetians numbered 207,500 while current estimates for them are between 270,000 and 320,000 (Henze, 1991). In 2001 between 90,000 and 110,000 lived in Azerbaijan where the state policies of Azerbaijan are more favourable to immigrants who are given Azerbaijani citizenship (Matveeva, 2002). Although Georgia accepted the conditions for joining the Council of Europe in 1999 that it resettles Meskhetians by the end of 2008, the Tbilisi government has been slow in executing the promise and also requests a declaration of being ethnic Georgians. Therefore, there have been very few applications to date, due to uncertainties



regarding the recognition of the ethnic and religious identities of the applicants. On the other hand, the prospect that returnees will be faced with another domestic problem is met with overwhelming local resentment by Georgians and Armenians in their ethnic homelands in the period prior to their deportation. Azerbaijan and Turkey, wary of upsetting their relationship with Georgia, support the Meskhetian right to return, but conditional on its acceptance by the Georgian side. Under the combined pressure from the UNHCR, the OSCE together with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) recommended the passing of legislation allowing repatriation, and a draft law was presented to the Council of Europe in March 2001. Meskhetian minority organisations such as Vatan, registered in 1994 in Russia, and Hsna, registered in Georgia in 1992, and the Union of Georgian Repatriants and the Latifshah Baratashvili Foundation were established later in Georgia in order to resettle the Ahiska Turks in their homeland in Georgia. After the August 2008 Georgian-Russian War in South Ossetia, there appear to be few prospects of any progress toward the resettlement of Ahiska Turks in their homeland.

**Integrated map 8.4: Deportation and exile of Meskhetians (1947-1953 and 1992)**



Note: yellow arrow: deportation in 1947-1953, red arrow; deportation in 1992

#### **8.2.2.4 Turkey's and Iran's policy option on the Chechen question and its connection with the Pankisi Gorge**


Turkey's rapprochement to the southern Caucasus and support of pan-Turkish activities in Tatarstan, Bakirdistan and Chechnya frustrated the Kremlin, for instance hosting the Chechen leader Cevher Dudayev and the meeting with President Demirel in October 1993 on the verge of the first Chechen War (1994-1996) (Bennigsen, 1999). Therefore, Russia accused both Turkey and Georgia of harbouring and supporting Chechen rebels. On the one hand, the strained relations between Georgia and Russia. Georgia rejected the joint-action plan against Chechen militants in the Pankisi region of Georgia (German, 2004). Countries which were involved in assisting Chechnya included Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, the secessionist Abkhaz republic and Tajikistan, as well as the Russian regions of Ingushetia, Kalmyk and Astrakhan, particularly areas along the routes to/from Azerbaijan through Dagestan. The usage of the ethnic political card against Turkish initiatives forced the formation of GUAM and strengthened the Georgian ties of Georgia with intensified dialogue at NATO. Proposals were made to work with NATO to fund this force within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program, which was established by NATO to strengthen ties with former eastern bloc and former Soviet states (Chikvaidze, 1994:27). However, after 9/11 Russia became the ally of the West against global terrorism. This gave Russia some latitude in the Second Chechen war (1999 to present) against the guerrilla fighters. Still, Turkey and US governments were not happy to see Russian jets bombing the Pankisi area of Georgia (German, 2004). Therefore, the Bush administration sent a small contingent of US military personnel to Georgia to help train and equip Georgian security forces to combat the Chechen, Arab Afghani, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups who had infiltrated Georgia in 2002 (Soner and Gencsoy, 2007). Hence, Georgia launched a second security operation and deployed 1,000 troops (following another in January 2002) on 24 August 2002 (Nichol, 2007). Regardless, the rivalry between Turkey and Russia was dissipated when Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish PM, visited Russia at the launch of its attack on Grozny, Chechnya. He did not defend the Chechens and this was appreciated as a 'real politik' act in the mutual relations (Reynolds, 2002). The countries inked a 4 January 2004 military cooperation agreement resulting in exchanges of officers between military academies (Smith, 2002). On 14-15 January

2002 the Russian Chief of Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, with a significant group of officers/intelligence personnel, made a trip to Turkey and spoke to Chief of Staff Kivrikoglu (TDNs, 15 January 2002), in the hope that Turkey and Russia could achieve stability through cooperation.

**8.2.2.5.0 Ethnic instability in South Ossetia: Georgian-Ossetian conflict**

Ossetes, Tats and mountain Judaists are considered to be Persian-speaking people in Caucasus (Tatiana, and Perepelkin, 1996: 80). Hence, Iranian people call them Cenubi Persians. The Soviet divide and rule strategy delimited Ossetia as South Ossetia and North Ossetia. The largely Christian people of South Ossetia was established as an autonomous region (oblast) within the Republic of Georgia in 1920s but the larger number of Ossetians (350.000 in the 1989) lives in the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic of the Russian Federation. In the 1980s the population in South Ossetia was 65,200% Ossetes and 29 % Georgians. In 1989 more than 60 percent of the Ossetes population of Georgia lived outside South Ossetia.

**Figure: 8.5. South Ossetia population distribution, 1989**



Sources: Soviet Cencus, 1989; compiled by author

South Ossetia declared its independence from Tbilisi in August 1990. Georgian autocrat, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, launched a military campaign against the pro-Russian Ossetians to crush all efforts at autonomy in South Ossetia. Sending guerrilla troops into the capital of Tskhinvali caused 160,000 Ossetians to flee North Ossetia into



Russia. Most of the Georgian population in Ossetia was displaced to Georgia and replaced with 100,000 Ossetians living in other parts of Georgia at the end of year (Herzig, 1999). Ultimately, in June 1992 a cease-fire was signed between Georgia and South Ossetia. The combined peace-keeping forces of Ossetia (1100), Georgia (300), and Russia (530), supervised under a Joint Control Commission (JCC), were located in the region but the negotiations were not under the auspices of any international organisation, though the OSCE had had a resident mission in Georgia since 1992--but its mission was always low profile. Neither Turkey nor Iran had any policy priorities in the Ossetian-Georgian conflict until the Russian-Georgian war began in August 2008.

#### **8.2.2.5.1 The Russian-Georgian War or Russian peace-keeping operations in South Ossetia (8-12 August 2008)**

In a November 2006 referendum, 99 % of South Ossetians voted for independence from Georgia, at a time when most of them had long held Russian passports. On 7 August, Georgian president Saakashvili's miscalculated attack and killing of 2,000 Ossetians (Chossudovsky, 2008), led to the rationalisations of a 5-day Russian military invasion into Georgian territory "as an effort to protect the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may be", as stressed by the Russian President Dimitri Medvedev (Chossudovsky, 2008). According to one report, some 34,000 people from South Ossetia fled to Russia (Deseret Morning News, 10 August 2008). During the five-day Russian-Georgian war between 8 and 12 August, Russia was aware of its engagement with Western countries and Turkey's interest in Georgia. Therefore, Russia did not attack any essential Western investment such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline the Baku-Tbilisi and Erzurum natural gas pipelines, nor did it conduct any air attacks against Tbilisi and the Batumi airport, which are operated by the Turkish company, TAV under a *management agreement* with the Georgian government. Ultimately, the five -day war between Georgia and Russia was extinguished, but the ceasefire agreement needed skilfully negotiating by President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and agreed with his counterparts Dimitri Medvedev and Mikheil Saakashvili. The Turkish Prime Minister's subsequent visit to Moscow and Tbilisi enhanced Turkey's regional policy options; Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's

“Caucasus Pact” idea was considered an opportunity to create an inclusive (Russia, Turkey, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) new foreign policy approach to solve all the frozen or unfrozen conflicts while Ankara hosted the Iran’s President Ahmedinejat on 14 August2008.

Integrated map 8.5: Russia-Georgian War map (8-12 August 2008)



Sources: Friedman, 2008

### 8.2.2.5.2 The South Caucasus’ external security context in the Russian-Georgian war

Although Georgia is not an official member of NATO, its defence systems and military training are fully integrated into NATO procedure. In 2005, the Georgian president announced the inauguration of the Senakskaya and Gori military bases that were restored by Turkish companies, which fully meet NATO standards in Georgia. 13 Turkish air forces military officers have provided Georgian pilot training in Senakskaya bases since the 1995 (Lebanidze, 2002). The Gori bases have also been used to train Georgian troops dispatched to fight under US command at the Iraq war theatre (Ria Novosti, 26 May 2006). Georgia has the third largest contingent of coalition forcers in Iraq after the US and the UK, with some 2000 troops. According

to reports, Georgian troops in Iraq are now being repatriated in US military planes (C-17 strategic airlifters) to fight Russian forces (Yeni Safak, 15 August 2008). However, Americans claim that the C-17 flights carried 30 tons of medical supplies and humanitarian aid from Germany to the Georgian capital Tbilisi. Russian forces are now directly fighting a NATO-US, trained Georgian army which includes US and Israeli and Turkish army staff advisers. According to US military sources (spokesman for the US European Command), the US has more than 100 military trainers in Georgia. A Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said that there were no plans to redeploy the estimated 130 US troops and civilian contractors, who were stationed in the area around Tbilisi (AFP, 9 August 2008). The US has also informed Russia as to which Tbilisi hotel is housing 17 Marines who were training Georgian troops so that the Russians would not attack it, Pentagon officials said (Youssef, 2008) While the NATO and US military advisers did not partake in the military operation *per se*, they were actively involved in the planning and logistics of the attacks.

The United States of America have provided Georgia with US\$30 million in annual military assistance, Turkey and Israel have made US\$ 100 million and US\$ 300 million worth of military equipment since 2000 (Peter, 2008). Today Saakashvili's army consists of 30,000 men, and his military budget is 30 times as large as it was during the term of former president Shevardnadze. However, the consequences of the war opened a Pandora's Box by triggering regional instability in the Caucasus. During the five- day war, Armenia breached the security contract between Tbilisi and Yerevan by allowing Russian aircraft to bomb Georgia. Hence, the Tbilisi government revised once more its relations with Yerevan. They will likely end up in a conflict in the Javakheti region (Yillmaz, 2008). Several hours after the ceasefire was announced on 12 August, Saakashvili declared that Georgia would leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and, following the missile defence system deal between Poland and United States announced that this would bring the most severe confrontation of two major powers since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Abkhazia and South Ossetia acted as trump cards and gave an opportunity to Moscow as if it were the West Bank of the Caucasus and allow for the possibility that Georgia will not be able to gain control its internationally recognised territory (Kanbolat, 2008). From the Russian standpoint, the Caucasus has been a buffer zone near the Turkish and Iranian frontiers since the days of the Tsars. Washington, Tel Aviv and Ankara, on the

other hand, are courting Georgia, which they see as a way to curb Moscow's influence in the southern Caucasus. However, they have not become involved in any conflict in the northern part of the Caucasus yet. Georgia is now also an important transit country for arms to Armenia for Moscow and oil being pumped from the Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan as well as a potential base for Washington efforts to encircle Tehran.

### **8.2.3 Overview of the internal and external security resettlement in the southern Caucasus**

The multifaceted Russian presence, including a thousand military, peacekeeping and border troops in Georgia and Armenia and also 1,500 troops at the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan have acquired a continuing status through the signing of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty (CST) by Armenia, Russia, and others in 1992 in order to provide mutual aid and ensure the security of the ethnic groups in the conflict zones in the region. Although Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from the SST in 1999, Russia still secured permission for two military bases in Armenia and three in Georgia and Russian border troops guard Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran, continuing to put pressure on Tehran and Ankara. More than 100,000 Russian troops also are stationed nearby in North Caucasus. Although Russia has already diversified its foreign policy and attempted to strengthen engagement with the West, the Georgian-Russian war in August stopped the normalisation of Russian relations with the Western countries and increased concern about the security of energy transports through Georgia –Turkey and the Black Sea.

On the other hand, Washington has considered Turkey as a country able to foster pro-Western sentiments, and to limit Russian and Iranian influence. The Azerbaijani view Turkey-Israel as a major ally against Russian influence in Armenia and Georgia. Despite having structural obstacles, Armenia is a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation organisation, along with Turkey, and the two states have established consular relations. Iran is a major trade partner with Armenia, partly due to having 200,000 Armenian citizens in Iran. In contrast, Georgia has an abiding interest in ties with the approximately 1 million Georgians residing in Turkey and the approximately

50,000 residing in Iran, and has signed friendship treaties with both states (Nickol, 2008). Turkey's policy in the Caucasus is mainly dependant on NATO's approval of an *Intensified Dialogue* between Georgia and the alliance that might lead to membership, which could minimise the Russian presence in the region. At the end of February 2007, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that Russia "*will not permit*" such NATO expansion. The Membership Action Plan for Georgia was faced with a serious challenge by the Russian military operation in August 2008. Therefore, Turkey did not support Saakashvili's violence which triggered the war and did not want to risk its improved relations with Moscow. In the framework of the US war on terror, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian forces worked as peacekeepers in Kosovo as part of the NATO force, with Azerbaijan also aiding efforts in Afghanistan. After Kosovo's declaration of independence, Georgia withdrew its 150 peace-keeping forces from Kosovo in April 2008, as it prepared to focus on troop deployments to Afghanistan. On the other hand, Azerbaijan (150 in August 2003), Armenia (46 in January 2005) and Georgia (2,000 in 2002) dispatched and deployed military troops in Iraq. Georgia has the third-largest number of troops in Iraq, after the United States and the United Kingdom (Jibladze, 2007). However, Ankara and the Pentagon's security capacity in the region was shown to be filled with holes, due to the Russian action or so called 'peacekeeping operation' in South Ossetia.

The ethnic instability is shown in map 8.6 below; in addition to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan is vulnerable to Russian intervention in Lezghian (171,400 in Azerbaijan in the census of 1989) on the border with Dagestan (ethnologue.com) and open to Iran's influence over Tat in the border with Iran (24,000 Tat reside in Azerbaijan in Census 1989) (www.thnologue.com). After the Georgian-Russian war in August, Russian leadership clarified that there is no guarantee of Georgian territorial unity after Saakashvili's slaughter of his own people. The autonomous regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia are now under Russian influence as is the region of Javakhati, which open up possibilities for Armenian interference in the region. The ethnic Swans in the Pankisi Gorge region still remain in a safe haven for guerrillas in the Caucasus. Additionally, the recent war shows that Turkey and Georgia have serious problems, especially in the resettlement of Meskhatians diasporas and the pro-nationalist policy of Saakashvili in the Adjara region.



Integrated map 8.6: Population migration and displacement in the southern Caucasus, 1988-2004



Sources: Change and et al 2008

8.3.0 Religious roots of instability in Central Asia and its impact on Turko-Iranian regional competition

The head of the Council of Muftis in Russia, announced that Russia’s population of 144 million contains 23 million ethnic Muslims in Volga-Ural and then northern Caucuses today, a rise of 40 % since 1989. An estimated 3-4 million Muslims are migrants from former Soviet regions, including 2 million Azeri, 1 million Kazakhs, and several hundred thousand Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz (Pipes,2005). By 2020, with the present growth rate, Muslims will account for 1/5 of the entire population of Russia (Al-Jazeera, 13 January 2007). However, the role of political Islam in Volga-Ural has been insignificant due to 400 years of Russian political, economic and ethno-cultural domination, higher levels of industrialisation, urbanisation and subsequent secularisation of the population and a large proportion of non-Muslim, mainly Russian, population. On the one hand, for historical and social reasons, the proliferation of radical Islam has been most intensive in the Fergana Valley, which in politico-administrative terms is divided between the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. During the heyday of the Taliban regime (1996-2001) Afghanistan had become the epicentre of terrorism with sanctuaries and training facilities provided to the likes of Al- Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of


Uzbekistan (IMU). Since 1999, the main agents of Islamic radicalism in Fergana valley has been Hizb at-Tahrir al-Islamii (Party of Islamic Liberation, HT) and to a lesser extent Akramiyya in Tajikistan. Neither Turkey nor Iran is happy to see the Saudi -backed activities of radical Islamist groups in Central Asia. Though Tajikistan is, religiously, Sunnite and in direct connection with the Fergana Valley, which has a different religious interpretation from the Iranian version of Islam, the Tajiks-Iran language connection provides Tehran with a cultural sphere of influence throughout the region, similar to Turkey's language and cultural connections with Azerbaijan.

### **8.3.1 The war on the Iranian periphery: Tajik civil war (1992-1997) and the Taliban connection**

Tajikistan is the only country in the cultural sphere of influence of Iran in Central Asia. The Iranian deputy minister emphasises that *the expansion of Iranian and Tajikistani ties was a natural continuation of common history between the two nations, which was disrupted during 70 years of communist rule* (Rundle, 1995:114). After the independence declaration on 9 September 1991, Iran was the first country starting diplomatic relations with Dushanbe by opening the Iranian embassy, at the location of which the street name was renamed from Maxim Gorky to Tehran. The statute of Lenin was replaced with that of Iran's greatest epic poet, Ferdowsi (Mesbahi, 1995:112-146). In fact, the Tajik language is very similar to Persian, spoken in Iran, and to Dari, spoken in Afghanistan. This cultural lineage encouraged Iran to establish the *Association for Persian-Speaking Countries* which organises cultural connection with Tajikistan by adopting the Persian alphabet instead of the Cyrillic (Afrasiabi, 1994:117). In response, the Tajik government embraced its historical legacy of Samanids and Iranian cultural heritage in Khorasan, allowing Iran to make inroads in Central Asia (Beeman, 1999). However, civil war broke out in May 1992 between the old-guard supporters of the government, backed by Moscow and a loosely organised opposition composed of disenfranchised groups from the region of Garm, Gorno-Badakhshan democratic liberal reformists and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRT) (Hiro, 1994). Iran wanted to play the role of mediator in the conflict. In the meantime in June 1992, President Rafsanjani said that *Iran is ready to become involved in negotiations with opposition groups* when Nabiev was visiting Tehran

(Hunter, 2003). However, anti-government demonstrations in the capital, Dushanbe, escalated civil war between pro-government forces and opponents of the Islamic-Democratic block, who then tried to show their military strength and unity during the bloody days of September-October of 1992. During an intense conflict in the winter of 1992-93, the conservative Kulyabi and Khojent militias with Russian, and Uzbeks assistance restored the former communists to power in Tajikistan (Horsman, 1999). Uzbekistan is the only historical competitor of Iran in this conflict zone, because Uzbekistani people comprise 23.5 % (1,198,000) of the Tajikistan population provide Kerimow and thus can interfere with Tajik internal affairs (Vesniki: 1990:12). On the other hand, the conflict threatened the domestic stability of Uzbekistan because Tajik people compose 4.3% (934.000) of Uzbekistan's population. The Tajiks p comprise in Afghanistan consists of 27 % of the population. This divided the nation and inflamed ethnic conflicts at the borders of these countries (Vesniki: 1991).

**Figure 8.6: Population distribution in Central Asia, 1989**



Compiled by author

Therefore, the Tajik civil war is not regarded only as an internal issue but also as a threat to global stability. This vulnerable region forms a regional alliance system with sub-national groups. Tashkent had officially set up a close relationship with Uzbek general, Rashid Dostum of Afghanistan who received direct economic and military aid from Tashkent and Ankara. On the other hand, Russia and Iran aided the other member of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The regional partnership of Uzbek and Turks continued at this first stage but Ozal's support for the Erk Party leader, Muhammad Salih, irritated the Kerimow government (Yeni Safak, 15 June 2002). While the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan triangle presents the greatest military danger in the region, Iran became the


main protector of the Islamist Tajik opposition groups including Akbar Turajanzode, who had taken refuge in Iran, making it necessary to bring Iran into the diplomatic process. Iran supported the Dushanbe youth movement and played a key role in removing the Nabiev government in September, but this policy by Iran was in conflict with Russian interests in the region because Dushanbe postponed the signing of the Tajik-Russian Treaty on Mutual Cooperation, which was planned for September in 1992. Iran also gave a US\$50 million credit to Tajikistan and provided the cultural materials to expand its influence in Central Asia. However, Iranian influence increased the instability in the region and internal conflict marked the second anniversary of Tajikistan's independence as the people were experiencing the bloodiest civil war in the history of the republic in September 1993. As a result of the civil war between 1992 and 1997, over 80, 000 people died, over 800,000 have emigrated to other states of the CIS, and roughly 100,000 fled or were deported to Afghanistan (Mesbahi, 1997). The republic has also lost a significant proportion of its own intelligentsia as well as around 150,000 Russian speakers; primarily engineers, technicians and skilled workers. Moreover, over 80,000 industrial enterprises were destroyed (Bondatrevsjky, and Ferdinand, 1994:46).

The leadership of Emomali Rakhmon suppressed political opposition and imposed strict media controls and the supreme court banned all opposition parties, leaving the Communist Party of Tajikistan as the only legal party. Ultimately, CIS' collective security council agreed to send troops to Afghan-Tajik border to prevent Islamist guerrilla groups infiltrating from their safe haven in Afghanistan in August 1993 (Moroney, 2004:345). Mesbahi claimed that Iran's foreign policy against the Islamist movement is pragmatist because Iran was concerned about the spread or escalation of these conflicts as well as the possibility of foreign interference in near its border and a refugee flow into Iran (Shahabi, and Farhi 1995). Therefore, Iran started mediation efforts with the cooperation of Moscow in August 1995, with Tajikistan's president, Imamali Rakhmanov, and Abdullah Nouri, the leader of Tajikistan's Islamic opposition, being invited to Tehran, and in the presence of Rafsanjani signed an agreement to settle their differences peacefully on 18 September 1994. Nevertheless, Islamist rebels took over population centres in south-western Tajikistan in 1996. The impressively quick successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan in September 1996 facilitated Russian-Iranian collaboration. As the Sunni Taliban are hostile to Iranian-



supported Shi'a groups in Afghanistan and its fundamentalist attitudes are an embarrassment to Iran, Iran tried to stop the Taliban (Rashid, 2000). It set up a regional conference in Tehran, which Russia took part in; Russia's leadership, which was worried about penetration of Taliban's influence to Central Asia or even Russia itself (20 % of the population is Muslim), supported this platform (Rashid, 2002). Primakov's trip to Tehran in December 1996 had this issue at the top of the agenda. Ultimately, with Iran's aid, Russia agreed a ceasefire deal between the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition, signed in February 1997. Involvement included by CIS PKF in October 1993, the Russian 999th Airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan, and the Gatchina Base No. 201, formerly the 201 Motorised Infantry Division – which is deployed in Tajikistan as well as command, intelligence gathering, radar, communication, and testing and firing range facilities, also in Kazakhstan (ITAR-TASS, 8 February 2008).

**Integrated map 8.7: Russian military presence in Central Asia 1993-**



Sources: <http://www.kommersant.com/pda/doc.asp?id=850612>

The instability in the region resulted in the launch of another post-Cold War regional organisation, as leaders of China, Russia and four Central Asian states announced the Shanghai Five, to fight ethnic and religious militancy while promoting trade and investment in 1996-1997 (sectsco.org). Meanwhile the murder of 9 Iranian diplomats

by the Taliban created a furore in Iran, bringing Iran and Afghanistan close to war on 8 August 1998. Anger at the militant group led Iran to deploy 70,000 troops on the border with Afghanistan and made Taliban-Iran relations extremely hostile prior to American-led invasion of Afghanistan (Douglas, 1998). The assassination of the Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud dramatically changed the regional balance of power prior to the coalition forces' occupation into Afghanistan. Turkey was concerned about the regional instability; the Turkish foreign ministry announced that *We consider the death of Ahmed Shah Massoud as an important loss for Afghanistan* and added *Information about the assassination points to the fact that it was not committed only by internal fractions, and this situation will make the solution to the problems in Afghanistan more difficult* (Turkish press review, 18 October 2001). After 9/11, Tajikistan was quick to offer support to the US-led anti-terror coalition, and doubled the number of border guards along its 1,300-km frontier with Afghanistan to prevent movement by al-Qaeda members in July 2002. The US, French and Russian troops still remained to prevent the terrorist infiltration between the Tajik and Afghan borders and US and French troops received logistic support to operate Afghanistan operation from Tajikistan this military bases. Turkey's effective role in NATO was not conflictual with Iran, therefore, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi and his counterpart Ismail Cem held talk about Afghanistan in Turkey on 5 November 2001. (Iran Mania Current Affairs, 6 November 2001). Tehran demanded support from the International Security Assistance Force's commander General, Hilmi Akin Zorlu who took command in June 2002 (The Independent, 11 February 2003). Shortly afterwards, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Dushanbe and announced a boost Russian military presence until April 2003 (Olson, 2002). Although Turkey has no military installation abroad, it plays an effective role in the Western security system with Hikmet Cetin twice leading the ISAF in Afghanistan between January 2004-August 2006 and its 1,000-plus troops are engaged primarily in the reconstruction and enhancement of Afghanistan's infrastructure as well as training the Afghan police forces (Frank, 2008). Russia is the only main arms trade partner of Tajikistan. According to SIPRI arms transfers' database, Moscow sold US\$40 millions worth of arm to Dushanbe between 1992 and 2007 (SIPRI, 2008).

### **8.3.2 The failure of pan-Turkish politics of Turkey in Uzbekistan**

Uzbekistan is the second largest producer of gold in CIS and fourth largest producer in the world and still claims the legacy of Tamerlane in the NIS. President Islam Kerimow is aware that the strategic political culture of his country and its natural resources allow him to behave as a regional actor. Though he supported the pan-Turkish policies of Turkey until 1995, Turkey's invitation of the Erk party leader Muhammad Salih created the diplomatic crisis in 1994 and 1999([www.muahmmadsalih.info](http://www.muahmmadsalih.info)). Kerimow neither followed the path of the Turkish model nor the Iranian revolutionary model of Islam but pursued the authoritarian secularist model of Ataturk and Reza Shah in 1930s. After ascension by Uzbekistan to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Iran's participation of the SCO as an observer, Kerimow challenged the systemic triangle of Turkey-US and EU. The role of China seemed to be competitive with Western interests initially but in the future, many political analysts believe that China will become the main competitor for Russian and Iran. Up to now, Turkey-US-EU tranquilisation allowed to operate the BTC pipeline which bypasses Iran, Russia and Armenia. However, closing by the Turkish Minister of Education of schools in 1994 and Gulen's missionary school September 2000 and the following Andijon events resulted in strained Uzbek-Turk-EU and US relations that were exacerbated after the removal of American troops from Khanabat military bases in 2005. On the other hand, the regional system in Central Asia is more stable than the Caucasus mini system. The major player in the region is Russia, Iran, Turkey and China but the region can be viewed as a dependent system (Agacan, 2007). SIPRI arm transfers databases show that Russia exported US \$ 12 million to Uzbekistan since 1992 (SIPRI, 2008).

#### **8.3.2.1 The stage of Islamic Extremism and the removal of Gulen's missionary schools from Uzbekistan (September 2000)**

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union from 1989, Fethullah Gulen's group moved into the Central Asian Turkic states with small- and medium-size businesses and educational institutions. Turgut Ozal (prime minister 1983-89; president 1989-93 in Turkey), an enthusiastic supporter of this new venture, wrote to the Central Asian leaders about the Gulen movement and how these people could benefit the new

countries. Despite geographical advantages for Iran, Gulen groups have still challenging Iranian revolutionary politics and Saudi-backed *Selefi* movements by operating private economic, educational and cultural sectors in the CIS (Turkone, 2005). The Gulen movement was portrayed as an integrated Islamist model and the new Turkish - nationalism was supported by Washington and Belgium. Therefore, the authoritarian leaders of the new republics are highly intolerant of Islamic activities but Gulen's group is very careful not to provoke these rulers. The management of these schools in each republic is in the hands of a general directorate (Genel Mudurluk) located in the capital city and affiliated to a big education company in Turkey. Uzbekistani-Turkish schools are operated by Silm Anonim Sirketi, situated in Bursa in Turkey and Kazakh-Turko schools were run by Feza and Selale (in Istanbul). Turkmen and Kyrgyz Turkish schools were set up by Sebat (Adapazari) and Baskent (Ankara) (Demir, et al 2000). Turkish firms in the area operate as subsidiaries for the Gulen groups, financing schools' building and running. Nurcu firms were also part of the business groups and ran many of these such as Ozbekistan ve Turkiye Isadamlari Dernegi (the Association of Uzbek and Turkish Businessmen, UTID) , Kirgizistan ve Turkiye Isadamlari Dernegi (The Association of Kyrgyz and Turkish Businessmen (KITIAD). Kazakistan ve Turkiye Egitim Vakfi (The Kazakhstan and Turkey Education Foundation (KATEV) is completely Nurcu, but Kazakistan ve Turkiye Isadamlari Dernegi (the Association of Kazakh and Turkish Businessmen, KATIAD) is not directed by Gulen's businessmen. Turkiye Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi (the Foundation of Journalists and Writers of Turkey), and Asya Finans, which intend to find funds for investments in the Turkic republics in October 1996 are reputable Nurcu institutions (Balci, 2003). Prime Minister Ecevit said that *"these schools spread Turkish culture and information about Turkey to the world and they are under the continuous supervision of our state"* (Anatolia News, 22 June 1999). The chart shows the soft power of the Gulen groups below.



**Table 8.2: Distribution of Gulen’s School in CIS**

| Country or region | Number of school | number of pupils | Teachers from Turkey Universities |
|-------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Azerbaijan        | 16               | 3133             | 264                               |
| Kazakhstan        | 33               | 4733             | 412                               |
| Kyrgyzstan        | 13               | 1872             | 146                               |
| Georgia           | 4                | 244              |                                   |
| Tajikistan        | 7                | 952              | 70                                |
| Turkmenistan      | 22               | 3665             | 275                               |
| Uzbekistan        | -                | -                | -                                 |

Sources: Oran, 2003; compiled by author

In contrast, the Turkish state established Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) to co-ordinate the public and private sectors to cooperate with the new state, especially in education and culture, and technical fields in each NIS (Winrow, 2007). However, Turkey’s great expectation from the ‘Great Student Project’ agreement between Turkey and Turkic states were not fulfilled in the region especially after Turkish-Uzbek diplomatic crisis in 1994 and 1999 (Oran, 2003). Turkey rejected the request of the Uzbek officials to hand over the chairman of Erk, Muhammad Salih, and Abdurrahman Polat, chairman of Birlik, who fled as refugees to Turkey when they were threatened by its Uzbek government (Turksam, 2005). Uzbekistan pulled out all of the students studying in Turkey and deported Turkish student who were studying in Uzbekistan in 1994. Tashkent claimed that the students were getting dangerous ideas from Turkish groups and the Uzbek opposition in Turkey (Oran, 2003). There is now only a single Turkic primary school which provides education services for Turkish student in a suburb of Tashkent. However, Turkish state schools in other countries still play a very effective role for the transformation of society in which official and non-governmental schools account for 10% percent of the Turkic states.


Table: 8.3.Turkish Ministry of Education Schools in Central Asia and the Caucasus (2007)

| Country      | School | Staff | Student | Turkish Graduate | current student in Turkey | Military personnel educated in Turkey | University                         |
|--------------|--------|-------|---------|------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Azerbaijan   | 3      | 51    | 785     | 1202             | 712                       | 520                                   |                                    |
| Kazakhstan   | 2      | 30    | 2502    | 736              | 552                       | 95                                    | Yesevi University                  |
| Kyrgyzstan   | 4      | 66    | 3209    | 1372             | 794                       | 45                                    | Kyrgyz- Manas University           |
| Turkmenistan | 4      | 58    | 3413    | 1399             | 570                       | 265                                   | Turkmen-Turkish university         |
| Uzbekistan   | 1      | 14    | 223     | 286              | 5                         | -                                     | -                                  |
| Tajikistan   | 1      | 3     | 208     | -                | 73                        | -                                     |                                    |
| Georgia      | -      | -     | -       | -                | -                         | 10                                    | International Black Sea University |

Sources: Turkish Minister of Education, 1997, pp.229-247, Sabah January 1997: compiled by author

In fact, the authorities saw Islamic fundamentalism becoming powerful in the Fergana valley which is the most fertile and densely-populated in Central Asia, and which is divided between Uzbekistan (Andijon, Fergana, Kokand and Namangan), Kyrgyzstan (Batken, Osh, and Jalalabad) and Tajikistan (Khodjent). But it is now seen as an Uzbek heartland because Uzbek demographic distribution in the region provides a great political advantage for Tashkent to interfere with the internal affairs of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan (www.eneews.ferghana.ru).

Figure 8.7: Distribution of Uzbek population (1989)



Sources: Soviet census 1989; compiled by author

However the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Fergana valley, established by Juma Namagani and Tohir Yoldashev with the aim of overthrowing Islam Kerimow's government in 1998, decreased Uzbekistan's penetration of the region (Reuel, 2004). The IMU began to move towards the Afghan Taliban and Ethnic-Tajik Shah Ahmed Messouds (Northern Alliance) military sectors and launched a series of audacious raids into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (Erol, 2005). But six blasts in Tashkent on 16<sup>th</sup> February killed 16 and injured over a hundred people. Militant figures in exile were observed as part of the inquiry into the attacks, including the leader of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Tohir Yoldosh, and the military chief, Juma Namangoni, who had pronounced a jihad against the Uzbek state in August 1999 (Polat, 2007). The Batken locality in south Kyrgyzstan was assaulted by IMU militants trying to get to Uzbek areas and incite an Islamic rebellion on 5<sup>th</sup> August 2000 (Polat and Butkeyich, 2005). Battles between government units and Islamic militants in mountains of southern Uzbekistan yielded 15 deaths and numerous casualties. United Tajik Organisation leaders and particularly its former chief commander Mirzo Ziyiev, currently the minister of rescue and emergency situations in Tajikistan, have close ties Uzbek fighters and their leaders, Juma Namangoni, considered Ziyoev's right hand man and personal friend (Jones, 2006). In an interview with RFE/RL, the Erk (Freedom) party leader, Muhammad Salih, denied the accusations of the Uzbek government but admitted that he met Tohir Yoldosh several times in Turkey, but did not reveal this fact or the subject-matter of deals (birlik.net). Salih also stated that he had acquainted Yoldosh with Zelimkhan Yandarbiev the ex-acting president of Chechnya. Yandarbiev, is a fundamentalist Islamist and a long-standing friend of Salih (Polat and Butkevich, 2005). In fact the absence of the great cleric Abdullah Murzaev, increased the regional tension and strengthened the link between Taliban and Chechen fighters and the Tajik radical Islamic movement. Turkey's unofficial support of the opposition and Uzbek officials' accusation against Ankara, for being a supporter of terror against Kerimow's regime harmed the bilateral relations. Uzbekistan recalled its students from Turkish universities and in turn, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Tashkent in mid-1999 (Haeri, 2004). Moreover, Turkey invited Muhammad Salih to the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, but he could not come to Turkey due to pressure by Tashkent (Erol, 2005). Turkey cooperated with Uzbek officials--the secretary of IMU, Zayniddin Askarov, who was accused of masterminding the Tashkent bombings (Erol, 2005). On the other

hand, Russian president Vladimir Putin abandoned poor relations with Tashkent and made a visit to Uzbekistan in May 2000. He responded to his counterpart's request for military help by declaring that any threat to Uzbekistan is a threat to Russia (Radio Free Europe, 18 May 2008). In contrast, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's trip to Uzbekistan, as well as those of the directors of the CIA and FBI, in spring 2000, provided Kerimov with the opportunity to make a bargain between the two great powers ([www.civilsoc.org/resource/albright.htm](http://www.civilsoc.org/resource/albright.htm)). However, Turkey's relations with Uzbekistan were completely frozen after the failure of Turkic-speaking countries summits, the sixth of which Kerimov and Saparmurat Niyazov refused to attend in Baku, Azerbaijan in April 2000. The closure of the Gulen schools in September 2000 completely cut off bilateral relations while the Pentagon requested the abandoned Soviet air base Khanabat in Uzbekistan for use in military operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban after 9/11 in 2001 (Winrow, 2007). However, the groups were mostly destroyed while fighting alongside the Taliban against the coalition forces in 2001; the IMU leader Namaganis was killed in Qunduz in Afghanistan and the fighters were dispersed. However, Yuldoshev and his fighters escaped with the remnants of the Taliban to Waziristan (border of Afghanistan) in Pakistan (Rahid, 2007). Whilst Iran sheltered the families of Uzbek and Tajik radical Islamists in the Zahidan region, it was in serious conflict with the Taliban government and led to Iranian support of the US-led occupation of Afghanistan until the Bush government declared Iran to be in the "axis of evil" in 2001. However, Uzbek-Iranian relations were unlikely difficult due to support by Karimov for the US trade embargo against Iran in the 1990s and the closer politico-military ties between the United States and NATO, after US military bases were located in Khanabat (K2) and Kyrgyzstan Manas Airport could mount military operations into Afghanistan (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 26 July 2004). On the other hand, the Kremlin convinced the Kyrgyz government to allow the Russian Air Force to set up its own base less than 70 miles from Manas in Kant—which marked the first foreign deployment of Russian forces abroad since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 26 July 2004). The role of Iran in the region was ambiguous, although the Islamic Republic of Iran and Uzbekistan signed in Tehran six memoranda of understanding (MoU) on political issues, security and economic cooperation as well as a campaign against terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime on 17 June 2003 (IRNA, 18 June

2003). Uzbekistan is important for Iranian heavy trucks which have to use Uzbek roads to reach Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and also northern Afghanistan.

### **8.3.2.2 Aftermath of the Andijon events (2005): the removal of K2 American military bases**

GUUAM, which was formed in 1997, was enlarged by one more member – Uzbekistan, which joined the group at the GUUAM summit that was held during the NATO/EAPC Summit in Washington D.C. on 23-25 April 1999 ([www.guuam.org](http://www.guuam.org)). Unlike other sub-regional initiatives like the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) groups or the Council of Baltic States, GUAM does not embrace Russia or countries outside the former Soviet Union ([www.bsec-organisation.org](http://www.bsec-organisation.org)). Defence cooperation took a quantum leap forward following 9/11 as Uzbekistan suddenly emerged as one of Washington's main strategic allies in the anti-terrorism struggle by volunteering the Karshi-Kahanabat air bases in October 2001 ([globalsecurity.org](http://globalsecurity.org)). However, when Edward Shevardnadze played host to Kerimow, who believed that the democratisation trends unleashed by Georgia's Rose Revolution in 2003 posed a threat to his regime, he cracked down on Open Society Institute activities in Tashkent (Yukselen, 2004). OSI chairman, George Soros, criticised the decision which he described as "*stifling civil society*." He also called on the US government to re-evaluate its strategic partnership with Tashkent (Eurasia Insight, 3 March 2008). Subject to approval by the US Congress on human right issues, Uzbekistan could receive military assistance (\$10.5 million) and financial aid package (over \$48 million) in 2004. However, Uzbekistan abandoned its anti-Russian stand and left GUAM in 2000 and left the organisation in 2005 (Georgian Times, 12 February 2001). Uzbekistan decided to be a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and hosted its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) event in Tashkent ([www.ecrats.com](http://www.ecrats.com)). The May 12-13 2005 events in Andijon, wherein Uzbek units are said to have killed hundreds of civilians, incited regional attempts to curtail liberties and press rights. This came into conflict with the liberal rhetoric of Western countries but reaffirmed close ties between Kerimow and Putin (Jonson, 2004; Pottenger, 2004). Relations between Washington and Brussels, on the one hand, and Tashkent on the other have been in a deep freeze. Uzbekistan strengthened its relations with Russia,

and to a lesser extent, China. Tashkent signed a strategic partnership agreement and joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization with Russia. On 5 July 2005 (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 27 September 2005) the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (consisting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), agreed to a Russian-offered plan for deadlines regarding US/coalition base removal from Central Asian countries. On July 29, the Uzbek state ordered the US to stop operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase within six months (Nichol, 2005). Tashkent is reported to have responded not only to Russian and Chinese efforts but also to US attacks which killed Uzbek protesters in Andijon (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 7 September 2005), (Human Rights Watch, 13 March 2005). The only Western country to have bases in the country is Germany, at the Kahanabat air bases. Berlin supported the suspension of EU sanctions against Uzbekistan during the visit of German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in 2006. Despite opposition of the US and UK, Germany managed to suspend the sanctions in 6 months and lifted a visa ban on the top Uzbek officials in May 2007 (The Economist, March 2007). However, a Central Asian “tilt” toward the US post-9/11 was evident, particularly in 2001 and 2002, with all of the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan signing military cooperation and base access agreements with the US, as well as receiving significant economic aid packages. Uzbekistan especially benefited from increased US interest in the region, receiving not only an initial aid package worth US\$150 million but also the signing of an US-Uzbek “*Strategic Partnership*” in March 2002. The provision of US \$3million in military aid to Kazakhstan in March, joint military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in July 2002 and the grant of US\$1 million in military aid to Kyrgyzstan in October 2003, was the American soft-power influence on the Central Asian states. Partnership for Peace (PfP) encompassed Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops, attracting significant military assistance from the US to the region. Later, inter-state cooperation efforts in Central Asia in terms of security affairs stimulated common military exercises with the participation of NATO, PfP, the US, CENTCOM, Russia and Turkey. However, American security engagement failed after the Uzbekistan’s closure of the Karshi-Kahanabad bases. In fact, this loss for the Tashkent government also meant a loss for the regional governments. Up to now, Islam Kerimov’s government has not allowed any democratic rhetoric of opposition groups and foreign interference, such as the wave of colourful revolutions and Turkish and EU support of the Erk party. This was because there is always a risk in




democratisation for the authoritarian state, with the leadership group preferring *de facto authority* to the public demand for democratisation.

8.3.3 Uighur exodus and its impact on Sino-Turko-Iranian relations in Central Asia

Kazakhstan’s ethnic tensions result in the impossibility for its government to win a direct conflict with Russia as the latter can utilise Kazak wariness of Chinese increasing dynamism and the probability of distaste for Chinese influence in the Xinjiang region of the China. Uyghur exodus and Han Chinese population transfer to Xingjian sinificased Uighur Turks’ motherland; almost 5,000 or 10,000 Uighur live in Turkey and 500 thousand Uighur Turks also emigrated to the Central Asian republics, mainly to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan and many of them integrated into new societies. In 1990, Uyghur accounted for 47.47%; Han 37.58%; Kazakh, 7.30%; Hui 4.50%, and the rest accounted for 3.15%. The major change is the relative increase of the Han, mostly through migration. In terms of the Xinjiang 2000 census, Uighur account for 45.21%, Han for 40.57%; Kazakh 6.74%; Hui 4.55%; and the rest account for 2.93%. China felt threatened by the fundamentalist and extremist the Muslim elements in Afghanistan because of its vulnerabilities in Xinjiang and its problems with Muslim Uighur.

Figure 8.8: Population distribution in Xinjiang and Kazakhstan (2001)



Sources of Xinjiang: Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region bureau of statistics (XBS). 2001. Xinjiang Tongji Nianjian (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook) (XSY) 2001 Beijing: China Statistics Press./Sources of (Kazakh); compiled by author


China has pursued a very pragmatic relationship with Kazakhstan, focusing in the last decade on securing energy assets. Initially China was more interested in making sure that the independence of Kazakhstan (as well as that of the other Central Asian states)

did not pose a threat to security in the Xinjiang province. But once the rulers in Beijing felt assured that the Kazakhs would provide no support for Uighur nationalists, who in Soviet times had enjoyed sanctuary in the Kazakh republic, their priorities shifted. China's reincorporation of Xinjiang in 1949 placed it in control of a geopolitical nexus between five great cultural and geographic regions of Eurasia - China, the sub-Continent, Iran, Russia and Europe. However, throughout the 1949-1991 period China was able to take advantage of this strategic position due to a number of internal and external factors such as the various political and economic crises of the Maoist era and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations (McMillen, 1979). Therefore, China established a significant security cooperation with the Central Asian states, including the Sino-Kazakh *Mutual Cooperation Agreement* on 23 December 2002 extradition agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and bilateral agreements on cooperation in combating *extremism, terrorism and separatism* with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and for the return of Uyghur separatists in September 2003 concluded with the opening of the *Regional Anti-Terrorism (RAT)* centre in Tashkent on 1 November 2003 (Clarke, 2008). The Shanghai group conducted a joint military exercise on Kazakh and Chinese soil on 6-11 August 2003 and completed the *Peace Mission 2007* joint military exercises between 9-17 Augusts at Chelyabinsk (Interfax, 16 August 2007). A transcontinental railway project, (Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku railway) will connect Asian and European railway systems, and be a source of hope for an expansion of trade, increasing the Chinese presence in the south Caucasus.

According to the SIPRI arms transfers database, Kazakhstan arm imports include US\$726 million from Russia, Ukraine US\$ 12 million, South Korea US\$8 million and United States of America only US \$25 million (SIPRI, 2008). According to the report, the casualties of ethnic conflicts total constituted 74,100 deaths in the Caucasus and 82,870 deaths in Central Asia since 1989. None of the ethnic and religious conflicts could reach a resolution but still remain in abeyance form in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The Russian-Georgian war has already triggered the first stage of an upcoming conflict, with some saying that a new Cold War began in August 2008.



Figure 8.9: The casualties in Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1989-2008



Compiled by author

8.4. Conclusion

The domestic roots of instability in the Southern Caucasus have manifested themselves as ethnic -based conflicts that resulted in external power penetration. On the other hand, the domestic conflicts in Central Asia, especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are due to religious and global terrorism causes subsequently resulting in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The Sino-Central Asia security and economic cooperation enlarged Iran’s role in the region but the competition between Chian and Russia-Iran is expected to rise in the future. The virtual state concept needs more international regulation for the enforcement of law and order in the southern Caucasus. The Pro-Russian Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazian authorities could serve as clients for Russia inside Azerbaijan and also as a sword of Damocles against Tbilisi and Baku’s pro-Western policy option. According to NATO’s intensified dialogue and the United State’s policy of global war on terror, Washington and Ankara give practical training to Caucasian states’ military personnel in the war zones in Iraq ([www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org)). On the other hand, Russian military bases in Georgia and CIS peace-keeping forces have restored a Russian presence in the Southern Caucasus and undermine the UNIMOG observer mission in the conflict zones. Therefore, they have been no final settlement for the frozen conflicts in the region. Iran’s foreign policy behaviour on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, cooperation in Chechnya, and the mediation efforts in the Tajik dispute have strengthened the Russia-Iran axis, which have pursued a pragmatic policy model against the proto-Turkish politics of Baku and growing initiatives of Washington and

Israel Meanwhile Tehran has benefited from the American operations after the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam's regime in Iraq. Neither Turkey nor Iran could have used the political Islam in the Volga-Ural and or to pass through the southern Caucasus due to 400 years of Russian occupation of the Turkic and Muslim peoples in the region. The policy of a Turkish secular Islamic model could not solicit any political response from the regional entities and failed in Uzbekistan. In opposition to the activities of George Soros's Open Society Institute, Tashkent considered Gulen schools to be missionaries of the Soros foundation and soft power actors affiliated with Turkey which supports a revolution in Central Asia. Hence, even though the Yilmaz Government gave the state ministerial post to the Uzbekistani-born Ahmed Andijon, Turkey's policy in Eurasia and cultural identity references to Samarkand were not reliable. The Kerimov regime used the military option to take control of radical Islamic groups' as such the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and brutally suppressed the civil disobedience in Andijon. Neither Turkey nor Iran are happy to see the Saudi-backed activities of radical Islamist groups in the Fergana valley and Chechnya—which is understandable in light of the growing economic and military cooperation within Turkish-Russian-Iranian relations. However, the criticisms of Western countries, including Turkey, targeting the Kerimov regime, resulted in the pull out of GUAM and normalisation of its relations with Moscow. Though there is a potential competition between Sino and Eurasian states, Russia and China managed to establish the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent under the supervision of SCO. Hence, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of NATO failed in Central Asia just as NATO's intensified dialogue failed in the southern Caucasus. For instance, the joint military exercise named Peace Mission 2007 between 9 and 17 August at Chelyabinsk demonstrated that Eurasia is in the process of constructing its own security system (Interfax, 16 August 2007)

## **CHAPTER NINE:**

### **THE INFLUENCE OF PIPELINE POLITICS AND MIDDLE-POWER INSTITUTIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS**

#### **9.1. Introduction**

The Caspian Sea is a large circumscribed aquatic entity, around 700 miles from north to south and 250 miles east to west, situated between the Central Asian and Transcaucasian states. The oil and gas deposits are located in the offshore areas of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as well as parts of Russia and Iran. Uzbekistan, despite not being a littoral nation, is the area's biggest gas outputter and so is counted as part of the region for this study. (APS Review, July 2006). Hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Sea constitute one of the largest unexploited oil and natural gas reserves in the world, situated strategically in the heart of Eurasia. Because during the Soviet period, the energy potential of the Caspian basin was closed to the world oil industry and it remained relatively undeveloped. Three significant projects lead the way in exploitation of resources in the area - the Kazakhs' Tengiz and Karachaganak fields; and Azerbaijan's Azeri, Chirag, and deepwater Gunashli (ACG) field. The cumulative production of the projects amounts to 30% of the region's production. Azerbaijan declared that it had found new gas deposits of up to 15 Tcf and 600 million barrels of condensate in 1999; Kazakhstan at Kashagan claims practical deposits of 7-9 billion barrels of oil equivalent, with a further potential of up to 9-30 billions in 2000. ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). The strategic geographic location of the Caspian reserves and their magnitude has created a power game over their control, involving the world's major economic and political interests. Therefore, large oil companies are racing to invest billions of dollars to tap the unexploited hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Sea basin. The regional political situation created a new bipolar system; whilst Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia have become, for all practical purposes, US territories of protection under the Silk Road Strategy Act 1999, in unified defence against China, Russia and Iran. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia and Belarus remain geopolitically allied with Moscow ([www.eurasianet.org](http://www.eurasianet.org)).


With regard to the influence of Central Asia and the Caucasus on Turko-Iranian relations, this study argues that energy is a primary factor in determining the foreign policy-making or relations of the new regional states. However, for Turkey-Iran's middle-power state institutionalism the ECO cannot create any alternative regional economic and security systems, but rather acts as a ground mediator between the international community and its members. This chapter mainly investigates the Caspian Sea resource management, the pipeline politics of Turkey, Iran, Russia, China and US-EU and ECO's role in the wider politics of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

## **9.2. Caspian Sea natural gas and oil sources**

Biological resources of the Caspian Sea, mainly fish resources, are estimated at US \$5-6 billion per year ([www.worldlakes.org](http://www.worldlakes.org)) However, hydrocarbon (oil and gas) resources in Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Russian, located under the sea bed as well as the on-shore proven oil reserves of the Caspian littoral states constitute 6.9/ 32.2 25 billion barrels, with projected oil reserves estimated at 158 billion barrels, nearly 15 % of the world's total oil reserves. The proven gas reserves amount to 166 trillion cubic feet but estimated natural gas reserves are at about 294.3 trillion cubic feet. Hence, the Caspian Sea basin is considered the fourth largest natural gas deposit in the world ([www.cedigaz.org](http://www.cedigaz.org)). Global energy needs are estimated to rise by more than 50% in the period 1993-2015, including, due to Asia's development, creating incentives for new energy sources in Central Asian and the Caspian areas.



**Figure 9.1: Hydrocarbon deposit forecast s in the Caspian Sea and Uzbekistan (Generated by author, figure 1 and 2)**



Source: Reserves, OGI; Production; EIA; Forecasts; Inter fax; CERA;SKRIN, APS Review, July 2006.


### 9.2.1 Caspian Sea resource management: exclusion of Iran from Azerbaijan’s international hydrocarbon consortia (20 September 1994)

The ‘eternal fires’ of Zarathustra have flared from Baku since the sixth century BC and the first Azeri oil was extracted by the Nobel brothers’ petroleum company in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Goltz, 1998). More recently, Azerbaijan’s president, Ebulfeyz Elchibey, made an important step towards Western interaction when he visited London and due to a subsequent visit of his successor, Heidar Aliev, in February, an agreement was concluded on production sharing (with a value of US \$8 billion ) involving the Azeri, and Chirag deep water portions of the Guneshli in 1992 (Cafersoy, 2007). The final version of this agreement was signed between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and British Petroleum (BP) at the Gulistan Palace in Baku on 20 September 1994. This agreement, the so called “contract of the century” inflamed the regional disputes on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, because it excluded Russia as well as Iran from the final decisions of the international consortium (Halliday, 2001), (Karagiannis, 2003). Even though Azerbaijan’s president attempted to give a 5% share of SOCAR and AIOC to Iran, he failed to persuade the partners of the international oil consortium, due to the American policy of dual containment against Iran. Therefore, AIOC had to step back from offering of a 5% stake in SOCAR in 1995 (Golan, 1998:16). In response to this, the Iranian media began to call Aliev the “the servant of America and Zionism.” Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti claimed that “This would not be in the interest of Azerbaijan and the agreement [with AIOC] is not valid until the Caspian Sea’s legal status is solved” (Swietochowski, 1993:118-35).



However, Iran’s opposition was not taken as a serious threat to the project while Russia still remains a major power in the region. Hence, AIOC agreed to give a 10% share of PSA to Russian Lukoil, which was part-owned (8%) by the American oil company ARCO. The joint venture, LUKARCO B.V, set up with British Petroleum also holds a 12.5% share in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and 5% in the development of Tengiz, a large oil and gas field in the West of Kazakhstan. Hence, Russia’s explicit recognition of Azerbaijan’s right to extract oil in its sector of the sea caused a direct conflict between the post-Soviet Russian state and the private sector oligarchy in December 1994 (Loza and et al.2006). The diagram below shows the final division of stakes (and therefore division of expenses) among the eleven final multinational signatories.

Figure 9.2: The oil companies stakes on Azeri Chirag Deep Water Guneshli (generated by author)



Sources: EAI 2006, BP 2006, TPAO 2006

However, OIEC of Iran managed to take a 10% stake in the Shah Deniz natural gas field in 1996 and the other Lankaran-Talysh’s 10% stake in the offshore production sharing agreement among the seven oil companies in 1997. However, this positive attitude did not normalise Azerbaijan-Iran relations due to the pro-Iranian convictions of the Azerbaijan Islamist party leader, which further incensed the Baku regime in April 1997. A further factor was the growing Azeri-Israel connection, which increased Iran’s concern regarding security. In 1999, the discovery of the Shah Deniz natural gas field (estimated reserves of 400 million cubic meters of gas) in the Azerbaijani

sector of the Caspian Sea appears to have boosted the region's natural gas export prospects. For the sake of the future, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a long-term natural gas purchase and supply contract on 12 March 2001. The project of the South Caucasus Pipeline, scheduled to carry natural gas from Sangachal via the Georgian capital of Tbilisi to Erzurum in eastern Turkey, where the natural gas will join the Turkish natural gas distribution system, arose as the result. Ultimately, Shah Deniz came online on 15 December 2006 (Fink, 2006). Thus, Azerbaijan is now delivering 70 Bcf of natural gas to Turkey, rising to 233 Bcf in 2007 and this will continue until 2018 ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)).

**Table 9.1 International oil consortium operating in Azerbaijan**

| Company   | Date Signed       | Shareholder's Percentage of Ownership  |
|---|-------------------|--|
| AIOC<br>(Azerbaijan<br>International<br>Operating<br>Company) | 20 September 1994 | BP Amoco(34.1); Statoil(8.56);Itochu(3.92);<br>Exxon(8.0);Ramco(2.08); Unocal(10.04);<br>TPAO(6.75);Delta (1.68);Lukoil(10.0)Penzoil(4.81);<br>SOCAR(10.0) |
| Shakh-Deniz   | 04 June 1996      | BP Amoco(25.5); Lukoil (10.0);TPAO (9.0);<br>Statoil(25.5); Elf (10.0);SOCAR (10.0);OIEC(10.0)   |
| Lenkoran-Talysh   | 13 January 1997   | Elf (40.0);OIEC(10.0); Petrofina(5.0); Total(10.0);<br>Wnittershall(10.0); SOCAR(25.0)   |
| Apsheron  | 01 August 1997    | Chevron(30.0);SOCAR (50.0); Total (10.0)   |
| Nakhchivan  | 01 August 1997    | Exxon( 50.0);SOCAR (50.0)  |
| Yalama  | 04 July 1997      | LUKARCO:Lukoil(32.4);ARCO (27.6); SOCAR (40.0)   |
| Oguz  | 01 August 1997    | Mobil(50.0)SOCAR (50.0)  |
| Kurdashi  | 01 August 1997    | SOCAR(50.0)Agip(25.0); Mitsui<br>(15.0)TPAP(5.0)Repsol(5.0)  |
| Jenubi-Garbi  | 02 June 1998      | Commonwealth Oil and Gas (80.0)SOCAR (20.0)  |
| Gobustan  |                   | Frontera Resources (30.0); Delta Oil /   |
| Kursangi and  | 02 June 1998      | AmeradaHess(20.0); SOCAR(50.0)   |
| Garabagy  |                   |  |
| Muradkhanli,  |                   |  |
| Jafarli, and  |                   |  |
| Zardab  | 22 July 1998      | Ramco(50.0); SOCAR(50.0)   |
| Inam  | 22 July 1998      | BP Amoco (25.0)SOCAR (50.0); Monument Oil and<br>Gas(12.5); Central Russian Fuel(12.5)   |
| Araz-Alov-Sharg   | 22 July 1998      | BP Amoco( 15.0);Exxon(15.0)Alberta Energy (5.0);<br>Statoil(15.0)TPAO(10.0)SOCAR(40.0)   |
| Ateshgah, Yanan   |                   | JAPEX (22.5); Teiloku(7.5); INPEX(12.5);ITOCHU   |
| Tava, and Mugan   | 25 December 1998  | (7.5);SOCAR(50.0)  |
| Deniz   |                   | Exxon( 20.0);SOCAR (50.0); with 20 % to be   |
| Zafar, Mashal   | 27 April 1999     | determined   |
| Savalan, Dalga,   |                   |  |
| Lerik Deniz,  |                   |  |
| Janub   | 27 April 1999     | Mobil(20.0)SOCAR (50.0); with 20.0% to be decided  |
| Padar   | 27 April 1999     | Mocrief Oil international, Inc. (80.0); SOCAR (20.0)   |


Sources: [www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)

### 9.2.2 The legal status of Caspian Sea resource management

After the dissolution of the Soviet regime, the legacy of the Soviet-Iran treaties of 1921 and 1940 was ratified in the Almaty declaration on 21<sup>st</sup> December 1991. Tehran and Moscow reiterated that joint utilisation of the Caspian Sea could be split as legal rights between compulsory registered littoral states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran), with the requirement to respect the legal status of the Caspian Sea resource management (Brzezinski,1997). Iran, therefore, proposed the Caspian Sea Cooperation Organisation (CASCO) which was established to solve the sovereignty question of the Caspian basin in October 1992. A spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry emphasised that this organisation was the most important outcome of President Rafsanjani's initiative (Tehran Times, 15 October 1994). However, this organisation could not solve the disputes over the Caspian Sea. It only delayed international investment into the region until the signing of the "Contract of the Century". Iran's exclusion from the Contract undermined Iranian initiatives in CASCO as a result of the US dual containment policy against Iran. The littoral countries took another stance on the dispute over Caspian Sea classification and the resulting resource division. The earliest indicators arose when Turkmenistan asserted its rights over the Azeri and Chirag fields to which the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) held rights, particularly with regard to an oil deposit named (by Baku) as Kyapaz and which Ashgabat refers to as Serdar and which contains up to 500 million barrels in 1993 ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). Due to this disagreement, Russia and Kazakhstan discarded Turkmenistan from the agreement which divided the Caspian seabed into *national sectors* in November 1997. Turkmenistan had not taken a harsh position until recently--it was a proponent of the condominium principle whereby each littoral country would possess a 10–20 mile territorial projection (Nassibli, 2003). The controversies have undermined the certainties that international consortiums require to invest. They need the resolutions to territorial issues regarding lakes, seas and coastlines in international law. The boundaries are shown in the three versions of the map below.



Integrated Map 9.1: The division of Caspian Sea basin



Sources: UNEP/GRID-Arenda, 2006

The Russian approach advocated a solution for the Caspian seabed and subsoil which would divide it into national sectors along international boundary lines. This solution won the support of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and they signed bilateral treaties with Russia at the Ashgabat summit by the end of 2002. Russia was willing to concede to a division of the oil production which involved the joint use of the surface areas. This permitted Russia to persist in the deployment of its navy in the Caspian and thus continue its ability to exert local influence. Iran, on the other hand, insisted on the demilitarisation of the area.

### 9.2.2.1 Diversification of foreign investments in Caspian Sea resource management

Whereas the Caspian littoral states prefer to continue their own independent foreign policy over the hydrocarbon resources, foreign investment now consists of seven

offshore production-sharing agreements with an international consortium (Cohen, 2002). However, the Russian military presence in the Caspian and the CIS was undermining the regional states' sovereignty, unless they could divert their energy pipelines and foreign connections. Therefore, Kazakhstan started to diversify its energy transport by signing an energy swap deal whereby Kazakhstan supplies oil to Iran via the Caspian Sea to the port of Neka, and in return, Kazakhstan receives the equivalent amount of oil via the port of Kharq from Iran's Persian Gulf. Russia was not content over Iran's collaboration with the CIS countries of the issue of deposits and attempted to claim possession over the hydrocarbon Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan sections of the Caspian Sea to restore its economic and political power in the area (Lal, 2006).

**Table 9.2 Caspian Sea Basin leading foreign investment project by country, 2006**

| Country    | Project major investor       | Proven reserves | Production               | Projection  |
|------------|------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|---|
| Azerbaijan | ACG Mega Structure (BP )     | 5.4 bb/b        | 450.000 bb/d             | 2007;500.000<br>2010:1 million bb/d                             |
|            | Shah Deniz (BP )             | 22.1Tcf         | Not producing            | 2007:296 Bcf  |
|            | Tengiz (Chevron Texaco)      | 6.9 mb/d        | 270.00 bb/d              | 2007:300,00 bb/d<br>2010:650.000 bb/d                           |
|            | Karachaganak(BG, Agip et al) | 2.4 bb/d        | 200.000 bb/d,<br>547 Bcf | 2010;500.000 bb/d<br>2015: 1.2 million bb/d<br>2010;75.000 bb/d |
| Kazakhstan | Kashagan (ENI-Agip, BG)      | 7-9 bb/d        | Not producing            | 2015:1.2 bb/d   |
|            | Cheleken (Dragon Oil)        | 0.6 bb/d        | 25.000 bb/d              | 2010:40.000 bb/d  |
|            | Nebit Dag (Burren Energy)    | 0.1 bb/d        | 19.000 bb/d              | 2005: 31.000 bb/d   |

Source: OGJ Production; EIA; Forecasts; Interfax; EIA, CERA, SKRIN, APS Review, July 2006

The lion's share of the ongoing project is under the Anglo-American sphere of influence in the Caspian but the secondary shareholder companies are the primary actors in the regional conflict. This encourages ethnic violence (Aras and Foster 2001). Russia is still controlling Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan's gas transport into Europe and Asia. Therefore diversification of the energy routes are essential to reducing the European dependency on Russia; because Moscow is getting more confident in using energy as a political tool, as seen when it closed the gas tap to the Ukraine (Kamalov,

2008). Iran's eagerness to improve cooperation in Eurasia and the Caucasus by offering them membership in ECO, and direct linkage with road and rail networks for landlocked countries, made Iran a more prominent actor in the region. However, several other factors bind Russia and Iran together, such as shared boundaries, regional issues, internal security, and a common strategy against the US hegemony, as well as economics and arms deals between them (though the arms trade is still smaller than it was with the Soviet Union)(Kamalov, 2007).


### **9.2.2 Turkey-Iran confrontation during the Caspian Sea incident**

Iran's up-and-down relations with its neighbours were illustrated in the Caspian Sea incident following the signing of the agreement between BP and SOCAR, over the exploration and development of a field in July and its ratification in December 1998. Pertaining to the Araz-Alov- Shargh field, the agreement was accused by Iran of increasing tensions in the region ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). An Iranian warship entered the disputed waters near Azerbaijan and threatened to fire on the research ship Geophysics-3 if it failed to leave the area (Olson, 2004:118). Iranian combat aircraft also violated Azerbaijan's air space to stop a BP research vessel operating in the Caspian Sea, which caused a low intensity conflict between Turkey and Iran in July-August 2001.

In the meantime, the Turkey's Chief of Staff Huseyin Kivrikoglu made a trip to Baku on August 25, along with 10 F-5 fighter aircraft— the Turkish air force acrobatic team *Turkish Stars*, which upsets the liaisons with Iran (Olson, 2004:120). The display was actually booked a year in advance and the General's trip was scheduled 3 months prior to take part in the first graduation ceremony of students at the Azerbaijan War School, a Turkish-assisted institution (Oran, 2003). An official at the Azerbaijan embassy in Turkey declared on 13 August that "There was nothing more natural than for our friend and brother, Turkey, to take a strong stance against Iran's aggressive position" (Hurriyet, 13 August 2001). The air performance was taken by the press as a significant political disruption—Azerbaijani media saw it as an assault on Turkish solidarity whilst the Turkish equivalents commented on it as intimidation of Iran (Hurriyet, 23 august; Radical, 26 August; Milliyet, 22 August 2001). Iran News described Turkey's actions as "unambiguous and a blatant sign of interference and

intervention in the affairs of its neighbours” (Sinkaya, 2005:14). Further critics in Iranian newspapers stated that Turkey’s actions were aimed at fulfilling and satisfying the interests and policies of its friends and allies like the US and Israel - the Zionist entity. However, former Iranian foreign minister Velayati said that “This is not a threat because every country has the right to pursue its own interests, and we do not see it as a threat” (Sinkaya, 2005:14). In fact, the Iranian government expressed disapproval of Turkey’s involvement in concert with, or on behalf of the US in containing Iran. However, Turkey declined an Azeri government invitation to build a base in Azerbaijan. A Turkish presence in this area could work to the US’s advantage, but Russia is openly opposed to such bases and activities by NATO in the Russian backyard. According to Articles 20 and 24 of the NATO New Strategic Concept, which was signed on 24 April 1999, the articles establish a linkage between energy resources and terrorism ([www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm)).

**Integrated map 9.2 Azerbaijan-Iran Araz-Alov Sharg oil field dispute**



Source: The Economist, 2 August 2001

Moscow was not happy to see third party involvement in the Caspian Sea dispute (Radio Liberty-Radio Free Europe, 21 August 2001). Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan reached a three-pronged deal on the sub-surface lines of division and joint governing of the Caspian’s area in 2003, which split up 64% of the sea into 3 uneven

parts as per the 'median line' principle, with Kazakhstan granted 27%, Russia 19% and Azerbaijan 18% (Jafar, 2004). The main area of dispute was Iran's stance, as it claimed a fifth of the relevant area. Turkmenistan and Iran, who failed to sign on to the deal, could see their developments in the area held back as a result (Canszi, 2004). In August 2006, the countries inked a deal to jointly launch efforts to remedy harm to the environment stemming from energy extraction. Since the Islamic revolution, President Vladimir Putin's arrival to Iran on 16 October 2007 was the first presidential level visit by a Russian leader. The visit was aimed at strengthening Iranian-Russian ties. Moscow and Tehran agreed to resist third party interventions in the Caspian dispute and agreed to develop 19 new nuclear projects in Iran in November 2007 (Young, 2005). This second summit of five Caspian littoral states' leaders in Tehran tried to clarify the plans on utilising the reserves under the Sea, but they only managed to reach a deal on the use of biological resources whilst also signing a non-attack agreement with regard to other littoral countries (Times Online, 16 October 2007). Iran, whose offshore waters are believed not to be rich in oil and gas, concluded a US \$470 million contract to start extracting oil and natural gas in Iran's section of the Caspian Sea, in cooperation with Brazil's national oil company *Petróleo Brasileiro* (Dow Jones Newswires, 6 March 2007). In summary, Iran stands to lose the greatest amount if the Caspian is classified as a sea. So, Tehran prefers an 'inland lake' label which would require the littoral countries to jointly and equally own the resources, including a 5-way division of the Kashagan field, worth multiple billions of US Dollars for Kazakhstan (Janusz, 2005). Due to the dispute, the pipeline project by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan under the Caspian seabed could not be ratified and this prevented Russian and Iranian initiatives on the legal status of Caspian. However, despite obtaining a smaller stake in the Caspian Sea, Iran benefited from the subsequent transit fees, oil swaps and oil sales.




Table: 9.3.Iran’s (annual) Financial Stake in the Caspian (in \$ millions)

|              | Transit Fees         | Oil Swaps            | Oil sale             |          | Gas |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------|-----|
|              |                      |                      | 1 mb/d               | 2 mb/d   |     |
| 1 mb/d       | 2927 (\$292,000,000) | -                    | -                    | -        | -   |
| 2 mb/d       | 584                  | -                    | -                    | -        | -   |
| .75 mb/d     | -                    | 136.9(\$136,875,000) | -                    | -        | -   |
| 1.125p/d     | -                    | 205.3                | -                    | -        | -   |
| 13.6% of oil | -                    | -                    | 595.7(\$595,680,000) | 1,191.40 | N/A |
| 20% of oil   | -                    | -                    | 876                  | 1,752    | N/A |

Sources: Askari, and Taghavi, 2006:1-18

Iran still insists on the 1925 and 1940 accords and considers the best system for the Caspian to be the condominium. If the other states wish to divide the Caspian (Iran asks for 20% of the total) Iran does not accept the dual regime (division of seabed and common usage of surface). Sectored agreements are favoured by Tehran. On the other hand, Iran did not support the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) because it excludes bodies of water that have no outlet to another sea or ocean (Article 122), but littoral states can benefit from the equity and proportionality considerations in UNCLOS ([www.un.org](http://www.un.org)). Iran believes delimitation could be practical if five littoral states had full sovereignty and exclusive control of air space and subsoil, with a territorial range of 24 miles, an EEZ with the right to explore hydrocarbon and living resources. Iran is also a major player which does not support the militarization of the Caspian.

Integrated map 9.3: Caspian Sea dispute




### **9.2.2.3 The questioning of the possible Russia-Iran-Turkey axis: Dundar Kilic case**

In opposing the regional cooperation of the Georgia-Ukraine (Uzbekistan)-Azerbaijan-Moldova (GU(U)AM)'s initiatives in 1998 ([www.guam.org](http://www.guam.org)), Moscow and Tehran solidified their ties by renewing the former military technology and equipment agreement in 1995, which included the rebuilding of the Bushehr nuclear station. The military contract was worth \$800 million for Russia and required the employment of up to 1,500 on-site Russian scientists in 2001 (Somersant, 21 February 2008). Due to dependency on Russia for key military technology, Iran reacted by means of a low-profile stance on the first Muslim rebellion in Chechnya (1994-1996) and to Russia's pro-Serb and anti-Muslim policy in Bosnia in 1993-1995, which developed relationships further (Sami, 2001). Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, during his visit to Moscow in March 1996, stated that Iranian-Russian relations were "at their highest level in contemporary history" (FBIS-SOV-96, 8 March 1996: p.7). On the other hand, Bill Clinton and the Yeltsin government agreed to remove or dismantle 1004 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 40 nuclear bombers in another Muslim country, Kazakhstan. In this context, Nursultan Nazarbaev signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty after receiving US financial support in 1995 (Anderson, 1997). However, the Clinton government could not impede Russian nuclear technology being transported to Iran, resulting in severe talks between Russia and American on the nuclearisation of Iran during the Moscow summit in May 1997.

The Russian-Iranian military and economic relationship continued to develop, with alleged Russian intentions to conduct a \$4 billion transaction of arms and related materials between 1997 and 2007 (Golan, 1998). Iran also benefited from the chaos in Nagorno-Karabakh in which Russian arms stockpiles and illegal nuclear technology could possibly have been transferred to Iran (Tchilingiran, 1999).

Figure 9.3 Iran–Russia trade, 1992–2007




Sources: IMF data and SPRI arm transfer data generated 5 September 2008; compiled by author

Tehran-Moscow relations mainly relied on military equipment purchasing and nuclear technology transfers to Iran from Russia. Marshal Igor Sergeyev visited Tehran in December 2000, the first visit of a Russian defence minister to Iran since 1980, and President Mohammed Khatami made a landmark visit to Moscow in March 2001. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in February 2001, the Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, stated that Iran intended to purchase approximately \$7 billion of arms from Russia in the next few years. But Russia promised to the US that it would avoid further agreements with Iran and stopped all weapons' sales after September 1999 (Newsline, 23 February 2001). However, despite the rhetoric of a Russian-Iranian strategic partnership, the relations had ups and down with regard to regional issues. For instance, the demilitarisation of the Caspian Sea may create a dispute between Russia, which has 40 naval craft based at Astrakhan and Makhachkala, and Iran which has nearly 50 ships at Bandar e Anzali. However, Moscow conducted the largest joint manoeuvres in post-Soviet history of its army, air force and the Caspian flotilla-the Sea of Peace 2002, which included a joint Russian- Kazakh effort in August 2002 (Ardeshir, 2002), (Alison, 2004). However, there is still no overarching agreement between the five Caspian littoral states on the division of the Sea's resources.



Figure: 9.4 Turkey–Russia trade, 1992–2007




Sources: IMF data and SPRI arm transfer data generated 5 September 2008; compiled by author

The main priorities in the Turkish-Russian relationship are trade, gas pipelines, and tourism but not strategic competition. Turkey signed an arms contract with Russia in 1992, which is similar to Iran’s agreement but this should not cause any systemic security risks ([www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org)). Critics of General Tuncer Kilinc, the general secretary of the National Security Council (MGK) see the Turkish-American policy as being internally contradictory in northern Iraq. Kilinc said that Turkey would do better to try and form agreements with Russia and Iran. In response, Iranian ambassador in Turkey, Hossein Lavasani, greeted him enthusiastically while he was visiting Recai Kutan. Lavasani said “I was not surprised at all by Kilinc’s remarks because our embassy (in Istanbul) some time ago entered into relations with the army on 28 March 2002” (as cited in Olson, 2004). The ambassador stressed that Iran’s relations with Turkey were numerous, but they had nothing to do with blocs or an axis. Turkey would rather want to have stronger relations without a strategic partnership; one might add that included Israel but Kemalist circles ridiculed Kilinc’s strategic alternatives (Hurriyet, 28 March-2002). As mentioned in Chapter Three, the systematic security obligation of Turkey will not allow any kind of systematic change. Hence, Turkey can only be an active mediator in the regional politics rather than a creator of a new axis in the region. On the other hand, Iran relations with Russia can be classified as a mistrustful partnership in pragmatist policy management, which prevents any systematic security relations. Hence both Turkey and Iran are happy to see the southern Caucasus independent state as a buffer zone between Russia and Iran-Turkey.



Figure 9.5 Turkey Iran arms import from Russia, 1995-2006



Source: SIPRI, 2008; compiled by author

The arms transfers between Turkey and Iran clearly demonstrate that the two states' defence technology and arms trades are completely different from one another. Therefore, there is no way to take part in security relations on a practical level. Turkey is mainly a customer of American and EU countries, especially Germany. However, Russia has become a major arms retailer for Iran. On the other hand, Turkey's relations with Russia are more systematic in trade and cultural connections than with Iran, but Moscow still keeps tight control over the security ties of the regional states in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

**9.3. The politics of oil and gas pipelines in Eurasia and Caspian Sea: Turkey's Iran's and Russia's competition in energy transport**

The politics of energy transport basically represent the metaphor of the "great game" in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This study analyses the initiatives of Russia, Iran, China and Turkey in the transportation of natural gas and oil from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Up to now, Azerbaijan's oil was the centre of energy exploration and transportation disputes. However, Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon sources are larger than the Azeri's, and mostly rely on the Russian transportation system. Due to the dual containment policy against Iran, the Iranian option remains limited to oil swaps and natural gas transports from Turkmenistan to Turkey (Fishelson, 2007). Turkmenistan, a fairly small and isolated country, has been mostly

ignored by the US press but has the purported fourth-largest natural gas deposits in the world. Therefore, energy pipeline politics are relevant not only to the regional competition between Turkey, Iran and Russia but also to the international competition in the region. The US holds only 2% of the world's oil reserves but consumes 25% of the world's oil production (Fishelson, 2007). Thus, as long as oil remains a primary fuel, US will never be able to rely on its own reserves. Therefore, interdependency in pipeline politics between 'patron' and 'client' have materialised with BTC. Turkey follows multi-dimensional politics to keep the balance between regional states and the Russia-Iran axis by using soft power strategies and playing the mediator role between international organisations and regional institutions. On the one hand, the United States mainly aims to extend its military influence in the Black Sea, which is not acceptable to Turkey's regional politics. Turkey will not tolerate the breaching of the Montreux Convention which was signed on 20 July 1936 (Kanbolat, 2008). Hence, Turkey became one of the founders of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation (BSECO), which included Armenia but excluded Iran, much as Turkey is excluded in CASCO. For enhancement of security coordination between the Black Sea littoral states, Bulgaria, Romania, the Ukraine, Russia and Georgia established the Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) in April 2001. The organisation is under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of the Black Sea Naval Commanders Committee (BSNC), composed of the various chiefs of the navies/Black Sea fleet commanders of the parties, aimed at preventing access to external powers, especially the United States. Therefore, Ankara continues its cooperation with Moscow to avoid external power penetration into the Black Sea.


### **9.3.1 Russian initiatives in energy transport against Turkey and Iran**

Russia considers Central Asia to be firmly in its sphere of influence, and would loathe losing any of its influence and benefits in the area, especially in terms of energy and security. Russia could become an alternative petroleum power to rival the Middle East by controlling the sizable Central Asian reserves on its own (Fishelson, 2007). The new face of Russian power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will rely on its oil and natural gas capabilities. The Russian state-owned company, Gazprom, supplies around 1/3 of Western Europe's aggregate gas imports. The largest importers of Russian gas are Germany, Italy, Turkey and France. Gazprom sold to Europe 161.5 bcm of natural gas,



and gas sales to the CIS and Baltic States grew by 1/3 to 101 bcm in 2006. The key customers were Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (<http://eng.gazpromquestions.ru>). The major pipelines of relevance are the Central Asia-Centre (CAC) pipeline, the Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the Blue Stream line. The study will compare the dependency of Turkey on the Blue Stream and Tabriz-Ankara pipelines within the Chapter on economics. The Russian port of Novorossiysk is the main terminal for Baku and Kazakh oil, competing with Turkish alternatives, while the CAC pipeline system maintains Russian influence on Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek natural gas transportation. The prospective project of a Trans-Caspian line and the Nabucco pipeline will be competitive with the Russian system.

Integrated map 9.4: General pipeline systems in Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia



### 9.3.1.1 Central Asia-Centre (CAC) pipeline

The Soviet-era pipeline system, CAC, is the main export route for gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Gazprom transports Central Asian gas to Russia and export markets as well as acting as an operator of Turkmen gas transit across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. However, the capacity of CAC at various points

does not exceed 45 bcm per annum (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/>). The two branches of the CAC's gas pipeline system meet in the south-western Kazakh city of Beyneu before crossing into Russia at Alexandrov Gay and feeding into the Russian pipeline system. Therefore, Kazakhstan is a major transit route for gas from Turkmenistan to Russia and on to other markets across the territory of the former Soviet Union. The 30-year old central pipeline system has significantly outlived its lifespan and needs substantial upgrading. Hence, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed a joint declaration to build the Pre-Caspian gas line in May 2007. It is expected that Gazprom will invest about \$1 billion, and Kazakhstan will invest over \$800 million for the modernisation of this natural gas pipeline network in 2008.

The western branch of the CAC pipeline delivers Turkmen natural gas from near the Caspian Sea region to the north, while the eastern branch pipes natural gas from eastern Turkmenistan and southern Uzbekistan to western Kazakhstan where the branches meet en route to the Russian gas pipeline system (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/>). Due to pricing disputes, Russia stopped the transfer of Turkmen gas, causing severe economic difficulties for Ashgabat's government. But this was resolved in 1998. Russia then became the major partner in Turkmenistan's natural gas exports. Turkmenistan mainly used the Central Asia-Centre Pipeline to export a total of 8.83 Tcf to Ukraine (via Russia) from 2002 to 2006, as well as smaller amounts to Russia (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/>). Russia received 6 Mfc in 2004 and 10 Mcf in 2006 and also expects to buy 80 Mcf of natural gas from Turkmenistan. RosUkrEnergo, the intermediary in the Russia-Ukraine stretch, operates the Turkmenistan natural gas at \$2.83 per million cubic feet (Mcf). Russia guaranteed initial natural gas exports of 212 Bcf in 2005, increasing to 1.8 Tcf in 2007, and remaining at 2.8 Tcf from 2009-2028 (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/>). Gasprom and the Turkmen national company, TurkmanNeft, also agreed to build another pipeline from Bektas to the Alaxandriv Gai compressor in the Russian natural gas pipeline system ([www.gazprom.ru/eng](http://www.gazprom.ru/eng)). After the pricing dispute halted in 1998, Russia became the natural partner for Turkmenistan gas exports. However, neither Turkey with its alliance nor Iran could achieve any success in competing with Russia on Turkmen gas exports. The planned Nabucco and Trans-Caspian pipeline projects aim to diversify the Turkmen gas export option towards Europe.



### Integrated map 9.5 Turkmen pipeline linking the Central Asian pipeline system



Sources: Gazprom, 2006

#### 9.3.1.2 Baku – Novorossiysk pipeline


The Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline (Northern Early Oil Pipeline) is an 830 kilometers (520 mile) line, which runs from the Sangachal terminal near Baku to the Novorossiysk terminal at the Black Sea coast in Russia ([www.bp.com](http://www.bp.com)). The Azerbaijani section of the pipeline is operated by the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) with a consortium of 10 partner companies that include BP, as the largest single shareholder, while the Russian section is operated by Transneft. 143 million barrels of oil (including output from ACG and other fields) have been transported via the pipeline system by the end of November 2005. This has allowed the shipment of 217 tanker loads from Novorossiysk over the same period. However, after a dispute over natural gas supplies from Russia, Azerbaijan announced that it would stop the exports of Azeri oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline starting in January 2007([www.bp.com](http://www.bp.com)). AIOC and SOCAR stopped using the pipeline for oil exports in April 2007 and February 2008. Azerbaijani oil transportation was resumed following completion of technical works in a section within Azerbaijan. Due to an explosion on the massive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline through Turkey and the outbreak of violence between Russia and Georgia, the Novorossiysk oil terminal saw an unexpected boost in crude shipments in August as producers in Azerbaijan were forced to redirect volumes to the Russian port (Tellinghuisen, Energy Intelligence Briefing, 29 August 2008). The Azeri state oil firm SOCAR and Russian Transneft which serves the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline part in Russia stated that the following August oil pumping would total 166,000 tons

versus 83,000 in July (Economic News, 12 August 2008). The dispute increased the attractiveness to international oil companies of Iranian options for Azeri oil transport, but Washington's opposition to the Iranian initiative is still the main impediment to this plan.

#### **9.3.1.2 Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC): Russia-US cooperation**

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium owns the 1,580-kilometer Tengiz- Novorossiysk oil pipeline that connects deposits in western Kazakhstan with the Russian coast of the Black Sea. The pipeline has been operational since 2001 and the initial capacity of the pipeline was 28.2 million tonnes at the end of that year but had increased to 31.12 million tons of oil in 2007 (Newswire, 11 June 2007; Tellinghuisen, Energy Intelligence Briefing, 29 August 2008). There is talk of almost doubling capacity to 67 million tons/year by adding 10 new pumping stations. Since the pipeline is already in place, and runs across relatively flat land, it should be relatively inexpensive and easy to increase the capacity if desired. Unlike Azeri oil, Kazakh oil is dependent on the Russian route of CPC and also a sizeable amount flows through the old Soviet pipeline system pumped via Atyrau-Samara (Fishelson, 2007). On the one hand, Russian oil producers use the CPC for approximately 85,000 bbl/d in 2005 (CPC News, 20 May 2005; [www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). However, increasing transport prices between varied shareholders of CPC have damaged the American-Russian cooperation over control of Central Asian oil and gas. The fact that American companies hold a sizable share (22.5% in total) strengthens the CPC's position as an extension of America's indisputable power on the world stage (Fishelson, 2007). The CPC aided this balance and helped the integration of Russia into the western capitalist system. CPC's shareholders are as follows: Russia 24%, Kazakhstan 19%, Chevron 15%, and Oman 7%. A variety of oil and gas companies make up the remainder. In addition to Kazakh oil, the CPC also exports for major Russian producers Lukoil, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, and TNK-BP (Fishelson, 2007).

Figure 9.6 Caspian pipeline consortiums



Sources: EIA and CPC official website: <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>  
<http://www.cpc.ru/portal/alias!press/lang!en-US/tabID!3357/DesktopDefault.aspx>; compiled by author

The American oil giant, Chevron, was the first major Western oil firm to enter the region after the formation of the joint venture Tengizchevroil (TCO) partnership in 1993. The Tengiz and Korolev fields within the TCO partnership are estimated to contain between 6 billion and 9 billion barrels of recoverable oil. Hence, Chevron will be able to fully develop Tengiz for the Tengiz Chevroil (TCO) joint venture to reach peak production of 700,000 barrels per day, expected by 2015 (Kandiyoti, 2008). Chevron has a 45 % interest and will be the principal shipper for the 900-mile (1,500-kilometer) TCP (PR Newswire, 16 May 1997; [www.chevron.com](http://www.chevron.com)).

Table 9.4 Transport cost comparisons for Kazak Oil from Novorossiysk

| To Europe. Assuming a Cost of Capital of 15% |        |                             |                                 |
|--|--------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Destination-Route                            | Cost/b | Cost as a % of Bypass Route | Cost Minus Cost of Bypass Route |
| Baku-Rotterdam:                              |        |                             |                                 |
| Tanker From Novorossiysk                     | \$2.33 | 89%                         | -0.28                           |
| Novorossiysk-Turkish Bypass                  | \$2.61 | 100%                        | 0.00                            |
| Novorossiysk-Samsun-Ceyhan                   | \$3.14 | 120%                        | 0.53                            |
| Italy  |        |                             |                                 |
| Tanker From Novorossiysk                     | \$1.74 | 79%                         | -0.46                           |
| Novorossiysk-Turkish Bypass                  | \$2.20 | 100%                        | 0.00                            |
| Novorossiysk-Samsun-Ceyhan                   | \$2.73 | 124%                        | 0.53                            |

Barnes, Joe and Ronald Soligo, 1998)



**9.3.1.3 Russia –Turkey energy cooperation: Blue stream**

Turkey’s structural engagement with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Moscow and Ankara achieved the completion of the world’s deepest twin Blue Stream natural gas pipeline. It began to pump Russian gas from Isobilnoye in southern Russia, to Dzhugba on the Black Sea, then on to the Turkish port of Samsun in 2003. Turkey’s Calik Energy Company, Russia’s Gazprom, and Italy’s Eni are major stakeholders in this project (Fink, 2006). The official opening ceremony of the Blue Stream pipeline and cooperation in the Blackseafor and BSEC organisation contributes to good Russia-Turkey relations (Cornell, Jonssonand and et al. 2006), Tanrisever, 2002). The prime ministers of Turkey and Italy (Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Silvio Berlusconi) and the Russian president, Vladimir Puti,n attended the ceremony on 17 November 2005 (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 17 November 2005).

**Integrated map 9.6: Blue Stream pipeline**



Sources: <http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/articles/article27150.shtml>

EU members received 35% of their gas from Russia in 2004: Greece (79%), Austria (65%) and Germany (38%) (Pamir, 2007). Providing energy has made Russia a significant player in the new world order (Fink, 2006). Although Russia uses energy as a political weapon against Ukraine, it has become a more reliable energy partner for the Ankara government.

### **9.3.2 Iran's initiatives in energy transport from Caspian Sea**

The blocking of the east-west flow of oil from the Caspian via Georgia, a route that bypasses Russia, has made that western route significantly less attractive for Caspian oil exporters while Iran is potentially perceived as a much more interesting route. Due to the conflict, the use of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline and of a number of other transportation units as well as the cessation of rail deliveries of oil to the Georgian port of Batumi, resulted in shortages (Goble, 2008). Iran had already been operating the Caspian oil and gas routes with tankers and Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline (Korpezhe-Kurt Kui) and using the former Soviet pipeline system from Baku to Tabriz. However, the proposed Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline will be competitive with the Russian alternative for oil and natural gas transportation from the Caspian Sea. Iran also is also a potential mediator between Armenia and Turkey. Moreover, Iran's natural gas pipeline potentially reduces the Armenian dependency on Russian energy, which is competitive with Russian initiatives in the region.

#### **9.3.2.1 Korpezhe-Kurt Kui (KKK) gas pipeline**

Turkmenistan has some of the world's largest natural gas fields containing 71 Tcf in proven and estimated natural gas reserve, 159 Tcf in the Amu-Dar'ya, Dauletabad-Donmez, Magrab and 17 newly discovered natural gas deposits in the Lebap, Mary and Deashoguz basins. Turkmenistan also has 1.7 billion barrels in proven oil reserves, with possible reserves of up to 38 billion billion barrels. Hence, Turkmenistan's energy sources became competitive with Russian natural gas in the post-Cold War regional political environment. The pricing dispute between Gasprom and TurkmenNeft reduced Turkmen gas production, which sagged throughout the 1990s, because Turkmenistan's only natural gas export route ran through Russia. Turkmenistan launched the \$195 million and 124-mile KKK pipeline to Iran, which is considered to be the first natural gas export pipeline in the Caspian Sea region for bypassing Russia. However, this is a fairly small pipeline, with a capacity of only 282 billion cubic feet (bcf) per year. The pipeline has allowed Turkmenistan to supply Iran with roughly 180 Bcf of natural gas per year (Olcott, 2004). Though some Turkmen gas is exported into Russia through the old Soviet pipeline system, the KKK gas is

purchased at market rates in cash, while most of the gas to Russia is bartered. The pipeline has no capacity to be a competitor with Gazprom, the Russian state natural gas company (IRNA, 17 March 1997). An additional 25-year contract between Turkmenistan and Iran was signed in December 1997. However, the proposed Nabucco pipeline project would add to the Turkey-Iran natural gas network and make Turkmenistan a competitor of Gasprom. However, Turkmenistan and Iran have been restricted by ILSA so that during 2005, Turkmenistan only planned to export 250 Bcf with the newly installed \$140 million gas processor to facilitate higher natural gas flows to Iran. On the one hand, pricing disputes between Ashgabat and Tehran caused the closure of KKK pipeline's taps. Under the new agreement, Turkmen natural gas will now cost \$130 per tcm until 30 June after which the price will rise to \$150 (www.strana.ru). The new regime of the Turkmen president, Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov, unexpectedly cut off exports via the KKK pipeline on 8 January 2008 and reduced daily gas exports to Turkey by 75 %, from 20 to 5 million cubic meters. The Turkmen cut-off forced Iran to halt all natural gas exports to Turkey, forcing Ankara to use as much as a third of its stored fuel. Part of the Turkmen gas imported from Turkmenistan is re-exported to Turkey and the other part is paid for by Iran and used in domestic ventures (Maleki, 2007). Currently Iran can produce 440 million cubic meters of gas per day, with about 380 million cubic meters needed for domestic consumption, an increase of 12 % over 2007 levels. On the one hand, the 29 years of US sanctions against Iran have had an even more negative impact on energy cooperation with Turkmenistan and the country's natural gas output (Daly, 2008). KKK is a small-width pipeline with non-expandable maximum throughput. So, although the Iranian connection boasts rather short lines, they remain pricey and in light of US opposition, agreeing to a collaboration to put the line together would not make sense. The US has placed a stigma on dealing with Iran as far as oil and gas firms are concerned—this would forestall the transportation of Kazakh oil and gas by means of Iran, with Chevron having equity in numerous Caspian fields. Another option for Turkmen gas is to be pumped to Armenia via Iran. According to the contract between Ashgabat and Yerevan in December 2001, Turkmenistan would supply up to 70.6 Bcf per year to Armenia via the Korpezhe-Kurt Kui pipeline, but the construction of the \$120 million, 84-mile Iran-Armenia pipeline link has been delayed for years due to disagreements between the two countries (Turan News, 1 August 2001).



Iran has five pipeline oil networks, and multiple international pipeline projects under consideration. Iran has invested in the Neka-Tehran pipeline to increase its import capacity at the Caspian port, to handle the growing oil shipments from Russia and Azerbaijan, and manage the crude oil swaps from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (www.eia.doe.gov).

Integrated map 9.7 Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline system and domestic pipeline system of Iran



### 9.3.2.2 Iran’s swap options for Turkmen- Kazakhs –Azeri oil transport from Caspian Sea by tankers/railcars/pipeline to Neka

The Iranian route for transporting oil and gas is the shortest, relatively safe, with low transit fees--incentives for energy suppliers of the Caspian Sea Basin. The export routes of the Caucasus or Russia are at a higher cost of US \$5-8 per barrel. However, Tehran has lowered the transit fees from \$4 per barrel to \$2.40 per barrel, to make the Iranian route more attractive. Despite the Iranian route being cheap and short, Washington and EU do not want Iran to be a significant transport route for the energy sources of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, they seek to diversify energy supplies in order to reduce their dependence on oil imports from the Persian Gulf. However, the dependency of regional countries’ energy transport via the Russian Central Asian pipeline system, especially Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, provides political power to Russian national energy company Gazprom, which supplies 19% of European natural gas. Hence, the Iranian option for energy transport still remains a more secure and reliable for diversification to Western countries’ demand against dependency of Russia. Up to now, Caspian oil from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan has been shipped through two Iranian ports, Neka and Anzali, and piped to refineries in Iran best situated to receive swapped oil by sea. On the other hand, Iran has sufficient refining capacity to meet its domestic gasoline and other light fuel needs. Thus, Iran

imported over 192,000 bbl/d of gasoline and relied upon imports to meet almost half of its fuel needs, costing \$5 billion in 2006. Iran imports part of its gasoline from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For oil swaps with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, Iran built a new terminal at the Caspian port of Neka and a new pipeline (370,000 bbls/day, 208 miles to Tehran), as well as two new refineries capable of processing 500,000 barrels of Kazakh crude a day as well as Azeri and Russian crude. Iran has been swapping oil and buying crude cheaply from the Caspian Sea ports and transporting it to Tehran.

Integrated map 9.8 : Caspian oil terminals and tanker transport



Compiled by Abbas Maleki and author (2006)

### 9.3.2.2.1 Kazakhstan- Iran oil swap

As the second largest onshore/ offshore oil producing country, Kazakhstan accounts for over 55% of the 3mb/d currently being produced in the region (including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). There are more than 170 fields in Kazakhstan, all onshore, but with a major part of Tengiz having become offshore because of a rise in the Caspian Sea's level. It is operated by Chevron, producing about 510,000 b/d of 47 degree API crude oil with 0.5% sulphur (Alam, 2002; [www.entrepreneur.com](http://www.entrepreneur.com)). On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's oil and gas transport mainly depends on the Russian distribution system. For instance, the Atyrsu-Samara pipeline is linked with the Russian pipeline system at 15 million tons

per annum and this will eventually increase to 20-25 million tons (Interfax, RIA-Novosti, 30 March 2007). Kazakhstan also exports its crude via two other Russian-controlled pipelines: The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which connects to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, and the Kenkyak-Orsk pipeline, which sends Kazakh oil to Russia's Orsk refinery. In 2006, Kazakhstan was the conduit for 43 million tons of crude oil and 24 billion cubic meters of gas via Russian pipelines (Blank, 2005). Hence, the proposed pipelines aim to diversify Kazakhstan's energy transport, such as the Central Asia Oil pipeline (Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan and Afghanistan to Gwadar, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan-China pipeline in Aktyubinsk, Kazakhstan, to Xinjiang). But the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline (Kazakhstan via Turkmenistan to Kharg Island, Iran) on the Persian Gulf will create a potential dispute between Russia and Iran. The proposed Trans-Caspian route (Kazakhstan Twin pipelines) will be an alternative energy transport system to counter Russian dependency. It was planned to start from Aqtau (western Kazakhstan, on the Caspian coast) to Baku and could extend to Ceyhan. Although Kazakhstan wants to diversify its energy transport and strengthen its economic ties with Western countries, Astana have been very keen to avoid direct competition with Russia in terms of oil and gas exports. Russia and Kazakhstan collaborate rather than compete, but Iran is another possibility for the latter's resource transfers. In accordance with the Kazakhstan-Iran oil swap agreement in 1996, up to 120,000 bbl/d of Kazakh oil could be transported by tankers through the Caspian Sea to the Iranian Neka port, then sent through pipelines to the Tabriz refinery for local consumption. The countries' efforts to agree a deal have been going on for years, but an obstacle is Kazakh crude's previous incompatibility with Iranian refining facilities and so are costs. Consequently, legal and technical hindrances as well as processing difficulties prevented the amounts involved from growing. Kazakhstan started conducting experimental deliveries to Neka of about 1,600 bbl/d in 2002 and the deliveries were predicted to grow through swaps to 17,000 bbl/d. Iran's Lausanne-based subsidiary, the NaftIran Intertrade Company (NICO), the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Kazakh national oil company KazMunaiGas, operate swap deals between the two countries. KazMunaiGas supplies up to 70,000 bbl/d of different types of crude to Neka. Crude oil is blended together at the Caspian port of Neka (Iran) and refined in Iran's northern regions to be swapped for an equivalent volume of crude at the Iranian Persian Gulf coast after payment of a fee that is in the range of \$1.50 to \$2.00.



Kazakh oil to the Persian Gulf provides a strategic advantage for Iran (Iran Daily, 25 June 2006). In early 2004, Iran finished its campaign of extending the internal distribution lines to Neka port to permit capacity growth from roughly 50,000 bbl/d to 150,000 bbl/d. Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, a deputy oil minister, stated that capacity would further grow from 150,000 bbl/d to 250,000 bbl/d by the end of the month and, following the deployment of additional pump stations, rise to 500,000 bbl/d by March 2007 (eia.doe.gov6). Iran has further intentions to enhance its Tabriz and Tehran refineries, to enlarge capacity to 500,000 bbl/d of Caspian crude oil. Since 2004, swap quanta decreased to 35,000 bbl/d during the winter of 2004-2005 but has since increased somewhat to around 147,000 bbl/d (eia.doe.gov).

Integrated map 9.9 : Old and new Neka (Iran)-Ray (Iran) pipeline



Compiled by Abbas Maleki and author

### 9.3.2.2 Turkmenistan Iran energy swap

Dragon Oil plc. (United Arab Emirate owned) is an operator of the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the Cheleken Contract Area of the Turkmenistan sector of Caspian offshore. A renewed 10-year contract between Dragon Oil and Iran commenced in May 2000 as the US oil titan ExxonMobil's permit submission to swap Turkmen oil for Iranian was rejected in April 1999. Turkmenistan is transporting over fifty percent (9,000 bbl/d) of its Caspial Sea oil production to the port of Neka. This port further serves as a conduit for gasoline and gasoil supplies from Turkmenistan

within the smaller terminals at Bandar Nowshar and Bandar Anzali. Tehran's total transport capacity is a mere 35,000 bbl/d Caspian oil, which it buys from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through a swapping agreement (Maleki, 2007). Dragon Oil produced approximately 7,000 bbl/d in 2001 pursuant to a PSA with Turkmenistan, exporting a share of its production through a swap deal with Iran, peaking in 2001. The company sold 8.7m barrels of which 83% were routed through the swap arrangement with a subsidiary of the National Iranian Oil Company in 2007 ([www.dragonoil.com](http://www.dragonoil.com)). The ILSA also seeks to penalise non-US firms from doing business with Iran, and it remains to be seen whether Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will choose to increase swaps with Iran.

#### **9.3.2.2.3 Azerbaijan-Iran oil swap**

Iran made suggestions that Azerbaijan can send its oil through the Korpezhe-Kurt Khui pipeline by sending it east through the Caspian Sea and to the Turkmenbashi docks in Turkmenistan, with a possible connection at that point to the suggested Kazakhstan-Iran lines in April 2002. Iran also offered to collaborate in constructing a line to transfer Baku oil by means of a 190-mile line to northwest Iran, with a subsequent unification with Iranian networks and refineries. TotalFinaElf, with its significant Iranian involvement, has offered to construct a line with a capacity of between 200,000 bbl/d and 400,000 bbl/d, and in May 2001, Iran's ministry of oil gave authorisation to building a refinery near the Caspian, next to the Azerbaijan border. This agreement was said to be contingent on the settling of the Caspian reserves' dispute, as well as requiring a boost in Western-Iranian diplomacy.

The oil swap agreement between Azerbaijan and Iran became very considerable when a blaze engulfed the pipeline in Felahiye /Erzincan province in the north-eastern part of the Turkish section of the pipeline on 5 August 2008. BP, Europe's second-largest oil company, and other exporters of Azeri oil have been unable to use the 1,768-kilometre (1,100-mile) transport through the BTC line, which carries 1 million barrels per day (bpd) from Azerbaijan's capital to the Turkish Mediterranean and on to Europe (Apa Azerbaijan News, 28 August 2008). The BP-owned Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, resumed tanker loadings following fire damage (Apa Azerbaijan



News, 28 August, 2008). This issue was exacerbated by the Russian-Georgian conflict as this not only stopped oil transfers through BTC irrespective of the Turkish portion's state, but further halted transport of oil through the Baku-Supsa line and by train from Azerbaijan to Georgia following the destruction of a bridge in Georgia in August 2008 (Global Intelligence, Stratfor, 26 August, 2008). Azerbaijan began sending crude through Iran due to the suspension of Azeri oil shipments via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and by trains; Azerbaijan sent about 100,000 bpd north through Russia via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. Realising Iran's unique strategic situation, its facilities to access free waters, its remarkable railway system and oil terminals in Neka, Amir-Abad and Anzali ports, and its oil storage tanks on the transit route of fuel to Turkey and Iraq, Azerbaijan has preferred Iran as a reliable route to export its oil to the world markets. Iran can currently handle 200,000 barrels per day of Caspian and Central Asian oil (Today Az News, 08 October, 2008). Iran received its first cargo of Azeri crude for transit on 24 August 2008 (Global Intelligence, Stratfor, 26 August, 2008). Azerbaijan is exporting up to 10,000 barrels a day of crude oil through Iran's Caspian port at Neka since the outbreak of the Russia-Georgian war in August (<http://www.shana.ir>). Azerbaijan has stated that transfers will continue only as long as the Western path by means of the BTC is offline. With Russia controlling the BTC operation, Iran could become an essential conduit in Azerbaijani oil transfers with wide-ranging regional effects (Global Intelligence, Stratfor, 26 August, 2008). Iran's oil swap deals have doubled to about 100,000 barrels a day from 50,000 barrels a day and are expected to rise to 200,000 barrels a day in the coming years (<http://www.silobreaker.com>). Iran aims to increase the volume of crude oil to 500,000 barrels a day under swaps, putting the imported oil through its northern oil refineries and exporting an equivalent amount from its southern ports (Today Az News, 26 October, 2008). Even if the BTC and Georgian options are back up and running, Azerbaijan now knows it has to get the Russians' approval for its energy to flow to the West ([www.istockanalyst.com](http://www.istockanalyst.com)).

Integrated map 9.10 Azerbaijan Iran oil swap option after BTC was shut down



Compiled by author

9.3.2.3 Iran-Azerbaijan natural gas transport

Iran sends gas through a pipeline to Azerbaijan pursuant to a December 1992 contract for 250 Mcm/year supply, which was halted in March 1995. The negotiation resumed in 1997 for gas transfers to the Azeri region of Nakhichevan ([www.silkroadstudies.org](http://www.silkroadstudies.org)) through an 80-km pipeline to be constructed from the Iranian Azeri town of Khoy to the region's border at Dzhulfa (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 12 April 1999). Eventually, in December 2005, Azerbaijan inked a deal which required payment of an identical set of fees as prescribed in the Iran-Armenia gas agreement. A gas line was also opened to connect Iran and Nakhichevan (Eurasia Daily Monitor, 24 February 2006). However, the proposed oil pipeline project from Baku to Tabriz (200,000 bbl/d to 400,000 bbl/d) by TotalFinaElf remains uncertain due to the price and US and Israeli connections with Azerbaijan ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). However, Azerbaijan and Iran maintain their cooperation in the transport of Caspian and Iranian oil to the Turkish port by using the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline.

Integrated map 9.11 Azerbaijan Iran oil and gas to Turkey



Compiled by Abbas Malek, 2006)

9.3.2.4 Iran-Armenian natural gas pipeline

In 2004 Iran and Armenia made public the building of a pipeline connecting the two states as well as an electricity network for the exchange of power. Iran provided a \$30 million loan to allow building of the Armenian portion of the pipeline as well as the 82 km electricity network by means of another \$8.4 million loan to be repaid with power. The Iranian firm, Sanir, is constructing the pipeline (APS News, 11 April, 2005). Pursuant to the May 2006 deal, Iran will transfer 36 bcm of gas over a 20-year duration starting in 2007 at a cost of \$210-220m to construct the new pipeline and update the existing Kajaran -Yerevan line at the Armenian end.



Integrated map 9.12 Tabriz (Iran)-Yerevan (Armenia) pipeline



Compiled by author, 2006

Russia is not happy to see both Turkmenistan's and Iran's contracts with Armenia because they would reduce Armenia's dependency on Russia. Iran diversified the pipeline routes with a new customer in March 2007. The 87 mile Iran-Armenian line was finished at Agarak and began operations at 200 Mcf/d to Armenia in return for power supplies (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/>).

**9.3.2.5 Proposed Kazakhstan –Turkmenistan to Kharg Island (Persian Gulf) pipeline**

Various options are possible for direct transport of Caspian oil to the Persian Gulf, including a line to send Kazakh oil to Neka by way of Turkmenistan, with a link to Iran's network at that port. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, at a meeting with Iran President Mohammed Khatami, said that this line would be the cheapest means of Kazakh oil exports; the project has undergone a feasibility analysis by the Kazakh state oil company and TotalFinalElf. The suggested 900-mile, \$1.2-billion pipeline would have a capacity of 1 million bbl/d. Turkmenistan deployed a \$140 million gas processor to increase natural gas transfer to Iran in September with the Kazakhstan National Oil Company (KazMunaiGaz) ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). Therefore, the Iranian option for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan oil and gas transport is considered to be a golden gate from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf--now open (Associated Press, 25 August 2005). Iran is now the major counter-balance to Russia

for energy supplies in Asia and the European continent. Iran’s major projects are demonstrating that Iran can no longer be isolated internationally as is typical when super powers try to deter middle-power states.

**Table 9.5 Iran natural gas export projects and SPA status for pipeline projects**

| Projects               | QTY (BCM/Y) | Start      | Status           |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|------------------|
| Turkey                 | 3 up to 10  | 2001       | signed           |
| Armenia                | 1~2.3       | 2007       | signed           |
| Nakhichevan            | 0.35        | 2005       | negotiation      |
| UEA (1,2,3, contracts) | 20 up to 25 | 2005-2007  | first one signed |
| Kuwait                 | 3.1         | 2007       | negotiation      |
| Oman                   | in process  | in process | negotiation      |
| Iran-Europe            | in process  | in process | negotiation      |
| Iran-Pakistan-India    | 27          | 2009       | negotiation      |

Sources: National Iranian Gas Export Company, 2005; compiled by author

### 9.3.2.6 The Asian option for Iran and Turkmenistan

The most hotly disputed idea is the \$7.4-billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) line which would send Iranian natural gas to the Asian subcontinent. With a suggested 1724-mile length and a 5.4 bcf/d capacity, the pipeline has been held up due to disagreements over shipment costs (Luft, 2005). Iran would likely expand the domestic IGAT-7 line into Pakistan instead of building a duplicate; with a capacity of 5.4 bcf/d and extends from Assaluyeh to Iranshahr. The IGAT-7 ought to be finished by 2011 (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/pdf.pdf>).

On the other hand, Trans Afghan pipeline (TAP) and Tran-Caspian pipeline (TCP) are systems considered an alternative to Iranian and Russian energy distribution by the US. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline (TAP) would expand from the Caspian through Turkmenistan and over the mountain, into Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as including a port/refinery. It could be extended even further into India so as to get access to the rapidly growing markets in Pakistan and India and justify demand for a line such as this one.

Integrated map 9.13 Trans-Afghan pipeline



Sources: Gazprom, 2007

TAP construction costs are elevated as Afghanistan is mountainous and torn by a civil war, including anti-Americanism, with active Taliban forces. This makes construction of the line and security difficult due to its high cost, as is the case with similar pipelines running through unstable Afghani areas. If Pakistan and/or India were prepared to contribute towards Afghan security, then TAP/TAPI could become practicable; at this time, it remains at the planning stage as its precise location, capacity or carriage type—whether oil, gas or both—have not yet been finalised (Fishelson, 2007). Consequently, another possibility is the building of a Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey pipeline (TIT), which could carry gas from the eastern shore of the Caspian across Iran and into southern Turkey, where it could connect with the large Turkish pipeline network for Kazakh natural gas. Iran is encouraging the building of a Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran oil pipeline (KTI), with a capacity of 1 Mlb/d, and constructed alongside a gas line. The latter are particularly convenient in the Iranian context due to the geographical proximity of fields in the north-east Kazakh sector of the Caspian.

### **9.3. 3 Sino alternatives against Russia**

China is proximate to Central Asia and has a common border of more than 3,000 km with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is located in the proximity of two more Central Asian states Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and this creates a motivation for Chinese involvement in the area (<http://www.chinaeurasia.org/Newsletter.html>). China aims to constrain separatists' movement and wants a stable border to diversify energy sources as well to become an economic partner of Central Asian states. China has managed to transform its national economic complex and became one of the leading trading partners of the Central Asian states. At present, more than 60 % of China's imports come from the Middle East via the Malacca Strait (Shenzhen Daily, 29 September 2004). Thus, in order to diversify oil resources, the state National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a leading Kazakh-Sino consortium operator, agreed to contracts with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan state firms, granting them 50 % stakes in the portions of the pipeline lying in their territories (<http://globalresearch.ca>), because China needs more oil to fuel its soaring economic growth and also to diversify its oil imports (<http://petromin.safan.com/news>).

#### **9.3.3.1 Atasu – Alashankou oil pipeline**

The building of the 988 km long Atasu (Kazakhstan)–Alashankou (Xingjian) route began in September 2004 and ended within ten months. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline must transfer 600,000 tons of oil before shipments commence in mid-2006. The initial amounts will not be in excess of 10 million tonnes annually, with an expansion to the full potential of 20 million tonnes per annum (Panorama, 17 December 2007). The expansion of the Kenkyak-Atyrau pipeline constructed in 2003 to the Kumkol oil fields in Kyzylorda region (south Kazakhstan) will substantially enhance the tonnage that can be sent to the Chinese Xinjiang Autonomous Republic refinery. Atasu-Alashankou also provides Siberian oil with a significant prospect of addressing increasing Chinese oil needs. In light of the economic potential of a Kazakh-Chinese-Russian triangle, Russia would be better off minimising the importance of political factors (Yermukanov, 2007). Transneft, the Russian oil pipeline firm on 25<sup>th</sup> April stated that it intends to send 1.3 million metric tonnes of oil (26,000 billion barrels per day) to China via the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by



2010 ( Blagov, 2006). The Chinese-Kazakh joint venture, PetroKazakhstan, has not yet been able to achieve adequate production levels, and by 2007 the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline is expected to transfer 5-6 million tonnes of oil (The European Weekly, 10 February 2007).

Currently refineries in the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous district in China, especially the one in Dushanzi, do not have the capacity to refine 10 million tonnes of Kazakh supplies annually, since they are also responsible for processing Chinese oil (Petroleum Report, Feb 7 2007). On the other hand, Russia now plans to connect the top of the line with oilfields in western Siberia and also open a direct pipeline to China in two years. Russian and Kazakh oil was previously transported to China by rail.

Integrated map 9.14: Atasu (Kazakhstan) Dushanzi (China) pipeline



<http://www.chinapage.com/transportation/pipeline/pipeline-kazakhstan.html>

### 9.3.3.2 Kazakhstan-Sino natural gas pipeline

In August 2005 Kazmunaigaz and CNPC made a deal to build a gas line from Kazakhstan to China, the path for which is currently undecided but the capacity was agreed to be at least 1060 bcf per year (30 bcm) (<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/pdf.pdf>). The state-owned Chinese



National Petroleum Company (CNPC), made its first foray into Central Asia, by buying the Canadian-based PetroKazakhstan which owns the Kumkol field. As Lukoil was a competitor for the same firm, this success was lauded in China in October 2007 (Fishelson, 2007). On the other hand, China and Kazakhstan held a meeting in Almaty on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2008 celebrate the initial work on a 1,300 km gas line, to be built in phases and which should be operational in 2010. It is part of a greater plan to connect China with Central Asia's supplies through two parallel lines (<http://globalresearch.ca>). The possibilities open to the parties were the extension of current lines between Bukhara and Tashkent in Uzbekistan to the economic capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty, through Taldy-Kurgan in Kazakhstan and on to Alashankou on the border with China (<http://en.rian.ru/world/20060418/46552957.html>). Kazakhstan proposed to allow transfer of Turkmen gas to China through the country and was open to plans over an underwater Caspian line (<http://globalresearch.ca>). Turkmenistan will connect to the 3,500 km gas line to be constructed by China National Petroleum Corp and the Kazakhstan government's KazMunaiGas. The length will be at least 7,000 km from Turkmenistan, across Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and on to China's north western Xinjiang region. Uzbekistan began building components on its territory as Turkmenistan unveiled its part recently (<http://globalresearch.ca>). The KPC project will have an impact on US influence in the Eurasian region as it contradicts the Silk Road Strategy; the KPC forms part of a Russian-Iranian-Chinese inspired scheme for a competing transportation system (Bobokulov, 2006). Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is evaluating options for another route from eastern countries, possibly through Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan to Guangdong province, situated on the southern Pacific coast of China. Kazakh energy experts are apparently examining the possibility of integrating these paths, while Russia is considering a gas line to China. Yet another possibility is building a gas line between Ishim in Russia's western Siberia and Alashankou through the Kazakh cities of Astana and Karagand. Another possibility is the construction of a line from Chelkar in western Kazakhstan through Kyzyl-Orda to Shimkent where it would join the Bukhara-Tashkent-Almaty pipeline (<http://en.rian.ru/world/20060418/46552957.html>).

Integrated map 9.15 Kazakh-Central Asian oil and natural gas export options to China



Compiled by EIA, 2006

However, the joint venture of the Chinese and Kazakh companies does not have the capacity to control the Caspian oil it will ship. The exceptional cold of Kazakh steppes during the winter in conjunction with the inferior oil standard with a high paraffin component, means that the line may collapse halt altogether if the pumping stations cease their operation, even provisionally, as occurred in the winter of 2005-2006 (Fishelson, 2007). Secondly, neither Kazakhstan nor China has advanced off-shore technology to explore and drill oil underwater in the Caspian Sea. Thirdly, the Kazahagan field, a high-pressure field with significant deposits of poisonous hydrogen sulphide, also freezes in the winter. Fourthly, the Kashagan consortium, or the Agip KCO, is led by the Italian company ENI, who potentially may wish to avoid the oil it transfers from getting to China if an embargo occurs. As noted above, most Caspian fields (likely to contribute a minority to total oil outputs) are in the possession of TengizChevroil, a joint venture of the Kazakhs and the US, which might choose to transfer oil through American-supported routes or via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), in which it holds shares (Fishelson,2007). Hence, China is not considered as major energy actor for Caspian energy transport, but a potential consumer of Russian and Caspian energy reserves.

### 9.3.4 Turkish alternatives to Russia and Iran in energy transport

Turkey is situated close to 71.8% of global proven gas and 72.7% oil deposits, especially in Middle East/Caspain basin (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>). The strategic

location means Turkey is the energy corridor between major producing states and consumer markets, making it a principal participant in guaranteeing energy availability by means of diversifying supplies. The westward projects connecting the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe are also a key to the region’s integration with the West (<http://www.washington.emb.mfa.gov.tr>). On the other hand, as an energy consuming country, Turkey’s needs were 78 million tons of energy-equivalent as of 2002, while the indigenous production of 25 million tones could only satisfy 32 % of its energy consumption. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources foresees that the primary demand will rise to 154 million tons of energy in 2010 and 282 million tons by 2020 (Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 22 March 2004 ). Therefore, Turkey is trying to diversify its energy sources by developing ambitious pipeline projects to secure its own needs and then further transit those resources to energy-thirsty Europe. Turkey’s dependency on 23 billion m3 Russian gas (63 %) and, 6 billion m3 Iranian gas (16%) is a serious problem for Turkey’s energy security. Turkey also bought 1.2 billion m3 Azeri gas and also Algerian and Nigerian gas in 2007. Turkey’s State Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) revised its estimates for Turkey’s gas demand as 38.8 bcm for 2010 and 43.4 bcm for 2020. Recently, these figures were revised again to 42.1 bcm and 61.0 bcm respectively ([www.botas.gov.tr](http://www.botas.gov.tr)).

**Table 9.6 Status of natural gas pipeline projects in Turkey**

| Project                       | Status             | Length (miles ) | Max capacity Bcf/year |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Blue Stream                   | in operation       | 750             | 565                   |
| Turkey-Iran pipeline          | in operation       | 750             | 495                   |
| South Caucasus pipeline       | under construction | 430             | 700                   |
| Turkey-Greece interconnectors | under Construction | 186             | 407                   |
| Nabucco                       | Proposed           | 2,050           | 460-1,100             |
| Egypt-Turkey pipeline         | proposed           | NA              | NA                    |
| Trans-Caspian Pipeline        | cancelled          | 1,050           | 565                   |

Sources: EIA, Turkey; <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/Turkey/NaturalGas.html>; compiled by author

The Baku-Supsa pipeline, the construction of which was completed in 1999 and which is capable of carrying 115,000 barrels of oil daily, was the first pipeline to bypass Russia by carrying Azerbaijani oil to the Black Sea coast of Georgia, which was then transported via oil tanker to Western markets. The rail transport, Dubendi (Azerbaijan) via Khashuri (Georgia), also became competitive with the Russian



pipeline, Baku-Novorossiysk, but Russia also had to establish another Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline by-passing Chechnya via Makhachkala in Dagestan. Whilst Russia keeps the initiative on Kazakh oil and Turkmenistan’ natural gas transport, Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi became the major alternatives to Russian and Iranian initiatives by by-passing Russia and Armenia. Two further projects, the Baku–Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the Trans-Caspian pipeline, by bypassing Russia, and Iran would increase the rivalry between Russia and Turkey in energy politics. On the other hand, the proposed pipeline project, Nabucco also pushes Iran towards the international community and would balance the Russian energy power for energy-thirsty Europe.

Integrated map 9.16 Turkey as an energy corridor/ hub



Sources: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european\\_energy\\_policy/turkeys\\_energy\\_strategy\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf)


At the meeting between George Bush and Putin in Moscow, both countries signed 67 oil and natural gas agreements in 2002. As a concluding mark, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin stated that “Whoever controls the production and distribution of oil, and natural gas, and the prices of oil, controls the power in this new world system” (CBC, 2006). Energy, therefore, is a central political means for Russia to return to the centre of global affairs in the new world order. Turkey and Georgia now appear to have been a major barrier to Putin’s expansionism in the 2000s. However, Iran’s role

in the pipeline politics remains that of a silent participant which prefers Russian initiatives on pipeline politics.

#### **9.3.4.1 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline**

Pipeline politics are different from other commercial agreements. They establish the hardwire relationships and represent multi-billion dollar investment links between countries. President Bill Clinton and Suleyman Demirel considered BTC to be an instrumental east-west channel which would guarantee the independence and economic stability of the Caspian Basin independent countries. This would be of benefit to the US and Turkey by bypassing Iran, the northern Caucasus (including Chechnya), and Armenian-occupied parts of Azerbaijan (Cagaptay and Gencsoy, Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005). The leading American project agreement was announced by the US Energy Minister, Bill Richardson, on 29 October 1998 (Middle East Economic Survey, 17 July 2006). The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which connects the Sangachal Terminal in Baku to the Marine Terminal in the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea, a 1,100-mile pipeline, 155 miles of which passes through Georgia, was built at a cost of \$4 billion. It is being developed by a group of eleven national and international oil companies and was formed for this purpose in August 2002 as a separately incorporated company (Bahgat, 2006). Britain's BP; Azerbaijan's SOCAR; Norway's Statoil; US based Unocal, Amerada Hess, and ConocoPhillips; Turkey's TPAO; Italy's Eni; Japan's INPEX and Itochu; and France's TotalFinaElf commenced building the line in May 2003. BP owns a 30% stake, is the biggest holder, and plays the role of the project design and building leader (Cagaptay and Gencsoy, Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005).

**Figure 9.7 Baku Tbilisi Pipeline**



<http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=87390;www.washingtoninstitute.org/mapImages/44ee2eb3bdfa8.pdf>

BTC was not only designed for Azeri's oil transport but also for Kazakh's in the median and long-term. This means totally challenging the position of Russia in Caspian Sea energy transportation. Therefore, Kazakhstan and Royal/Dutch Shell, ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil were contracted to carry oil from the Aqtau field in Kazakhs' sector of the Caspian Sea to Baku in December 1998 ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). The project would extend its link with the BTC pipeline if the issue of the Caspian Sea bases were solved between literal states. The first shot was fired between Russia and the West especially for Turkey and Georgia under the aegis of Washington, after the opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the second pipeline to bypass Russia, took place on 25 May 2005. It will be the first non-Russian main pipeline outlet to the international markets after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The pipeline was designed with the capability of carrying 1 million barrels of oil a day, initially to transport Azeri oil. The US supported Kazakhstan's participation in the BTC by supplying the Azerbaijani region with oil from the extensive Kashagan field. The US Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, said that "The USA. wants the Kazakh-Azeri talks on the transport of Kazakh energy resources through the BTC oil pipeline to be completed in March 2006" ( Fink, 2006; Crawley,2006).

**9.3.4.1.1 Security arrangements at the pipelines**

NATO's Partnership for Peace Program was put together to increase connections with former eastern bloc and ex-Soviet states and to aid GUUAM's efforts to guard the pipeline against potential attacks (Chikvaidze, 1994:27-8). The removal of Russian troops from the Akhalkala military base, which was handed over to Georgia's control

in October 2007, strengthened these Western initiatives (Kanbolat, 2006). However, Turkey's and NATO's growing engagement with Georgia further tightened Russian-Georgian relations and the seriousness of the security situation over the BTC pipeline (Nickol, 2003). The explosion of the BTC pipeline in the Turkish section (in Refahiye) just 48 hours before the outbreak of the Georgian-Russian war on 8th-12th August halted the oil flow. It could not be transported via BTC, it could be via carried via Russia and its Novorossiysk port. On the other hand, all planned projects would have to be delayed further due to uncertainty around Georgia, including the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project, which is very important for Turkey (Today's Zaman, 15 August 2008). The vulnerability of the Georgian portion of the BTC pipeline was also manifestly demonstrated when Russia bombed the areas around the pipeline's route, just to send a message to the West. The entire pipeline requires constant patrols in order to prevent sabotage, especially by the PKK, with the services being provided by private security companies. Interestingly, Western companies believe that Iran's pipeline option, the Baku-Tehran-Khark (BTK) pipeline, could be maintained at a fraction of the cost of the BTC pipeline (Baev, 2006). The Iranian option has the great advantage of passing through a politically stable Iran, whereas the BTC pipeline passes not only through Georgia, but also through the restive Kurdish areas of Turkey.

Just a few days before the inaugural ceremony for the opening of BTC pipeline in Ceyhan port, the American Minister of State, Condoleezza Rice, signed a security agreement with Turkey, amounting to a practical start to the quadrennial defence review (QDR) during the G-8 summit. American Senator Richard Lugar, who referring to Article 5 of the Alliance Charter in case of military attack, declared in NATO's summit in Riga in November 2006 (Dempsey, 2006), that: "Any NATO member whose energy sources are cut off by force should be able to rely on assistance from the alliance because an attack using energy can devastate a nation's economy". Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning at NATO, supported the establishment of a NATO energy security and intelligence analysis cell with the duty to focus on intelligence related to terrorism and energy security. Even in this context, potential NATO operations, in/out area, of the traditional types of policing, peacekeeping, and peace building, are going to overlap (Shea, 2006).

This included the Georgian and Turkish Black Sea ports (Poti, Batumi, and Ceyhan), Georgian and Azerbaijan railways, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the ferry



lines that join Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea/Lake (Turkmenbashi-Baku; Aktau-Baku), and the railways and roads being constructed in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and China, as well as the Chinese Pacific terminals, considered to be crucial components of the 'mega corridor' (<http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9907>).

#### 9.3.4.1.2 Transportation costs of Azeri oil

At \$1.40, the cost per barrel of transport from Supsa to Italian ports by naval routes is \$0.50 lower than Kirikoy-Ibrikbana and a \$1.40 lower than Baku-Ceyhan (Ronald and Barnes, Oct 26 1998). This includes the cost of expanding the Baku-Supsa pipeline to 800,000 barrels per day. A hook up into the Baku-Ceyhan line for shipment of Kazak crude will be far more expensive than other Western routes with the long pipeline costing considerably more than \$2.75 a barrel compared to only \$1.74 for shipments through the CPC pipeline in Russia to the Black Sea and on to Italy (Barnes and Soligo, 1998). The main benefit of the oil's international sales will be reaped by Azerbaijan, which at present rates, about \$29 billion per year, while Georgia and Turkey will earn transport fees of \$600 million and \$1.5 billion per year (Cagaptay, Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005).

**Table 9.7 Transport cost comparisons for Azeri oil**

| Delivered to Europe. Assuming a Cost of Capital of 15% |        |                |                 |
|--|--------|----------------|-----------------|
| Destination-Route                                      | Cost/b | Cost as a % of | Cost Minus Cost |
| Baku-Rotterdam:  |        | Bypass Route   | of Bypass Route |
| Tanker From Supsa                                      | \$1.91 | 87%            | -0.28           |
| Supsa-Turkish Bypass                                   | \$2.19 | 100%           | +               |
| Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan                                    | \$2.72 | 124%           | 0.53            |
| Baku-Ceyhan  | \$3.20 | 146%           | 1.01            |
| Italy  |        |                |                 |
| Tanker From Supsa                                      | \$1.41 | 80%            | -0.36           |
| Supsa-Turkish Bypass                                   | \$1.77 | 100%           | 0.00            |
| Supsa-Samsun-Ceyhan                                    | \$2.30 | 130%           | 0.53            |
| Baku-Ceyhan  | \$2.78 | 157%           | 1.01            |


Sources: Barnes, and Soligo, 1998



9.3.4.2 South Caucasus natural gas pipeline

The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) or Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum is being constructed in the same corridor as the BTC to minimise the environmental and social impact, using the same integrated project team to the Georgian-Turkish border ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). It is 692 kilometers (430 miles) long, of which 442 kilometers (275 miles) extend through Azerbaijan and 248 kilometers (154 mile) in Georgia. The initial throughput of the pipeline is 8.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year, and after 2012 this could be enlarged to 20 bcm per year. The South Caucasus Pipeline is intended for the carriage of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field, with capacity of 0.8 bcf/d by 2007 ([www.bp.com](http://www.bp.com)). About 610 mmcf/d of the Shah Deniz gas will be sold to Turkey, 145 mmcf/d to Azerbaijan, and up to 77 mmcf/d to Georgia ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). The intended Trans-Caspian pipeline could potentially join the above line to Turkmen and Kazakh output.

Figure 9.8 South Caucasus gas consortiums



Sources: BP and Washington Institute for Nearest, 2008

Although, BP closed the pipeline for safety reasons because of the Russian-Georgian war on 12 August, gas supplies were resumed on 14<sup>th</sup> August 2008. The technical operator of the pipeline is BP and the commercial operator is Statoil ([www.jamestown.org](http://www.jamestown.org)). The South Caucasus natural gas consortium pumped gas from the Sangachal terminal in May and began deliveries of natural gas on 15 December 2006.

9.3.4.3 Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipeline (TCP)

Turkey’s engagement with Turkmen natural gas started with the visit of President Suleyman Demirel during which both presidents signed the early gas deal on the 29<sup>th</sup> October 1998 (BBC News, 21 May 1999). This agreement was turned into a final purchase agreement in May 1999 when Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Ziya Aktas, signed another contract that envisages the construction of a 2000 km gas pipeline through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Turkey, the so-called Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) project.

The plan was suspended although discussions between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan regarding the pipeline were reinitiated in October 2001 (Baran, 2007). The intended Erzurum-Baku pipeline will create a direct connection to the TCGP Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) via Baku and Tbilisi to Erzurum, joining up with the Turkish gas system (<http://www.eia.doe.gov>). The TCP oil segment would stretch from Aktau, Kazakhstan or Turkmenbashi and Turkmenistan under the Caspian Sea, to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), ultimately accessing the Mediterranean.

Integrated map 9.15: The proposed Trans-Caspian natural gas pipelines




Although TCP is still in the drafting phase, analyses suggest that a gas line could cost \$5 billion with a 30 bcf/year capacity. An oil line could cost \$4 billion with 400,000 barrels/day output, amounting to 40% of BTC's overall export capability. The US, however, requires European collaboration on the TCP, which would necessitate European belief in its utility. The vast majority of European consumption of gas originates in Russia and the TCP could limit these close ties based on need by taking gas straight to Europe (Fishelson, 2007). In March 2005 Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed to construct the Aqtau-Baku line, joining the Kashagan offshore oil fields near Aqtau in Kazakhstan to the BTC in Baku via a sub-Caspian pipeline in March 2005 (Cagaptay, and Gencsoy, Central Daylight Time, 28 May 2005). The Trans-Caspian westbound pipeline for Turkmen gas also envisaged export volumes of 16 billion cubic meters annually at the first phase (mainly to Turkey) and 32 billion cubic meters in the second phase (to south-eastern and central Europe). Later, the plan was halted due to Russian opposition alongside that of Iran ([www.jamestown.org](http://www.jamestown.org)).

#### **9.3.4.4 Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH: Turkish and Iranian alternatives to Russia**

The Nabucco project revolves around a new gas line joining the Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan), the Middle East (UAE, Iran, and Egypt) via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary with Austria and further on with the Central and Western European gas market (Xypaki, 2008). It would span about 3,300 km, beginning at the Georgian/ Turkish and/ or Iranian/ Turkish borders and extending to Baumgarten in Austria. Market research suggests a total investment requirement of 7.9 billion Euros and could transfer up to 31 bcm/y ([www.nabucco-pipeline.com/](http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/)).



Figure 9.9 Nabucco gas pipeline




Compiled by BP Statistical Review 6/2007(in bcm)

The consortium further encompasses MOL of Hungary, Transgaz of Romania, Bulgargaz of Bulgaria, Botas of Turkey, each of which holds an equal share of 16.67% in the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH's project (Payvand News, 13 November 2008). RWE's joining of the project as the sixth partner increased its potential in December 2007. The construction of the pipeline will start in 2010 and the first gas will flow to Europe in 2013 (Xypaki, 2008). Iranian pressure was placed on the Austrian company, OMV, one of the six stakeholders in the slow Nabucco project which intends to bypass Russia through the use of Central Asian energy. Iranian Oil Minister, Gholam Hossein Nozari, said that "The Austrians must hurry up and turn the preliminary contracts into actual contracts, because time is running out and we won't wait for OMV forever" (IRNA, 12 September 2008). Similarly, Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said in January that "Everybody has recognized that the Nabucco project can't work without Iran. A country with 16% of the world's gas reserves cannot be ignored" (Tehran Times, 14 September 2008). The head of Botas, Turkey's governmental pipeline firm and a Nabucco stakeholder stated on 5<sup>th</sup> June 2008 that Iran's and similar countries' involvement would be needed to ensure sufficient supplies are available to make the project worthwhile. In contrast, Matthew Bryza, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs, stated in a Reuter's interview that Washington would object to Nabucco line's use as a conduit for Iranian gas. The managing director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline

International GmbH, Reinhard Mitschek, declared that contrary to the US position, the Vienna-headquartered organisation would take gas wherever it can be found because the EU's 27 member-states' consumption being at 500 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2007, of which 300 bcm was imported and 200 bcm was domestically produced in Europe, is set to diminish within 20 years. So, Europe has an expectation of a diverse and full range of sources, with the EU receiving 25% of supplies from Gazprom, a company which previously utilised gas-pricing as a political weapon against Belarus and the Ukraine, resulting in EU wariness of Russian-dependence. The organisation is also planning a south stream pipe to run alongside the Nabucco, with potential feed-ins to supply south-east European markets such as Austria etc (Pannier, 2008).

Figure 9.10 Nabucco gas pipeline project projection



Mitschek stated that “Iran announced recently that they are keen to construct IGAT-9, a pipeline from the South Pars field to the north to Tehran and finally to the Turkish border, and I could imagine that at a certain point in time as soon as the political situation will allow that, gas exports from Iran to Europe will take place. We have several statements also from the European Commission, Commissioner (Andris) Piebalgs and others that Iranian gas in the long-term is an issue for Europe” (Pannier, 2008). Iran’s South Pars field, some 100 kilometres off Iran’s southern coast, is believed to be the world’s largest gas field. Austria’s OMV has signed a so-called Heads of Agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company to develop the South Pars field (Pannier, 2008). Turkey and Iran also signed the memorandum of understanding to develop several blocs in South Pars and the Iraqi government Gazprom to transport natural gas from Middle East to Europe. It is hoped by Nabucco

that a deal with regard to a trans-Caspian line can be struck, to be laid under the sea from Turkmenistan to Kazakhstan. Mitschek believes the prospects of constructing a line are reasonably good and that some firms who own Nabucco shares are already operating in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Pannier, 2008).

#### **9.4. Turkey-Iran's (geo) Economic Cooperation Organisation in central Asia and Caucasus**

The Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) represents middle-power states' intergovernmental international institutionalism and was formed in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to reduce customs tariffs and promote commerce with the aim of an eventual customs union. ECO is the successor organisation to the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which existed from 1964 up to 1979. In 1992 the newly independent republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were admitted into ECO. It is now represented in a wide range of geographical areas within the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis (8,620,697 km<sup>2</sup>). Turkey and Iran played a pivotal role in the organisation with a regular meeting of the ECO held every two years. Nine summits have been organised since 1992 to deregulate commerce amongst its members ([www.ecosecretariat.org](http://www.ecosecretariat.org)). ECO's secretariat and cultural departments are based in Tehran, its economic department is in Turkey and its scientific section is located in Pakistan. The ECO agenda is to form a united market for goods and services, a referential planning council, a trade and development bank, joint organisation for reinsurance, shipping, and air transport, a cultural institute, science foundations and institutional infrastructure much like those of the European Union. The Economic Cooperation Organisation Trade Agreement (ECOTA) was signed on 17 July 2003 in Islamabad and the Transit Transport Framework Agreement in May 1998 ([www.ecosecretariat.org](http://www.ecosecretariat.org)). The member states promote intra-regional trade, which increased to US \$ 16.7 billion in 2004, compared to US \$ 10.2 billion in 2002.

##### **9.4.1 Transportation sector as an interdependency factor**

There are several potentially important corridors across Central Asia: east-west north-south and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe, Caucasus, Asia) linking Asia and



Europe along the former Silk Road are part of a network project attracting large investments partners like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank. These have committed funds for capital projects on ports, railways and roads along the TRACECA route ([www.traceca-org.org](http://www.traceca-org.org)).

**Integrated map 9.16 Asian highways network and Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor (TRACECA)**



Compiled by Traceca, 2008; Abbas Maleki, 2006

Iran’s geographical position provides railway and highway links with Turkey in the west and Afghanistan to the east and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on both sides of the Caspian (Dannreuther, 2003). In March 1995, the Iranian and Central Asian presidents cut the ribbon on a 700 km rail link between Bafq in Iran and the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The link connecting Mashad with the Persian Gulf and Iran with Turkmenistan (the Tejen-Sarakhs-Mashad line), was finished in March 1996 (<http://www.caspianstudies.com>). However, Turkey’s only rail connection to Central Asia goes through Iran but is not functioning effectively as the Armenia rail connection between Turkey and CIS countries is closed. Nevertheless, there is a passenger train to Iran, the Trans-Asia Train, travelling once a week between Istanbul-Tehran.

In September 1996, the Izmir Treaty set out the basis for the establishment of the ECO, which called for accelerating the development of transport and communications infrastructures linking the member states with the outside world. ECO members

adopted the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA), heavily drawing on the TIR convention in May 1998 (Pakistan Press International, 22 October 2004). TTFA has the potential of taking the role of a key player in operations to eliminate non-physical impediments to the unification of regulations as well as accession by its members to international transport agreements and standards (ECO Bulletin, September 2002). There are limited transportation options between land-locked Turkey and Central Asia. The Istanbul-Almaty block container train has been running once a week since 22 June 2002. In addition, there are also about 29 roll-on/roll-off vessels in the Turkish fleet-- 6 regular private vessels are operating to CIS countries through the Black Sea. For the time being, the national air carrier of Turkey has flights to all the capitals within the region (Astana, Tashkent, Dushanbe, Bishkek and Ashkhabad) and convenient connections for many westerners from Istanbul (Heisbourg and Tocci, et al 2003). Iran has recently been engaged in road-construction projects in north-west Afghanistan, providing new routes to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan ([www.caspianstudies.com](http://www.caspianstudies.com)). However, poorly organised transit gateways to Central Asia via Iran, Azerbaijan, and Georgia create significant problems for Turkish truck drivers by increasing taxes on road use, resulting in fiscal burdens on Turkish truckers (Orbis, Fall 1996). Therefore, Turkey started to diversify its transport links with two projects. Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan have been planning to join their rail networks through the Kars-Ahalkala connection, which will provide a rail connection between Turkey and Georgia as well as an alternative rail gate to Central and East Asian countries serving the east-west rail corridor between Europe and Asia. Turkey's and Iran's mutual rail project, Tatvan-Van on the east-west corridor to Central-East Asian countries via Iran will provide a faster and uninterrupted alternative with more capacity than the existing ferry connection.


#### **9.4.2 Intra-regional trades and the imperative of private and state sectors of Turkey and Iran**

The Turkish state, private sector and non-governmental organisations have filled the vacuum in the region through making major investments, which provide Turkey today with significant political influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iranian products are well known and cheap across Central Asia, but exports are hampered by the domestic demand in Iran for goods and products, and the lack of sufficient private



business experience as well as the weak government support for exports. Thus, Iranian economic sectors have small stakes in regional economic markets in comparison to Turkey’s economic integration with regional states, resulting in its larger role in the region. Turkish investments in the region impact various fields but are mainly focused on energy, textiles, foodstuffs, communication, banking and the tourism sector. Moreover, the Turkish Eximbank has supported free market reforms in Central Asia. Additionally, one of Turkey’s most successful organisations, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), is a vital instrument for providing aid, institutionalising government policies (36 % of all TIKA projects and programs focused on the region), and devising economic strategies for Central Asia ([www.tika.gov.tr](http://www.tika.gov.tr)). In general, Turkish companies have completed a large amount of construction, including educational, governmental, medical and residential buildings, as well as transportation infrastructure. The total intra-regional trade between ECO members was 25,102,500.000 in 2006 ([ecosecretariat.org](http://ecosecretariat.org)). Turkey and Iran hold the biggest stakes in regional export and import ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)).

**Figure 9.11 Intra-regional trades**




### 9.4.2.1 Turkey’s and Iran’s trade relations with Kazakhstan

According to the Turkish statistical institute report in 2004, Turkish companies made \$US 1.3 billion worth of investments in Kazakhstan. The main investor companies are TPAO, Turkcell, Okan Holding, Rumeli Holding, the Anadolu Group and Koc Group in Kazakhstan ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)). Turkish construction companies also completed 147 projects, at an estimated cost of US \$ 3.2 billion in Kazakhstan. In a 2006 report, the



Turkey-Kazakhstan trade volume reached \$US 1 billion and Kazakhstan also used \$US240 million of Turkish Eximbank credit and pays back credit regularly. On the other hand, Iran’s trade volume, mostly dependent on imports, amounted to US \$ 1.2 billion (IMF, 2007). Approximately \$ 435 million in Turkish foreign direct investment (FDI) flows into Kazakhstan each year, with additional capital brought from third countries by Turkish companies bringing the annual total to \$1.3 billion. In fact, US firms have a larger share of FDI in Kazakhstan than do Turkey and Iran. Hence, Turkey’s economic influence relies on the American presence in Kazakhstan. Economic interaction between Tehran and Astana is limited to oil swaps and small portions of other sectors.

**Figure 9.12 Turkey, Iran –Kazakhstan trade, 1993-2007**



Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2008; compiled by author


### 9.4.2.2 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Turkmenistan

Notwithstanding the fact that 400 Turkish companies are registered in Turkmenistan, only 20 of them do active business there. Turkish trade makes up about 5 % of Turkmenistan’s total trade balance ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)). Turkmenistan also receives the second largest amount of Turkish FDI in Central Asia. As a contribution to the liberalisation of Turkmenistan’s economy, Calik and Koluk Holding operate Nebu, Kotum, Linkway textile factories and the Anadolu Groups produce 23 million tonnes of Coco-Cola beverages per year. Ziraat Bankasi is a partner of the Turkish-Turkmen Bank which ranks fourth place in foreign direct investment company in Turkmenistan. Turkish construction companies (GAP Insaat, Ucgen, Ekpar, Mensel, Gama, Polimeks, Burc, and Alarko) completed \$5.5 billions’ worth of projects, over 350 sites in Turkmenistan. However, despite this advantage in the private sector, Turkey’s trade



volume with Turkmenistan was US \$ 4.5 million lower than Iran’s trade involvement of US \$1.4 billion in 2006 (www.deik.org, 2007). However, Iran’s trade mostly depends on energy, especially natural gas transport. Iran-Turkmenistan has also benefited from the geographical advantage which made Iran and Turkmenistan a major route between the Central Asian states and Europe.

Figure 9.13: Turkey Iran–Turkmenistan trades, 1993-2007




Economic and Social Data Services Direction of Trade Statistics, September, 2008; compiled by author

9.4.2.3 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Uzbekistan

Despite a fluctuating political relationship between Ankara and Tashkent, Turkey’s Ziraat Bankasi has held a 50% share of Utbank in Uzbekistan since 1992. In the automotive sector, the Koc Group produces vehicles at a factory in Samarkand. Additionally, Barsel Holding is running 12 factories in Uzbekistan within the textile sector(www.deik.org, 2007). Tashkent took \$375 millions of credit from the Turkish Eximbank and pays instalments regularly (www.deik.org,2007). Turkey’s trade increased after 2003 and reached \$600 million. 13 Turkish construction companies completed at the cost of US \$ 330.6 million a total of 19 projects in 2004(www.deik.org, 2007). On the other hand, Iran’s trade volume increased by around US\$130 million in 2006 (www.deik.org, 2007). Despite having different political views, Uzbek and Iranian businesses are becoming closer because Uzbek roads are essential for Iran to access other Central Asian states and northern Afghanistan. Within the energy industry, Iran’s Oil Exploration Operations Company (OEOC) has inked a deal with Petronas of Malaysia to conduct seismic tests in Uzbekistan at the high price of \$30 million (Mehr News Agency, 18 May 2006).



Figure 9.14: Turkey Iran–Uzbek trade, 1993-2007




Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics February 2008; compiled by author

#### 9.4.2.4 Turkey-Iran trade relations with Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan is the only CIS country which is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Serin, 2003:7). Turkish exports constitute 90% of the bilateral trade volume, making it a key trade partner for Kyrgyzstan ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)). Turkish investments have focused mainly on banking, foodstuffs, plastics, and construction materials. Turkish construction companies have completed 19 projects in the Kyrgyzstan at a total value of more than \$330 million. Turkish investment is estimated at \$75 million within Kyrgyzstan. Tasarruf Mevduatları Sigorta Fonu holds a 70 % share of the Demir Kyrgyz International Bank (DKIB), which is one of three prestigious banks in the country (Ukraine Business Report Weekly, 13 September 2006). The Anadolu group is the owner of a 90 % share of the local Coca-Cola Corporation, which produces 39 million tonnes of drinks per year. The National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic has already utilised \$ 48.13 million of Turkish Eximbank credit. In comparison to Iran's trade with Kyrgyzstan, amounting to \$15 million, Turkey's is substantially higher, with \$160 million in 2006 ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)).

Figure 9.15: Turkey Iran- Kyrgyzstan 1993-2007




Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics September 2008); compiled by author



9.4.2.5 Turkey-Iran trade with Tajikistan

Due to the civil war, political uncertainty and structural problems, Turkey’s foreign direct investment (a mere \$30 million) and economic relations with Tajikistan placed Tajikistan the last among the Central Asian states until 2001. But between 2001 and 2005 Turkish – Tajik trade grew from \$29 million to \$93 million. The primary exports of Turkey to Tajikistan are carpets, plastic products, machinery and cleaning materials but aluminium and aluminium products are the main import from that country to Turkey(www.eik.org). Turkish companies contributed only \$30 million investments in textile, food, and construction projects such as Oyak Insaat (Sikev-Zigar road) and Seyas Insaat (Tajikistan-China road) (www.deik.org). On the other hand, Iran economic and cultural links with Tajikistan are primarily connected to infrastructure projects such as the road link from Tajikistan to Iran via Herat in Afghanistan, the Anzab Hydro-tunnel, the Sang-Toudeh II Power Plant over the Vakhsh river (www.eurasianet.org), and the construction of the Raqoun power station (Iran Daily, 11 November 2007). The World Bank has acknowledged the political and economic stability efforts made by Iran in Tajikistan. However, according to IMF figures, Iran’s trade volume is around \$114 million, but Turkey’s increased dramatically to \$190 million in 2006 (IMF, 2007).

Figure 9.16 Turkey- Iran Tajik trade, 1993-2007



Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2008); compiled by author


9.4.2.6 Turkey’s and Iran’s trade with Azerbaijan

Energy and communication sector firms and private companies have played a significant role in Turkish and Azeri trade, ever since the end of the Cold War. The company holds a 6.53 % share of BTCco and a 9 % share of the SCP pipeline project



(Desai, 2008). Turkish private companies invested \$1.5 billion in Azerbaijan. The Koc Group, Tukcell, Alcatel and Teletas Anadolu Group, Ziraat Bank, Baybank, Royalbank and Cibank continue their services in the country. Azerbaijan utilised \$ 150 million of the Turkish Eximbank credit—the trade volume between the two countries is approximately \$1 billion. However, trade with Iran was around \$ 404 million in 2006 (www.deik.org)

**Figure 9.17: Turkey Azeri–Iran trades, 1993-2007**




Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics February 2008); compiled by author

### 9.4.2.7 Turkey-Iran trade with Armenia

Armenia’s controversial relationships affect the economic relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran. Due to a lack of diplomatic relations, Turkey and Armenian trade volumes were at only \$40,000 in 2006. However Iran-Armenian trade volumes constituted \$140 million. Armenian Airlines is allowed flights between Yerevan - Istanbul and Yerevan - Trabzon. Turkey also opened the H-50 air corridor for international airlines operating on the Armenia line. Regular bus services are also available from the eastern Black Sea to Armenia, through Georgia. Additionally Armenia is permitted to use the Trabzon port for export and import purposes. After a visa regime reform in Turkey on 10 January 2002, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan stated that 700,000 Armenian workers were allowed to stay in Turkey (BBC World Service, 16 July 2007). There are 20 companies founded by Turkish - Armenian businessmen currently in operation in Armenia. According to some unofficial data, the bilateral trade volume between the countries has increased from about \$30 million in 1997 to \$200 million in 2007 (Canbolat, 2007).

Figure 9.18 Turkey/ Iran–Armenia trade, 1993-2007




Economic and Social Data Services,( Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2008); compiled by author

9.4.2.8 Turkey’s and Iran’s trade with Georgia

Turkey’s trade relations with Georgia are more important than with the other CIS states in the region (www.deik.org). According to Turkish State Statistical Report, around 100 private Turkish companies made \$150 million worth of investments in Georgia. Sixteen of them are construction companies, which completed over 30 projects in the country. Georgia used \$ 41.5 million credit from the Turkish Eximbank but trade volume between Turkey and Georgia is at the very low rate of \$US 750 million, with trade with Iran being at \$40 million in 2006 (Akturk,2006)

Figure 9.19 Turkey/ Iran–Georgia trade, 1993-2007



Economic and Social Data Services (Direction of Trade Statistics, September 2008); compiled by author

9.4.2.9 American economic and military assistance to Eurasia and the Caucasus states

American assistance to Central Asian states plays an essential role for the economic and political sovereignty of the Central Asian republics but Russia still remains the



main trade and political power in the region. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Soros Foundation used soft power strategies and had direct and indirect effects on the regional states' internal affairs, especially with regard to the 'colourful revolutions', in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine([www.soros.org](http://www.soros.org)). However, the Russian military presence in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia and former Soviet energy and transport systems balance out the American soft power strategies.

**Table 9.8 US Government assistance to Central Asian republics (1997-2003)**

| Country      | Military (US\$ million) | Trade (US\$ million) |
|--------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Kazakhstan   | 72.5                    | 468.8                |
| Kyrgyzstan   | 28                      | 467.6                |
| Tajikistan   | 12.8                    | 449.3                |
| Turkmenistan | 13                      | 118.2                |
| Uzbekistan   | 75.1                    | 366.1                |
| Total        | 201.4                   | 1870                 |

Sources: Olikier and Szayna 2003; compiled by author

**9.4. Conclusion**

The formation of the Azerbaijan International Consortium was the first trigger for the 'Great Game' pipeline policy and disputes regarding the legal status of Caspian Sea resources (Bahgat, 2006). "The great game is finished when everyone is dead, not before", said Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim (Kipling, 1991:3). However, most scholars claim that the Great Game was over after the completion of the pipeline route through the Caspian and Central Asia (Maleki, 2007). The interventionist policies of the Russian oligarchy use ethnic instability as a means of penetration, while cooperating with Washington's policy of global war on terror in the region. However, due to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Russia interfered with the domestic affairs in Georgia, directly impeding Western initiatives, such as the BTC pipeline in August 2008. On the one hand, Turkey's new project to establish the "Caucasus Stability Platform" would not only diversify the pipeline options of Western initiatives but decrease the level of Russian presence in the Southern Caucasus. Turkish president Abdullah Gul's visit to Yerevan created a suitable atmosphere in which to put an end to the problems between Turkey and Armenia 6 September 2008 (Aras, and Ozbay, 2008). Brzezinski argues that "If either Turkey or Iran were to be destabilized, the



internal problems of the region would become unmanageable, while efforts to restrain regional domination by Russia could even become futile” (Brzezinski, 2004:125). However, both Turkey and Iran not only coped with the competition over the Caspian Sea incident but by circumventing Russia also increased their interdependency through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline and the prospective Nabucco project. Therefore, Washington is not entirely against the Turkey-Iran natural gas deals and economic relations but seeks to maintain a comprehensive and integrated Eurasian geopolitical strategy (Brzezinski, 2004). On the other hand, the strategic importance of the Black Sea-Bosporus and Blue Stream projects intensify the interdependence relationship between Turkey and Russia. Russia will continue to take concrete steps to ensure that the majority of Kazakh oil and Turkmen natural gas was carried via Russia to Western markets. In this regard, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) plays an essential role in the cooperation between Russia and Western companies, especially the American company Chevron (Today’s Zaman, 15 August 2008). However, the proposed Trans-Caspian pipeline project could be connected with the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline, which is an alternative to the Russian and Iranian initiatives. Therefore, a Russian military presence in the southern Caucasus directly represents a deterrent to both Turkey’s and the US’s initiatives. Iran’s oil swap option does not have enough capacity to compete with the BTC pipeline and CPC but Iran still remains the most secure transport option for Caspian Sea energy sources. On the other hand, neither Turkey nor Iran has any influence over Central Asian energy politics, but China has emerged as a major player, especially due to Kazakhstan’s oil and natural gas exploration and transportation, and will become a competitive alternative to Russia in the future. After the Georgian-Russian war in August, the Black Sea became one of the disputed arenas of international politics, one which would lead to a legacy of confrontation not unlike that of the Bosphoros and the Dardanelles. The interdependency relations in transport and the ECO’s role in cooperation between Turkey and Iran will serve as leverage against Russian domination in the region—through seeking a new strategic relationship. This intergovernmental organisation helps Iran’s new orientation towards Asia. Despite Iran’s geographical advantages, Turkey’s private sector success and Turkey’s Western involvement serves as a cornerstone of to the geo-strategic relations with Central Asian and Caucasian states.

## **CHAPTER TEN:**

### **TURKEY- IRAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

#### **10.1. Introduction**

During the monarchical reign in Iran, by Turkey's engagement with Iran mostly consisted of security matters through the Baghdad Pact and CENTO. The only economic institutional tie was through the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), which organised economic interaction between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan (Ogutcu, 2007). While Iran became the main military and trading partner of the US Japan and Western countries, Turkey has encountered an economic crisis, internal terror and Western arm embargo in the 1970s. The RCD, thus, could not be helpful in granting Turkey's request for more lenient payment of the heavy oil import bill. Turkey's inefficiency as a liberal economy did not allow it to enter Iran's open markets at this time (Iran Trade Ministry, November 1989). Turkey received a curt response from Tehran and other oil producers and the absence of such necessities pushed Turkey into an era of structural change in its economy and domestic life in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution opened a new page in Turkey-Iran economic relations, as Iran became one of the countries admitted to the Joint Economic Commission Protocol with Turkey. Since the first Joint Economic Commission meeting in 1983, there have been nineteen Joint Economic and Trade commission protocols signed ([www.deik.org](http://www.deik.org)). This Chapter examines the impact of economic relation on Turko-Iran relations within three phases: the First Gulf War period (1979-1989), the Second Gulf War period (1990-1991), and the post-Cold War (1991-2002) period which include the situation after the invasion of Iraq (2003-2008). The systemic security settlement of middle-power states underpins foreign policy - making and restricts their economic relations even if a necessity arises for mutual interdependency relations in the economic and transportation sectors. Therefore, this chapter analyses why Turkey and Iran failed to institute economic relations.

#### **10.2.0. Economic relations during the first Gulf War (1980-1989)**

During his term, Turkish Prime Minister Ozal pursued economic liberalisation policies reversing the austerity policies announced on 24 January 1980, which entirely

changed the trade regime and government control of the economy. Turkey opened up its economy with the objective of integrating into the global system by adopting free trade regulations in 1987, and unlimited foreign exchange (money transfers) in 1984. This consolidated Turkey's attempt to increase export-led growth through a liberal economy. Economic liberalisation continued during the coalition governments of 1991-2002. An important milestone in these policies has been Turkey's customs union with agreement the European Union (EU) in 1996 (Hale, 2000). On the other hand, the Islamic Revolution changed the direction of Iran's economic ties, especially towards the Third World. The economic policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran were strongly influenced by the socialist ideology of revolutionaries, called Islamic Socialism, which is characterised by state-controlled economies with nationalised banks, insurance companies and major industries. Eight years' of war with Iraq greatly influenced the centralisation of the Iranian economy. This section attempts to discuss how Turkey achieved its active neutrality politics by gaining outstanding leverage against Iran and Iraq during the war periods. It also aims to explain the structural changes in the Turkish and Iranian economies and the new agreements relating to trade transport, and banking regulations between the two countries (Kamron, 1991).

There were two main causes for the improved economic relations with Iran: Ankara rejected both the request by Washington to use the Incirlik airbases for military operations and economic sanctions against Iran. Turkey also preferred to follow active neutral politics during the First Gulf War (Berresiye, 1983: 379). As result, Tehran and Baghdad considered Ankara a reliable trading partner of goods and a transit route for their imports from Europe. Thus, Turkey welcomed an export and revenues' expansion, derived from the transportation of goods for it which provided Turkey with a formidable amount of foreign exchange to assist the development of a liberal open - market economy (Carkoglu, et al. 1998).

#### **10.2.1.0. Turkey-Iran trade accords and new regulations**

Turkey and Iran signed a series of trade agreements and protocols--the International Road Transport Agreement of the 12<sup>th</sup> May after which the economic commissions of both countries agreed to produce a new protocol on banking, economics and trade in

Tehran on 7 June 1980 (T.C Resmi Gazete, 7 June 1980). Iran needed a neutral transportation channel for its import and exports in with the external world during the war period. The barter and trade protocol agreements in the following year, signed on 22 April, dramatically improved the trading volume between the two countries. The barter agreement and trade accord on various issues on 14<sup>th</sup> January and 10<sup>th</sup> March 1982 furthered the Joint Economic and Trade Commission meeting envisaged by the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1983. In this period, Turkish exports to Iran increased from \$45 million in 1978 to \$1.088 billion in 1983, making up almost 19 % of the total exports of Turkey at the time. In 1984, Turkish imports from Iran increased from \$189 million in 1978 to \$1.548 billion Kumar,2008).


However, the situation changed in Turkish-Iranian trade after Iran's cutbacks on oil production and the decline of oil prices coupled with the diversion of resources to the war with Iraq which finally led to Iran's economy suffering from foreign exchange shortages, that resulted in the curtailment of its purchases from Turkey. Nevertheless, the Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission conducted a second meeting and signed an additional accord in May which encompassed industrial and technologic cooperation on 16<sup>th</sup> August 1984. The Turkey-Iran Industrial and Technical Joint Economic Commission at its third term meeting introduced a new road map for the building of natural gas and crude oil pipelines between the two countries on 22th January 1985 (Ghasemi, 2002:51-54). The additional protocol to this contract diversified non-oil products earmarked for export with a planned \$3 billion trade volume (T.C Resmi Gazete, 30 January 1985:7). Articles 44-47 in this agreement arranged the import and export leverage for Iranian and Turkish goods but Article 48 regulated the trade in the border provinces of Agri and Urumiye (T.C Resmi Gazete, 30 January 1985:7). The Turkey-Iran fourth-term economic, industrial, and technical Joint Economic Commission meeting concluded with another accord in Tehran on 30 December 1985. This protocol confirmed the third-terms joint economic meeting decision and introduced new regulations into border trade as well (Ghasemi, 2002). However, the decline of oil prices (from \$26 to \$10) disrupted the trade balance, and caused the cancellation barter agreements in 1981 and 1982. Turkey mostly stopped importing oil from Iran in the first six month of 1986, but an additional protocol emerged from the fourth economic cooperation meeting in Ankara on 19 June 1986 with the formation of all diverse committees such as trade, banking, transport and

communications, industrial and technical. The meeting aimed also to improve the non-oil trade and sale of Iranian products via Europe by Turkey (T.C Resmi Gazete, 23 September 1986). However, neither the non-oil trade regulations nor the trade volume succeeded in increasing the volume of transactions between the two countries and it remained lower than \$1 billion in 1986.

#### **10.2.2.0. Oil and War**

It can be said that there are two factors which influenced the level of Turkey-Iran trade in the 1980s: Turkey's oil shortage and trade with Iraq, and the Turkish National Oil Company (TPAO) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) regulation of the oil prices and volumes. In the 1984 and 1986 Joint Economic Commission Protocols, Iran agreed to sell 6 million tons of oil each year, but Turkey bought 7.2 million tons in 1985 and 5.7 million tons of oil in 1986 (Arefnya,2003: 105-9). Despite the plan to sell 5 million tons in 1986, Turkey only bought 2 million tons from Iran. Nevertheless, after the OPEC meeting in Geneva in November 1986, Turkey agreed to buy 6 million tons of Iranian oil at \$18 per barrel in 1987(www.deik.org). On the other hand, during the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey imported 7.93 million tons of oil from Iraq and exported \$4.88 millions' worth of products; Iraq's debt to Turkey reached \$2 billion in 1990 (www.deik.org). During the war, Turkey's pressure on Iran about the Kurdish insurgency impeded a possible attack on the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline, which was the only pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to the international market. In addition, the existence of Iranian refugees in Turkey created a political crisis, especially as they were considered the prime suspects in political murders in Iran (Tibi, 2004), but their business activities played an effective role in increasing the trade volumes and cash flow to Turkey( Karasapan, 1989:33-5). However, according to the Turkish Chamber of Commerce data, companies originating in Iran are mostly called nameplate (tabela) companies, which did not take part in any trade but were designed to merely be registered as a presence in Turkey.

Figure: 10.1 Turkey’s export and imports to Iran and Iraq (1980-1991)



Sources: (IMF, TUIK, DIEK, 2007); compiled by author

In comparison to Iran, Turkey’s imports from Iraq were higher than Iran’s in the first phases of the war in 1981. However, Turkey’s imports from Iran reached their peak levels in 1983-1984, but after the cancellation of the barter agreement in 1985, Turkish-Iranian trade declined dramatically. While Turkey-Iraq trade volume peaked at \$2.1 billion in 1989, Turkey-Iran trade volume was only \$800 million (IMF, 2007). These figures signify that despite Turkey’s political mentality during the war, its political and economic relations with Iraq were more dominant than with Iran (Aydin et al, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2005). In fact, Iran managed to keep Turkey as a neutral party in the war due to not targeting Turkey with any systematic revolutionary or ideological exports (Chubin and Tripp 1988:123-146). After the war, the headscarf crisis in Turkey and Iran’s position on this issue created a diplomatic crisis that resulted in a decline in bilateral trade between the two neighbors in 1989 (Tibi,2004).

10.3.0. Post-Cold War period (1991-2002)

After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, Ali Khamenei and the pragmatist leader H. Rafsanjani took over power in Iran. Rafsanjani’s first government’s Five-Year Plan (1989/90–1993/94) authorised up to \$27 billion in foreign borrowing. It aimed at increasing productivity in key industrial and economic sectors and promoting the non-

oil export sector. His second government's Five -Year (1994/95–1998/99) plan aimed at targeted money in transport, particularly the railroad system and the construction of a public underground system in Tehran. Other projects were aimed at revitalising the petroleum sector and developing the natural gas sector.

With regard to Turkey, it had been regularly governed by coalition governments, whose economic mismanagement created two economic crises in April 1994 and 2001. The National Security Council, the military-dominated checks-and-balances organisation, took control in all domestic and foreign policy, including in relation to the PKK terror and against the rise of political Islam.

Regarding their economic relations during this period, Turkey and Iran consistently maintained regular contact through the Joint Economic Council meetings. Consequently, an economic and industrial accord was signed between the two countries on 22 February 1990. Economic sanctions after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 further diminished Turkish exports to the Middle East. As explained in the Chapter Nine. Turkey-Iran and Pakistan replaced the Economic Cooperation Organisation with RCD and signed a mutual payment agreement on 11 July 1990 (Aydin and et al, Arab Studies Quarterly, 2005). After the dissolution of the Soviet empire, Turkey-Iran-Pakistan and Uzbekistan signed additional treaties in Ashkhabad in 10<sup>th</sup> May 1992 (Haine, 2003). Turkey remained the main road for Iranian trade to access the European market during this period, and Iran remained the main short and safe transportation road for Turkey's relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus. Under the ECO regulations, the two countries signed a transport agreement in Ankara on the 15 December, and petrol, natural gas, industrial, electricity, border crossing trade and transportation agreements on 22 December 1993 (Arefnya, 2003). The Turkish energy company BOTAS and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) agreed the controversial long-term natural gas project for natural gas and oil pipelines at the 12th Joint-Economic Commission's two meetings in March and May 1994. In the meantime, the Iranian oil minister, Gholamreza Agazadeh, and the Turkish energy ministry, Veysel Atasoy, concluded 23- year natural gas and oil pipeline contracts on 2-4 May 1995 ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)).

**10.3.1. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) and the Turkey-Iran natural gas agreement (August 1996)**

The controversially militant economic politics of the Clinton government resulted in a complete ban on transactions with Iran in April 1995 and a subsequent passage by the Congress of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) which potentially could penalized third party states for investing in Iran (Dowling, and Popiel, 2002). Under the ILSA, all foreign companies providing investments of over \$20 million for the development of petroleum resources in Iran would be subject to the imposition of two out of seven possible sanctions by the US. However, Turkey never applied this economic sanction against Iran and always supported Tehran in the UN against anti-Iranian decisions (Washington Post,2 December 1996). On the other hand, Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan’s first foreign visit to Iran in August 1996 resulted in the signing by the Turkish and Iranian governments of a \$23 billion natural gas deal and an agreement for the construction of a pipeline between Tabriz and Ankara over 25 years, in July 1996 ( Calabrese, 1998). An additional 25-year contract was signed between Iran and Turkmenistan in December 1997 that would support the planned Nabucco pipeline project (IRNA, 17 March 1997). The contract with Iran reflected Turkey’s efforts to cope with domestic energy demands and its desire to avoid over-reliance on Russian gas that at the time constituted 75 % of Turkish consumption. Thus, strategically, Turkey made several agreements with other countries to balance its energy needs.

**Table: 10.1Turkey’s natural gas agreement contracts**

| Agreements           | Bcm per year | Date             | Year | Status       |
|----------------------|--------------|------------------|------|--------------|
| Russia (west)        | 6            | 14 February 1986 | 25   | in operation |
| Algeria              | 4            | 14 April 1988    | 20   | in operation |
| Nigeria              | 1.2          | 09 November 1995 | 22   | in operation |
| Iran                 | 10           | 08 August 1996   | 25   | in operation |
| Russia( Blue Stream) | 16           | 15 December 1997 | 25   | in operation |
| Russia (west)        | 8            | 18 February 1998 | 23   | in operation |
| Turkmenistan         | 16           | 21 May 1999      | 30   | -            |
| Azerbaijan           | 6.6          | 12 March 2001    | 15   | -            |

Sources: BOTAS, 2006



The US persisted in its pressure on Ankara to overthrow Erbakan’s government, which was ousted in June 1997 through what is now known as the ‘post-modern military coup d’état’ (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 12 April 1999). During the events of 28 February, the National Security Council banned Erbakan’s two successive parties and his top lieutenants were barred from politics, and this new form of coup aimed at curbing the religious freedoms including parson-preaching schools.

Despite the anti-Islamic developments in Turkey, the reformist Khatami government managed to establish diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey once more and therefore moved forward with the natural gas pipeline project with the succeeding Ecevit government. Consequently, the Iranian part of the new 40 diameter line was slated for completion in 1998, extending 265 km from Tabriz to Bazargan at the border, at a cost of \$150 million. The Turkish part was also scheduled for completion by 1998, extending from Dogubeyazit on the Turkish side near Bazargan to the eastern Turkish city of Turkey Erzurum (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 12 April 1999). The building was finished and began transferring natural gas in 2001 (www.deik.org, 2006). The source for most of the gas was Kangan in the south, with oilfields in the Ahwaz area providing further output. From 2001, NIOC added to the transfer the South Pars field’s gas as its exploitation began; Iran’s commitment was for 4 bcm in 2002 expanding to 10 bcm/y in 2007 (APS Review Gas Market Trends, 11 April, 2005).

Integrated map 10.1: Turkey- Iran pipeline




<http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm?aid=617> ; compiled by Abbas Maleki, 2006



The Turkey-Iran natural gas contract was eventually accepted by the Washington administration, because the deal did not involve direct investments in Iran by Turkey or other Western countries. Moreover, the pipeline might be also carry for gas from Turkmenistan. In addition, some concessions was extracted from the Americans permitting imports of Iranian goods such as caviar, pistachios, dried fruit and carpets, in the form of an exemption from the general ban. ILSA's five-year term ended in August 2001, and numerous US energy sector companies lobbied for non-renewal ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). However, in late July 2001, the US Congress voted overwhelmingly to renew ILSA for five more years (Katzman, 2006).

According to the take-or-pay deal, Iran has exported 20.74 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey (Eroasia Daily Monitor, November 24 2008). However, in return, Ankara failed to take the necessary steps at the time to guarantee a barter deal with Tehran under which the former could have reduced its trade deficit burden, stemming in large part from the gas deal with Iran. In July 2007 Iran and Turkey signed MoU that would pave the way for \$3.5 billion worth of Turkish investment in Iran's South Pars gas field on a buyback basis ( Iran Daily, 21 August 2007). This study deals with this issue in the economic Chapter.

Figure 10.2: Turkey’s exports and imports to Iran 1992-2000



Sources: (IMF, 2006, DIEK, TUIK, 2007); compiled by author

It should be noted that Turkey and Iran could not achieve a major trade partnership in comparison to the trade at this time. Russia began to rival Germany as Turkey's biggest export market, buying about \$4.1 billion Turkish goods in 1998, compared with \$5.4 billion for Germany during the 1990s. During this period, Turkey- Iran trade hit the lowest amount, as Iran transacted over 80 % percent of its foreign trade with Asian countries as Iran's had diversified its economy and natural gas contracts with other states.

#### **10.4.0. The influence of domestic politic in trade: 2003-2008**

After the Justice and Development Party (henceforth, AKP) was elected into office at the end of 2002 and elected Tayyip Erdogan as its leader and prime minister of Turkey, a resolution was proposed on March which aimed at providing for US military passage through Turkey for the invasion of Iraq. However, parliament overturned the proposal and consequently Turkey and U.S relations underwent a critical period despite being partners in NATO.

Turkey's new approach to EU and Cyprus policy increased foreign investment and trade. According to official figures, trade between Turkey and Iran rose up in recent years that was valued at 2.4 billion dollars (2.0 billion Euros) in 2003, a 90 % increase on the previous year ([www.deik.gov.tr](http://www.deik.gov.tr), 2006). Erdogan's government copied the approach of Kemal Dervis, the economy minister in the previous government who had a mandate from the IMF to rescue the Turkish economy, and the IMF economic program further increased the liberalisation of economy and politics in Turkey. Throughout the constitutional crisis in June 2007, the JDP continued to transform Turkish society into a moderate by conservative Islamic direction. This is clear from the election of Abdullah Gul, one of the founders and important leader of JDP, as the president of the Republic. And worked towards the removal of headscarf ban in universities in 2008 and JDP's politics attracted Arab sovereign investment from the Gulf.

During the same period, Iran's nuclear crisis with the US and the rise of conservative power in Iran impeded the liberalisation of the Iranian economy. The Revolutionary Guard and the conservatives in the Iranian government cancelled the Turkcell and

TAV contracts for security reasons in 2004. However, as usual Turkey did not impose the UN sanctions against Iran in 2006. Thus, trade volume between two countries increased to \$8 billion in 2007 and was expected to reach \$10 billion in 2008, which represents a significant boost when compared with the early 1990s.

#### **10.4.1. The arbitration of the Turkcell consortium and cancellation of TAV contracts (2004)**

Turkcell, a Turkish mobile phone service provider, was awarded, by the Iranian authorities, alongside GSM (900/1800), a license on the 18<sup>th</sup> February 2004, According to the license the Consortium was expected to pay an upfront fee of about EUR 300 (\$370) billion. The cell phone licence was successfully bid on by a Turkcell-led group of companies on the 14 February; this was Iran's largest foreign investment since the Islamic Revolution, and is worth more than \$3 billion over 15 years, with the option to renew every five years, giving it a 70% stake (TDNs, 30 July 2004

According to the agreement, if the Consortium had not pursued the GSM license, the EUR 300 million payments under the consortium agreement would have become payable immediately. Turkcell guaranteed an €210 million portion of this guarantee through HSBC plc. However, after the parliamentary elections in February 2004 in Iran, the conservatives took over the Parliament. The government which rose to power declared that the Turkish agreements were a threat to national security as it would enable Turkey to eavesdrop on Iranian mobile calls. The second agreement to which it objected was concluded with a Turkish-led engineering group, Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV), to build and operate a new airport. The consortium stated that it had spent over \$15 million on preparatory training and goods. The reason for the cancellation was the Revolutionary Guards' accusation that the consortium was involved with Israel, resulting in the closing of the Imam Khomeini airport on its first day in May 2004 and the removal of the company's employees (The New York Times, 10 October 2004).

It is important to note that in April and July 2004, Turkey and Israel signed several economic and trade agreements during the visit of Israel's deputy prime minister

Ehud Olmert to Turkey in mid-July 2004 (Kumaraswamy, 2005). Most notably, one agreement involved having Israeli companies bid on the privatisation of Turkish companies such as Tekel, Petkim, Turkish Airlines and Turkcell. Tehran's aggressive stance regarding the apparent financial connections between Turkey and Israel led to a changed stance, leading to the contract's extension to a South African group instead, giving the first major role to this country's company in the Middle East (www.zawya.com, 2007). Thus the Iranian parliament ordered the government to cancel the two Turkish contracts as well as the official trip of Khatami to Turkey in August. It is also important to note that the Turkish prime minister's visit to Tehran with 130 Turkish businessmen could not solve the Turkcell contract crisis on 31 July 2004 and both the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council stated that the agreement concerning the mobile phone network would become effective upon the approval of the Iranian Parliament on 26 September 2004. But during the following year, on April 25, the Iranian Parliament approved a revised proposal, which suggested a reduction of Turkcell's stake in Irancell to 49%, included several other amendments to the terms of the license agreement originally agreed and submitted the proposal to the Guardian Council for their consent. In May 2005, the Guardian Council gave their consent. The consent was approved by the Iranian President. In addition, the company was involved in various activities, including call centres and database management, directory assistance, advertising, operating a central betting system, Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) services, value added GSM services (VAS), fixed-line long-distance call services and internet services through various consolidated subsidiaries in June 2005. In addition, during the following month Turkcell released EUR 210 million which was guaranteed in the contract on 26 July 2005. On 2 September 2005, the board of directors of Turkcell decided to continue with the Irancell project and approved the ownership structure of Irancell with a stake of 49% in Irancell for Eastasia. However, it has been stated that 21% of the shares in Irancell should be transferred to the National Bank of Iran, Bank Melli and the parties should agree that these shares should be publicly offered in the third year following the initiation of the Irancell operations, and these agreed terms should be reflected in all agreements between the parties in Irancell (The America's Intelligence Wire, 8 September 2005). MTN made an announcement in October 2005 of a \$358m transfer to an Iranian bank, to serve as its share of the Iranian mobile network licensing fee, with a further statement noting that it was attempting to purchase a 49% share in

Irancell, a joint company with Iranian businesses, through the Ministry of Telecoms. The company lost out to Turkcell in the primary tender but is expected to replace Turkcell as the primary investor in Irancell, although this is not final (Ford, 2006). The Iranian Telecommunications Ministry set the 21<sup>st</sup> November 2005 as the deadline with respect to the finalisation of the shareholder structure of the Consortium. In the meantime, Eastasia has deposited €172.7 million in Bank Saderat Plc., located in London, as its potential contribution to the GSM network license fee and a portion of the initial capital, to show its willingness to invest in Irancell. Turkcell provided a deposit pledge with (Turkish) Garanti Bankasi in the amount of EUR 91.6 million, and provided a bank loan to Eastasia for the same amount. The maturity of this loan is set as November 21, 2005 which is also the proposed deadline for the completion of the negotiations over the shareholder structure of the consortium. Although Turkcell does not currently conduct any operations in Iran, once shareholding structures are finalised and Irancell commences operations in Iran, such operations may in the future be relevant to Turkcell. As a result, Turkcell has brought a claim in Iranian courts seeking to compel the Ministry to implement the laws and regulations passed by the Iranian Parliament in connection with the GSM tender process (The Middle East in *zawya.com*, January 2006). On 14 January 2008, Turkcell sent an official letter to the Turkish Stock Exchange which explained the question of contract with Iran and applied to an international court for arbitration in Paris, but the court case is still pending.

All in all, the conservative cadre in Iran does not want to share the wealth of the state and open society further economically or politically at this point, after the failure of Foreign Investment Promotion & Protection Act on 25 May 2002 and cancellation of Turkcell and TAV contracts (Celalifer, 2007).

#### **10.4.2. UNSC resolution and US unilateral sanctions against Iran (2006)**

George W. Bush's "*axis of evil*" address in January 2002 was the continuation of economic and diplomatic efforts against Iran since the Iranian Revolution. The situation became critical after the revelation of Iran's enrichment program at Natanz in February 2003, which resulted in attention from the UN nuclear monitoring authority, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran alleges that the

nuclear research is non-military, including for energy production, but the US claims the intentions are military, referring to a Security Council process as its response ([www.globalpolicy.org](http://www.globalpolicy.org)). UNSC demanded that its members ban the supply and sale of all equipment, technology and finance which could contribute to Iran's uranium enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water related activities or to the research and development of nuclear weapons (Green Peace Briefing, February 2007). UNSC passed a resolution supporting the P5 and Germany's proposal for incentives in diplomatic and economic form, as well as requesting Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment by August 2006 ([www.globalpolicy.org](http://www.globalpolicy.org)). A third resolution, number 1747, broadened the previous sanctions package against Iran. It includes sanctions such as banning exports of conventional weapons from Iran and freezing the overseas assets of 28 Iranian individual and entities including the state-owned Bank Sepah and the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards. Stuart Levey, the undersecretary for US Treasury blamed a major governmental bank, Bank Saderat, of sponsoring terrorist groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in September 2006. Levey stated that since 2001 a Hezbollah-controlled organisation had received 50 million US dollars directly from Iran through Bank Saderat. He said that the US government would also persuade European banks and financial institutions not to deal with Iran (as cited in Washington Times, 9 January 2007). On the one hand, in an interview with the Financial Times (5 January 2008), Hamid Borhan, head of Bank Saderat Irani said that *Of 600 foreign banks that used to do business with Bank Saderat before the US imposed sanctions in September 2006, some 200 had halted their business transactions*. However, China became Iran's main trade partner last year without paying much attention to the US position, while much trade is being conducted through the re-export hub of the United Arab Emirates (Financial Times, 5 January 2008). Therefore, Russia and China, two Security Council members blocked the move and called the US bank sanctions arbitrary and unhelpful. As a result of Iranian non-compliance, the security Council placed sanctions on nuclear materials and technology transactions. IAEA offered a 60 day 'grace period' in which it could stop its enrichment in exchange for the lifting of UN measures against it in December 2006; Iran did not agree ([www. Globalpolicy.org](http://www.Globalpolicy.org)). The action taken by the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control or OFAC against Bank Saderat in September and the designation of Bank Sepah on 9 January 2007 represented the

strengthening of economic sanctions against Iran and illustrated the different legal authorities that the United States is using to achieve its purpose. Mohammed Bagher Zolghadr, one of the 15 top Islamic Republic officials specifically targeted by the UN for travel limitation (among other sanctions, including blocking of his bank accounts), made a working visit to Moscow without any incident during 4-8 April 2007. However, Chinese banks have cut back business with Iranian banks due to US pressure over Teheran's disputed nuclear programme in February 2008 (Khaleej Times, and Reuters 2 February 2008). The position of Turkey was highlighted by Stuart A. Levey, the Treasury's under-secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, who called on Turkey to scrutinise actions by three Turkish branches of Iran's state-owned Bank Mellat ([www.ekathimerini.com](http://www.ekathimerini.com)). He claimed that Iran uses its banks for its missile development and Turkey's proximity to Iran, shared history and ties between their people make Turkey a place where "*there is need for vigilance.*" This is required in order to make sure that Turkey's financial institutions are not abused by Iranian financial institutions and Iranian state-owned banks (The Associated Press 28 January 2008). However Turkey is moving ahead with regard to the pipeline and buy-back deals on the South Pars Project.

#### **10.4.2.1. Turkey's South Pars Natural Gas Project (2007)**

By disregarding Washington's warnings concerning any type of engagement with Iran, Turkish energy minister, Hilmi Guler, had a meeting in Tehran with Hojjatollah Ghanimifard, the international affairs director of the state-owned National Oil Company on 19 August 2007 and both of them reaffirmed a MoU signed on 14 July 2007 (Today's Zaman 13 August 2007). The MoU includes the buy-back contracts between Turkey and Iran relating to the South Pars natural gas development fields' phases 22-24. Turkish officials have estimated that the project will require a total investment of \$3.5 billion, including \$2 billion to build a pipeline to transport gas across Turkey. The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) will independently provide finance to the amount of \$3.5-billion and will begin the construction of facilities in the South Pars field in 2008 (<http://oildompublishing.com/>). To move forward on the project, Turkish energy minister Hilmi Guler made an official visit to Tehran to sign cooperation agreements



in electricity production and construction of natural gas power on 19 August 2007(UP Energy 30 November 2007), (Turkish Petroleum Corp. Investments,1 October 2007. The US and Russia are mutually disturbed by the increasing Turkish-Iranian collaboration as it has an impact on Russian influence over Turkmen gas resources and a detrimental impact on US efforts to isolate Iran. However, Turkey retains an interest in forming the Turkish-Iranian-Turkmenistan joint venture to export natural gas to the European Union. Turkey wishes to receive by way of a bargain decreased gas prices for Iranian supplies of gas. Iranian Oil Minister Kazim Veziri Hamane stated that the increasing European interest in buying Iranian gas via Turkey could solve all problems regarding the Nabucco line (Keyhan International, 1 August 2007).

Integrated map 10.1: South Pars development projects phases



<http://mvdg.wordpress.com/2007/10/08/pipeline-politics-turkeys-south-pars-project/>

However, in late September, US criticism against Turkey-Iran cooperation escalated through comments by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns expressly urging that as a United States and NATO ally, Turkey not to break the united front against the Iranian uranium enrichment program and therefore they will have to sacrifice the South Pars project”(Kreyenbuhl,2007).

Instead, it would prefer that Turkey put more weight on Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz project, Kazakhstan's Kashagan and Turkmenistan's natural gas projects or proposals to purchase gas from Iraq. The short-term success, however, of such a project is minimal due to Turkey's tensions with US as well as with the armed conflicts in the area. US Ambassador to Turkey, Ross Wilson, stated that the MoU's potential was to jeopardise the country's efforts alongside Turkey to exploit Caspian Basin deposits, putting them back a decade, including the network designed to take the materials to Turkey and for international sale. The effect of continued support of the trans-Caspian gas line and similar ventures is to increase the diversity of Turkish and European supplies, as well as leading to Turkey's status as a major transit state, whilst strengthening connections to its neighbours. Wilson did, however, promise to mull over US protests prior to MoU implementation (Euroasian Monitor News, 24 November, 2008). The Bush administration added Iran's Revolutionary Guard to its terrorist organisations' list which can be enforced even by imposing sanction on European and other foreign companies that invest more than \$20 million in Iran's petrochemical industries (turkey.usembassy.gov). Turkish energy minister Hilmi Güler, who joined President Abdullah Gül for his trip to the US on 8<sup>th</sup> January 2008, told CNN Turk that Turkey and the US have made a deal for joint exploration of Iraqi oil and gas deposits, with Washington's comprehension of Turkish needs for Iranian output to fulfil domestic demand (Today's Zaman, 17 January 2008). Prime Minister Erdogan, at a Madrid press event on that, emphasised that Turkey is persisting in its gas agreement with Iran as neither US nor Israel can satisfy Turkey's natural gas demands (Anatolia news agency, 14 January 2008). The Turkish government exploited the chance to declare openly its dissatisfaction with American leniency for Kurdish rebels in North Iraq (Kreyenbuhl, 2007). The US offer of Iraqi oil is still questioned blocking by the Kurds the ratification of the Law of Oil (Xinhua News Agency, 28 January 2008). However, Turkish media reported that the state-owned Turkish Pipeline Company (BOTAS) has launched a feasibility study covering Turkey's segment of a planned Iraq-Turkey natural gas pipeline (APS Diplomat Operations in Oil Diplomacy, 11 Feb 2008). It is to be built parallel to the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. The project aims to transfer 10 billion cubic metres of Iraqi natural gas annually to the Turkish and world markets as envisaged in 2007 (Xinhua News Agency, 28 January 2008). George W. Bush's government had also sent the US Congress a July 2000 deal, concluded by the then US President Bill

Clinton the effect of which would have been to allow the sending of nuclear technology to Turkey's slated civilian nuclear industry (<http://afrocubaweb.com>, 31 January 2008). While the future of the project is still uncertain such a long-term project will not be able to solve Turkey's energy needs in the short-run (Energy Daily, 23 January 2008).

Due to Turkey's position of dependency, Iran began to cutoff natural gas supplies to Turkey in January 2008 which raised further questions about the reliability of Iran as a supply source for the proposed Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Central Europe. In fact, due to disagreement between Iran and Turkmenistan on price increases, Ashgabat stopped delivering up to 23 MMcm/d to Iran in late December 2007 (International Oil Daily, 30 January 2008). However, officially both sides announced technical difficulties and problems of infrastructure as being responsible for pausing the gas flow (Anatolia news agency, 5 February 2008). Turkish energy minister Hilmi said that Iran had stopped its gas exports due to a cold snap that forced Iran to keep more gas on the domestic market to meet the country's own needs (Global Insight, 11 February 2008). The giant South Pars offshore field's total recoverable reserves are estimated at 14 trillion cubic meters, which is being developed in 28 phases and over \$15 billion in investments have been committed (Petroleum Report, 25 July 2007). Hence, Turkey's ambition to be an energy hub for European countries diversified its energy dependency on Russia and enhanced the process of EU membership accession. On the other hand, Turkey and Iran have no intention to challenge Russia's position, which provides 65 % of Turkey's natural gas. It should also be recognised that Russia has a very strong military and economic connection with Iran. Therefore, this energy project could always be handled to the mutual interest of three countries; Turkey, Iran and Russia. Such joint trilateral interest could increase the stability of the international order and the reliability of Russia's and Iran's integration into the international community.

#### **10.5. Turkey- Iran tariff agreement (2007)**

When Kürsat Tüzmen, then the undersecretary of foreign trade for the Turkish prime minister's office, visited Iran in May 2000, Turkey and Iran signed trade agreements reducing customs taxes at their border crossings and extending the crossings through

two of the most important gates, Gürbulak/Bazergan and Kapikoy, to stay open for 24 hours (Olson, 2000). Turkey's exports to Iran were around \$360 million and its imports from Iran were close to \$839 million in 2001.

The growth in bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran is part of the JDP's strategy of trying to strengthen economic ties with other Muslim countries (Euroasian Daily Monitor, 24 November 2008). In this framework, Kursad Tuzmen, who became foreign trade minister in 2002, announced in July 2007 that Turkey would soon sign preferential trade agreements with 18 Muslim countries, and in which the tariff barriers between Turkey and Iran would be reduced in stages as part of an attempt to boost trade among the ten members of the ECO. He said that "trade between ECO members only accounts for 5-6% of their total trade at the moment. This is a very small proportion. We must certainly increase it" (Euroasian Daily Monitor, 24 November 2008)

The role of free trade ports in Iran (the cities of Chabahar, Culfa, Kis, and Kesm Ireland) and border trade centres in Turkey (Artvin, Ardahan Agri, Kars, Van, Hakkari, Mardin, Sanliurfa, Gaziantep, Kilis, and Hatay) also provide a great contribution to the economic development in the region (Cetinsaya, 2006). In general, Turkey-Iran trade can be categorised as being in primary and secondary goods such as iron and steel, boilers, machinery and mechanical equipment, textile fibers and yarns, man-made staple fibers, confectionery, automotive and spare part, plastics, electrical machinery, and paper. These constitute the bulk of Turkish exports to Iran. Turkey's imports from Iran have kept pace with its exports. Mineral fuels and oil have an important place (93 %) in Turkish imports from Iran. In addition to hydrocarbon resources, copper and copper products, organic chemicals, rawhides and skins, plastics constitute major elements of Turkey's imports from Iran (Cetinsaya, 2006).




**Table: 10.2. The percentage of mutual import and export between Turkey-Iran**

| Turkey | Export | Import | Iran | Export | Import |
|--------|--------|--------|------|--------|--------|
| 2002   | 0.58%  | 2.55%  | 2002 | 3..25% | 1.36%  |
| 2003   | 0.77%  | 3.94%  | 2003 | 5..51% | 1.85%  |
| 2004   | 0.22%  | 3.11%  | 2004 | 4.42%  | 0.58%  |
| 2005   | 0.77%  | 4.72%  | 2005 | 5.78%  | 2.20%  |
| 2006   | 0.76%  | 6.58%  | 2006 | 8..91% | 2.35%  |

Sources: IMF, TUIK, DEIK, 2007; compiled by author

Comparing to the coalition government’s trade margin, the Turkey-Iran trade balance reached \$2.94 billion in 2003 (AsiaPulse News, June 18 2003), and \$2.771 billion in 2004. The value of Iran-Turkey trade grew by 52.45 percent to \$6.692 billion in 2006 compared to 2005’s value of \$4. 382 billion, which reached at \$8 billion in 2007. According to the Turkish Statistics Institute, Iran had a share of 3.9 percent in Turkey's total imports in 2007 and 1.3 percent in its exports--which makes Iran the seventh major exporter to Turkey after Russia, Germany, China, Italy, the US and France, (www.tuik.gov.tr). The report specifies that Iraq, Japan, India, Singapore, Italy, Afghanistan, Germany and the Netherlands are the primary purchasers of Iranian goods.

**Figure: 10.3.Turkey’s exports and imports to Iran (2003-2007)**



Sources: IMF, TUIK, DEIK 2008; compiled by author

## 10.5. Conclusion

In general, it can be stated that the volume of Turkey-Iran trade relations does not match the long-term historical relations and ethnic and religious ties between them. Though ideological factors have played a very significant role in promoting each country's economic sectors, there are many reasons behind the neither failure-- for instance, the systemic behaviour of Turkey in leaning towards the Western camp in trade and politics and security. However, Iran's behaviour in the manner of a lone wolf is seen as an alternative alliance mode against a super power. The dual containment policy of the US, a trade embargos, and nuclear matters, decreases trading between Turkey and Iran, but only stimulates the energy sector which is certainly beneficial for Turkey's internal needs. The lack of a private sector for Iranian companies and the strict bargaining in deals impedes the development of relations with each other. If Turkey and Iran manage to sign the tariff agreement as mentioned above and make the ECO more effective, they will move forward to increase institutional trading and diversify their exports and imports. In recent years, the growth of the non-oil sector in Iran has contributed to the reduction of unemployment and improvements in social cohesion. However, the oil and gas sectors still accounted for 80% percent of total exports--this affected social instability in Iran in 2007 (Ogutcu, 2007), because the state controls all economic activities in the country. While a small portion of the economy is run by private companies, the percentage is not sufficient to reduce the unemployment. Therefore, the conservative movement in Iran still remains a barrier to Turkey's private sector investment in Iran, especially after the breach of the contract regarding Turkcel, which diminished the already poor level of trust in Iran's business sector. The other issue in Turkish-Iranian trade is the growth in truck traffic toward Central Asia, for Turkey and Europe, as well as the oil smuggling (90% of all general transactions ), which was estimated at \$4 billion in 2007. This caused loss of control of the bilateral trade and of tax revenues for the Turkish government (Cetinsaya, 2006).

The importance of Iran's oil and gas resources for a country with an energy shortage, like Turkey, and their transport links to international markets make Iran desirable a major trade partner for Ankara, because Iran is the owner of the second largest proven natural gas reserves (3 tcf) ([www.eia.doe.gov](http://www.eia.doe.gov)). It is also the second largest oil

producer in OPEC with 4.2 million barrels per day (bbl/d), which is equal to 5 % of global production ([www.ogj.com](http://www.ogj.com)). The growth in bilateral trade between Turkey and Iran provides a new dynamic in the political sector.

On the other hand, Turkey consumed 617,000 of barrels per day in 2006, with a share of 0.7 % globally (Euroasian Daliy Monitor, 24 November 2008). This has to be considered when taking into account Turkey's South Pars project and Iran's nuclear ambitions. As a United States' and NATO's ally, Turkey is faced with the practical security considerations because it does not want to encourage a nuclear neighbour in the Middle East, nor does it want to support a US military option against Iran. Thus, Turkey's position remains uncertain (APS Diplomat Recorder, 19 January 2007). However, if the South Pars contract is to be signed, Turkey would become an energy hub country from the Caspian-Middle East to Europe. Ultimately, the Nabucco project would counteract the Russian natural gas company's, Gasprom's, hegemony in energy.

Iran tried to capture foreign investments by opening the Chabahar port, Khis Island, in the Hurmuz free trade zone, and by making announcements of new investment opportunities in Iran ([www.investiniran.ir](http://www.investiniran.ir)). The rail network between Turkey and Iran needs to be restored and the necessary security against smuggling provided, as sea transport is also very expensive due to the lack of direct routes. Air flights at unconventional hours to Tehran reduce Turkish and Iranian businessmen's contacts. Iran, in turn, wants to use Caspian and Black Sea trade routes and enjoy Turkish investments in naval technology. The Iran Tourism and Touring Organisation (ITTO) and the Ministry of Tourism in Turkey operate the tourism industry between the two neighbours. It is estimated that 1.5 million Iranian tourists came to Turkey in 2007. The cancellation of the double taxation agreement came into effect in March 2005 and the Association for Turkish and Iranian Trade also support bilateral trade, which was established in November 2001. Since the establishment, the Association has organised five Turkish and Iranian trade and economic cooperation seminars and meetings ([www.isiad.org](http://www.isiad.org)). According to IMF records as of 21<sup>st</sup> March, 2007 and 20<sup>th</sup> January 2008 Iran received \$11 billion foreign investment from the UAE, India, Germany, France, Italia, and Turkey. Iranian trade had certain successes as well, as the Samand automobile produced by the Iranian Khodro Company has already entered the Turkish

market. All these positive developments play a very significant role in conflict management through bilateral relationships.



## CHAPTER ELEVEN:

### THE CAPACITIES OF THE MIDDLE - POWER STATE: ARTICULATION OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 11.1. Introduction

As the discussion in the previous chapters indicates, the relationship between Iran and Turkey can be characterised as one of '*mistrust*' and this largely depends on the past experience and social memory of Turkish and Iranian peoples. Although both societies have been faced with the *collective amnesia* of religious and secularist apostasy, the relationship of conflict and cooperative makes up their sub-conscious mindset. Turkey and Iran have been able to manage wary but peaceful relations since the détente agreement of Qasri-Shirin, which represents the recognition of the *dual legitimacy* of the two countries' religious and political identities. Rather than applying the conflict resolution theory in my concluding remarks, I believe that clarifying the medium-sized states' capacity not only provides better understanding of middle - powers' *multilateral diplomacy* but also explains their *multi-directional* participation in transnational organisations. Middle - powers may concentrate on "*niche diplomacy*", where resources are targeted in "specific areas best able to generate returns worth having rather than trying to cover the field" (Cooper, 1997: 5). Turkey-Iran has different character definitions from traditional middle - power states such as Australia and Canada - peripheral Western democracies, which have sought to pursue their objectives through *multilateral channels*. Instead, Turkey and Iran act as both coercive and benign regional powers, to produce constructive policy in the region. However, a benign regional state, like an emerging middle-power, may employ the tools of traditional middle - powers, such as coalition-building, conflict management and mediation within a regional setting. For instance, Turkey continues to be a benign regional power, seeking to employ these traditional tools, beginning a trilateral dialogue between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and the Syrian-Israeli conflict and playing a major role in the UN, NATO and the EU in peacekeeping and police operations and observer missions in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East and as far afield as in Afghanistan (Lesser, 2000). However, Iran acts as a regional middle - power, aspiring to be a regional hegemony, and to having a nuclear capability for self-reliance in the international society. The

Islamic Republic of Iran has the capacity to be a regional hegemony, with its natural resources and religious sphere of influence, as an independent middle - power state in the Middle East. On the one hand, Iran as a middle-power state avoids a direct confrontation with great powers whilst the super powers do not allow expansion of its sphere of influence. In practice within the uni-polar system, the bargaining capacity of a middle-power has been reduced, but as regional middle - powers, Turkey and Iran create alliances with less threatening powers in the region, aiming to check the penetration of the super powers by defending regional autonomy. The alliance of middle - power states also minimises each others' influence in the region. For instance, the Iran-Syrian alliance and the Turkey and Israel alliance perform the regional polarity system in the Middle East. However, soft power relations between Russia and Turkey, and strategic relations between Iran and Russia also put a check on the middle - power and great power hegemonic aspiration in the Central Asia and Caucasus. Since post-cold war, Turkey-Russia has sought deterrence against penetration of the US in the Black Sea. Both Ankara and Moscow do not want change to the *status quo* of the Montreux Convention of 1936. It places restrictions on the number, type and length of stay of warships of non - Black Sea states in the Black Sea and is opposed to any permanent or extended deployment of US naval vessels in the Black Sea, which contravene these provisions (Winrow, 2007). Therefore, the interest of the patron super power (the US) and the client (Turkey) do not always coincide with the global aspirations of the super power and the regional aspirations of the middle-power states. Turkey offered the creation of the '*Balkan Stability Pact*' and the '*Caucasus Stability Pact*' after the Cold War and the Russian - Georgian War in August 2008, as a traditional middle - power state, acting within the international community. In practice, middle-powers have the resources; and the organisational skills that become internationally influential on *sectors bases* or *niche bases*. Cooper argues that middle - power states are capable of autonomous contributions to international affairs, not generally or even widely, but in specific niches appropriate to their skills, experience, and interests and typically deploying common patterns of statecraft (Cooper, 1997), which fits into the roles played by Turkey and Iran in international relations. Therefore, as argued so far, by definition and through their sphere of influence, Turkey and Iran should be considered as middle - power states.

This chapter, thus, aims at bringing the entire discussion together as articulated throughout the thesis by providing the results of testing the middle - power state capacities of Turkey and Iran. In other words, previous chapters provide the contents of the discussions regarding various aspects and features of middle - power states, in relation to Turkey and Iran, as defined and modified in Chapter Two, which was chosen as the theoretical framework of this study. Thus, this chapter bridges the findings in the form of discussion in the earlier chapter and the conceptual framework by testing the explanatory power of the modified version of the middle - power states as defined in Chapter Two in the case of Turkey and Iran.

#### **11.2.0. The historical dual legitimacy of middle - power statecraft**

The course of amity and enmity relations represents the change but also progress through several stage of socio-political development in Turkish and Iranian history. As explained in Chapter Three, Turko - Persian cultural and political synthesis has gained great momentum in the Middle Age. The coalition of Turks and Persians protect their native culture and also shelter other small nation's cultural reservations from Arabic assimilation in the Northern front. The military discipline and verbal culture of Turks provided great practical results; Turks easily adopted the Persian state bureaucracy and court tradition. With this hybrid cultural synthesis, Turkish Sufi-oriented verbal culture managed to assimilate different national groups with addition of the intermarriage system in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, such as amongst Meskhetian Turks, Azeri Turks, Khemshili Turks, the nations in Asia Minor and partially, the peoples' of Balkan, who were forced to do so. The distribution of power in political leadership and state bureaucracy also underpinned common political and religious discourse in Persia.

On the other hand, the Mongol invasion terminated the '*Turko - Persian Islamic synthesiss*.' The cultural dynamics of Persia was re-harmonised by Turko-Mongol state tradition and created another political context, known as the '*Persian renaissance*.' The major elements of Persian renaissance, court tradition, and state bureaucracy sustain its legitimacy until the establishment of nation state system in the Asian continent. On the one hand, Persian language remained a "*lingua franca*", as a

court language until the Russian occupation of Turkish and Iranian buffer zones in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

However, in the later period, the Ottoman Turk-Greek coalition completely set aside Persian bureaucratic and court traditions in the western front, and created a new kin soul of nationhood and statehood in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. The coalition of Turks and Kurds brought a new dimension to Turkish political culture by engaging Arabic culture via Kurds that was apart from the Turks-Greek coalition in the state bureaucracy and strengthened orthodoxy of religious institutionalism in the imperial court. For instance, as a result of this, Sheikh ul-Islam, as an institution, was allowed to join the Sultan's court in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

The Turkish-Kurdish coalition against Persians and Arabs resulted in great military and political successes for Ottoman Turks in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Although Ottoman Turks won the battles of Chaldiran and Mercidabik, as mentioned about negative balance strategy in *Chapter Two* they only occupied the Arabic lands and preferred to ensure the sovereignty of Persia as an independent middle - power state. Ottoman Turks became the leaders of the Sunni world and represented the multi-national state system against the nation-based states. Hence, the origin of Persian and Turkish conflict is political rather than religious. The new religion of Persia unified the various ethnic groups--the majority of Iranian and other small groups such as Turks and Arabs. Therefore, the emergence of the Iranian nation is based entirely on Twelve Shi'ism rather than ethnic distinctions that restored the Persian crown in Persia. The duality of religion and statehood and also nationhood became the conflict issues between the two empires. However, the legitimacy of state and religion was resolved by the peace treaty of *Qasri Shirin* in 1639.

The Assembly of Najaf, explained in Chapter Four, was the first attempt to overcome the Sunnite-Shiite antagonism. The ecumenical attempt by Nadir Shah was mainly aimed at integrating the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis under the leadership of exalted of Turcoman tribe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. However, pan-Islamist policies of Abdulhamit II and the rhetoric of Jamal al-Din Afghani were perceived as a national security threat by Qajar government in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Caliphate movement in South East Asia and Islamic utopian clerics and thinkers such as Afghani, Rasid Reza,

Abduh, Iqbal and Nursi could not create a new political opposition to the western hegemony. The failure of Islamic utopian politics weakened the Islamic identity in the periphery of Atatürk's Turkey and of Pahlavi's Iran. The *hidden identity* of Turks and the national identity component of Iranian people was religion, which sustained self-strengthening progress of contemporary Turks' and Iranians' identities. Therefore, the revolution of Turkish secular oligarchy and the Islamic revolution of Shia religious elite are attempts to create an imaginary secular and religious society during the last three decades. However, for the status quo of Turkey and Iran as middle - power states, both secular and religious revolutions would not equal to fully-fledged new political and economic systems to international community. Therefore, both of the alternative regimes will not be adopted by the Islamic world.

During the Cold War, Turkey and Iran chose semi-sovereignty status quo in regard to security and economic engagements with Western countries that provided both Kemalist and Pahlavi's regimes with a great initiative in the international community. As mentioned in Chapter Four, both Turkey and Iran have lost their guardianship status quo in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the last four hundred years and failed to prevent the death and exile of Turkic and Muslim peoples under Soviet rule. In fact, they have no agenda of external national identity construction in their sphere of history even though they have kinship and cultural ties in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The kinship and historical dual legacy claims of both secular regimes reshaped the mistrust relationship between the nations. As mentioned previously, this policy or strategy named '*negating strategy*' in the Chapter Two; they perceive each other as a competitive rival rather than potential ally, even though they were part of the western security system and allies of Israel in the Middle East. Both Turkey and Iran ensured that the sovereignty of each country is essential for each other's national security as against Soviet hegemonic ambition. Turkey and Iran maintained their status quo as buffer states in the Northern Flank in the bipolar system. They truly benefited from bargaining power of being a middle - power state during the Cold War period. After the Cold War, however, Turkey and Iran negated each other's influence in the Caucasus and Northern Iraq. As a middle - power state, Turkey and Iran has no economic and institutional capacity to expand their influence in the region, because super powers and great powers do not allow the middle - power states hegemonic expansion into the regional system.

Middle - power states have two options to maintain their sovereignty in the international community--being a client state or negative balancer which may be valuable for the offshore or forward strategy of balance of power. Turkey has chosen the semi-sovereignty status, while the Islamic republic of Iran retains her self-reliance or full-sovereignty. Similarly, Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of the "*guardianship of the jurist*" (*Valayet-e Faqih*) was an attempt for religious revolution within religion and provides clerical legitimacy in the religious state (Miller, 2006). However, neither Ja'fari proposal of Nadir Shah nor the diplomacy of Taqrib Movement in 20<sup>th</sup> century have brought Iran back into the Sunni fold. The secular republican leadership and Arab monarchies did not grant any type of wholesale recognition of Ja'fari madhhab. In the 21st century, Islamic identity is composed of seven 'zones' of political Islam, often in competition, namely Arab, Persian (Shia), Turkish, South Asian (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan), Malay-Indonesian, African and Minority (Diaspora) zones (Yavuz, 2004). Each zone's understanding of Islam is not only primarily informed by its own national culture and by diverse historical and economic factors but is also shaped by the Turko-Persian Islamic synthesis. Hence, one presumes that Turkey's engagement with NATO and the nuclear ambitions of Iran are considered a part of national identity construction of medium-sized states to maintain survival in the international society. The security concerns of middle - power regimes impede the creation of revolutionary institutionalism in society, because securitising the internal politics results in the factionalism that strengthens the patrimonial structure in the society. Ironically, both Turkey's and Iran's legitimacy depends on the resistance to western imperialism; the motivation of this westernisation is to maintain its role as a middle - power state and relations in society.

### **11. 2.1. Transformation of the public sphere in the middle - power state**

The progress of Islamic oriented states' society is different from western societies; Ottoman Turkey and Persian state and social relations are defined as "*oriental despotism*" by Kodourie and Haim (2005: 100). In fact, the failure of renaissance, reformation movement and industrial revolution reshape the authoritarian modernisation in both Turkey and Iran. Turkey and Iran lack the western style social class system such as the *bourgeoisie* and the *labour class*, but have a fragmented society which demonstrates that there is no common culture identified as national

identity. Therefore, the revolutionary movements not only helped to create nation states but narrowed the liberalisation of society in Turkey and Iran (Yilmaz, 1998). For instance, the Tobacco Revolt in 1891, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906-1911 and the Young Turk revolution in Ottoman Turkey in 1908-1918 made structural changes in state-society and attempted to create a new imaginary society as well as established nation states. This revolutionary period of Ottoman Turkey and Persia marked a rise in the public consciousness and witnessed the emergence of a public debate in newspapers, journals and magazines in the higher echelons of the Turkish and Iranian societies. This debate was largely confined to a small class of intelligentsia and statesmen. On the other hand, the economic dimension of the public debate was marked with ethno-religious lines in which the economic class overlapped with ethno-religious community. Modernisation efforts of both state elites' were mostly military--technical areas of education became the main target of the leadership groups in Turkey and Iran. Hence, Kemalist and Pahlavi's revolutions were classified as a military *coup d'état* and their revolutionary activities were also called as an "*authoritarian reformation*" (Kansu, 1997:5). In fact, Turkish revolution and monarchical revolution was one of the many echoes of global upheaval in development in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, technological innovation, mass social unrest, economic fluctuations with worldwide repercussions, imperialism and new ideas concerning nationhood occupied a prominent place (Mardin, 2004). Hence, the external enforcement is the main revolutionary drive for the middle - power state. On the other hand, middle - power state's revolution has no capacity to continue its revolutionary dynamics when they reach a certain point. For instance, the Young Turk revolution and the constitutional revolution in Iran were interrupted by Kemalist and Pahlavi's authoritarian revolution. Similarly, Islamic revolution in Iran was a clear-cut break of modernisation programme of the Shah.

On one hand, secularist and Islamic revolutions focused on the creation of an identity as part of a social engineering process. However, both secularist and religious projects can be classified as '*a traumatic change*' in society. The authoritarian modernisation in Turkey basically created its own public sphere by defining it through tenets of Kemalism, which excluded Islam and, hence, narrowed down the public sphere to move out the '*non - confirming public*' which is Islamic and therefore Islam remained as an unaccepted identity but it remained as the only '*hidden identity*' of Turks. On



the other hand, Turkey refused to accept the ethnic based definition of national identity of Turkishness, as the Kemalist leadership view Islam as a '*glue*' integrating the various groups for the maintenance of the country. The well-known Turkish writer, Adnan Adivar states that the Kemalist interpretation of secularism, akin to positivism in the West, has become the "*official dogma*" of religion on (Turkish society) just as Islamic dogma had been imposed in the past" (as cited in Yavuz, 2003). The state - monitored public sphere has been characterised more by concern of the western or traditional appearance than by "*public realm*" of Turkish and Iranian society (Williams and Lang, 2005:245). The continuity of the constitutional movement became a clear - cut development when the Islamic revolution seized power in Iran. However, the implementation of the Islamic republic ended the liberal progressiveness of the Shah's revolution even though it referenced the constitutional revolution which offered a more liberal society in 1908. The theocratic regime of Iran does not recognise secular identities and also voices of women in the public sphere (Bayat, 1991:316). The discussion between Iranian philosopher, Abdulkarim Soroush and former foreign minister Velayeti was mainly focused on the absence of civil society and factionalism as well as the politicising of the public sphere in Iran (Soroush, 1995). Similarly, the discussion about laicism and Anglo - Saxon secularism created two constitutional crises in 2007 and 2008 against Justice and Development Party politics in Turkey. The decision of Constitutional Court in 1997 and 2008 initiated a new move to define secularism in the Turkish context by stressing that secularism does not mean separation of religion and the state, but implies separation of religion and worldly affairs. According to Habermas, however, the public sphere is "*made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state*" (Habermas, 1991:197). Hence the public sphere is the source of public opinion needed for "*legitimate authority in any functioning democracy*" (Rutherford, 2000:18). The emancipation of the human condition not only protects the fundamental individual liberties and rights but also recognition of individuals, groups, identities, diversities, and representation of those in the public and political domain as legitimate normative contributors. In the case of Turkey, the secular definitions of the public sphere in favour of the imagined society is challenged by Islamist struggle for recognition of religious identity and visibility mostly represented by Sufi groups in the public sphere, whereas Islamic political hegemony is challenged in Iran by urban groups such as youth, women and

intellectuals who desire secular practices in their daily lives. In both cases, the issues of gender occupy the centre in the dispute of private life in the public spheres. As a result of politicised and '*state-monitored public sphere*', the secular regime of Turkish Republic and the regime of Iran Islamic Republic have failed to create *non-polarised public sphere* in contemporary Iran and Turkey.

#### **11.2.2. Middle - power state containment strategy in agents, and state – society relations**

Religious institutionalism has been formed in '*state-controlled form*' in the Sunni world and as non-governmental organisations in Persia. Hence, the '*secular modes of production*' in both Turkey and Iran were met with internal challenges from society. Whilst *Kemalist oligarchy* managed to control political Islam and Islamic radicalism, Pahlavi's regime was destroyed by the Khomeini's revolutionary movement but similarly Islamic regime of Iran is now faced with secular and globalist challenge. As mentioned in Chapter Five, unlike Safavid '*state-controlled religious institutions*,' in Iran have their own space, economically and politically. Religious identity of Iranian people was also one of the components of Iranian national identity in Pahlavi's regime. Thus, the religious establishment did not allow the Shah's demand for republican system such as Mustafa Kemal's revolution in the state; Shia clerics were not happy to see the abolishment of Caliphate and secular court system in Turkey. This shows that even if Shia did not follow the Sunni Caliphate politically, they informally recognised the legitimacy of Sunnite Caliphate, especially Ottoman Turkey's religious and political roles in the Islamic world.

On the other hand, any of the social movement in Turkey and Iran would influence the domestic politics of the respective countries. Islamic revolution in Iran was considered as a challenge against the secular identity of Turks in 1979. Thus, a military *coup d'état* in 1980 launched the counter revolutionary activities of Kemalist establishment, successfully blockaded the influence of the Islamic revolution of Iran and the radical Islamic movement in Turkey. Turkish society, is not homogeneous, and was composed by external migration and then reshuffled by mass domestic immigration which has important consequences for systematic change in state – society relationship. Due to absence of common political discourse, this fragmented

society structure is very vulnerable to foreign or internal penetration. Hence, Kemalist leadership successfully advanced the society and used the agents groups in the '*fragmented society*,' especially Islamic groups. The legitimacy of Islamic groups in Turkish society depends on the '*hidden identity*' definition of state - establishment which allows Islamic groups to carry out their own network and education system. As stated in Chapter Five, Sufi Naksibendiyye groups, and Gulen and Suleymanci movement created '*a counter- public sphere*' in society and an incubator for the evolution of popular Islamic identity (Yavuz, 2000). The Islamic groups in Turkey use the "*opportunity space*" in the society and, thus, Turkish synthesis of Islam will never allow for a revolutionary society even if it is believed that the Kemalist revolution was against the public's religious realm in Turkey. Religious institutions in Turkey have been operated by the state, and the *education law (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu)* does not allow for any private religious education. Therefore, religious groups still play a more effective role than the state in the social transformation of society, as Islamic groups, as agents of the establishment, have renegotiated the modern Turkish identity formation and contributed to this identity through changing the periphery according to the centre's new political culture and symbolic lifestyle. In this regard, the Kemalist revolution is an internal revolution within the Sunnite sect in Turkey.

It is thus concluded that middle - power states are able to blockade others' revolutions, hence middle - power state *contains* the other's influence in its own internal affairs. In this regard, Turkey has provided the religious groups with an "*opportunity space*" to balance an alternative identity against Islamic and Marxist movement in 1980s and 1990s. This explains why Turkish society has not evolved in the same line as articulated by Gramsci or Marxian political economy in their attempt at theorising the political and social change. This is because, as mentioned above, systematic changes in Turkish society were the result of a balance of power change in the regional and international system, and therefore change in modern Turkey has always been the result of external legitimacy search rather than the results of internal dynamics.

On one hand, the other characteristics of middle - power state are that it is able to manage the activities of agent groups in society. In Turkey, Islamist and Kurds

occupy the periphery, the state – establishment provide them a space where they are placed time to time without any identity claim in the centre. For instance, in that sense, the neo - liberal economic policies of Ozal's leadership strengthened the periphery's economic growth. However, the Kemalist establishment forced them back to their peripheral zone by launching the 28<sup>th</sup> February process -- post- modern military *coup d'état* in 1997 -- to cleanse the public sphere from the contamination by religious groups (Yavuz, 2000). The 28<sup>th</sup> February process allowed the Kemalist leadership groups to exclude the periphery from the public sphere, including from the economic benefits of the centre, especially Kurdish and Islamist groups were excluded from the privatisation of giant state economic enterprises and factories so that the Kemalist elite could maintain their economic and political hegemony, despite the fact that they failed integration with globalization as they could not be cost efficient due to renter mentality. The Refah - Yol coalition government was forced to comply with the cleansing of peripheral identities from centre and public sphere as a result of 28<sup>th</sup> February 1998 process. Even though, the first Islamist prime minister, Erbakan challenged the military intervention by saying that “*with or without blood,*” the system will be changed, the situation became more critical for Islamists after he was ousted from his post in 1997. However, it is important to note that Erbakan's WP functioned instrumentally in cleansing Islam from the public sphere.

In addition, the middle - power state can also manage the unitary activities of agents groups as well as opposition groups (Yavuz, 2000). For instance, the Welfare - Party never gets any political support from Islamic groups, but receive serious criticism from the *Gulen* Movement and *Iskender Pasha* Group. In fact, Islamist-oriented parties in Turkey and reformist parties in Iran are part of the state regime or state - establishment. Sufi groups in Turkey see themselves as the wise men or the technocrats of the states while the *Gulen* group considers themselves as an alternative leadership in the government and state apparatus. However, the *Gulen* group has no social base and also no concern to claim an Islamic identity. Rather, they prefer to be pragmatic and assertive for their own factionalism to infiltrate the state - establishment. In comparing Islamic groups in general, the *Naksibandiyya* movement is socially constructed in Turkey because *Nakshi* took over the *Baktashi* lodge after the abolition of *Janissaries* who were considered the main element of the imperial army until 1826. Sufi - oriented movements do not avoid to claim their identity when

they reach a certain level in the centre, but their presence in state apparatus only provide an opportunity space as a thermidor to secure the survival of the regime. Similar situation can be evaluated in the case of the Khatami and the Erdogan governments in the 2000s respectively. In this sense, the thermidor can only originate from leadership groups in middle - power state but not from the agents or oppositional groups, because middle - power state does not allow the rise of a civil society against its own factionalism. Thus, change in the society can only occur within leadership groups in the middle - power state. For instance, during the Justice and Development Party leadership in recent years, secular liberals supported the democratisation programme of the EU.

As middle – power states, religion is the most influential institution in Turkish and Iranian politics, despite the secular nature of Turkey. It plays a significant role in the formation of the nation state and the reconstruction of religious or secularist identity as well as bilateral relations between Turkey and Iran. For instance, due to religious disputes, Turkey and Iran have faced two diplomatic crises. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the symbolic figures of the regime, Ataturk and Khomeini, the religious political symbol of the headscarf and the symbolic meaning of Jerusalem are the main instruments of religious and ideological confrontation between Ankara and Tehran since the revolution in 1979. Even though Iran has no serious influence on Alevi groups but has measurable impact on small Ja'fari groups in Turkey, the ideological differences have a major impact on the Turco –Iran political dispute. On the one hand, due to the agent role of Alevi groups in the Kemalist leadership, the potential supporters of the Shia sect has been integrated with the secular establishment even if state has not officially recognised their religious identity. Because social agents in middle - power state are parts of the state establishment who conduct modernisation via this agent structure of society. The state - agent structure in society negates the other power's influence and also impedes the revolutionary drive of middle - power state. Hence, middle - power state's revolution is a '*false*' definition of social revolution. Consequently, the Turkish secular revolution and the Islamic revolution of Iran can only be defined as '*a revolution within religion.*' The only differences between the two revolutions are in the public sphere. Secular revolution within Sunnite sect undermines the *influence* of God; however, the Islamic revolution within Shia *brought God back* to the public sphere. Therefore, both of them use the public

sphere as the arena of their ideological struggle, which impedes the creation of a civil society. Hence, the roots of change and progress in the middle - power state are the *external drive* and *changes* of the regional and international system.

### **11.2.3. Middle - power negating strategy in armed agents relations and legitimacy of counter terrorism politics**

The armed agent and state counter terrorism is the product of the nation state system; the nation state was an alternative to the multi - national system of the Ottoman Empire. The creation of a nation state from an empire has been a '*traumatic change*' in Turkey, because the imaginary society project of Kemalism breached the entire legitimacy of common political discourse, religious and political social contract between state ethnic, religious and agent groups in Turkey. The exclusion of Kurdish and cleansing of Islam from the public sphere terminated the role of religion in the political contract. The *hidden religious identity* of Turks could not have the capacity to create a new imaginary society. However, the Shia religious identity of Iran unified the different ethnic groups in Iran. Even if Pahlavis imitated the Kemalist reformation program, the religious identity of Iran was one of three component of new imaginary society of Pahlavi's project. As mentioned above, state and agent relations in Iran were not under state control. Iran maintained its feudal structure and its disciplinary religious institutionalism during the Pahlavi government. However, Turkey's external immigration from Balkans and the Caucasus and the internal population transfer from rural areas to urban districts completely changed society and provided the Kemalist regime with an *opportunity* to use the public sphere for their ideological activities (Karpat, 2004).

The leadership of Turkey has maintained the *anarchical order* between agent groups such as religious and nationalist-Marxist, Alevis-Sunnis and impeded any type of middle - power state revolution in Turkey while Iranian disciplinary society's actions against the Shah resulted in the Islamic revolution in 1979. Therefore, the control of this internal threat is more important than the external one. If an internal threat was not under the control of leadership groups, the ethnic or religious movements of agent groups could create a revolutionary practice such as the Iranian Islamic revolution or become a transnational issue, which middle - power state would not able to control -

such as PKK and PJAK in Turkey and Iran. On the one hand, they excluded agent groups in the periphery can cooperate with external partners to find a legitimate place in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the Shah used the *proxy* Kurdish political cards against Iraq and also tried to use small Shia groups in Turkey. Similarly, Turkey used the Azeri political card against the Shah's activities to undermine his regional leadership politics in the 1970s. Similarly, after the Islamic revolution, Iraq and Turkey used the Iranian opposition armed group, Mujahedeen Khalq Organisation to weaken the revolutionary export policy of Iran. In response, Iran supported the guerrillas of Kurdish nationalist groups against Turkey and Iraq in 1980s and 1990s.

Middle - power leadership groups ensure that the activities of ethnic and religious agents are under state control. Hence, middle - power states use counter terrorism strategies to control the internal instability and sometimes create internal '*chaos*' or '*anarchical order*' to maintain its regime. Therefore, the leadership group interest is more important than the public interest. The national security and state interest is considered most crucial for the leadership groups. As mentioned in Chapter Six, Turkey did not refrain from using counter - terror groups, Turkish Hezbollah against the PKK insurgency campaign in the 1990s. However, the promotion of such an armed group can create the conflict between regional states as well as super - power interest in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, middle - power - state and super - power state's interest were in conflict in Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East. For instance, in Turkish - American relations, the conflict was rooted in differences of liberal and authoritarian states with regard to transnational conflict despite Turkey's contribution to the regulation of UNSCR 688 decision, "*safe haven*" and "*Operation Provide Comfort*" in Northern Iraq, as a middle - power state, Turkey has no confidence in finding a peaceful resolution or a social contract between Kurds and the state. Because the middle power states have no capacity to produce a peaceful solution for their own transnational movements. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, for instance, Turkey's and Iran's interference into the Kurdish civil war in Kurdistan - Iraq could not reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East. However, the Dublin process and Washington process signify that liberal democratic states provided peaceful resolutions against civil war between Kurdish groups in Kurdistan - Iraq.

On the other hand, middle - power leadership groups used an armed agent to negate the other regional powers influence in its own domestic sphere. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the Kemalist leadership undermines the influence of the Iranian Islamic revolution by using the unresolved political murder cases in Turkey. The image of terror between the two different regimes remains as a '*phantom*' to demonstrate the violent face of the Islamic revolution in order to legitimise the secularist regime of its state. Iran also benefited from Turkey's counter - terrorism by discrediting the secularist regime and claimed a Turkish - Israeli connection to state terror in the Middle East. However, the '*phantom of terror*' between two equal middle - powers was able to cause an armed conflict such as the undeclared war between Turkey and Syria in 1997, because middle - power states cannot resort to armed conflict directly. They only seek to invalidate each other's influence in the region. Therefore, as a middle power state, Iran and Turkey benefited from the dispute on regime differences and agent structure in the regional politics. While Turkey's political engagement also provide an opportunity to comply counter - terrorism against ASALA and PKK in the West, it has not received serious criticism from international society. However, as a rogue state, Iranian counter - terror activities such as the *Mykonos Verdict* and supporting Hezbollah and Hamas brought about *UN sanctions*, and the *dual containment* policy of America. However, both states maintained their bargaining power capacity against super - powers or great - power interference in the regional politics.

The other characteristic definition of middle - power states is that they cannot establish any regional military alliances against the super - power or great - power in the region. The institutional engagement between equal states could not also work systematically but only allows for a symbolic peace effort by medium - sized states. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, the '*Turkey Iran High Security Commission*' and Border committee have not provided any positive results versus violence on border crossings and guerrilla activities of PKK and PJAK so far. Due to the absence of a *social contract* between Kurds and Turks, Iranians and Arabs, the legitimacy of middle - power leadership does not receive any full-fledged support from society. However, traditional middle - power states have a social contract under the quasi of common political and economic interests and their geopolitical position has been defined in the international system.



#### 11.2.4. The absence of middle - power state's social contract

State formation of Turkey and Iran lacked the experiences of industrial revolution, diversification of civil society and similar sources of modernisation drive. Therefore, the structure of state-society relations could not elicit any common political discussion. The Hobbesian, Locke and Rousseau's *contractarianism* or Tocquevelli's *social contract* cannot find a place in Turkish- Iranian state and society, because the democratisation focuses on secularism and security concerns of the state regimes in both Turkey and Iran (Boucher and Kelly, 1994). However, secularism is not necessary for democratisation (Berger and Huntington, 2002). The social contract can be present in civil society, justice and regulate state-agent relations. There are two main reasons behind the absence of middle - power social contract:

(a) Middle - power state social contract is not able to protect the premises and interest of agents. As mentioned in Chapter Three, pan-Islamist policies of Sultan Abdulhamit II and the activities of Hamidiye regiment strengthened Kurdish and Ottoman Caliphate ties. The new form of Kurdish and Turkish alliance created a common standing against Armenian guerrilla war by Russian support. However, the failure of the pan-Islamist policies of the Ottoman state, made it clear that Turks cannot protect the interests of Kurdish people in the region. Therefore, Kurdish military campaigns started against pro-Turkish and pro-Iranian politics. Since then, Kurdish people have rebelled 13 times against the Ottoman state and 28 times have conducted military campaigns against Turkey (Birand, 2008).

(b) Middle - power states prefer to agree with agents of ethnic groups rather than making a social contract. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, there is an unofficial contract between secular Kurds and Turks against pan-Kurdish and pan-Islamist groups under the principles of secularism. The identity of Kurds is considered to be a part of the Turkish national state identity in this context. Therefore, the argument articulated by Sheikh Said in 1925 in giving the fatwa to justify his rebellion against the new Turkish states explains the clear - cut alienation of two nations from each other. He stated that "you [Mustafa Kemal] abolished the political contract between Turks and Kurds [by removing the Chaliphate], thus there is no political-religious ties anymore between you and us" (Mumcu, 1991:123).

Unlike the Western religious experience, Islam cannot be discarded from the public sphere in the Middle East, because the religion is the main component of common political identity of different ethnic groups. Even though Kurdish territorial integrity was divided between Turkey and Iran in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, religious leadership kept Kurdish people under Turkish rule. The abolition of the Caliphate was the cancellation of middle - state religious and political - contract. The long - term territorial division and assimilation policies of regional national states against the Kurdish entity have created a torn identity for Kurds. Many Kurdish reports were prepared by the Turkish government and non-governmental organisations since the abolishment of the religious and political contract, which aimed to integrate Kurds in the new nation state system (Akcura, 2008). Due to structural change in the international system, a Kurdish report in the 1990s offered a more democratic solution (Akcura, 2008), because the change they need is motivated by global developments and their capacity as an external actor in the middle - power state. On the other hand, middle - power state has no capacity to claim its imperial legitimacy in the region. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, Turkey's historical and kinship claims on the Kirkuk question cannot offer any peaceful solution but nor can the super power ignore Turkey's or Iran's influence in Iraq, as a *niche space*. Neither Turkey nor Iran can fill this *niche space*, and this resulted in the balkanisation of the Kurdish question in the Middle East and reduced Turkey's and Iran's influence in the region.

Due to the absence of a social contract, middle - power states have to spend their economic and military power to control military insurgencies of opposition groups. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, Turkey and Iran are still wasting their efforts against the PKK and PJAK. Therefore, middle - power states cannot be effective players in the international politics because they spend their power and time to control internal instability. Therefore, both Turkey and Iran have no capacity or tradition to produce such a contract which would provide a common political discourse between the state and the Kurdish people.

### 11.3. The middle - power's negating strategy and its state capacity in regional competition

A Middle - power state has no capacity to undertake armed and political competition with its counterparts, great powers and regional middle - power states, but parties use soft power or proxy politics to gain stakes in the natural resources of small power states. As mentioned, Russia uses domestic instability as a proxy to interfere with the internal affairs of Southern Caucasus states and also to challenge the western economic initiative of BTC in August 2008. Russia was not happy to see the *Azerbaijan International Consortium* and Turkish and Georgian initiatives in pipeline politics. On the one hand, Turkey refrained from the direct support of Washington's demand to use, for military purposes, the Black Sea against Russian military action in Georgia due to the unclear position of regional politics. Turkey's independent project of "*Caucasus Stability Platform*" aims to diversify the policy option of Ankara and also to reduce the dependency of Russia and United States in the regional politics.

However, as a middle - power state, Turkey has no capacity to produce a conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh or to create an effective regional alliance. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, Turkey excludes Iran from the *Caucasus Stability Platform* in the first stage of its proposal and BSEC. Similarly, Iran considers Turkey as an outsider in CASCO. The Caspian Sea incident was checking the influence of each middle - power state and also demonstrates the policy differences between Turkey and Iran regarding hydrocarbon sources of Caspian Sea. The incident was not aimed at causing direct military conflict between Turkey and Iran, but to diminish the economic influence of each other. Therefore, the parties in the *Nabucco pipeline* project are reluctant to establish interdependency relations. On the other hand, the cooperation in *Blue Stream* and *Blackseafor* intensify the strategic relations between Turkey and Russia. Diversification of an energy pipeline route is essential for the security of energy, and also sovereignty and the democratisation of small power Caspian Sea states. Therefore, Turkey, Iran and the Asian continent are considered an alternative against the Russian energy giant's hegemony in the international market. Kazakhstan's, Uzbekistan's and Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon sources flow through the Central Asian pipeline system of Russia. On the other hand, the cooperation in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium demonstrated that Russia does not totally stand against

the diversification of energy transport to the international market (Today's Zaman, 15 August 2008). However, Russia was not happy with the total isolation of Caspian energy transport such as the *Trans-Caspian pipeline* project.

The demographic distribution in Kazakhstan is essential in establishing strategic economic and political relations. The Russian population in the northern part of Kazakhstan and the landlocked geographic position restrict energy transport options for the Astana government. Russia retains its ethnicity right claim for intervention if Kazakh government enters the western or Chinese spheres of influence. On the other hand, ethnic minorities of Kazakhs in Xinjiang increase the energy cooperation between Chinese and Kazakh governments. The oil pipeline and projected gas pipeline to Xinjiang will play a major role in energy transport options of regional countries. Kazakhstan has received mass external immigrant from China and Central Asian state. Kazakhs are no longer a minority in their own land and the sovereignty of Kazakhstan guarantees that it is a regional player that can balance Uzbekistan's regional ambition. Small powers can also check the other regional players' influence in regional politics.

Turkey's influence in Caspian energy transport is limited to the BTC. However, Iran has a more reliable geographical proximity in energy transport. Turkmenistan plays a significant role for Iranian transport and energy supply, but due to the *dual containment* policy and UN economic sanctions, Iran cannot receive enough foreign investment to establish refineries and pipelines from the Caspian to the Gulf. Iran only benefited from oil swap options and tanker transport from Caspian Sea to Neka port. The technological deficiencies of Turkmenistan and Iran breached the reliability of the Turkey - Iran gas contract. Rather than isolating the regional player from energy sources, diversification of energy transport provides stability in regional politics. On the other hand, unresolved issues of the Caspian Sea's status in regional politics serve to protect Russian initiatives. Therefore, Russia checks Iranian influence and external partner investment in the Caspian Sea. In contrast to Russia's deployment of its navy throughout the Caspian Sea, Iran propounds that the Caspian Sea should be demilitarised and that no forces should be deployed there. Therefore, both Iran and Russia could not block Azerbaijan's international oil consortium and BTC consortium. The dispute is one of the obstacles of energy extraction from the Caspian Sea. As

mentioned in Chapter Nine, due to a dispute between Iran and Azerbaijan, BP terminated its project in one of offshore oil fields, Azov, in the Caspian Sea. In fact, the status quo of the Caspian Sea is not issue of international law and international organisations, because Russia and Iran retained initiatives at the negotiation stage. As a middle power, both Iran and Turkey cannot solve the legacy of Caspian Sea and cannot design their own pipeline policy in the regional politics. Therefore, most of the energy issues have been solved by the international consortium so far.

#### **11.4. Responding to the institutionalism: middle - power state cooperative détente relations**

Middle - power state economic and political regime is not able to create any economic and political regional institutions such as European economic and political integration. Even though they have natural interdependency on essential issues such as transport and energy shortages, their economic and political relations could not offer constructive relationships in regional politics. As mentioned above, therefore, they become an outsider or *third party* player in mediation effort of conflict resolution in the regional conflict. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, *Economic Cooperation Organisation* (ECO) could not provide regional economic integration. The absence of a common political discourse restricted the potential economic power of the regional countries. Similarly, Developing Eight Islamic countries (D-8), Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) have no institutional capacity in the nation state systems of regional states. The middle - power states' practice of international institutionalism allows only small-scale economic and political operations. Secondly, Iran's private sector has no capacity or professional experience to supply the demands of a new regional market. However, Turkey's private and state companies play an effective role in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey also established TIKA, as an international development office, to support cultural and economic activities of regional states. On the other hand, Iran's trade is limited to oil swaps with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Turkey made strategic investment in the communications system between regional countries and also Turkey's state oil company, TPAO is one major partners of international oil consortium in the Caspian

Sea. As mentioned in Chapter Nine, despite the geographical advantages of Iran, its economic sector is very weak within Central Asia and the Caucasus.

On the other hand, middle - power states do not wish to establish economic integration with one another. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, Turkey-Iran economic relations do not reflect the real potentials of neighbouring countries' economic capacity, because the ideological and regime differences play a significant role in economic relations. Therefore, Turkey-Iran trade accords and regular meetings of Turkey-Iran Joint Economic Commission allow only small -scale trade operations. The Turkey-Iran trade graphic reflects the oscillatory relations, which are not based on rational politics. Therefore, the realist school approach is not applicable for the unit level analyses of such country based studies. For instance, the Turkey-Iran trade volume increased during the Iran-Iraq war and after the American led-occupation of Iraq. However, Turkey and Iran have no success in tariff agreements on a customs union and tax exemption in bilateral trade. The uneasy relations in the transportation sector restrict the friendly relationship in economic interaction and also increase the unrecorded trade volume between two countries. Due to a lack of private sector regulations and experience in Iran, Turkey's trade with Iran demonstrates an enormous gap between export and import. For instance in Turkey-Iran's 80% of Iran's foreign trade depends on natural resources, oil and gas. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, state control of the economy forced the cancellation of Turkish companies', Turkcell and TAV contracts. During the JDP government, Turkey and Iran agreed to make enormous investments; Turkey and Iran signed a €220 million Industrial agreement (Fars News Agency, 04 August 2008); Turkey also agreed to build three natural gas transformation power plants of 2,000 megawatt in Iran; Turkey will invest \$3.5 b in Iran's South Pars gas field (Fars News Agency, 19 July 2007). Turkey refused U.S.'s request to scrutinise and suspend the activities of the Iran's *Bank Mellat* in Turkey whilst Iran's major trade partners such as Germany and China suspended the activities of the Iranian bank. The metaphor of ups and downs in political relations, thus, is valid in Turko-Iran economic relations. Even though Iran is the owner of the second largest proven natural gas reserve and second largest oil producer in OPEC, Iran's non-oil export is only 20% into the international market. As middle - power states, Turkey and Iran are not certain to sign the strategically important *South Pars gas field* agreement. Turkey explained its strategic position for refusing to apply the ILSA, the

UNSC resolution and the US unilateral sanctions against Iran. In fact, a middle - power state does not want economic and political isolation of its counterpart. The sovereignty of middle - power states is as important as their own sovereignty in regional politics. Turkey is not happy about its dependence on unreliable energy contracts with Iran. Therefore, diversification of energy sources is an essential security concern of this middle - power state. Because institutionalism of middle power states cannot establish the political and economic super - structure in international society.

#### **11.5. Responding the nuclear proliferation: middle - power self - reliance and forward strategy**

Iran was the heart of the western alliance and a friendly state to Israel in the Middle East during the initial Cold War period, therefore, the monarchical regime of Iran benefited from the technology of *Eurodif* (France), *Coredif* and the *Stanford Research Institute* to develop the nuclear ambition of the Iranian nation, because Iran is part of the *Non-proliferation Treaty* and had strong engagements with western institutions. Iran was acting a regional middle - power player with the support of sophisticated American armaments system.

However, the Islamic revolution by Khomeini suspended the Shah's nuclear program and also terminated Iran's regional player role, because Iran had to deal with the counter revolution strategies of super power and regional powers' resistance. If middle - power state leadership focused on militarisation and security concerns, public sphere and political life would be militarised to increase the civil obedience and internal stability of states. However, the religious nationalists turned back to the strategic nuclear programme and started slow negotiations with Russia in 1989-1995-2003. The dual containment policy of the United States, and the 9/11 trauma further isolated Iran from the international system and forced Tehran to develop domestic armament technology for the self-reliance strategy. Hence, the nuclear weaponisation programme of Iran was not only stimulated by internal dynamics but also demonstrated middle - powers' anger against the double standard politics of the international community. International organisation lost credibility for the Iranian public and state, especially due to the UN Security Council policy in the Iran-Iraq war.

Even though Iran signed the NPT in the 1970s, the revelation of Iran's clandestine nuclear programme in 2002 and 2003 created an enormous storm in international affairs. Iran upgraded the smuggled P-1 centrifuges initially acquired through the A.Q Khan network; IR-2 centrifuges are capable of operating at three times the speed of the P-1s (Ehteshami, 2008). The IAEA has found it impossible to certify that Iran's nuclear program is fully civilian, leaving the country open to criticism that it has a clandestine weapons programme. The UN Security Council demanded a complete halt to Iran's enrichment and heavy water related activities. However, Iran accused the IAEA and the UN Security Council of having *double standards* by comparing its programme to the Israeli nuclear arsenal (200 or more nuclear warheads). Iranian scientific achievements in the field of nuclear technology have become a symbol of national pride and the domestic political propaganda militarised political life in Iran since the neoconservative government seizure of power in August 2005. Iran will be fourth country that is not a party to the treaty that has conducted nuclear tests, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. However, Iran's weaponisation may have started proliferation elsewhere in the region such as Turkey and GCC countries. Turkey has been under NATO nuclear weapon hosting country program with the United States to deploy and store the 90 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Therefore, Turkey can be classified as a traditional middle - power state in hosting nuclear technology amongst the likes of Canada and Australia. However, Iranian and Pakistani and North Korean nuclear capability are considered a threat to the international community. As mentioned in Chapter Four, 439 nuclear power plants are under operation in 31 countries around the world. Iran's Bushehr nuclear station now relies entirely on Russian fuel supplies and technological support.

On the other hand, only three states -- Russia, France and the United States -- deploy nuclear cruise missiles. China and Pakistan are also developing cruise missile -- Intercontinental Ballistic Missile -- range systems to increase their future nuclear capability. The Rumsfeld commission in 1998 stated that the Iranian threat was an exaggeration. He claimed that Iran now has the technical capability to deploy an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - range ballistic missile, similar to the TD-2 (North Korean Taepodong-2 missile) within five years. However, Iran test - fired the Hoot Torpedo, and tested the new version of Shahab - 3 ballistic missile with a range of



only 1,250 miles (2, 000 km) and armed with a 1-ton conventional warhead on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2008 (Reuters, 10<sup>th</sup> July 2008).

The events mentioned above demonstrate that middle power state technology depends on the core and also the absence of regulation on the regime of strategic weapons puts them in a critical position in international society. Having a nuclear deterrence of middle power also impedes the super – power containment policy against such state, Iran and North Korea.

The position of Turkey on the nuclear crisis of Iran is different from the Hostage issue in 1980 and ILSA, because the nuclear armed Iran not only challenges Turkey's role in the region but also increases the nuclearisation of GCC countries in the Middle East. As a middle - power neighbour, Turkey tried to play a mediator role in protracted negotiations on Iran's nuclear issue, but middle - power states have no power to act as a mediator in transnational issues. Turkey does not follow aggressive policy against the nuclear programme of Islamic republic, because Ankara supports the peaceful nuclear technology of Iran. If Iran has nuclear capability, Turkey will easily develop its nuclear technology with western help.

#### **11.6. Testing the articulation of theoretical framework**

In order to introduce a new theoretical framework and certain amendments in hierarchy or definition of states as middle - power state, integrated approaches, as this one, need to modify the middle - power definition and also explain the nature of Turkey and Iran relations within such a modified version of middle - power states. This is due to the fact that both countries' character definition is differentiated from the traditional middle power states as discussed in the Chapter Two. This chapter had outlined three levels of analysis demonstrated that '*forward strategy*' of Turkey and '*negative balancing strategy*' of Iran provides continuity in sovereignty and survival by finding '*niche spaces*' in international society. This strategic culture in regard to security supports the client and self - reliance theory, which gains relative significance from the '*containment policy*' of '*offshore balancer*.' However, both countries' strategic interest does not allow supporting the '*preponderance strategy*' of United States. Therefore, both Iran's interference into Iraq and proxy engagement with Syria

and Lebanon in the War of Hezbollah and Israel in 2008 and Turkish parliament's rejection of March Memorandum had checked the balance of power '*preponderance strategy*' in the Middle East. On the other hand, Russia – Georgian war in August checked the '*forward strategy*' of Turkey in the Caucasus and Black Sea. Therefore, if one looks at the systemic level of analysis, the two middle - power states' behaviour will be explained within the realist perspective. Similarly, the *negating strategy* of middle - power state is based on the rational politics to gain leverage in the buffer zone. This strategy also formed the competitive *détente relationship* between two neighbouring countries. On the other hand, deconstruction of new identity and alternative regime theory may challenge the domestic politics of middle - power state. Therefore, the internal threat perception avoids the realist approach; rather employs the constructivist approach to agent society and agent - state relations. The *containment strategy* of two alternative regimes does not allow such rational politics in bilateral relations. However, they became the main core of the *competitive détente relationship* in Turkish and Iranian cases. On the other hand, the nuclear proliferation of Iran will challenge the balance of power *containment* and *offshore balancing strategy* and can be explained in a realist perspective. The regional super power can cause instability in the core and periphery. Such regional super powers might cause a war according to realist principles. Therefore, the holistic approach is a necessity of *peaceful co-existence strategy* of Turkey and Iran provides with the researcher to establish a rational model tested in the Chapters from Three to Ten, which is contextualised below.

In modelling the relationship between the two countries, as articulated in Chapter Two, a number of variables and assumptions were adapted to provide the working mechanism of the modified middle-power state theoretical framework in the case of Turkey and Iran. These were formulated around three levels: (i) domestic and national level variables; (ii) systemic level variables, and (iii) regional level variables. The detailed description and contextualisation of these variables and assumptions can be found in Chapter Two (section: 2.5.1). Throughout the chapters, these variables and assumptions have been contextualised to illustrate the working mechanism of the proposed and modified theoretical framework. This discussion below, thus, provides further contextualisation for the working mechanism of the proposed model and

articulates the findings of the model within the framework of these variables and assumptions.

According to Clausewitz's perceived power and statecraft principles, Turkey and Iran are classified as first order Middle-East middle power states while GCC countries and Syria are ranked in the second order. As an independent security complex in Levant, Israel was classified as upper secondary super regional power in the Middle East. In addition to this classification, the theory building chapter (Chapter Two) established the assumptions of this study by introducing the main independent and dependent variables to test the nature of Iran relations to find if they can be classified as middle-power states. It should be noted that as analysed throughout this chapter, the relationship between these two most influential states in the region was identified as cordial and competitive or cooperative *détente* relationship. The state identity is considered as main architect of strategic culture for both the countries.

The concept of Turco – Persian Islamic synthesis in Chapter Three and deconstruction of Turkish and Iranian nation state also presented the main ground of this experimental research. The pattern of these relations and the threat perception provided the independent variables in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The discussion in these chapters demonstrates that the Islamic revolution in Iran and sub-group nationalism (Kurdish nationalism) acted as an independent player in the regional politics. The revolutionary export policy of Iran was also negated by the super power containment policy. Therefore, this research had taken up religious and ideological confrontation, Islamic terrorism and Kurdish nationalism so as to demonstrate how these domestic agents and transnational agent groups played a significant role in the measurement of the capacity building. On the other hand, the pattern of patron – client relationship and negative balancing strategy had presented independent variables in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine. Moreover, interest conflict between super power and regional powers provided Turkish – Iranian cases with rational measurement of these independent variables. However, developments in energy and transportation presented an interdependence relationship, which was discussed as an independent variable in Chapter Ten. Therefore, the application of holistic approach in this study to every single event not only provided this research with experimental and testable

results but also helped to modify the certain definitions in middle – power state in international relations.

The feature of middle power state had been defined and briefly discussed in Chapter Two: *A middle - power state is a key actor in the region, it organizes regional polarity in its own sphere of influence, plays a role as a regional balancer, has the capacity to bargain with super powers and is able to resist to super-power intervention but it cannot establish coalition blocks and also not allowed to export its revolution or hegemonic influence into the region.* This definition holds basic characteristics on Turkey and Iran relations. Hence, Chapter Two analysed Turkey and Iranian position and concluded that both country's policy behaviour present those five characteristics as middle – power states mentioned above:

Feature (a) explained that *middle power is a key player in regional politics.* Chapter Two elaborated the feature of middle power which introduced the new intellectual norms in analyzing the Turko - Iranian competitive and cooperative détente relationship. Turkey's forward strategic role and Iran's negative balancing policy have also played effective role in the containment policy of US over years. Similarly, Turkey's zero problems with neighbour states and Iran's nuclear ambition challenges the preponderance policy of Washington by claiming its own deterrence in international politics.

Feature (b) clarifies that *equal level middle power states can organize the polarity system in the region;* Turkey and Iran always become an alternative political, religious, ideological discourse in defining the middle power regional polarity. As a secularist - Sunni state, Turkey is considered as an alternative secularist model against Iran's Shia Islamic revolution in their sphere of influence of history in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1991. On the other hand, the Iran – Syrian alliance and Turkey – Israel alliance relationship reflect regional polarity of middle power states. Regional middle power always makes alliance with the less threatening one to negate her counterpart influence in the regional politics.

Feature (c) stresses that *middle powers play a balancing role in the regional politics*. This role is identified as either a negative balancer or forward defender in Turco – Iran cases. For instance, Iran’s regional role is based on self-reliance. However, Turkey’s balancing act is relied on the patron - client relationship. However, geopolitical position provides an opportunity with bargain in the Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea. Similarly, Iran’s geopolitics in the Persian Gulf and Asian security belt is the natural power of Tehran’s government.

Feature (d) emphasizes *middle -power is absent from coalition – buildings*; although middle power states have unique characteristic in regard to geopolitics, they are not able to establish a super economic and political structure in their domestic and regional politics. Because the agent structure in Turkish and Iranian society is different from the Anglo-Saxon middle power state. State is the agent of society in those countries. However, Middle Eastern states created own agent in the society. Therefore, both Turkey’s secularist revolution and Iran’s Islamic revolution could not have introduced a full-fledged revolution so as to establish such a type of super structure.

The feature (e) explains that *middle power states are capable to contain its counterpart’s revolution in their sphere of influence*. As we mentioned in Chapter Five, Turkey impeded the revolutionary export policy of Iran by using religious groups in the 1980s and 1990s. The super power also prevented such Third World revolutionary expansion by supporting the opposite regional power. For instance, the Iran - Iraq war explained that middle power’s hegemonic ambition could not be tolerated by the super power. Similarly, if such military action threatens the super power interest in the regional politics, the use of force would lead to indispensable options such as the American led – invasion of Iraq.

In concluding, the analysis, contextualisation and discussion throughout the chapters and particularly in this section is a clear indication that Turkey and Iran relationship should be considered as a middle-power state, as the discussion provides evidence for the working of variables and assumptions. It should, however, be stated that in order to enhance the explanatory power of the middle-state theory, the proposed modifications are essential. As the analysis and discussion evidences the modification

suggested and tested by this study proved to be a successful one, which have improved the robustness of the middle-power state theoretical framework. The findings of the contextualisation and articulation of the theoretical modelling made in this section to evidence the working mechanism of the modified theoretical model, namely modified middle-power state, is systematically presented in the following section

### **11.7. Systematicising the findings for middle - power states in the case of Turkey and Iran**

The discussion in this thesis, and the above discussion in this chapter in contextualising the findings on the case of the Turkey-Iran relationship help us to make generalisations about the relationship between two middle - power. This generalisation, in a systematic manner, can be listed as follows:

- 1) The common sphere of history and kinship relations creates the dual political and religious legitimacy, which are the main motives for competitive détente relationship between two equal level states.
- 2) The public realm of two conflicting states resists improving the competitive and cooperative détente relationship between Turkey and Iran. Therefore, the competitive regional power would not able to export its revolution to others.
- 3) Middle - power reformation drive is defined as *bourgeoisie revolution*; it is not socially constructed and has no *communicative action* with the agent groups. Therefore, middle - power states' regimes cannot produce a civil society due to having an undefined political geography, because it is too idealistic and based upon irrational principles. However, traditional middle - powers identify themselves culturally and geographically in a sphere of influence of the European political identity.
- 4) Middle - power states employ the agent groups against revolution and terrorism to maintain its regime security. Hence, anarchical order in the internal politics provides a wider space for the leadership group to continue their legitimacy of power in society. Therefore, counter terrorism and counter revolutionary politics are essential for state-agent relations in middle - power state politics.

5) The legitimacy of agent groups in society depends on their cooperation with leadership groups and regime survival. The agent groups only benefited from the opportunities provided by leadership groups. If an agent group became an internal threat, middle - power states' systems eliminated this agent group in society. Therefore, internal threats in domestic arena will be taken under the control by the middle - power states.

6) Middle - power states employ agent groups to eliminate the opposition groups in internal politics. However, if the religious or ethnic groups militarise, the leadership and regime cannot control the internal threat, because it is now a transnational, external threat. Therefore, middle - power states are not able to control the transnational issue in the regional politics.

7) Transnational issues of middle - power states invite foreign penetration into regional politics and reduce the influence of middle - power states, because middle - power states have no capacity to solve transnational issues and no experience of humanitarian intervention. Therefore, middle - power states face intrusions of responsibility to protect in their own internal affairs by international community.

8) Middle - power states have failed to make a social contract with different ethnic and religious groups in the nation states system. Therefore, middle - power states spend their power and efforts to stabilise their domestic affairs.

9) Middle - power states cannot occupy a niche space in the region, but the influence of middle - power states is considered a major deterrent against super power penetration into region.

10) Middle - power states are not able to create a regional system, or not able to establish a regional alliance with great power and medium sized states, middle - power states prefer to form an alliance with less powerful states in the regional system. Middle - power-great power relations in regional politics mostly rely on the mutual suspicion and distrust relationship.

11) Middle - power states can bargain with super power states, similarly small power states have the capacity to bargain with middle - power states.

12) Middle - power states can resist military intervention of super power and great powers, however, small power have no capacity to deter regional expansion of great powers or super powers. Middle - power states can reject the super power demands of economic sanction.

- 13) Small power states do not engage in direct military conflict with their counterparts and have no capacity to solve their own internal transnational issues.
- 14) The transnational ethnic nationalism invites foreign military intervention in small power states. Neither super power nor middle - power prefers any military conflict with the regional great power directly.
- 15) Middle - power states can negate each other's influence in the region. If the regional middle - power state engages in a military conflict or competition, the result would be a *zero sum gain* in the regional politics.
- 16) The sovereignty of middle - power states is essential for the national security of other states, because the presence of two middle - power states unite against an external threat, and creates a buffer zone.
- 17) Middle - power states' institutionalism cannot establish a political or economic regime in international politics. Therefore, middle - powers' attempts to form a regional alliance are not considered a regional threat against the international system.
- 18) Middle - power and super power interests will be in conflict in regional politics, but neither middle - power states nor super - powers wish to engage in combat.
- 19) Unless nuclear capacity is surveyed by the international community or it serves the geopolitical interests of a super power, middle - power states are now allowed to have nuclear technology.
- 20) Middle - power states have no capacity to act as a mediator in a regional conflict. Therefore, the influence of middle - power states is restricted by their own capabilities.
- 21) Patronage and clientele structure in society prevent the collective behaviour of agents in society. Therefore, the leadership of middle - power states is the principal beneficiary in the short-term, but their politics impede the establishment of superstructure as a model for the international community in the long-term.

### **11.8. The scope for further research**

This study has provided a theoretical, transnational and geopolitical account of Turkey and Iran in the regional politics in addition to the role of middle - power states in international politics. There is scope for further research on domestic politics in particular how patronage and clientele relationships characterize “divide et impera” politics to prevent the collective clientalism of agents in domestic politics. Patronage has its own morality and pride (Gellner and Waterbury, 1977), therefore, further study



will explore the preconditions and consequences of the middle - power state's bureaucratic decision making process. Secondly, the case of Iran's nuclear ambition will be classified as a transnational issue for future research. Thirdly, the absence of super economic and political superstructure requires further research to be examined in international politics.

## 11.9. Epilogue

The research in this study has fulfilled its aim by successfully testing the proposed and modified theoretical framework, which now efficiently explains the relationship of the two middle - power states; Turkey and Iran.

As the theoretical framework of this study, the contextualisation, and the articulation of it presented with event analysis throughout the chapters indicate that Turkey-Iran relations have demonstrated how to manage a *peaceful co-existence* in one of the unstable regions of the world. The research argues that a long tradition of Turkish-Iranian bureaucratic politics have been successfully conducted to *détente and cordial relationship* since 1639. The holistic approaches to micro-level events analyses signified that *competitive détente* and *cooperative détente* rely upon the experience of *assertive pragmatism* and *self-help capability* to maintain the *peaceful co-existence* as a sovereign state in the international society.

In response to ethnic and ideological conflict, Turkey and Iran cannot be either classified failed states or hegemonic powers in their sphere of influence despite their military campaign into Northern Iraq, because the international structure and hegemonic nature of international politics does not allow such state take over of any buffer zone. On the one hand, the super power (in this case the USA) needs to co-exist with such stable *forward forcer client* and *negative balancer* for the sake of its *offshore balancing strategy*. Therefore, as buffer middle power states, Turkey and Iran, in their roles of forward forcer and negative balancer, prevent the general war in international society. Consequently, this research argued and proved that Iran and Turkey have all such types of multi - balancing and multi - directional capacities due to being middle - power states, which the balance of power cannot neglect nor can it isolate them from the international system.

In concluding, it should be acknowledged that modified version of the middle power state theoretical framework with the identified variables and assumptions is an efficient and robust theoretical framework to best explain the relationship between Turkey and Iran throughout the history and in contemporary times.

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